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•CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
OP FORSYTH AND BRUNNER
1. The Problem and Method of the Thesis 
The problem of the thesis is to determine, expound, 
and compare critically the Christological thought of Peter 
Taylor Forsyth and Heinrich Emil Brunner and on the basis 
of such a procedure to endeavour to ascertain those ele­
ments in the thought of each theologian which seem to make 
a positive and viable contribution to the construction of 
an evangelical Christology. In an effort to identify the 
central issues in the history of Christian dogma which 
underlie their thought, a survey of the major classdcal 
issues will precede the exposition and critical compari­
son. In turn, this survey will provide the standard 
Christological categories to be used for interpretive and 
evaluative purposes in this thesis.
The orderly exposition of the thought of Forsyth 
and Brunner with respect to the Person and Work of Christ, 
as their thinlcing is seen over against major Chris tological 
issues and categories, should serve to identify their re­
spective viewpoints in relation to that concept of the ^ 1
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doctrine of Christ commonly held in the evangelical tradi­
tion of the Church. It is hoped that the critical com­
parison of the main Christological emphases of Forsyth and 
Brunner will bring to the surface of the discussion certain 
valuable insights which are of promise in the construction 
and reconstruction of Christology —  an ever pressing and 
never ending task of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ.
A large part of this first chapter will be devoted
to major issues of Christology as these issues have arisen
in the formulation of Christian doctrine, "Christology" 
means doctrinal thought concerning the Person and Work of 
Jesus Christ, By a survey I intend no more than the dis­
covery and summary presentation of the major Christological 
issues that have been defined and dealt with by the Church
in the course of her history.
In the second and third chapters the doctrine of the 
Person and Work of" Christ in the teaching of Forsyth and 
Brunner is successively expounded. The purpose of this 
exposition is to bring into focus the theological pre­
suppositions and methodology of these two thinkers, fol­
lowed by the statement and clarification of their concepts, 
inclusive of certain analyses deemed contributive to the 
objective understanding of their Christological thought.
In the fourth chapter the key phrase is "critical 
comparison," This phrase signifies the procedure of
3
examining, in the light of stated norms, the distinctive 
components in the Christologioal thought of Forsyth and 
Brunner by setting in juxtaposition their similar and dif­
fering views for the purpose of discovering and crystal­
lizing those elements which are believed to have abiding 
worth for Christologioal construction. The summary will 
include those doctrinal constituents which, in the course 
of the discussion, ha,ve appeared to be especially con­
tributive to a viable and evangelical Christology.
There are necessary and specific limitations to this 
thesis with reference to subject matter. Although both men 
wrote on subjects indirectly related to Christology, the 
doctrine of Christ will be considered here primarily from 
the standpoint of systematic theology* There will be no 
investigation of the philosophy of religion, Christian 
ethics, or other disciplines that bear an undoubted rela­
tion to theology. Furthermore, there is no intention to 
deal with the doctrines of systematic theology as a.whole 
but specifically with the doctrine of the Person and Work 
of Christ as understood and interpreted by Peter Taylor 
Forsyth, a British theologian, and Emil Brunner, a Conti­
nental theologian. Other articles of Christian dogma will 
be considered only when they are directly involved with the 
Christologioal thought of these two men.
In the second place ; while there have been and are
. 4
many diverse views of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, 
primary attention will be given to those that have been 
promulgated by Forsyth and Brunner. References to other 
views will be made only for comparative purposes. The ex­
position of Forsytlr|*s and Brunner's thought is restricted 
to the areas indicated in the outline of the chapters, 
which both includes* major Christologioal issues and omits 
minor ones. Prior to this exposition attention will be 
given to those points and propositions of Christology that 
have emerged from the conflicts, controversies and deep 
seaZrching for the larger truth that have been a part of the 
ongoing life of the Christian Church for almost two 
millennia.. The aim will be to clarify historic issues in 
such a way as to provide a conceptual perspective for 
understanding, expounding and critically comparing the 
Christologioal thought of Forsyth and Brunner.
In the third place, among the criteria that might 
be used for the examination and evaluation of the teachings 
in question, this thesis will limit itself to the two 
following norms which will be explained in greater detail 
at the beginning of Chapter Four*
The first standard of judgment will be the self- 
consistency of the doctrine of the Person and Work of 
Christ as this doctrine is set forth by each theologian. 
This standard will be supplied to their similar and differ-
5
ing views as they are systematically considered.
The second norm will be coherency with the evangel­
ical experience of the Church as that experience relates 
to One who, in the time-honoured confession, "For us men, 
and for our salvation, came down from heaven."
There are also specific limitations with respect to 
resource material. The bulk of the Christologioal data 
collated in the last section of this chapter has been pro­
vided by a relatively small number of scholarly books and 
reference works. Titles, authors (or editors) and addi­
tional facts of publication are included in the bibliog­
raphy. Those quoted directly, or from which abstracts are 
taken, also appear in the footnotes. While the writer has 
read extensively in the Fathers and other theologians of 
the past, and is indebted to them for important informa­
tion, ^  direct quotations will be given.
The numerous books and articles written by Forsyth 
will serve as primary source material from which his 
thought on the subject of Christology will be derived. 
Articles and books:' written about this remarkable man and 
his theology will serve as secondary sources. Of very 
great value for this thesis are the volumes by Forsyth en­
titled: The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, The Principle 
of Authority, The Justification of God, God the Holy Father, 
The Work of Christ, and The Cruoiality of the Cross.
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In the development of his theological doctrines 
Brunner has comprehensively expounded his understanding of 
their central meaning in the three volumes of his Dogmatics 
under the titles: The Christian Doctrine of God, The 
Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, and The 
Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consumma­
tion. Both his own numerous books and articles and those 
written about his theological viewpoints are contributive 
in that they have to do with his total Christian theology, 
which cannot be separated from his Christologioal thought. 
However, along with the volumes in the above series, of 
prime value for this thesis are the following works: The 
Mediator, The Divine-Human Encounter (or Encounter With 
Truth), and Revelation and Reason. As is true of writings 
by and about Forsyth a listing of all primary and secondary 
sources relating to Brunner, which have been read and which 
have contributed in a greater or less degree toward the 
furtherance of this undertaking, will appear in the bibliog­
raphy at the end of the thesis. Those specifically quoted 
or referred to will also have a place in the footnotes.
Since the primary theme of this dissertation has to 
do with the doctrine of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, 
there apparently exists a need for the delineation of the 
main Christologioal issues that have been defined and dealt 
with by the Church down through Christian history. There­
7
fore, brief resumes of these issues will be set forth later 
in this chapter. These will,provide the standard and his­
torical categories, the requisite frame of reference, for 
investigating the Person and Work of Christ in the thought 
of P, T. Forsyth and Emil Brunner.
Consecutively, in the second and third chapters, 
there will be expositions of the Christologies of the two 
theologians. It is firmly assumed that a knowledge of 
their theological presuppositions and methodology should 
prove invaluable in properly understanding and interpret­
ing their Christologioal views. Therefore it is the 
writer's aim to give these subjects prior and careful 
treatment in the first section of each chapter.
For the purpose of gleaning from the examined doc­
trines the views and concepts believed to have positive and 
abiding value, Chapter Four will be a critical comparison 
of major Christologioal elements in the theology of Forsyth 
and Brunner. Their compared thought will be evaluated in 
the light of the norms which have been previously stated.
In conclusion, an ordered summary will be given of the 
"findings" that have resulted from this investigation which 
are considered to be fruitful in the formulation and re­
formulation of a doctrine of the Person and Work of Jesus 
Christ,
It would be a regrettable omission if brief biog-
. 8
raphies of Forsyth and Brunner were not included in the 
early pages of this thesis. The next two sections will 
therefore be devoted to this matter.
2. A Biographical Sketch of P. T. Forsyth^
In keeping With the'spirit of Forsyth himself who, 
in the recollection; of his daughter, Mrs. Jessie Forsyth 
Andrews, once said: "I hope no one will ever write a dreary 
official full-dress biography of me," a very brief account 
of his life and work will be both proper and adequate.
Peter Taylor, son of Isaac and Elspet Forsyth, was 
born in Aberdeen, Scotland, May 12, 1848. The parents, 
people of modest means, were lifelong members of the 
Blackfriars Street Congregational Church of Aberdeen.
Their son received his early education in the local Grammar 
School and, despite straitened circumstances of the senior 
Forsyths, Peter was able to enter Aberdeen University where
1. Although they will not be directly quoted, the chief sources of material for this thumb-nail sketch are : W. L. Bradley, P. T> Forsyth - The Man and his Work (London: In­dependent Press Ltd., 1952), pp. 13-63; R. M. Brown, P. T, Forsyth: Prophet for Today (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1 9 5 2), pp. 17-20 ; Harry Escott (ed.), P. T» Forsyth 1848-1921 - Director of Souls (London: The Epworth Press,1948) , pp. XVii-xzF;" Joh 'H . Rodgers, The Theology of P. T . Forsyth (London: Independent Press Ltd., 1 9 6 5), pp. 2-10; Jessie Forsyth Andrews, "Memoir" in The Work of Christ by P. T. Forsyth (London* Independent Press Ltd., 1945TT”pp* vii-xxix; and a personal interview graciously granted to the writer by Mrs. Andrews in her residence near Crawley, Sussex, England, on December 7» 1968.
9
he graduated with first class honours in classics. In I8 7O 
he spent a very important semester at Gottingen, studying 
under the renowned Albrecht Ritschl. This semester not 
only put the young man under the influence of Ritschl, but 
also greatly increased his proficiency in the German 
language two important factors in his later "theological" 
life. Returning to England, he entered New College, Hamp­
stead, where his stay was cut short because of ill health.
In 1876 he was called to be pastor of the Congregational 
Church, Shipley, Yorkshire. The next twenty-five years 
were divided among five different parishes, including 
University Emmanuel Congregational Church in Cambridge.
Certain biographical events can be identified as 
being highly significant in fashioning the life and work of 
Peter Taylor Forsyth. In 1877 he married Minna Magness, 
who was a source of great courage and strength to the young 
pastor in his early ministry. Their marriage was blessed
with a daughter, an only child, Jessie. During those yearsIForsyth expended much time and intellectual energy on the 
doctrinal interpretation of the Scriptures along evangel­
ical lines. So influential was he in this enterprise that 
he became known as the chief exponent of the Neo-evangel­
ical movement in England.
During his fourth pastorate Forsyth received and ac­
cepted a call to become pastor of Emmanuel Church in
10
Cambridge, but was forced to take a three months* sick 
leave before entering upon his labours there. A week after 
arriving in Cambridge his spirit was deeply overshadowed by 
the sudden death of his wife. The next four years were 
marked by great physical and nervous weakness, with even 
the threat of a lapse into hypochondria. However, during 
those unhappy years events took place which were in large 
measure to shape an impressive future career. In 1895 
Forsyth received an honorary Doctorate from the University 
of Aberdeen. In I896 he was Congregational Union preacher 
for the Autumnal Assembly at Leicester and delivered a 
sermon, "The Holy Father," regarded by many as a pulpit 
discourse of outstanding excellence. Two books were pub­
lished that same year and two the next.
The real turning point of Forsyth's life came with 
his second marriage to Bertha Ison in 1897. This charming 
and devoted woman was a true helpmate and unfailing in­
spiration, helping her husband to focus on the future 
rather than the past. There followed for him a great up­
surge of physical and intellectual vigour. In 1897 he was 
invited to serve as the English delegate to the Inter­
national Congregational Council which convened that year 
in Boston. Forsyth read a paper before the Council on 
"The Evangelica,l Principle of Authority," capturing the 
minds of his audience by the substance of his message and
11
by the power of, his presentation. Prom this time on he 
enjoyed an international reputation as a theologian and 
a preacher.
The acceptance of an offer of the Principalship of 
Hackney College,Hampstead, marked the terminus of Forsyth's 
preaching ministry as such, and the beginning of his teach­
ing ministry. During this tenure of office fame continued 
to accrue to him as writer, teacher and preacher. In I9IO 
he became Dean of the Faculty of Theology in the University 
of London. This followed naturally since in that year 
Hackney College was recognized as the Divinity School for 
the University, In this position Peter Taylor Forsyth 
continued to be stimulating and inspiring in his teaching, 
prophetic and profound in his preaching, and prolific in 
his writing until his death on November 11, 1921.
3 . A Biogra.phical Sketch of Emil Brunner^
Heinrich Emil Brunner, popularly known as Emil 
Brunner, was born December 2 3 , I8 8 9, in Winterthur,
1, Books and articles from which pertinent facts about Brunner have been gathered are as follows: Emil Brunner, "Intellectual Autobiography of Emil Brunner," The Theology of Emil Brunner, ed. Charles W. Kegley (The Library of Living Theology, Vol. Ill ; New York: The Macmillan Compan^^, 
1 9 6 2), pp, 3-20; Emil Brunner, "A Spiritual Autobiography," The Japan Christian Quarterly (21, 1955# No. 3), pp. 238- 
2W 5 '‘Brunner (Heinrich) Emil," The Encyclopedia Britan- lca,pub. William Benton, Vol. 4 (195V)1 p. 307; Edwin Robertson, "Brunner, the Great," The British Weekly, April14, 1 9 6 6, p. 6 .
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Switzerland, the son of Emil and Sophie Brunner. His 
German-speaking parents were staunch members of the Swiss 
Reformed Church, his mother being the daughter of a Re­
formed minister. During the course of his younger life, 
Emil came under both the direct and indirect influence of 
two spiritually dyn^ic pastors, Christoph Blumhardt and 
Hermann Kutter. The latter, who might be called the father 
of the modern dialectical movement in theology, had an 
especially profound effect upon the spiritual and intel­
lectual development of his young admirer.
Following his early education in the Gymnasium in 
Zurich, Emil Brunner continued his studies in the Univer­
sity of this city, from which he received his doctorate in 
1 9 1 3. Other theological study and research had been under­
taken previously (1 9II) at the University of Berlin. In 
1913-1 9 1 4, during his first stay in England, he learned the 
English language. The sojourn in England was cut short by 
the outbreak of the First World War and Brunner returned 
home to help man the defense line along the Swiss border. 
Later he became pastor of the mountain church, Obstalden 
in the Canton of Glarus, where in 191? he was married to 
Margaret Lauterburg, a niece of Hermann Kutter. They had 
four children, two of whom died early in life.
Three years after undertaking the pastorate at 
Obstalden, and two years after his marriage, Brunner
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received and accepted an invitation for a year's study at 
Union Theological Seminary, New York, He returned home to 
find that in his absence Karl Barth had "thrown a theologi­
cal bomb" into Germany, A longstanding association with 
this towering personality and his "Barthianism" now began, 
though this was later marked by much real or professed 
disagreement. The theologicaT. and philosophical line de­
veloped by the group to which both theologians belonged 
was known variously, but in no case with exactness, as: 
the Theology of Crisis, the Dialectical Theology, Neo- 
Orthodoxy , and Barthian Theology,
In 1924 Brunner resigned from his Glaronese charge 
and took the chair of systematic and practical theology of 
the University of Zurich, which he occupied until 1955* 
Aside from theology, but not alien to it, there were two 
other spiritual factors that became important in the second 
half of his life: The Oxford Group movement and the I-thou 
philosophy of Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber, The Oxford 
Group, coming over from Britain in 1931 as a new type of 
revival movement, impressed the Swiss theologian with the 
close relation of spiritual reality to fellowship or com­
munion. The "I-thou" concept of Ebner and Buber was a 
philosophical "spring" contributing to the development of 
that principle which was to become so regnant in Brunnerian 
theology: the principle of Wahrheit als Begegnung.
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Brunner’s theological thinking was dominated from the very 
start by a deep desire to be able to preach the gospel to 
those outside the Christian Church and to interpret it to 
the secular mind. Welcoming '*encounters" with such minds, 
he became a distinguished lecturer at universities in 
Europe, Great Britain and the United States. He served 
during the academic year 1938-1939 as a visiting lecturer 
in theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, 
New Jersey, but chose to return to his old post at Zurich 
when the outbreak of the Second World Wa,r seemed imminent. 
In 1942 he became rector of the University of Zurich and 
continued so for two years. An invitation was extended to 
him in 1948 to deliver the Gifford Lectures in the Uni­
versity of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland, -- these being 
later published in two volumes as Christianity and 
Civilisation.
In the ensuing years of 1949 and 1950, at the urgent 
call of Dr. John R. Mott, Brunner travelled extensively in. 
the Far East as a theological adviser to the worldwide YMCA 
organization. On this prolonged tour he lectured in 
several countries, including Japan. Becoming deeply im­
pressed by the spiritual needs and receptivity of the 
Japanese people, he gladly returned to their country in 
1953 to become-Professor of Christian Ethics and Philosophy 
at the new International Christian University in Tokyo,
15
where he remaAned through two academic sessions. Return­
ing to his native land and city in 1 9 5 6, he was forced to 
go into semi-retirement because of ill health. Through 
the next decade he continued with his writing, though at 
a reduced tempo. His death occurred at Zurich in Holy 
Week, April 6 , 1966.
Smil Brunner had a truly brilliant career as a 
scholar and theologian. He was well known and influential 
throughout all of Christendom as a persuasive writer and 
lecturer, teacher and preacher. Never flagging in mission­
ary interest and zeal, he had an abiding concern for what 
he called "die andere Aufgabe der Theologie." This task 
he conceived to be that of encouraging a favourable hear­
ing for the gospel through "eristics," preferred to the 
traditional term of "apologetics" in that it is aggressive 
rather than defensive in character. Attesting to the 
spiritual and intellectual stature of this man are the 
honorary degrees in divinity which were bestowed upon him 
by the universities of Munster, Edinburgh, Utrecht, Oxford, 
Oslo, Princeton and St. Andrews. In addition, the Univers­
ity of Bern granted him an honorary Doctor of Laws degree. 
His numerous prominent students of the past decades and his 
scores of widely read books and articles evidence the im-Iportant place that ■•he held, and continues to hold, among 
the theologians of jthis century*
16
A Survey of Major Christologioal Issues 
in Christian History
Since this thesis is concerned with the doctrine of 
the Person and Work of Jesus Christ it seems advisable to 
make a rapid survey of the capital and classical issues in 
Christology as these have emerged in the history of Chris­
tian thought. The object of this exercise is two-folds 
first, to project these issues into an immediate and, it 
is hoped, reasonably clear perspective, thereby identify­
ing the Christological problems that twentieth century 
theology has inherited from the past; secondly, to provide 
the categories for dealing with the essential elements 
discovered in the Christological thought of Forsyth and 
Brunner.
Of central significance in the Christian faith is 
the doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ. It is the con­
viction of the writer that the basic components of this 
doctrine, namely; the true Deity, the real humanity', and 
the union of Deity and humanity in the one Person, are in­
cluded in the Scriptural witness. With this conviction is 
the awareness that recent studies —  most importantly 
Eduard Schweizer's Jesus Christ in the Many-sided Witness 
of the New Testament  ^ -- have pointed out once again the
1. Eduard Schweizer, Jesus Ghristus im Vielfaltigen Zeugnis des Neuen Testaments (München ; Siebenstern Taschen- buch Verlag,
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great variety of Scriptural testimonies to this fundamental 
Christian doctrine.
During His lif.e on earth, widely divergent ideas 
of Christ were already in circulation. This is revealed 
in the .answers given to the question asked in Caesarea 
Philippi* "Who do men say that the Son of man is?"l The 
reply indicates that one man discovers in Him John the 
Baptist, while another sees in Him Elijah or Jeremiah, or 
one of the other prophets. It is not surprising to find 
differences in the testimony of the Apostles as the more 
incisive query "Who do you say that I am?"^ presses upon 
the early Church.
In the chapter that begins his Humanity and Divinity 
of Jesus Christ John Knox shows that within the New Testa­
ment there are three distinct types of Christology, some­
times standing alone and sometimes in a parallel relation­
ship in the same writing.3 In brief, these types may be 
labelled "Adoptionism," incipient‘"Kenoticism," and "In­
carnat ionism. " In the last type there is posed in acute 
form the problems that were to occupy and agitate the mind 
of the Church for several hundred years. This type of 
Christology, based on Johannine teaching, confronted the 
Church with the necessity of explicating two problems*
1. Matthew 16*13 (RSV). 2. Matthew 16*15 (RSV).
3. John Knox, The Humanity and Divinity of Christ (Cambridge* The University Press, 196?), pp7 i-l8 .
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first, the relationship between the pre-existent Logos-Son 
and the Godhead; secondly, the relationship between the 
Divine and the human-in Jesus Christ. In the movement of 
the Church to define and declare its basic faith over 
against heretical teaching, the explication of these two 
problems went hand in hand. As Grillmeier has well stated, 
"Church teaching had to develop trinitarian and Christo­
logical doctrine side by side if it was to maintain the 
divine Sonship of Jesus in any true sense.
It is important to note that the essential Christo­
logical elements of the Divinity, the humanity and the 
unity of Jesus Christ were apprehended by the primitive 
Church not as intellectual problems but as issues of faith. 
In their daily lives and worship of God the earliest Chris­
tians proclaimed that Christ was the Son of God and the Son 
of man, but they did not inquire how this was true. How­
ever, in the ensuing years Christians as well as non- 
Christians raised inevitable questions as to how this 
could be.
Two opposing tendencies can be detected in early 
Christological thought. One of these is thé tendency to 
"Docetism" in which the "pure" Divinity of Christ is 
guarded so zealously that His real humanity is denied.
1. Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition (London; A. H. Mo bray & Co. Limited, 19f)3T) p. 93*
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Incarnationlsm, as Knox indicates, is always in danger of 
slipping over into this view. Although Docetism ha,s no 
real support in Johannine writings, it was already being 
suggested as a solution to the Christological problem in 
the milieu in which they were written. The docetic view 
was espoused by various Gnostics of whom Marcion was a 
chief representative. Marcion could not tolerate the idea 
of a human birth or human growth for Jesus, but claimed 
that He came down from heaven as a saving spirit and as­
sumed a phantom body in which He manifested the good God.
On the other hand, to the early Ebionites Christ 
was a mere man who was endued with power in his baptism 
to become a prophet. But Ebionism was too Judaistic in 
character and therefore limited in influence, so the true 
opposite of Docetism came to be "Adoptionism" which denied 
to Christ essential Deity,
Although the fundamental errors of Docetism and 
Adoptionism were soon refuted, they served as provocative 
forces to initiate doctrinal thought with respect to the 
Person of Christ, The tendencies they represented and set 
in motion found continued expression in the historical de­
velopment of this critically important doctrine.
The development of an incarnational type of Chris­
tology requires, as has been pointed out, a defining of the 
relationship between the pre-existent Logos-Son and God the
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Father. In the process of making this definition the 
Church, with profound insight, rejected every view which 
detracted from Christ’s unity with God or which blurred 
the distinctness of His personality. Included in the re­
jections was Monarchianism in its two major forms, Dynamic 
and Modalistic.
The Dynamic Monarchians, though they did grant that 
Jesus was born of a virgin, laid great emphasis on His 
humanity and were thereby Ebionitic in their viewpoint. 
However, it is better to refer to their position as 
"Adoptionist" since their most able expositor, Paul of 
Samosata, thought of Jesus as .having been "adopted" by God 
and endued with divine power in His baptism. On the other 
hand, the Modalistic Monarchians identified Christ, who 
had no pre-existence, with God by interpreting His person 
as one of the successive modes in which God as divine 
monos manifested Himself. Christ as a distinct personality 
fades from sight and the one God goes to the Cross for 
man’s salvation (Patripassianism). Sabellius, the classic 
exponent of this kind of Monarchianism, believed that the 
unity of the Godhead unfolded itself in three successive 
modes in the course of the development of the world. These 
modes were ; God the Father as Creator and Lawgiver, Christ 
the Son as Redeemer, and the Holy Spirit as Life-bringer 
and Sanctifier in the Church.
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The heresy of Arianlsm, which stressed the distinct 
personality of Christ at the expense of- His unity with God, 
was a powerful "negative" influence in moving the Church 
toward a firm statement of the Christ-God relationship,
A. Harnack in his History of Dogma has enumerated the 
chief points set forth by Arius, the formulater of the 
heretical doctrine which bears his name. Among these 
points we find it affirmed that Christ, who is called in 
Scripture Wisdom, Word, Son, Image, etc,, was created by 
God of an independent substance {oucrfc< or to be
the maker of all things ; that He is an intermediate 
creature between God and man, not unbegotten but "the only- 
begotten; and that, being endowed with free will as a 
rational being, He is capable of change
Tertullian, in working out his concept of the rela­
tion of Christ to God, devised a trinitarian formula, but 
it was scarcely more than a bare affirmation of three-in- 
one, Christ "shared" in the una substantia as the Son who 
existed eternally immanent in the Father, as Creator with 
the Father, and as the revelation of God in the Incarnation 
—  a three-fold hypostatic existence.
Origen, supplementing the teaching of Tertullian,
1. Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, trans, E, B, Speirs and James Milar~~(!London* Williams and Norgate, 
1 8 9 8), pp. 15-19.
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identified the Logos with the Son and so brought together 
the Divinity of Christ and His distinct personality. On 
the one hand, Origen held that the Son proceeding from the 
Father by "eternal generation" encompassed the entire 
glory of God in Himself as His absolute Image, as absolute 
Wisdon, Truth and Reason. On the other hand, this keen- 
minded Alexandrian considered, the Son as mutable in His 
person and as being morally subordinate to the Father, 
having a derived and dependent existence while the Father 
alone was eternally the self-subsisting ground of His being.
The Council of Nicaea, showing a plain aversion to 
the tenets of Arianism as well as to some of the views of 
Origen, offered the following solution to the problem of 
the Deity of Christ and His relationship to God:
We believe in one God. . . • And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten from the . Father, only-begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father. . . begotten not made, of one sub­stance with the Father,^
The Council thus conceived of Christ as Son reither than
Logos, as being homoousios with the Father, and concluded
with the assertion that there never was a time when the
Son was not. Nicaea also anathematized the Arian and
Origenist view that Christ was morally mutable.
Athanasius —  whose doctrine of the Person of Christ,
1. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam & Charles Black, 195^7» P* 232,
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as will be seen, came to be so deeply appreciated by P. T. 
Forsyth —  did much to impress the Nicene position on the 
mind of the Church, To this vigorous opponent of Arianism 
should go much of the credit for replacing the emphasis on 
the Logos in Incarnationism with an emphasis on the Son.
In his Christological thought ;Origen*s subordination of the 
Son to the Father is replaced by the idea of the. supreme 
condescension of the Son of God in becoming the Saviour of 
men. The work of Christ becomes the decisive clue to the 
secret of His person. Only a Christ as great as God Him­
self could effect the salvation of sinful men. The.article 
of the Nicene Creed, "Who for us men and for our salvation 
came down from heaven" is echoed in the writing of 
Athanasius. For him, Christ and His saving work are to be 
understood not in an intellectual frame of reference but 
in a moral context of grace. While Athanasius had imper­
fect ideas of the nature of salvation, as Sydney Cave has 
said: "His greatness lies, not in his interpretation of 
redemption, but in his concentration on redemption and his 
realisation of its implicates."^
Like Athanasius, the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil of 
Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzvis and Gregory of Nyssa) were
1. Sydney Cave, The Doctrine of the Person of Christ (7th Imp. ; London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., iTtdT, 1962 ), p. 97,
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in fundamental accord with the Christological position of 
Nicaea and helped to indoctrinate the Church with the views
of the Council. Unlike Athanaisius who began with the onej:divine essence and interpreted the hypostases in that light, 
these Fathers essayed the interpretation of the one divine 
essence in the person of Christ by beginning with the three
hypostases and bringing them under the one divine ousia.
For the Cappadocians each hypostasis had its particular 
attribute. Christ the Son was the generated hypostasis 
with the same divine substance and nature, the same dignity 
and glory, the same power and energy as the unbegotten God.
While some students of Christian doctrine have main­
tained that the Cappadocians were tritheists at heart and 
that their labours had the net result of interpreting 
Christ as one aspect of a three-fold and abstract divine 
essence, Maurice Wiles does not go along with this 
conclusion;
For the Cappadocians as thoroughgoing Platonists the ousia that is common to all men is not an abstract concept but the most important thing that there is.It is this fact, so foreign to our way of thinking, that is determinative of their understanding of the divine ousia•and which shows them to be essentially monotheistic in intention.^
The Cappadocian Fathers must indeed have tried diligently
to - put to sound Christological use the philosophical
1. Maurice Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine . (Cambridge; The University Press, 196?), p. 133*
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language forced upon the Church in the controversy with 
Arius. This was a task that would tax their dedicated in­
genuity and that of many "theological" successors to the 
utmost. It should also be stated that for all the earnest 
effort expended, the aim to define a fully coordinated 
Trinity was never achieved. "The most carefully articulated 
statement of the relation of ousia and hypostasis remains 
in the final analysis no less paradoxical than Gregory of 
Nazianzus’ more direct declaration that the Trinity is 
'separately one and unitedly separate’. The nub of the 
problem was that the category of "substance" was not ad­
equate as a synthesising agent for two great truths of rev­
elation, namely ; that God is one and that the Son is God.
A problem of equally great or even greater propor­
tions was that posed by the question of Christ’s humanity 
and its relationship to His Divinity. How could it be as­
serted that Jesus Christ as Divine was at the same time 
truly human and that Deity and humanity were perfectly 
united in the one Person? As has been indicated, Incarna­
tionism in coming to grips with this problem is always in 
danger of becoming docetic* The struggle with Docetism 
was even more protracted than the conflict with Arianism 
which engaged the spiritual and intellectual energies of
1. Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine, p. 139-
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the Church over such a long period of time.
Assuming a number of different forms in the early 
centuries, docetic Christology culminated in its most 
seductive shape in the teaching of Apollinarius. On the 
current theory of two complete natures, it seemed hopeless 
to this thinker to maintain the oneness of Jesus* person. 
Seeking to preserve this unity, he denied to Christ a 
rational soul {voaS^ ) in which freedom of choice has its 
locus. The Church vigorously rejected this curtailment of 
His human nature which left Jesus lacking in the very con­
stituent of manhood which makes man to be man and capable 
of union with God at alli the very part of his nature in 
which man has sinned and needs to be redeemed.^ But this 
heresy was remarkably persistent and would reappear even 
in twentieth century Christological thought.
After Apollinarianism had been condemned by the 
Council of Constantinople three principal views of the 
Person of Christ came to the forefront in theological de­
bate. The first view, put forward by Nestorius, kept the 
Deity and the, humanity of Christ in such strict separation 
that their unity was lost and, while his exemplary manhood
1. Cf. G. L. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics (London* SPCK, 19^0), p. 233» "Apollinarius left no scope for direct action of the Saviour on the souls of men."
27
was established in opposition to Docetism, His Saviourhood 
was given up. At the other extreme, the view of Eutyches 
emphasised the unity of the Person but in so doing sac­
rificed the plurality of Deity and humanity by having the 
former absorb the latter. The third view, of which Cyril 
of Alexandria was the originator, represented an attempt 
to use the category of "Nature" in such a way that
all the life experiences of Jesus Christ could be considered 
theanthropic, not some human and some divine, but all of 
them both divine and human simultaneously. But Cyril's 
"school", seeking to avoid the error of Nestorius, pushed 
too far in the direction of Eutyches and Cyrillian teaching 
came under judgment by the Church.
Using the Christological metaphors "form of God" 
(forma Dei) and "form of a servant" (forma servi) drawn 
from Philippians 2*6,7, St. Augustine interpreted the "two 
natures" as self-evidently exclusive and apart. At the 
same time he insisted very plainly in the Enchiridion, that 
Christ was both God and man in the one person. However, in 
referring to the two "forms" as co-existent in Christ, in 
opposition to St, Paul who interpreted them as successive 
modes of His being, Augustine was inclined to be docetic
in his viewpoint. :-
•iIn a letter to the patriarch of Constantinople deal­
ing with the erroi^s of Eutyches, the Roman Bishop Leo
28
indited an epoch-making document in the history of Chris­
tology. The main points of Leo’s Tome as these are given 
in A. B. Bruce’s compendium are : the absolute identity of 
the God-man with the divine Word ; the. co-existence of the 
divine and human natures in one person without mixture or 
confusion; the natures as separate principles of operation, 
though always acting in concert with each other; and a 
"communication of idioms" postulated by the oneness of the 
person —  e.g. the Son of man coming down from heaven and 
the Son of God being crucified and buried.^ While these 
assertions did not really solve any Christological problems 
they had the merit of "setting out the factors demanding 
recognition fairly and squarely.
The high-water mark of the Christology of Incarna­
tionism was reached-in the conciliar decisions of Chalcedon 
which gave formal expression to much that had been sug­
gested by Leo. Significant excerpts from the Chalcedonian 
Formula are as follows *
. . . we . . , confess I that our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly man . . . consubstantial with the Father in Godhead, and the same consub- stantial with us in manhood . . . one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, made known in two natures without confusion, without change, without division, without separation . . .3
1. A. Bo Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ'(Edinburgh* T. & T. Clark, 18?6 )“,“ “ppV 81-82”.
2. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 338.
3- Ibid., pp. 339-340.
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The definitions thus expressed are in part positive and in 
part negative. The positive are limited to two points. 
First, the true Deity and the real humanity of Christ are 
affirmed. Here can be seen the net gain from the long 
battle with Arianism on the one hand and the longer re­
sistance to Docetism on the other. Ruled out of the 
Church’s faith is any Arian or Adoptionist view of Christ 
which identifies Him as a created being elevated to a 
divine status. Also ruled out is any view which conceives 
of His humanity as mere appearance or fantasy, as the cloak 
or outer covering of His essential Deity. The second 
positive affirmation of Chalcedon is that of the singleness 
of the Person of Christ * "one and the same Christ . . • 
made known in two natures." This pronouncement rejected 
any doctrine of a double Christ instead of the one incar­
nate Son of God. Such were th!e positive points in the 
Formula, surpassing in importance the negative adverbs by 
which the extremes of Nestorianism and Eutychianism were 
shut out.
Concrete Christologioal doctrine set forth at 
Chalcedon was obviously very limited in scope. No light 
was really thrown upon the basic problems how to conceive
of what relates to the Divine mode of life and what re-
%lates to the human mode of life as being united in the ex­
perience of a single Person. The conciliar Decision did
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not lead the ancient Church a step nearer to any satis­
factory idea of unity in the Incarnate Life. Deity and 
humanity were left in sheerly miraculous and inert con­
junction. Failure at this point can be mainly attributed 
to the character of the conceptual tools at the disposal 
of the Council. These tools were static and abstract con­
cepts and terms borrowed from Greek metaphysics. A trend 
toward this kind of borrowing was started at Nicaea when, 
in an attempt to secure the Divinity of the Second Person 
of the Godhead, the loan-word oucrjW was inserted in the 
Nicene symbol. At Chalcedon the famous adjective o/^ aouo^ ics 
was extended to the humanity of Christ as well as to His 
Deity, Moreover, a new and less happy synonym of oocr/ix 
—  one calculated to attract to itself more "materialistic" 
connotations —  was introduced into the doctrinal defini­
tions. This was the word (nature) employed in the
infelicitous phrase à* v- . Underlying the de- ’
scriptive categories of Chalcedon was the presupposition 
that the "two natures" are disparate and static substances. 
This being the case, it was quite impossible for the 
Council to make any progress toward the solution of the 
"unity" problem with respect to the Person of Jesus Christ.
Comment should be made upon the fact that the "bal­
anced" Chalcedonian view of Christ as truly God and truly 
man derived in large measure from the way in which the two
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rival exegetical schools of Alexandria and Antioch placed 
their respective emphases on the Divinity and humanity of 
Christ. Alexandrian thought, originating in a more rare­
fied intellectual atmosphere, tended to be "other worldly" 
rather than concerned with the affairs of ordinary life 
and subordinated the moral to the metaphysical. Hence 
the Alexandrian view of Christ strongly emphasized His 
Deity and was more or less docetic.
Antiochene thought, Aristotelian rather than Plato- 
nist in its philosophical orientation, was more down to 
earth and ethical. In theology ethical concern generally 
predominated over the evangelical. In their view of Christ
the Antiochenes tended to put an excessive stress upon His(
humanity which came to expression in such forms as 
Adoptionism and Nestorianism. However, the Antiochene po­
sition helped restore to some extent at Chalcedon the 
Divine-human equipoise which did not obtain at Nicaea be­
cause of the dominating influence of Athanasius and the 
Alexandrians.
In a way the emphasis of the school of Antioch was 
adumbrated in the important anti-docetic teaching of St. 
Irenaeus. This early Church father —  to whom favourable 
reference is so frequently made in the writings of Emil 
Brunner —  brought the weight of his greatest effort to 
bear upon portraying the true manhood of Christ. In his
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familiar "recapitulation theory" Irenaeus interpreted the 
genealogy of Luke, which traces Christ’s birth back to Adam 
the son of God, as showing Him to be One who summed up in 
Himself all races and all generations of mankind. Central 
also to his thought is the figure of the historical Christ 
and the redemption wrought by Him. While much stress is 
laid upon the Incarnation as having redemptive value in 
itself, Irenaeus plainly indicates that there was a work 
to be performed by the Saviour of men which gave genuine 
soteriological significance to His earthly life. There is 
sound justification for Cullmann’s estimate* "Down to 
theologians . . .  in the nineteenth century . . . there has 
scarcely been another who has recognized so clearly as did 
Irenaeus that the Christian proclamation stands or falls 
with the redemptive history, that this historical work of 
Jesus Christ 8,s Redeemer forms the mid-point of a line that 
leads from the Old Testament to the return of Christ."^
With respect to the atoning work of the God-man the 
Ransom or "Classic" Theory held by such early Church fathers 
as Irenaeus, Origen and Athanasius, embraced the view that, 
in order to fulfill the Divine purpose to ransom the souls 
of sinful men from bondage to Satan, Jesus Christ must be 
both God and man* man because He was to offer a ransom for
1. Oscar Cullmann, ■ Christ and Time (London* S C M Press 
Ltd., 1 9 5 1), pp. 5 6-5 7 .
33
men; God, in order to triumph over Satan and his citadel. 
According to Irenaeus, "the earthly life of Jesus as a 
whole . . . was a continuous process of victorious con­
flict. Yet it was in the final and decisive battle on 
the Cross that the ransom was fully paid and men delivered 
from Satan’s thraldom.
In the theory of Anselm- of Canterbury, man the sin­
ner is a helpless and hopeless offender against the Divine 
honour and dignity. The penalty should be paid by man, 
but none but God could pay such a price. Either the sinner 
must be punished eternally or a substitute must be found 
who can satisfy the offended honour of the holy God. The 
character of this substitute must satisfy both the claims 
of God and the needs of man. Therefore, the Son of God 
became man in order that, on behalf of man. He might make 
the reparation which none but God could make.
The soteriological position marked out by Hugo 
Grotius in his Governmental Theory is not "how God could 
get reparation for a private injury, but that of safeguard­
ing the interests'“-of His moral government. This view
Iwas developed in answer to the Socinians who held that
1. Gustav Aulen, Christus Victor (London* SPCK, 1931)» p . 46.
2. T. H. Hughes, The Atonement (London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 3 6®
; 3^
Christ was only a man whose death, by the arbitrary and in­
scrutable decree of God, is made effectual for the forgive­
ness of sins to all who so accept it, Grotius conceded 
that while God has the perfect right and power to forgive 
without punishing, Divine wisdom dictates that in bestow­
ing forgiveness the moral law must also be secured against 
contempt. To do this God delivered over to death His in­
nocent Son, In this way there was no compensation, sub­
stitution or satisfaction involved. There was only a 
manifestation determined by divine justice.
The essence of the Moral Influence Theory of 
Abelard, later adopted by Socinus, has been given by H. S. 
Franks : "It is the doctrine that Christ reconciles men to 
God by revealing the love of God in His life and still more 
in His death, so bringing them to trust and love Him in 
return,"! At the core of this"^  theory is the inspiration 
provided by the supremely good but entirely human person, 
Jesus Christ. Variations of the Moral Theory found a place 
in the teaching of Schleiermacher, Hitschl and modern theo­
logians of liberal persuasion. In a typical phrase,
Hastings Rashdall of the Liberal school echoes the senti­
ment of Abelard; "The death of Christ justifies us, inas­
much as through it charity is stirred up in our^hearts."^
1. R, S. Franks, The Atonement (London; Humphrey Milford, 1934), p. 2
2. Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian
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Characteristic of this "subjective" theory in all its var­
iations is the insistence that the Atonement essentially 
involves a change taking place in man rather than a 
changed attitude on the part of God.
The latter day Ethical Satisfaction Theory of the 
Atonement was an attempt to show that the suffering and . 
death of Christ were an actual power unto salvation. Ex­
ponents of this theory have contended that Jesus Christ in 
the days of His flesh so fully realized the sins of men as 
His own that He could make a vicarious confession of sin 
on behalf of man,^ or, in a variant view, offer to God a
pvicarious penitence. The Atonement includes both the 
activity of the holy God in, through and beyond Jesus 
Christ and the response of the whole man who is sinful and 
in need of being reconciled to God and his fellow-men.
In dealing with the Work of Christ, most Christian 
thinkers have maintained the Chalcedonian view of the 
Divine-human Person. Apart from Abelardians and Socinians, 
the primary emphasis has always tended to fall upon the 
Divine nature of Him who is able "to save to the uttermost"
Theology (London* Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 433.
1. J. McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement (4th. ed; London* James Clarke & Co., 1959)» pp. 129-I5 0 .
2. R. C. Moberly, Atonement and Personality -(1st ed.; London* John Murray, 1904), pp. 11?-1 3 3,
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the race of sinful men. In Soteriology the Athanasian and 
Alexandrian conviction shines through that, if not sin 
itself, at least the effects of sin go down to the very in­
most being of man. What is wrong with man can only be set 
right by the action of a truly Divine Power upon man* s 
whole being. While this properly rules out any Adoptionist 
Christology, any Antiochene over-emphasis on the humanity 
of Christ, there is neglect of the complementary truth that 
in Christ we have One who was really touched with the feel­
ing of our human infirmities. Such has been the pattern 
of thought with respect to the Person and Work of Christ 
all through the long dominance of the Two-nature Doctrine. 
Christ's Deity is conceived as loosely attached to His 
human nature, yet overbearing it, and almost reducing to 
unreality the moral struggles, conflicts and victories of 
His earthly career.
The effort to cope with the problem of unity pre­
sented by the Two-nature Doctrine of the Divine-human 
Christ was not resumed until the Reformation. Related to 
this effort in Luther's Christological thought is the mod­
ern development of Kenoticism which, as stated earlier in 
this section, is a third type of New Testament Christology 
along with primitive Adoptionism and Incarnationism.
The Scriptural locus classicus of kenotic theory is 
Philippians 2*5-11 where the divine pre-existent Christ is
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pictured as entering the human realm for its redemption
through an act of kenosls or self-emptying. Although, by
scholarly consensus, the Philippian passage has been found
inadequate to support a Christology of Kenoticism, in a
real sense the whole New Testament reveals a kenotic motif.
For, as D. G. Dawe has cogently declared:
It is simply necessary to place in juxtaposition the many references to Christ's pre-existent glory as a sharer in the divine life, and all the ref­erences to His humiliation, limitations, suffering and death in the earthly ministry. Then it can be argued that the only way in which these two opposite sta,tes of existence can be predicated of the same person is by some process of divine self-limitation.1
In the early Church "Kenotic" Christology held 
promise of explaining in some intelligible way the rela­
tionship of two contrasting elements of Christian faith.
The contrast between two modes of existence which faith 
must attribute to the same Person raised a profound ques­
tion. How can One who shares truly in the life of God also 
share in the real life of humanity? The answer attempted 
poetically and cryptically in Philippians II was that God 
in some sense had limited Himself in His person or being 
to live a human life. This was a genuine Christological 
insight with fruitful possibilities. However, the Church 
soon entered upon an era which affected quite negatively
1, D. G , Dawe, The Form of a Servant (Philadelphia:The Westminster PreFsl 1963) , p*~ 2"8.
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the development of these possibilities.
Specifically, the conflict with Arianism precluded 
for many centuries any chance of developing a Kenotic 
Christology. In the bitter struggle to maintain the true 
Divinity of the Son of God against the Arian contention 
that He was created and mutable (TpG^Tcs) , the Church re­
linquished the Biblical concept of God as personal and dy­
namic being and substituted the Greek metaphysical category 
of static and unchangeable substance. Since it was ve­
hemently asserted that Christ was fully divine, the attri­
bute of absolute unchangea.bleness was ascribed to Him also. 
Furthermore, the Arian controversy also "fixed" the ex­
egesis of the Philippian passage. Although a number of 
Greek and Latin fathers alluded from time to time to the 
Kenosis text, as P. Henry has commented in his excellent 
disquisition*
Nearly always their exegesis is characterised by the two following marks* First, the subject of the passage is the pre-existent Christ and the main if not exclusive object of the kenosis is the act of incarnation itself; secondly, Christ did not ex­change one "form" in order to take another in its place, there was no essential metamorphosis, but at the most, according-to some, a change of appearance.^
The phrase "He emptied Himself" simply meant a veiling or
1. P. Henry, "Kenose," Supplement au Dictionaire de la Bible, ed, L. Pirot and others (Tome Cinquième: Paris* Librairie Letouzey et Ane'', 1957) , col. 5 6 . Translation mine. The scholarly discussion of "Kenosis" by Henry is so thorough that it might almost be termed "exhaustive."
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obscuring of the divine glory while Jesus was on earth.^ By 
such dogmatic affirmations a pattern of "orthodox" exegesis 
was established by the anti-Arian fathers. The develop­
ments of the patristic age reaching a climax at Chalcedon 
closed the door on any creative use of kenosis for a long 
time to come.
With the Reformation came the doctrine of Justifica­
tion by PaAth in Christ and with it Luther's idea of a 
close bond between the trusting soul and the Incarnate 
Saviour. Prom this idea the Reformer went on to infer a 
parallel union of the Divine and the human by which a 
parallel exchange of properties takes place —  i.e. a 
communieatio idiomatum. However, Luther's attempt to im­
prove upon the disunity in the Chalcedonian Formula mis­
carried when the communicatio idiomatum came to be mainly 
championed in the interest of sacramental multipresence.
The critical historical investigation to which the 
Gospels were subjected in the modern scientific age dimmed 
the divine "aura" which had long surrounded the record of 
the life of Jesus, On the other hand, it brought to light 
as never seen before the human lineaments of the central 
Figure. The old question is posed with new sharpness ; How
1, Cf, Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (trans. F . L. Battles; London; S.C.M. Press, lÿST) , Vol. I, p. 4 7 6 ; "For a time the divine glory did not shine, but only human likeness was manifested in a lowly and abased condition."
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is it possible that this Person who finally appears to be 
so genuinely human —  a true "earthling", so to speak —  
could all the while in the days of His flesh be living, 
either consciously or unconsciously, the life of Deity? 
Endeavouring to answer this question kenotic theorizers 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, boldly moving 
against the barrier of a philosophical substructure for 
the doctrine of God, have declared that, on the basis of a 
kenosis involving a drastic but fitting act of accommoda­
tion, it is possible to conceive in some intelligible way 
of the Divine as being truly united with the human in the 
one Person of Jesus Christ.* Whereas Luther, the "Father" 
of Kenoticism, thought of the Divine attributes' as having 
been first communicated to-Christ's humanity and then 
stripped away —  a view which gives no real help toward 
understanding the life of Jesus among men —  modern , 
theorists conceived of the Kenosis as applying to His very 
Deity itself*
Thus, the significant distinction between Chal- 
cedonian and Kenotic Christdlogy becomes quite evident* 
While the Two-nature Doctrine speaks of a completely 
Divine and a fully human "nature" in the one Person, the 
kenotic motif speaks of the self-emptying or diminution 
of the Divine Being so there could be a truly human life* 
And while the Two-nature Doctrine posits the co-existence
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of the human and Divine in one Person, the basic picture 
in Kenoticism is that Christ foregoes the Divine Being in 
some way to become man. Theologically Kenotic Theory has 
Justified itself by holding that such a stupendous self- 
sacrifice on the part of the Second Person in the Godhead 
means a subordination of less vital attributes and 
activities of the Divine Being to the one supreme end of 
holy love; it is the triumph of the moral in God over the 
physical.
This brief survey of historical issues relating to 
the Person and Work of Jesus Christ has, it is believed, 
served to achieve the limited objectives set forth at the 
beginning of this section and thus lead into the exposi­
tion, first of the Christological thought of P. T. Forsyth 
and secondly that of Emil Brunner.
CHAPTER II
THE GHRISTOLüGICAL THOUGHT OF PETER TAYLOR FORSYTH
1. Theological Perspective, Presuppositions and Methodology 
Peter Taylor Forsyth's most important Christo­
logical thinking and writing were carried on at a time 
when the belated impact of the liberal viewpoint, which 
had dominated German theology for ‘a hundred years, was 
producing an. effect in Britain which took the form of the 
so-called "New Theology. A few excerpts from a 
definitive statement issued to the secular press in 1 9 0? 
by R. J. Campbell, a recognized "New Theology" spokesman, 
serve to show the theological and philosophical 
"colouration" of this movementj
The starting point of the New Theology is be­lief in the Immanence of God, and the essential oneness of God.and man. . , . Every man is a potential Christ, or rather a manifestation of the eternal Christ, that side of the nature of God from which all humanity has come forth. . . . The New Theology looks upon evil as a negative rather
1. A description of the "Theology" and the contro­versy it provoked, which deeply involved Forsyth, is ably set forth by Robert McAfee Brown in P. T. Forsythi Prophet for Today, pp. 26-30.
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than a positive term. . . . Sin is simply selfish­ness, It is an offense against the God within. We believe that Jesus is and was divine, but so are we. His mission was to make us realize our divin­ity and our oneness with God.^
Toward such viewpoints Forsyth was in diametric opposition.
His counter views, reflecting major fs,cets of his own
theological thought, were vigorously presented in an essay
entitled "Immanence and Incarnation," appearing in The Old
Faith and the New Theology.^ From a starting line of
immanence the "New Theology" could never probe the depths
of the tragic human situation as he saw it. The sense of
guilt was thereby discouraged and the miracle of saving
grace was denied, Man becomes his own Saviour, needing no
divine invasion from beyond his own being. And as for
Jesus Christ, in a theology of immanence "the eternal
ideal Christ is a divine principle quite separable from
its classic instance —  the personality of the historic
Jesus."3 Furthermore, it "speculates about a Christ made
flesh but it never grasps the true seat of Incarnation —
a Christ made sin,"4 It is never enough, Forsyth feels,
1. R. J. Campbell, "The New Theology," The British Weekly, January 17, 1907# P* 4l4, Part of a citation from an earlier issue, of The London Daily Mail.
2. P. T. Forsyth, "Immanence and Incarnation," The Old Faith and the New Theology, C. H. Vine, ed, (Samuel Low, Marston and Company: London), 1907, PP* 47-61.
3. Ibid., p. 57. 4. Ibid,, p. 48.
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to emphasize the Incarnation to the neglect of the Atone­
ment, which WS.S being done all too generally in his day 
even in "orthodox" circles far removed from the influence 
of any "New Theology," And this champion of evangelical 
faith is ready to challenge all enunciators and inter­
preters of Christian doctrine with the forthright 
declaration: "Christianity [which3 is a theological 
religion or nothing , , , centres in the person of Christ 
rather than in the Christian principle and is the religion 
of His atoning Incarnation,
Living in an era of scientific theology, a time 
when New Testament criticism was popular, Forsyth was not 
inclined to disparage the movement but to approve it 
wholeheartedly. "The service rendered to Christianity by 
the great critical movement is almost beyond words,
J. K, Mozley is astute in his observation that a way was 
thus furnished his fellow theologian for "the erection of
1. P, T, Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ (London; Hodder & Stoughton, 1911)» p, xv.
2, Ibid,, p. viii, Cf, Ibid., p, 49% "Much that is of permanent value has been done by the religious-historical school. Criticism is our friend and not our enemy in its place. It is a good servant but a deadly master. It be­comes our enemy only when it aspires from being an organ of Evangelical faith to be its controller."
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a dogmatic edifice in which the component materials could 
be selected according to their real strength."  ^ However, 
Forsyth objected to the usual doctrinal interpretation of 
the phrase, "The Fatherhood of God," which came to the 
fore in this period. The expression was often used glibly 
and in a manner bespeaking an easy access to the presence 
of an indulgent God by ways other than faith. In his 
opinion ideas of this nature were given forceful impetus 
by such works as the liberal Adolf Harnack’s Das Wesen des 
Christentums, in which the idea of a "simple gospel" of 
the Divine Fatherhood was promoted —  but could not be 
Biblically sustained. "The leading doctrine of much modern 
theology is the Fatherhood of God • . . which [offers us] 
a God genial, benignant, patient, and too great in His 
love to make so much as Paulinism does of the sin of a 
mere child like m a n . ^
Along with the acceptance of the principle of 
higher criticism, Forsyth asserts that the development of 
sound doctrine is "a triumph of faith, working in its 
grasp of moral realities and steadying itself by its still
1. J. K. Mozley, "The Theology of Dr. Forsyth," The Ex­positor, W. R. Nicoll, ed., Vol. XXIII (February, 1922),p. 82. Canon Mozley was a great admirer of Forsyth and makes frequent reference to him in his writings.
2. P. T . Forsyth, Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind (London; Independent Press Ltd. , 1953)7 p. 232'.
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stronger grasp of Christ."  ^ The indelible characteristic 
of sound theology is that it is thoroughly Ghristocentric, 
with the Person and Work of Jesus Christ providing the un­
shakable foundation for the discipline. It becomes 
apparent in the very early pages of The Person and Place 
of Jesus Christ that the author intends to introduce his 
readers to a "high" Ghristology;
Faith in Christ involves the Godhead of Christ.Faith in Christ in the positive Christian sense,means much more than a relation to God in whichChrist supremely helps us. It is a communion possible not through but to Christ and Him crucified. It means that to be in Christ is to be in God.^
From this definitive position Forsyth points out what he 
regards as a deadly weakness in the "new religious-
historical school of Germany", represented for him by!such contemporary writers as Wilhelm Bousset, JohannesIWeiss and Paul Wernle, who, in applying the evolutionary 
principle to the history of religion, adopt a relativistic 
way of thinlcing "which takes from Christ His absolute
value and final place" in divine revelation and which is
"sympathetic with a Christ it does not worship, and praises
1, Mozley, "The Theology of Dr. Forsyth", op. cit., 
p. 8 3 ,
2. F . , The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 6.Since this chapter is devoted to the thought of Forsyth, hereafter in this part of the thesis his name will be designated in footnotes simply by the initial F.
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a Christ to whom it does not pray. " ^ result of the
alleged findings of this school is to represent Jesus as 
the subject of faith rather than the object of faith, 
calling men to believe not to Jesus but like Jesus.
Forsyth’s strong objection to a rationalistic type 
of theology sets him over against the views of yet another 
great German thinker, G. W . P. Hegel.^ Almost every 
reference to Hegel —  of which there are many —  reveals 
his combative spirit toward the rationalistic tendencies 
of this philosopher. Against these tendencies, finding 
wide expression in England through the medium of the New 
Theology, Forsyth is vigorously on the offensive.
Actually it is a case of a rea,l- theology versus a kind of 
theosophical way of thinking. "In a, theosophy (like 
Hegel’s system) what we use is the intuition of thought 
by thought, in theology it is the intuition of a person 
by faith."3
The need to develop a solid counter-position to
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp. 10-11.
2. Forsyth was an avid reader of Hegel and in his Lyman Beecher lectures he says reminiscently ; "I immersed myself in the Logic of Hegel, and corrected it by the the« ology of Paul, and its continuity in the Reformation" (Positive Prea.ching and the Modern Mind, p. 195)*
3* F ,, The Principle of Authority (London? Independent Press Ltd., 1952], p. 213.
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rationalism -- not limited, incidentally, to that of 
Hegelian metaphysics —  undoubtedly had much to do with 
turning Forsyth toward a voluntaristic theory of knowledge 
in his theologizing. This voluntarism, however, is not of 
the later pragmati<^ type but bears much similarity to that 
of the Kantian school. In fact, the generally beneficent 
shadow of Immanuel Kant falls athwart the pages of much of 
P. T. Forsyth's major work.^ No close or extensive read­
ing is required to detect this significant influence. It 
is intimated, for instance, in a laudatory observation 
made by Forsyth in his magnum opus ; "It would mean worlds 
for our Christian faith, which brought such an inversion 
of moral values, if the ethic of Kant and its developments
1. J. H. Rodgers in The Theology of P. T. Forsyth makes the comment, "One of the most serious short-comings of the existing studies on Forsyth's thought is the lack of a sustained discussion of Forsyth's relation to Kantian, neo-Kantian, and Ritschlian thought. Such material is of the greatest help in understanding Forsyth" (p. 177). Rodgers, however, does not undertake to correct this de­ficiency. R. M. Brown, P. T, Forsyth; Prophet for Today, simply observes that "Among the philosophers, Kant exer­cised the deepest influence on Forsyth who often referred to him as 'the philosopher of Protestantism'" (p. 31)» while W. L. Bradley, P. T . Forsyth - the Man and His Work, and G. 0. Griffith, The Theology of P. T, Forsyth (London; Lutterworth Press, 1948), make only incidental reference to Kantian influence^.
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came to receive as much attention as the universities have 
given to the pagan ethic of Aristotle. Up to 8, certain 
point a real bond of intellectual and spiritual kinship is 
possible between the two thinkers. The heart of the 
British theologian warmed toward the Prussian philosopher 
who turned his back on an Egypt of fettering Orthodoxy 
and Rationalism, climbed the height of a moral Sinai -- 
though, regrettably, having no personal communion there 
with the supreme Lawgiver —  and who at least faced in the 
direction of a Promised La,nd of more productive thought.
The day of orthodoxy went by, and with it the night of Rationalism, With Kant came a new order of things. The ethical took the place that had been held by the intellectual. The notion of reality replaced that of truth. Religion placed us not in line with the rationality in the world but in rapport with the reality of it. And the ethical was the•real,As Kant handled the principle, it was much hampered by the circumstances of his day, but his route was right.^
While Forsyth readily acknowledges his indebtedness 
to Kant and to the Neo-Kantians in rebutting the claim of 
Rationalism to be the sole guide to truth and in their 
separation of the speculative and the practical reason, he 
stands opposed to the Kantian teaching which seems to imply
1. F,, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 312.
2. F ., The Principle of Authority, p. 4.
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that religion is merely a department or adjunct of 
morality and he has some words by way of correction;
It is true that religion belongs neither to the rational, the aesthetic, nor the ethical side of the soul exclusively. It draws on the whole soul's being and energy. But the Christian religion at least involves, if not the solitude, at least the primacy of the ethical. If Reality is to reach us it must be thus,1
These words emphasise the point of view that Forsyth
steadily maintains throughout all his theological works,
that religion is ever wider than morality, though morality
is an indispensable element in religion. Indeed it is the
supreme importance of the ethical for any true conception
of Ultimate Reality that binds him to the Kantian school.
There an Ultimate "Reality" (God) who, as
personal Being, does "reach" through to man from beyond
man in dynamic and decisive revelation. These are facts
of the Faith sounded on the Forsythian trumpet with no
uncertain note.
The last moral reality is a person, not in repose but in action with the world. The real God is present, in the soul, active in history, and master of the world. . , . God's way of carrying home His love to the world was by a person who was realized in one act corresponding to the unity of the person and the scale of the world.^
1, F., The Principle of Authority, p. 4,
2, F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 237*
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In this connection, Forsyth is skeptical of existing forms 
of thought and of rational ideas in abstraction from con­
crete historical experiences, ‘
Certainty , , , is at bottom no matter of intellectalone, nor of thought ; it cannot be there without an act of will, an act of appropriation by the per­sonality. A process of thought apart from an act of will . . . would be but a mental panorama, a cinematogram played to a house of one.l
Facing up to the problem of subjectivism, Forsyth says 
that Christian certainty conies through revelation or in­
vasive authority experienced by redeemed man. According 
as man responds in faith to the divine revelation and 
appropriates it he is lifted to new levels of living. 
Revelation, which is "defined as the free, final and 
effective act of God's self-communication in Jesus Christ 
for man's redemption"2 and is declared to "take affect in 
us, not as a,n act of insight, but only as an experience of 
being redeemed","3 must be an act and experience of a 
personal God in and through the personal Christ to a re­
deemed and renewed person among persons.
According to Forsyth, "All Christology must rest on
1. F ., The Principle of Authority, p, 100.
2. F ,, "Revelation and the Person of Christ," Faith and Criticism, (E, P, Dutton & Company, Inc., New York,
I893i, p. 116,
3* Ibidem,
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a moral salvation, spiritually and personally realized."! 
In order to understand his interpretation of the sub­
jective and experiential elements in the Revelation of God 
in Jesus Christ to man, it should be seen in relation to 
that of the influential Albrecht Ritschl.^ In Ritschlian 
teaching Jesus Christ is the historical revelation of God, 
the Revelation which faith experiences and to which it 
witnesses. Revelation is both experiential and subjective 
This is evident in Ritschl's interpretation of the God- 
consciousness of Christ as consisting of an experience 
which He had and which He communicates to His followers.
It is in this way that God’s grace in Christ becomes 
effectual for man, and this is. what the Gospel record 
means in its assertion that God revealed Himself in 
Christ to man. Although Forsyth does not agree with the 
content of this view of Ritschl, he does agree with the 
proper place it gives to the experiential and subjective
1. F ,, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 332.
2. Just how intensive this influence was is indicated by Forsyth in an autobiographical reference to a turning point in his spiritual pilgrimage : "I withdrew my prime attention from much of the scholar’s work and gave it to those theological interests, imbibed first from Maurice, and then more mightily from Ritschl, which come nearer to life than science, sentiment, or ethic ever can do" 
.{'Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 195) •
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elements in the Revelation of God in Christ, elements that 
are essential for Christian faith. In this respect 
Ritschlian doctrine was a decided improvement over the 
radical subjectivism of Sohleiermacher;
The [movement which arose out' of Sohleiermacher to correct Sohleiermacher, the movement as80cia,ted with the principle of Ritschl . . .  is the movement to an objective Gospel carrying a theology which does not arise in experience but only makes its appeal to experience.1IForsyth thinks of Ritschl as taking two definite forward
steps from the position of Sohleiermacher;
Ritschl moved at least two steps forward. . . .  He said faith was an act of judgment —  a judgment of our whole man on a certain fact’s value ; its effect and worth for us, and not on its mere existence.And he said further that it was an act of obedience, of total submission corresponding to the absolute nature of the Gospel fact and its demand.2
The emphasis in Ritschlianism on the place of value judg­
ments in Christ’s work of Revelation is heartily approved 
by Forsyth. Reformation doctrines can truly be interpreted 
in this way. These doctrines were formulated as a result 
of the Reformers* experience of Christ and the realization 
of His value for their lives of faith.
Forsyth adds to the thought of Ritschl by asserting
1. F., "The Place of Spiritual Experience in the Making of T h e o l o g y The Christian World Pulpit, March 21,
1906, p. 185.
2. Ibidem.
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that man cannot believe that Christ can have value as the
revelation of hdly God unless God creates the belief
itself in him.
My experience of Him is that of one who does a vital revolutionary work . . . that I could not bring to pass by any resources of my own. . . .And any faith I have at all is faith in Christ not merely as its content nor merely as its point of origin, but as its creator. . . . The great change , . . was a revolution effected in me and by Him.^
Faith then is renewed man's God-given response which re­
ceives revelation.
It is the gift and creation of God. . . . Révé­lait ion would be impossible . . . were it not also, in the same act, Redemption and Regeneration. . . . It is no more possible for the natural man to be­lieve what God has done in Christ than to do it.2
Forsyth believes that in Christ man's faith becomes an 
instrument of real knowledge, which relates not to an ob­
ject but to a Subject who takes the initiative with man.
In support of his view he cites the words of St. Paul who 
said : "But know that you have come to know God or rather 
to be known" (Galatians 4:9 KJV).
It is in the region of the will and conscience that 
Forsyth locates the meeting-place between God and man.
This is the locale of the divine-human encounter. It is
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp
198-199,
2, F., The Principle of Authority, p. 2?.
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the prius in the soul of man to which the Revelation of God
in Jesus Christ makes its appeal.
There is such a thing . . .  as a, religious a priori in us, though it is not an authority but the power to own authority. It is not a passivity but a receptivity, a loyalty, an obedience. Revelation does not come to us as if we were blank paper, dead matter or blind forces. It finds something to appeal to, to stir, to evoke. But this prius re­sides in the will and its power, not in the reason and its truth.^
Furthermore, the presence of this prius in no way compro­
mises the "Protestant position. . . . that we contribute 
nothing; that our salvation is'wholly and solely of God's 
grace, with which we are placed in direct contact, and are 
sure at first hand; that it is quite undeserved by us, and 
of God's side absolutely free. There cannot be any 
"ignoring the fact that both faith and repentance and all 
Christian experiences are supernatural things, are the 
gift of God."3 If the case were otherwise, Forsyth would
1. F ., The Principle of Authority, p. 1?4. Elsewhere Forsyth warns against a careless use of "appeal" in con­nection with the approach that Revelation makes to man;"The word 'appeal' must . . .  be used with care. It im­plies one of two things, a surface that responds or a court that allows. And for revelation, human nature is the former and not the latter. It is not a permit, but an obedient response" (F., "The Word and the World," The British Weekly, February 10, 1910, p. 534).
2. Ibid., p. 350.
3. F ., "The Place of Spiritual Experience in the Mak­ing of Theology," op. cit., p. 184.
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be flirting with the Pelagianism that is to be found in 
Roman Gatholio theology and he has no intention of doing 
this. If a man is saved, it is God alone who does the 
saving and to God alone is due the glory and the honour.
Forsyth rarely discourses for long on any theo­
logical theme without making some reference to "conscience" 
and in his Christological discussions these references 
come thick and fast. This is not surprising when it is 
remembered that the motto of his great work, The Person 
and Place of Jesus Christ, is * "Morality is the nature of 
things," The famous dictum of Joseph Butler is true be­
cause conscience is universal in human experience, as 
Forsyth sees the matter; "Conscience is the most universal 
thing, the most missionary thing of all. It is what makes 
man man and makes him one and makes him eternal."1 
Conscience, when analyzed, admits of no merely human ex­
planation, for while it is within man at the same time it 
is outside of man. In stating the case for the "inward­
ness" of conscience Forsyth appeals to common experience:
I would bear you back upon your own conscience and bid you listen to its voice. . . . There is .in the soul a bar, a tribunal; our thoughts and actions are ranged before it; judgment is passed there upon
1. P. T. Forsyth, Missions in State and Church (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ï9 0 8), p. 16. Cf., F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 351 "The essence of Humanity is conscience."
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what we have been and done. Every one who believes in morality believes in the conscience as the power we have of passing moral judgment upon ourselves.^
And yet this "moral partner", this "'judge that follows us 
like our shadow" is not of human choice or appointment, and 
Forsyth says ; "The place which we cannot help assigning to 
conscience (whether we admit it or not) is a place given 
it by another power than ourselves. • . . And for such a 
moral being . . .  we have but one name -- G o d . B u t  the 
theological significance of "conscience" has still not 
been fully explored, "for there is no possibility of going 
to the bottom of the matter and leaving out Jesus Christ,"3 
Rather than leaving Him out, it must be said of Him:
"Christ was and is the conscience of mankind and of God."4 
In coming to know Him as the "Conscience within the 
conscience"5 man is enabled to meet the demands of a moral 
universe with which he is in conflict because of his sin­
fulness •
To Forsyth's way of thinking, knowledge is awareness
I
1. P. T, Forsyth, The Cruciality of the Cross (London: Independent Press Ltd,, 1948), pp. 62-63. The Tanguage of Forsyth in these and following pages is in many places strikingly similar to words and phrases used by Kant in his note on "Conscience" in The Critique of Practical Reason(London: Longmans, Green & Go., lo79), pp. ^90-^921
2. Ibid., pp. 64-65. 3. Ibid., p. 6 5 . 4. Ibidem.
5* P. T. Forsyth, God the Holy Father (London: Independent Press Ltd.7 1957), p. 961
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of the real, of the authoritative Absolute. In the act 
and state of Redemption man becomes aware and certain of 
this Absolute,
The final authority for all life . . , must bea religious authority. The absolute Lord of Life must be found in life as religious, in personal communion with a personal God , . . but religion to our modern soul has two features. As ethical it must be essentially an act, . . . and as psychological it must be an experience. And to these subjective features of religion must corres­pond its object. That must be a person putting Himself into an act for an experience. Our re­lation, as living persons, to an influence or an idea is not religious. The final authority must therefore be . . .  a communing person, . . .  It can be neither a statement, nor a symbol , . , nor the Church, For a humanity with a history it must be the Christ of the historic and redeeming Cross,^
Forsyth believes that the authoritative Absolute which is 
revealed to man in his faith-experience is the very soul 
of his faith. "The person and work of Christ alone gives 
the moral soul to itself, Christ gives to the soul 
(will and conscience included) an eternal place by estab­
lishing its communion with the righteous God, In this 
communion with God through Christ, man becomes aware that 
the real (the holy God in Christ) is both ethical and re­
demptive, This makes possible for him a "new relation by
1, P., The Principle of' Authority, p. 6 3 ,
2. F ., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p, 251.
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a new creation" and gives him moral insight and re­
sponsibility, j.
Forsyth acknowledges that philosophical specula­
tion can bring man into contact with the authoritative 
Absolute but he denies that philosophy is able to provide 
this Absolute, And whereas philosophy succeeds only 
relatively, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ brings 
man finally and completely into contact with the ultimately 
Heal and Authoritative. It is the contention of Forsyth 
that the work of Christ takes men out of the realm of the 
prepositional truths of philosophy and into the realm of 
Revelation which is "not God’s gift of truth, but of Him­
self . But there is also no authority for mere theo­
logical knowledge or statements, and Forsyth declares:
There are doctrines of salvation, but no saving doctrines. In a strict use of words, there is no such thing as saving truth. . . . Our supreme good is not knowledge, not correct doctrine. , . . it is the practical obedience and penitent response of faith in the historic grace of Christ to the conscience.^
Such a statement strikes a blbw at the intellectualizing 
of revelation wherever it may occur. Forsyth does not 
hesitate to hammer home the evangelical truth %fhich for
1. F., The Principle of Authority, p. 155*
2. Ibid., p. 399.
60
him is of surpassing importance:
God in Christ is the maker of His own revelation* It was God Himself that came to us in Christ ; it was nothing about God, even about His eternal essence or His excellent glory. It is God that is our salvation, and not the truth about God. And what Christ came to do was not to convince us even that God is love, but to be with us and in us as the loving God forever and ever. He came not to preach the living God but to be God our life ; yes, not to preach even the loving God but to be the love that God forever is,^
It can hardly be over-emphasized that the concept of the 
interpersonal character of Revelation is evident in 
Forsythian Christological thought from beginning to end. 
There can be no Revelation unless there is someone to 
receive the self-disclosure of God. Likewise man cannot 
possibly know God except through the divine self-reveal­
ing. And this self-revealing is thoroughly vital and 
dynamic. God in Jesus Christ acts, comes, gives Himself 
on behalf of sinful and impotent man. This Revelation 
is personal, experiential and sacramental, for "the 
absoluteness of Christianity lies in an experience of 
the historic and most human Christ as a superhuman 
visitant, and as the one moral mediator of personal
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p, 354, Cf. Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, pp, 10-11 ; P. T. Forsyth, The Soul of Prayer (London: Independent Press, 
1 9 4 9)» p. 37; P. T. Forsyth, "Revelation and the Person of Christ," Faith and Criticism (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1693)* pp."119-1 2 0.
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communion with the living, and holy, and eternal God."^
It is the new creation of man effected by Christ.
While P. T. Forsyth is not to be considered a 
Biblical theologian in the strict sense of the term, this 
is not to say that Scriptural undergirding is ever lack­
ing in anything he wrote,^ One does not follow far on 
the track of his thought without catching sight of some 
Biblical allusion and having borne in upon him the aware­
ness of a solid substratum of the truth of the Scriptures. 
This is especially true of his magnum opus. Not only are 
there references, both explicit and implicit, to the
1, F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 2 5I,
2. S. J. Mikolaski in an article on "The Theology of P. T. Forsyth," The Evangelical Quarterly, (January-March, 
1 9 6 4)/says that Forsyth "did not write as a biblical theologian" (p, 3 6). However, this comment by Mikolaski needs tempering. It would have been better to say that Forsyth did not write as an "exegetical" theologian after the manner, for instance, of Oscar Gullmann or Karl Barth, or to say that he was chary of so-called "proof" texts and believed that "revelation is distilled from the Bible rather than dissected" (P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 93)• An excellent discussion of"Forsyth's relation to the Bible is to be found in the Presidential Lecture given by Professor A. M. Hunter to St, Mary's Theological Society, St. Andrews, 3^ d^ November, I9 6I. In this lecture, "P. T, Forsyth Neutestamentler" (q.v. The Expository Times, Vol. 73» pp. IOO-IO6 ), Professor Hunter sees his fellow Aberdonian as one who thoroughly complied with his own forthright counsel given in Positive Preach­ing and the Modern Mind ; "No man should ask for a publichearing on a theological question unless he has mastered his New Testament at first hand" (p. 70).
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Philippian passage which serves as a somewhat concealed 
scaffolding for the last three chapters of the book, but
many other New Testament texts are cited —  the "mini-
Johannine Gospel" of Matthew xi. 2? is a favorite —  as
well as Isaiah 53* The guiding principle of selection
used, not only in The Person and Place but everywhere in
Forsyth's theological works is, naturally, that of
Christological significance and association. Under the
guidance and stimulus of this principle the thought of
the Christologist gravitates toward the Apostle Paul
"as the supreme devotee, organ and expositor of Christ."^
And, as every serious student of Forsyth would be led to
expect, it is the soteriological insight of the Apostle
that is the secret of his magnetism. "Paul was specially
and divinely illuminated as the interpreter of Christ's
act."2 Yet this high estimate does not imply that Paul
1. The British Weekly, October 31» 190?, p. 83* A quotation from a repTy^to James Denny anent a request for a statement of the theses underlying Positive Preaching and The Modern Mind. Cf, F., "The Evangelical Churches and the Higher Criticism," The Contemporary Review, (October, 1905)» PP* 574-599* This is a strong article, replete with Christological implications, from which several citations will be taken. It, along with some other significant contributions to magazines and news­papers, belongs to the "formative" period which preceded The Person and Place. The particular reference here is to "the large Pauline version of Christ" (p. 582).
2. F . , Theology In Church and State, p. 41. Cf * p. 31*' "We hear [in Paul's Epistles^] the man who had Christ'sown interpretation of His work,"
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is ever to be pitted against Christ or that the Epistles 
are ever to be set over against the Gospels. Such an 
idea is entirely untenable.
We must not sha.rply contrast Paul a,nd Christ. . . . All we possess is the evangelical Christ common to Paul, the other apostles, and the first Church.We can compare the Epistles and the Gospels. Their view point is the same —  the Gospel. They ply the same Christ the Saviour. But the service of the evangelists is supplementary to that of Paul, They sustain the Gospel he preaches.1
Though he cannot go along with the doctrine of 
verbal inspiration Forsyth carefully shields himself from 
any possible charge that this is a casual or flippant re­
jection. "The true minister ought to find the words and 
phrases of the Bible so full of spiritual food and 
felicity that he has some difficulty in not believing in 
verbal inspiration. The Bible is the one enchiridion of 
the preacher still . . ."2 Yet it is not the Bible per 
se which should be revered and cherished. To do so would 
be sheer Bibliola.try, the fatal error of the hyper- 
orthodox, The Scriptures are of secondary value to the 
holy intent of their inspiration, and there must be no 
misunderstanding of this intent. The Bible exists for
1. P., "The Evangelical Churches and the HigherCriticism," op, cit., p. 584,
2. F,, Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p, 26,
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the sake of the Gospel, this "Gospel" actually meaning two 
things: "It means the mighty saving act of God in Christ;
and it means the news of that act by the word of apostolic 
men,"  ^ But primarily "it means God's Word to man, not 
spoken but done by a Saviour who spoke very little of 
it."2 It could be said simply and truly that Christ Him­
self is the Gospel which is the raison d' • atre of the 
Bible, but such a succinct statement needs a safeguarding 
proviso :
Of course you may say that Christ is God's Gospel , . , and that is quite right as long as we are not speaking of the Jesus of biography, of Jesus as a personal influence merely, but of the Christ of great history, the Messiah of redemption; so long as we are not speaking of the teaching and character of Christ only but of His work, which was the crisis of His person; so long as we live and move in Christ the Redeemer; so long as we do not begin with the Incarnation but end there; so long as we begin with the Redemption, Atonement, Reconcilia­tion, and go on to end with such an Incarnation as is demanded for the purposes of that gracious Gospel and that saving G o d .3
1. F., "The Evangelical Churches and the HigherCriticism," op, cit., p. 593*
2. Ibidem. Forsyth has some difficulty in relating the "Word" to the Bible. He goes on to say : "It is not the Bible that contains God's Word so much as God's Word that contains the Bible." This would seem to make him re­luctant to settle for the Christ-manger meta^phor of Luther of which Emil Brunner writes approvingly (B,, Revelation and Reason, p. 2?6). Developing his own imagery Forsyth
says of the Bible: "It is a sacrament" (p. 579); but later on it is "the element which inecCiates the one great Sacrament —  the historic grace of God in Christ" (p. 594). Italics mine.
3. Ibid., p. 576.
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While his own Biblically inspired Ghristology was 
being intently wrought out, Forsyth was settling into a 
position somewhere between the extremes of stifling fund­
amentalism and latitudinarian rationalism that were to be 
found in the theological schools of his times., "The 
meticulousness of orthodoxy on the one hand, and of 
criticism on the other, has joined with other.influences 
to make religion either vague or trivial • . • Bible 
scholars became pedants,"1 Herein is but the tedious, if 
somewhat modified, prolongation of an ancient feud* "The 
see-saw of the old supernaturalism and rationalism is 
interminable."^ Forsyth can see no spiritual profit in 
fraternizing with either camp. But there is a middle 
course which can be safely pursued and there is a 
criterion which is both superlative and comprehensive in 
its application* "The final criticism of the Bible is not 
the "higher criticism" but the highest, the criticism 
whose principle is God’s supreme object in Bible, Churcri, 
or even Christ —  the object of reconciling grace."3
1. P., "The Evangelical Churches and the Higher Criticism," op. cit., pp. 597-598.
2. P., "Authority and Theology," The Hibbeft Journal, (October, 1905), p# 68.
3. P., "The Evangelical Churches and the Higher Criticism," op. cit., p. 598.
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Critics who labour under the rule of this principle pose 
no threat to the causa sacra of the Scriptures, and, 
operating from a necessary base in Christian faith, they 
have a worthy and essential duty to perform. "Everything 
turns on the . . . final authority of the Gospel, Stand­
ing at the altar and receiving, the sound contributions of 
the critical method."^
Whereas Luther tested Biblical passages by their 
direct, indirect and salutary connection with Christ, 
Forsyth uses the Scriptures as a whole In applying Luther's 
principle.^ Actually Christ and the Gospel are one and 
the same in his thinking. The Scriptures are the semantic 
vehicle for conveying the Gospel, the kerygmatlo core with 
all Its corollaries.
Forsyth believes that "the perception of faith Is 
the condition of any science of God; religion founds all 
theology."3 Explaining his understanding of the place of 
scientific method In relation to the development of the­
ology, he says I
A theology Is scientific . . . according as It does
1. F., "The Evangelical Churches and the Higher Criticism," op. cit., p. 598.
2. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 14.
3* F., The Principle of Authority, p. 100.
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justice to its creative fact, and serves as the expression, or exposition, of that revelation.The ground of real knowledge is perception, it is experience, it is our reaction to fact, it is not ideas ; and it is experience not of our need hut of something that rouses it, and then does more than fill it. Theology therefore does not appeal to a prior and surer philosophy; hut a philosophy comes later, and it must take due account of the facts, and especially of the revelationary and ex­perienced fact which theology expounds.1
The "fact" of which Forsyth speaks is the revelation of 
God in Jesus Christ. The "experience" to which he refers 
is the experience of God on the part of the faithful and 
renewed man in Christ. While he is certainly not anti- 
philosophical in his viewpoint, Forsyth definitely supports 
the priority of theology over philosophy in their re­
lationship one to the other. Rational thought can serve 
faith "in due season" as the interpretative instrument.
When we have found our soul’s God on other than intellectual lines, it is quite possible for us to return to our mental process, to the logic of thought, and find it its donative quality features which corroborate the will's faith, and share in the convergence of all our powers on the God whose gift they are.^
It is thus that place and service are allowed to the 
power and processes of the human intellect.
In the thought of Forsyth man does not create -
1. P., The Principle of Authority, p. 95*
2. Ibid., p. 105.
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truth, he only receives and obeys it. "Wisdom is over 
the thinker who loves it and seeks it; and the infinite
wisdom is the holy Lord, King, and G o d . N e i t h e r
intellect nor thought alone can produce certainty, for 
this absolute assurance cannot exist apart from "an act 
of will, an act of appropriation by the personality."^ 
And here the theologian moves into the realm of Vol­
untarism*
Thought is a work . . .  a duty, and not a mereprocess. . . .  We are under obligation to seekand think the truth. . . . It is a task and not a treat. And we do not legislate for truth; we have to see that the law of thought has its way with us. Our chief act of will is practically recognition of a gift. It is obedience to a grace, even in science.^
However, in moving from Intellectualism into Voluntar­
ism the thinker must proceed with caution. "Voluntarism 
means only the primacy of the will, not its monopoly."^ 
Moreover, "a will, acting without reason, on other than 
intelligent principles, is not a will but a mere instinct 
or impulse."5 Forsyth holds to the truth that our 
rational faculties are not all of us but are a part of 
the larger whole —  the moral personality, which is the 
more impressive and authoritative gift of God. In other
1. F., The Principle of Authority, p. 100.
2. Ibidem. 3. Ibid., p. 101.
4. Ibidem. 5» Ibidem.
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xvords, "the intellect may be the instrument of the will,
but it is not its creature."^ Even .the will itself "is
not the cause of truth but its recognition, its service.
• • . in God Himself, His will is a perfect and eternal
appropriation of His n a t u r e . I n  the sphere of both
the intellect and the will man is dependent on the
authoritative God who descends upon him with His claim.
According to Forsyth*
The gift of God is more impressive and authorita­tive on our moral side. The conscience, which be- .gan its witness by owning the moral obligations of thought, comes to itself and its authority only as God saves it by His final light. That is what is meant by the primacy of the will for life or faith. It is the gift and will of God that we should find this final authority in the moral region of ex­perience, of personal contact with Him, of com­munion with the holy, will in will. The only, point it is desired to make here is that the authori­tative note is not a monoply of our moral judgment, but is at the base of our intellectual processes also. It is articulate in conscience, but it is also active in thought.3
With will, conscience and intellect involved, there comes
into being the certainty of God, the God who is able in
and through Jesus Christ to bring will, conscience and
intellect into harmony with His universe, a universe of
1. P., The Principle of Authority, p. 102.
2. Ibid.,p. 102.
3. Ibid., p. 111. j
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which He is the ultimate moral Reality. These presup­
positions enable Forsyth to deal theologically with both 
the profoundly ethical and the darkly tragic side of life.
The methodology of P. T. Forsyth is to be under­
stood in the light of his presuppositions and of his con­
viction that "Christianity is concerned with God's holi­
ness before all else; which issues to man as love, acts 
upon sin as grace, and exercises grace through judgment."1 
In his thought the holy God is equated with the "One who 
has His universal end completely in Himself, who is 
identical with the end of the disordered universe —  with 
its redemption. He is the Redeemer because He is iden­
tical with His owA redemption."^ This is not to say that 
God is the seime as man's highest concept of love, good­
ness and fatherliness. It to say that God is above 
all free, eternal, omnipotent, and inconceivable by the 
mind of man. He is actually unapproachable in majesty 
and beyond any human definition or ideas to which He can­
not be confined. However, it pleased the holy God to 
conde8cent to man and to come into the earthly situation 
in revealing presence. This He did in the Incarnation 
and in the Cross of One who is both Son of God and Son
1. P., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. vlii.
2. P., The Justification of God,(London* IndependentPress, Ltd., 19571# P» 63.
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of man. In Jesus Christ it is revealed to man that he 
must reverentially fear and love God, who in the Person 
of His Son judges man's sin in love and is also its con­
queror. Hence, in the convinced thought of Forsyth, 
Ghristology must be at the very heart of a sound Christian 
theology.
Believing that Jesus Christ bridges the "qualita­
tive" chasm between the finite and the infinite, Forsyth 
employs the interpretative principle of paradox in his 
method of dealing with the immeasurably deep and reason- 
defying themes of the Incarnation and Atonement. Justi­
fying this procedure, he says : "We do not touch the deep 
illogical things of God till we find paradox their only 
expression."1 And again -- with a caveat thrown in*
. . . when the soul is moved to its depths . . • then do . . .  we flee for strength to the truths of paradox. . . . Life from its beginning is a vast vital contradiction. . • . the preacher must not be afraid of paradox. . . .  Of course . . . astring of paradoxes, ingeniously invented, is onething. It is smart, metallic, offensive. But the great, recurrent paradox of the spiritual life, revealed or discovered, is another thing. The haunting moral paradox of the Cross is another thing. And if we shun that . . . we have no Gospel to preach.2
Thus, the device of paradox, which Forsyth regards as
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 203.
2. Ibid., p. 202-203. '
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quite indispensable to the evangelical theologian, is 
always to be used with discretion and discrimination. 
Furthermore, he believes that in considering those vast 
and vital matters of the Faith, when the "traffic" of 
rational thought seems to have come to an inevitable, 
complete and final halt in an apparently alogical cul de 
sac, the Christian thinker must never give up exploring 
the remotest possibility of a "way out." Even when faced 
with the challenge of those greatest andf*e from all the 
evidence that reason seems able to adduce —  utterly con­
tradictory truths of "God and man . . .  in a Godman and 
in a Cross. . . . The effort to adjust the great paradox 
could only cease with the paralysis of thought."  ^ As he 
launches into his own labours in this area of Dogmatics 
Forsyth is under the strong conviction that there should 
by all means be a resumption of "the long movement of the 
Church's thought to pierce and clarify the mystery of 
godliness in C h r i s t . " 2  Yet in all of his dogmatic Chris- 
tological development he proceeds with the awareness that 
"the nearer we are driven to the God of Christ, the more
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 72.
2. Ibid., p. 240.
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we are forced on paradox when we begin to s p e a k , H e  
therefore has no qualms about resorting to this interpre­
tative principle as he develops his thought on the Person 
and Work of Jesus Christ.
Although he obviously uses the dogmatic approach, 
this procedure must be clarified if there is to be an 
adequate understanding of Forsyth's methodology. For him, 
"dogma is the science of f a i t h . T h e  full meaning of 
this statement is found in the explanation that follows *
It does not mean a science of thought attached to faith, like Greek metaphysics. It does not mean a metaphysic of Being. . . • Nor on the other hand does it mean a science of the subjective religious acts, a psychology of religion. But it means . . . the science of religion as a moral relation, a living and historic relation between two person­alities, two consciences ; which in Christianity is a redeeming relation. It is the science of real­ized redemption. It is a science wherein faith is not so much the observed object as the observing subject. It is faith thinking and not only faith thought of. . . . And it is upon the lines of such an ethical religion alone that we reach [the] moralizing of dog m a .3
The distinctive flavour of Forsyth's Ghristology may be
1. F., The Soul of Prayer, p. 71# Cf. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 305* "It is only by a para­dox of thought that we possess our own souls and their reality." .
2, F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 215* 
3# Ibid., p. 2l6.
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said to inhere in this concluding phrase which he added to 
the pot pourri of twentieth century theological expressions 
"The moralizing of dogma." A correct understanding of 
this determinative principle is a necessity in getting at 
the mind of this creative theologian. But to have such an 
understanding requires close study of the writer's ex­
position. The moralizing of dogma certainly does not mean 
the reduction of Christianity to a system of morality and 
the demotion of Christ to the role of the world's greatest 
ethical teacher. "It is a poor error to think that the 
ethicizing of religion is its prompt application to present 
problems, or the reduction of religion to ethics, and 
faith to cold morality."I While this view may have wide-
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind,' p. 204.In an "Addendum on Religion and Ethic" in The cEristian Ethic of War (pp. 59-63)» Forsyth considers the merits and demerits of three kinds of relationship between religion and morality, holding that they may be treated as co­ordinate, identical or reciprocal. The first relationship is actually one of causality. "Either the religion pro­duces the ethic, or the ethic the religion" (p. 6o). If the former be true, it makes "the morality less than pure by introducing a pre-moral, a non-moral element (power or love)" (p. 61). If the latter be true, "it makes our re­ligious certainty to rise from our moral success [in] a total subversion . . .  of our Christian religion" (Ibidem). The second relationship, in which religion and morality are regarded as being one and the same, also has serious drawbacks. "We have either a mystic morality leading to pride or slackness, or we have an exigent religion leadingto despair" (p. 62). Forsyth believes that the true view of the matter is to look upon religion and ethic as re­ciprocal, and this means ascribing to both a common source which is at one and the same time moral in nature and
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spread appeal, it is but the "crypto-unitarianism of many 
who feed themselves and others on Christian sympathies 
and Christian ethic without Christian redemption."^ What 
Forsyth has in mind is of a vastly different order. His 
"moralized" dogma represents —  it should be reiterated —  
"the science of rèligion as a moral relation, a living and 
historic relation between two personalities, two con­
sciences, which in Christianity is a redeeming relation.
By the moralizing of theology, or by the "ethicizing of 
religion" as he so frequently calls it, he proposes to 
show that morality is indeed "the nature of things" in all 
the province of theology, and he essays by this cohesive 
principle to bind together the various components of dogma 
in a harmonious whole. In this way he intends to demon­
strate that"Christianity is a solution to the problem of 
life, which is a moral problem."3 With specific reference
religious in power. To say this is to point unerringly to the Christ who in His "One Person and Act [is] the source of both ethic and religion" (p. 6 3 ). In Him the distinct tion and identity of religion and morality are balanced and sustained. "We have the mystic Christ to us identical with the moral Christ for us" (Ibidem).
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 2 1 6. Cf. P., The Principle of Authority, p. 389* "To moralize religion is to make it personal as the
Reformation did, and yet to rescue it from the subjectivity of Modernism and its collective egoism."
3. F*, Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 225.
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to the Incarnation, the moralizing of this dogma means 
that "the Incarnation being for a moral and not a meta­
physical purpose, must be in its nature moral.
While firmly repudiating rationalistic metaphysics, 
Forsyth acknowledges the necessity for another kind of 
metaphysic in his Christolbgical construction. The 
character of this metaphysic is indicated and explained*
Some metaphysio is here involved, certainly, but it is a metaphysic of the conscience. It starts from the conviction that for life and history the moral is the real, and that the movements of the Great Reality must be morally construed as they are morally revealed. . . .  As Christians we are united with Christ by a moral, i.e. a personal process; and can we think otherwise of the manner of His union with God which is its base? It is only in the way of moral modulation that the divine Logos could, become true man.^
The metaphysic which Forsyth accepts and employs is
actually that of personal and vital faith, with Redemption
serving as its guiding principle.
A metaphysic of some kind is bound up with a Christ of this kind. • . . It is impossible to think of One who changed the whole relation between the race and God without a metaphysio of the rela­tion between that one and God. It is impossible to thinlr of Christ as the personal concern of every person without a relation between His Person and every other which it is not an absurdity to con­ceive in the theological way which makes Christ the
1, F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 219#
2. Ibid., pp. 222-223#
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agent of their creation. . . . Some metaphysic of personality is inevitable —  . . .  It must be a metaphysic of faith itself. It must be some form of the post-Kantian metaphysic of ethic ; a meta­physic of the ethic which culminates in God's supreme moral act of redemption and in man's supreme moral act of faith. It is along such lines that a modern Ghristology must be shaped.I
But Forsyth wants to make sure that he will not be mis­
understood, so he makes a succinct distinction. "A faith 
in metaphysic is one thing, and a metaphysic of faith is 
a n o t h e r . W h i l e  the former prevailed too much in theol­
ogy and religion in the past, Forsyth believes that the 
latter will come into its own in the future.
Tempered by his presuppositions, the whole Ghris­
tology of this "moral" theologian is built around the 
finality of the suprahistoric Christ understood in terms 
of the guiding principle of redemption and within the 
framework of the metaphysic of conscience. He interprets 
Christ's unity of being along "those ethical lines which 
alone consist with personal relation and explain it."3 
In a prophetic, though perhaps overly sanguine, spirit 
he declares of his mode of theological procedure:
The moral and experimental method in theology will
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp.355-356.
2. Ibid.,, p. 356.
3. Ibid., p. 231.
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give us, from its congeniality with the source of our revelation in a personal Saviour, results as great and commanding in their sphere as did the application of the other experimental method of induction so appropriate to natural science.!
It can be definitely asserted that the presuppo­
sitions and methodology of P. T. Forsyth provide him with 
the ground and freedom to develop a Christocentric the­
ology which is both ethical and evangelical.
In B'orsyth's system morality is not closed but open. It does not set up a law but offers at most a guiding, interpretative, but, above all, illuminable principle. It does not detract from revelation but provides the means for its exal­tation. 2
Forsyth very clearly aligns his Christological thought 
with the concept of revelation as an ethical act of God 
Consequently his methodology yields that ethical evan­
gelical theology to which all his dogmatic labours are 
dedicated, a goal which is clearly indicated in relation 
to his proposed work in Ghristology*
Let the doctrine [of Chris^ be reconstructed, reinterpreted, restated —  what you will. Pro­vided two things. First that the task be essayed by competent and reverent people and not by amateurs. . . . Indeed the work can really be done only by the collective Church in earnest
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 231.
2. N. H. G. Robinson, Christ and Conscience, (London* 
James Nisbet Sc Company, Ltd*., 1956), p* 142.
79
faith, working on the contributions of individuals equipped and morally serious. And second, pro­vided that what is aimed at is religious truth, which is so much more than the results of severe historical criticism; truth as it is in Jesus and not about Jesus; truth which is the Church's super­natural faith giving a rational account of itself ; the truth of a faith which is not natural religion, but an invasion of the natural man, and an enclave in the course of history; the order of truth which . . .  is the substantial, distinctive and evangel­ical truth of the Church's experience.!
With this delineation of the task of theology firmly 
fixed in his mind, Forsyth develops his Christological 
thought with the concern that it be presented "according 
to the true mode of its constitutive elements. He be­
lieves that the aim of all theologians, himself included, 
should be to present "not so much a new system of theology, 
as a new pronunciation of theology . • • theology uttered 
with à change of accent."3 He then goes on to explain*
In order of importance we should go to the world first of all with the Atoning Cross which is the Alpha and Omega of grace ; second with the resur­rection of Christ which is the emergence into ex­perience of the new life won for us on the Cross; third with the life, character, teaching, and miracles of Christ; fourth, with the pre-existence of Christ, which is a corollary of His Eternal Life, and only after such things with the Virgin Birth, which may or may not be demanded by the rest. It is not a case of denying any of these points. They may all be accepted, but let it be in their true perspective, the perspective of
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 240.
2. Mozley, "The Theology of Dr. Forsyth," op. cit., p# 169.
3. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 87*
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faith.^
Truly it is from the perspective of faith that 
Forsyth carries out his own theological enterprise. In 
discussing "The Place of Spiritual Experience in the Making 
of Theology" he speaks and writes as one to whom such ex­
perience has come and to whom it has been deeply meaningful. 
However, something more than experience is needed for the 
proper and effective handling of vast doctrinal themes.
To attempt this on "a basis of experience alone lands us 
in individualism, subjectivism, and romantic temperamental 
theology."^ The thing that matters most and is needed 
most is faith. "Faith is the great thing; and faith is 
not an experience in the sense of a mood, but as response 
to a revelation."3 it can be stated even more definitely 
and emphatically that* "The toystery and the power of 
Christianity is faith —  understood not merely as a 
religious sympathy or affection, but as direct personal 
communion with Christ, based on forgiveness of sins direct 
from Him to the conscience."^ Furthermore, "the recon-
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 8?.
2. P., "The Place of Spiritual Experience in the Mak­ing of Theology," op. cit., p. 186.
3. Ibid., p. 185.
4. F., Rome, Reform and Reaction (Londoni Hodder and Stoughton, 1899), p. 92f.
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ciliation of faith and experience exists but in the object 
of our faith —  the Reconciler."! The source of faith, as 
well as its objective ground, is Jesus Christ present in 
the Spirit. Therefore, the "burden" of the minister as 
theologian must be "an objective gospel, which descends on 
our experience both to kindle and to correct it."2 Such 
a gospel is the unfailing inspiration and guideline in all 
of Forsyth's Christological thinking.
Finally, it should be observed that Forsyth teaches 
as one whom ."God taught . « . what sin was and the theology 
of its cure."3 This is a decisive matter where Ghristology 
is concerned, for "only the saved have the real secret of 
the Saviour."^ Such a vital experience has given to 
Forsyth a first-hand knowledge of the Great Physician of 
souls and His curative ministry. From this vantage point 
he can appreciate that "moralisation of Ghristology" so
1. P., "The Place of Spiritual Experience in theMaking of Theology," op. cit., p. 185#
2. Ibidem., op. cit., p. 186.
3. Ibidem. This is one of the rare instances whereForsyth indulges in personal testimony. Cf. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp. I96-I98; P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 193#
4. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 219.
i ' .
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forcefully expressed in Melanchthon*s Loci of 1521,
The knowledge of Christ is to know his benefits, taste his salvation, and experience his grace. • • • To know him to purpose is to know the demand of the conscience for holiness, the source of power to meet it, where to seek grace for our sin's failure, how to set up our sinking soul in the face of the world, the flesh, and the devil, how to console the conscience broken.!
Forsyth sees eye to eye with Melanehthon that the Person 
and Work of Christ must be viewed in relation to each 
other if there is to be a valid interpretation of either. 
"The character of Christ rests on His person; and His 
person has universal and eternal value for us only as it 
takes effect, condensed but entire, in His act of death 
and rising as God's final and endless act of holy redeem­
ing l o v e . T h e  Incarnation is not to be understood 
apart from the Work of Christ which centres in His Cross. 
Neither are"His benefits" to be understood apart from 
the Incarnation. From a theological perspective the 
matter can be stated thus ;
Theologically, faith in Christ means that the person of Christ must be interpreted by what that saving action of God in Him requires, that Christ's work is the master key to His person, that His benefits interpret His nature. It means,
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 220f.
2. P., Theology in Church and State, p. 26.
(London* Hodder and Stoughton, 1915).
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when theologically put, that Ghristology is the corollary of Soteriology; for a Ghristology vanishes with the reduction of faith to mere religion.
This chapter will take up first the "Person" and 
then the "Work" of Jesus Christ in the thought of P. T. 
Forsyth. There is a certain naturalness to this pro­
cedure since on the human level the "being" of a person 
necessarily comes before what he does. Furthermore, this 
order will be following the way in which Forsyth himself 
dealt with Christological t h e m e s I t  is believed that 
the order of treatment is really immaterial in relation 
to the thought under consideration.
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 6.
2. This statement depends on Forsyth's assertion in the Preface of The Work of Christ that this volume origi­nated in the form of lectures which "took place immed­iately after the delivery of my Congregational Lecture on The Person and Pla.ce of Christ, which they supplement"(p. xxx). It further depends on a concluding remark in the Preface of Forsyth's chief Christological work* "It may be useful to add that the lectures were undertaken ten years ago when the lines of treatment were being then laid down in the writer's mind. . ." (p. ix).
/
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2. The Person of Jesus Christ
In order to understand the Person of Jesus Christ 
in the creative and provocative thought of P. T. Forsyth 
it is imperative that his theological presuppositions and 
methodology be kept closely in mind while his various 
Christological concepts are being considered. And, to 
begin with, it may well be noted that Forsyth's sub­
scription to the principle of the "moralizing of dogma" 
commits him to a new approach to Ghristology. "The • • • 
moralization of religion • • . prescribes a new manner 
of inquiry on such a central subject as the person of 
Christ. This inquiry is essentially that of determin­
ing what must be thought of the Christ who brought to 
pass the new creation of the moral soul of man to which 
the Bible bears fundamental witness. Such an investi­
gation starts, as Forsyth believes, "from the conviction 
that for life and history the moral is the real, and that 
the movements of the Great Reality must be morally con­
strued as they are morally r e v e a l e d . T h i s  is to say
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 222.
2. Ibid., p. 222f. Cf. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 209* "A real theology is that which is framed under the primacy, not of the rational or scientific, but of the moral, that is, of the holy. Everything here turns on the hegemony of personality, on its central organ
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that "the spiritual world is not the world of noetic
process or cosmic force, but of holy, i.e. moral, order,
act, and p o w e r . P r e s s i n g  this point sets the thought
of Forsyth inexorably on collision course with Ghalce-
donian Ghristology and he says x
Now concerning the union of the two natures in Christ the old dogma thought in a far too natural and non-moral way. Its categories were too ele­mental and physical. It conceived it as an act of might, of immediate divine power, an act which united the two natures into a person rather than through that person. It united them miraculously rather than morally, into the existence of the in­carnate personality rather than by its action.The person was the resultant of the two natures rather than the agent of their union. They were united into a person whose action only began after the union, and did not affect it. It began (ac­cording to the dogma) in the miraculous conception, which was not an ethical act, rather than in the grace of the eternal son, who, for our sakes, from rich became poor.^
as conscience, on its central energy as will, on its cen­tral malady as sin, on its central destiny as redemption."
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Ghrist, p. 223#
2. Ibid., p. 223* Cf. F., Religion In Recent Art, p.363* "There, in the moral personality of Christ, is the sacred soil and fertile field for the rise of better an­swers to the old problems than have yet been given." It must not be assumed that Forsyth was scornful of early creeds and creed-makers. In his Theology in Church andState, with Ghalcedon evidently in mind, he says in acharitable spirit * "The first thing we have to recognize in creeds of the past is that however lamentable may have been the proceedings of certain councils, the existence of
the creeds was due to a moral necessity rising at a crisis out of the nature of the Gospel as it faced the world"(p. 106).
86
In the reconstruction of the classic formula on an 
ethical basis it even becomes misleading to talk about 
"union." The difficulty here, Forsyth maintains, is in 
the materialistic connotation of the word. "Union is a 
term too physical, too natural," and this is even true of 
"terms like permeation or interpenetration."! Great care 
must therefore be exercised to avoid the common yet 
erroneous way of speaking of Christ as a kind of human 
receptacle who by an effusion of the Holy Spirit became 
brimful of God-ness. Once again the offence of which 
early twentieth century Liberalism is particularly 
guilty —  is against the moral basis of the Incarnation, 
in that it is but "a poor and passive idea of humanity 
instead of a moral, which must be active even in its re­
ceptivity."^ Stating the case more vividly and meta-
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 223f*
2. Ibid., p. 224. Of. Ibid., p. 352; also F., "Revel­ation and the Person of Christ," op. cit., p. 119f* "We may not think of Christ as a human receptacle, whose con­secration was in the contents alone. It is quite inade­quate to say that the mould of His human personality was willingly and entirely filled by the Spirit of God." This is a popular though —  as Forsyth declares —  heterodox way of "explaining" the mystery of the person of Christ.In 1950 Dr. Roy Smith of the Methodist Church of America wrote a pamphlet for Church Membership classes entitled*"I Believe in Jesus Christ" (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press* Nashville) in which the divine-human personality was illustrated by the figure of a child's sand-bucket dipped into the infinite sea and holding every drop of the ocean that it could possibly contain. Forsyth would never have approved of this analogy.
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phorically, here is hut the repetition of an error of the 
long past which conceived of the human nature of Christ "as 
no more than a coat which was put on, while the divine be­
came but a palladium dropped from Heaven in human form, 
with an action more mechanical than moral."!
B'orsyth holds that the Christology of Chalcedon 
bears the clear impress of having been conditioned by a 
now outdated Greek metaphysic and this poses a real 
problem for modern man.
The formula of the union of two natures in one person is essentially a metaphysical formula, and the formula of a Hellenic metaphysio, and it is more or less archaic for the modern mind. The term "nature" is a purely metaphysical term, and one which characterises a scholastic metaphysic of being rather than a modern metaphysic of ethic.The metaphysic of being, if not banished from modern science, tends to be retained only in so far as the moral is regarded as the real, and the key to being is found in personality.2
Furthermore, to appreciate "what was lost in a Church 
dominated by a Ghalcedonian metaphysic with an Aristote­
lian editing" is to recall "what really made Christianity 
in the first century."3 This was none other than "a 
moral and religious experience, in the contact of a 
historic Redeemer with the living and personal experience
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 224.
2. Ibid., p. 229.
3. Ibid., p. 218.
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of redemption"! This was the vital element that was lost 
in the Church and remained lost "till the personal faith 
of the New Testament was rescued from a religion chiefly 
institutional and creedal at the Reformation."^
It is not surprising to Forsyth that the dogma of 
the person of Christ in its classic form has given per­
plexity to generation after generation of theologians.
He rightly observes that no dogma has been more susceptible 
to the impact of progressive changes in the .intellectual 
climate of Christendom. Actually, this susceptibility —  
amounting to vulnerability —  while it is not difficult 
to explain, is of no little importance to this discussion. 
And Forsyth succeeds so well with his "case history" that 
he deserves to be quoted at some length*
The Ghalcedonian or Athanasian form of belief, which is embalmed in the current formula of twonatures in one person in Christ, may be said tohave been seriously shaken wherever modern con­ditions have been realized. This has occurred the more readily as the creeds in which it was embodied served for their day the purpose rather of repelling errors than of adjusting truths.The truths were not really and inwardly adjusted but only placed together; and they were thus the more easily shaken apart. They were married but not wedded, or if wedded not welded; and though
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 218.
2. Ibidem.
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they lived in the same house, it was not without friction. The human mind, the moral experience, were not yet ripe enough. Psychology, and es­pecially religious psychology, had not then come into existence ; and, while the strongest assertions were made about the existence of the two natures as a postulate of faith, it was beyond the power of the metaphysic which then prevailed to show how they could cohere in a personal unity. The at­tempts failed even at a later date, when a doctrine of mutual permeation took the place of a doctrine of conjunction and mutual action. With the modern growth of psychology, and the modern revolution of metaphysic, such formulae were bound to dissolve. They were based on an early metaphysic of natures and a crude science of personality,1
Yet Forsyth shows no inclination to gloat over any dis­
crediting of what he calls in one place "the somewhat 
stiff mentality of the Apostolic Fathers, or the Christ­
ianized philosophy of the Apologists with their logism, 
Such a negative and vacuous reaction would not provide an 
answer to a pressing problem. "No dissolution of the old 
dogma prevents the Christological question from still be­
ing the question of the hour and of the future for relig­
ious thought."3 A more constructive approach to the so-
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, P. 21?. Forsyth's diagnostic comments are reminiscent of the picturesque simile which A. G. Bruce in The Humiliation of Christ attributes to the Lutherans in their criticism of the two-nature doctrine in Reformed theology * "According to the Reformed conception of the union, the two natures were simply glued together like two boards, without anÿ. real communion" (p. 120).
2. Ibid., p. 4?. 3. Ibid., p. 218.
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lution of this problem is intimated, he believes, in the 
hopeful signs of a return to the Bible, and, specifically, 
to the Gospel of the Bible. The scriptural doctrine of 
the Person of Christ serves as a much better starting 
point than the ecclesiastical development of the dogma.
"And it is satisfactory for this reason» It remoralizes the 
whole issue by restoring it to personal religion.
Forsyth points out that such a reorientation of Christolog- 
ical thought had been temporarily and imperfectly achieved 
in the Reformation. With renewed Biblical emphasis "on 
the conscience and on the guilty conscience, Christianity 
became once more personal and evangelical; that is, it be­
came predominantly ethical.Unfortunately, the leaders 
of the Reformation really adopted only half-hearted 
measures in moralizing the dogma of Christ’s Person.
While commendable and fresh attention was being given to 
the religious side of the redemptive work and of justi­
fication by faith, the Reformers slipped into the old
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 218.
2. Ibidem. Gf, P., "The Gross as the Pinal Seat of Authority," The Contemporary Review (October, I899).Here Forsyth says » "The Reformation took an indispensable step that the best work of the Church had made inevitable, when Luther transferred the supreme problem of life to the area of personal conscience" (p. 597)*
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pattern of thought with respect to the Incarnation.
The Reformers, with all their new departure in the religion of Redemption and Justification, took over the substance of the old theology about the divine nature that gave Christ His redeeming power. With all their moralizing at the close of Christ’s life they did not duly moralize its beginning, or the heavenly act which preceded and prescribed its beginning.1
The consequence of this Reformation procedure is to ring 
down a curtain of discontinuity between the Incarnation 
and the Atonement. There is thus "a paralyzing division 
down the middle of the divine action in Christ" which pro­
duces "the ethical effect of Christ on man crossed by an 
initiative on God’s side when Christ left heaven, which 
was more metaphysical or miraculous than it was moral.
The ultimate contribution of the Reformation to the re­
formulation of a Christology, both firm in regard to 
ancient truth and yet flexible enough to accommodate 
the moral insights of modern times, was therefore of a 
limited nature.
The deceleration of moral momentum in the post- 
Reformation period invited a return of theological minds
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 234.
2. Ibidem. Forsyth goes on to say with keen per­ceptiveness I "If its first condition is an incarnation
made possible only by such an act of power as underlies the union of natures into a composite person, then the redemption is unreal. It is a phantasmagory" (p. 235)*
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to intellectualist preoccupation. "The great moral vis of
the Reformation subsided into the renewed intellectualism
of the seventeenth century dogmatists, so able, so acute,
and so irrelevant to life."^ In natural reaction to this
development there came, under the stimulating influence of
the Enlightenment, a counter swing toward a larger
rationalism and a warmer humanism.
Correction then became inevitable ; and it came from the Illumination, the rationalist, human movement of the eighteenth century, with its science and its romance, its enlargement both of interest and of heart, its sense of the world and of humanity, its concrete realism.^
The rise of Hegelianism represented a strenuous effort
"to scholasticise Christianity anew, and to rationalize
Christology on the largest lines."3 However, Hegelianism
ran its course and ultimately failed completely in its
high objective. Forsyth gives a brief resume of the
waxing and waning of this movement *
The older and narrower Rationalism had simply abolished Christology by reducing Christ to a mere man, and any science of Him to the psy­chology of genius. And Hegel seemed to restore all by discovering a Christology in the very nature of thought and being. But the capture of Hegel by his extreme left has brought his system
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 110.
2. Ibidem.
3. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 218.
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to much the same effect as the old rationalism. While the reformed and evangelical spirit has, by its revival, notably in Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and others, discredited all the Hegelian con­structions.^
It is over against this background of thought and counter- 
thought , of appreciating and of depreciating the moral 
kernel of Christology as he sees and analyzes it, that 
Forsyth proposes to make his own contribution toward the 
long movement of the Church's reasoned attempt "to pierce 
and clarify the mystery of godliness in Christ."2
i. The Concept of the Deity of Jesus Christ
(1) The Incarnation 
According to Forsyth there are two truths that 
must be acknowledged and maintained in any proper under­
standing of the Incarnation. On the one hand, the utmost 
care must be exercised to safeguard the initiative and 
absoluteness of God.
Nothing must be done to imperil the absoluteness, the freedom, of God, His creative initiative on grounds entirely within Himself. Accordingly, the union in a corporeal Christ can only be an exalted form of God’s relation to those finite conditions which underlay the existence of a created world . • a relation within the absolute God, an immanence of the world in the Transcendent. of the corporeal personality in the spiritual.3
1. P., The Person and Pla.ce of Jesus Christ, p. 2l8f.
2. Ibid., p. 240. 3. Ibid., p. 3^4.
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On the other hand, the genuine realness of human life
must be preserved.
Nothing must be done to impair the reality of human life, the conditions of its finitude, the necessity of growth within the course of time.It begins with certain possibilities, with a destiny engrained in the protoplast; but it only passes from a destiny into a perfection through a career.^
This earnest theologian recognizes the problem of the 
apparent contradictions represented in the concept of 
"absolute God and relative man, absolute finality and 
growing attainment, absolute Grace and growth in Grace, 
the victory won and yet the victory to be won, the King­
dom come and the Kingdom coming,Nevertheless, stand­
ing firmly on his premise that the unity is "an exalted
form of God's relation to those finite conditions which
underlay the existence of a created world, and made it 
at the same time a finished world,"3 Porsyth believes 
that the solution of the problem is to be found in the 
alogical but dynamic unity of the Person of Jesus Christ*
It is not in a monumental person but in an active, not in a quiescent personality, statuesque and ideal, but in one who exists in a vast movement and is consummated in a crucial act. The union
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p, 344f,
2. Ibid,, p. 345.
3. Ibid., p. 344.
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means that this act or movement is twofold* In a sense, but in no monistic sense, we have one nature, in two modes of action; for moral reality must be in heaven what it is on earth. It is a polar move­ment, the reconciliation of two directions, two tendencies, and not the fusion of two quantities, and certainly not of two forces. It is wills that are concerned; and wills are not forces so much as elective and directive powers over forces.^
If will be considered a force, then it is only so in the 
sense that it chooses, aims, coordinates and concentrates 
other forces. Upon this ground we have in Christ "the 
union of two moral movements or directions, and not merely 
of two forces or things; and we have their reconciliation 
and not merely their confluence, their mutual living in­
volution and not simply their inert c o n j u n c t i o n . T h e  
religious purpose of the union of the two movements in 
Christ, which is His will, is that of the salvation of 
man and his restoration to communion with God.
For Forsyth the key to understanding the Incarna­
tion is Soteriology.
The canon for the Incarnation . . .  is soteriologi- cal. It is the work of Christ that gives us the key to the nature of Christ. It is the experience of faith in His work that alone opens to us the person and the deity of Christ as the creator of the new life with G o d .3
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 345.
2. Ibid., p. 346.
3. Ibidem.
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This is not meant to imply that "the experience of faith 
in His work" reveàls to the individual or to the Church 
the whole personality of Christ at any particular point 
of time. As in the faith-experience of the apostles, so 
also today there is required a cosmic interpretation of 
Christ's work which transcends the experience of any indi­
vidual. "If the effect of Christ on us be but our recon­
ciliation • • . that is an effect that might have been 
produced by a prophet and martyr of unparalleled sanctity 
and unquenchable love."^ Such a subjective construction 
of Christ’s work would not necessitate "the belief to 
which the early Church was driven by the apostolic sense 
of what they had in Christ —  the belief in His pre- 
existence."^ The only way In which the work of Christ 
can interpret His Person in an exhaustive sense is when 
that "work" is regarded "as the new creation ^  nuce."3 
It is the miracle of a work of such magnitude that compels 
the highest possible estimate of Christ. "Nothing lower 
than the Holy God could re-hallow the guilty human soul.
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 279*
2. Ibid., p. 280. 3* Ibidem.
4. Ibid,, p. 281. Cf. P., The Cruciality of the Cross,p. 19» "The divinity of Christ is what the Church was driven upon to explain the effect on it of the cross."
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It is from the aforementioned point of view that 
Forsyth can insist that "the question of Christ is not a 
question of a divine hypostasis but of a divine Saviour.
•• • Christology turns on a Soteriology."^ This insistent 
premise furnishes the ground for the Porsythian concept 
of the Person of Jesus Christ. Coupled with it are the 
twin notions of Kenosis and Plerosis which in turn have 
their grounding in the pre-existence of Christ. In the 
discussion which follows an attempt will be made to show 
how Forsyth's Ghristological thought is developed on this 
basis and how it is conducive to that concept of Christ's 
Person which leads him to conclude that "Christ is more 
precious to us by what distinguishes Him from us than by 
what identifies Him with u s . "2 However, before the sub­
ject of the pre-existence of Christ and the related idea 
of His cosmic significance in the teaching of P. T.
Porsyth are taken up, a brief consideration should be 
given to this theologian's attitude toward that doctrine 
of the Incarnation which has to do with the miraculous
1. P., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 16. Many similar citations could be given. ïfii's is a point which Forsyth makes with almost monotonous regularity in all his Christological writing.
2. P., "The Distinctive Thing In Christian Experience,"The Hibbert Journal (April, 1908), p. 486.
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birth of Jesus.
It is Forsyth's tireless contention that a knowledge 
of the true identity of Jesus Christ is not reached 
through subscription to certain tenets but through moral 
verdict and decision. "What think ye of Christ? • • .
Your opinion is not asked about the miracle of His birth 
or any other single point."1 It is not surprising there­
fore that the questionable doctrine of the Virgin Birth 
is relegated to the periphery of Ghristological concern.
"We should lean but lightly on the Virgin Birth, which 
does not make a moral appeal to us, but too often appeals 
to a ready interest either in a baby or a m i r a c l e . W h i l e  
the doctrine may be a part of the traditional teaching of 
the Church, it is not a vital part such as the Incarnation, 
to which it is not intrinsic. By the standards of true 
orthodoxy "to deny the Virgin Birth is heterodox, but to 
deny the Incarnation is heretical."3 Furthermore, as 
Forsyth sees it*
The key to the Incarnation is not in the cradle,
1. P., Missions in State and Church, p. 60. For Porsyth the focus of Christology is always on the Person rather than a proposition relating to that Person.
2. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 87*
3. P., "Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, Heresy, and Freedom,"The Hibbert Journal (January, 1910), p. 323.
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but in the Cross. The light on Bethlehem falls from Calvary. The virtue lies in some act done by Christ; and He Himself did no act in His birth, but in His death He did the act of the universe. The soul of the Incarnation does not lie in His being born of a pure virgin; but it lies in the death of his pure soul and the perfect obedience of His will as a propitiation for the sins of the world. God was in Christ as reconciler, not as prodigy. The key to the Incarnation lies, not in the miracle performed bn His mother, but in the act of redemp­tion performed by Himself
While the narratives in Matthew and Luke having to do with
the birth of Jesus have been the focus of much critical
activity, the settlement of the matter is not really in
the hands of the critics, either literary or historical.
This is due to the fact that the question is fundamentally
theological rather than critical. According to Porsyth,
the decisive factor that impinges on the problem has to
do with the integrity of the Gospel and especially with
the requirements of the grace of holy God toward sinful
man:
Was such a mode of entry into the world indis­pensable for Christ’s mode of redemption? If it was otiose to that work then we can leave it to the methods of the critics. But if it was es­sential to that work we must refuse them the last word. If it was essential to the perfect holiness of Christ’s redeeming obedience, what is unhappily called His sinlessness, then it must stand, what­ever the critics say.^
1. P., God the Holy Father, p. 40.
2. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 14. Cf. P., The Person and"Place of Jesus Christ, p. 361: "It
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Though Porsyth dodges a direct response to the issue he 
has posed -- *'I am not here called on to decide that 
question"^ elsewhere in his writings he indicates his 
probable reply. In his book, The Church, the Gospel and 
Society, he clearly implies that the question of the 
Virgin Birth is bound up in the larger question of what 
constitutes moral authority in the Church. And Porsyth 
declares emphaticallyi "It is not truths extracted from 
the Bible and guaranteed by prophecy and miracle. This 
is antiquated supernaturalism with its doctrinaire 
orthodoxy."^ The Christian Creed really has only one 
article, in comparison with which all other articles pale 
into insignificance. "It is the Gospel of God’s redeeming 
Grace in Christ."3
(2) The Pre-existent and Cosmic Christ 
It is Forsyth’s conviction that if there is a 
diminishing emphasis on the Virgin Birth there must be —  
after the example of the apostle Paul —  an increase of
is to be noted . . . that were the Virgin birth beyond historic criticism it might not by itself give us a pre­existent Christ, and it need not give us more them an Arian."
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 14.
2. P. T. Porsyth, The Church, the Gospel and Society (LondonI Independent Press Ltd., 1962), p. 6^ .
3. Ibid., p. 69.
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emphasis on the pre-existence of Christ.1 In support of 
this latter concept he alludes to the teaching of the 
Fourth Gospel and to Matthew lli27, from which the idea 
is inseparable. The paucity of Synoptic references may 
be explained, he believes, by the fact that Jesus was 
often reticent about matters of the profoundest import,
"They may be few Just because |J.t^  bulked unspeakably in 
Christ’s m i n d . A n o t h e r  possible explanation is to be 
found in the fact that in teaching His pre-existence Jesus 
would be going against the most sacrosanct tenet of Juda­
ism. "It was a belief whose challenge went to the heart 
of Jewish Monotheism."3 A certain reserve in speaking on
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 261. Porsyth has strong feelings about the importance of the doctrine of pre-existence. In Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind he recommends to ministers the preaching of a sermon on the difficult theme of Pre-destination by con­necting this New Testament teaching with thç pre-existence of Jesus Christ. He is convinced that* "Pepple . • . will listen to preaching about the soul’s destiny • • . about its being bound up with God's timeless thought, will and purpose —  a purpose pre-intelligent, pre-active and pre­redeeming. . . • Faith in an eternally slain Christ is the foundation for the Church of all certainty of salvation, all divine destiny for the soul. . . .  We were from the first where Christ, by God’s eternal will, ever is" (p. 96).
2. Ibid., p. 266. Porsyth adds: "His thoughts about His death were unutterable, except in an act."
3. Ibid., p. 274.
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this subject was almost obligatory, fori "If he had been 
explicit and categorical about His pre-existent life it 
would have been to invite from a Jewish crowd a death as 
certain as Rome’s suppression of Him would have been had 
He raised the Messiah’s flag."^ But, these explanations 
aside, Porsyth is rightly impatient with those "con­
cordance critics" who apply a quantitative test to every 
theological idea projected in the Scriptures. A rare 
reference may carry great weight, as he believes to be 
the case in the allusions to kenosis and pre-existence in 
Philippians 2. Paul was no professor of Dogmatics and it 
is not surprising that his theology often comes in more 
as obiter dictum than as duly proportioned and studied 
truth. However, the strength and clarity of the apostolic 
testimony far more than makes up for the restraint of the 
Synoptics. Porsyth explains this as followsi
The apostles could not evade the idea of a pre­existence which may have come home to Christ Him­self only in the uplifted hours and the great crises. . . .St. Paul’s belief in the pre-exist­ence of Christ . . . did not rest on Christ’s words. It was an inevitable rebound of spiritual logic under his faith’s obsession by the Christ in glory. Such glory, such Godhead could not be acquired by any moral victory of a created being within the limits of a life so brief as that of Jesus. . . . And so, from the exalted glory of Christ, Paul's thought was cast back, by the very
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 2?5f.
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working of the Christ in him, and in the whole consciousness of the Church’s faith, to the same Christ from all Eternity by the Father’s side.^
According to Porsyth, in Paul’s Epistles, the
Fourth Gospel, the teaching of Jesus, and in the Council
of Kicaea, the view of the pre-existence of Christ is "in
terms of the Son and not in terms of the L o g o s A n d
the relationship of the Son to the Father was a totally
unique one. "He was not a person who became a son, or
was destined to be a son, but his whole personality was
absolute sonship."3 Such absolute sonship is consistent
with Christ’s possession of divine and saving power and
therefore could not have come into being at any particular
point of time.
Such a relation as we believe our Saviour now bears to the Father could not have arisen at a point of time. It could not have been created by His earth­ly life. The power to exercise God’s prerogative of forgiveness, judgment and redemption could never have been acquired by the moral excellence or
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp. 268-269. Porsyth goes on to observe* "I do not think that today we can evade this same retrospective pressure of our faith, when its tide is full, any more than thé apostles could."
2. P., "Does the Church Prolong the Incarnation?" TheLondon Quarterly Review (January, 1920), p. 212. Porsyth further maintains that "the Logos theology has impaired the moral effect of the theology of the Holy Spirit, stifled the moral note of the Kingdom as it ruled Christ, and arrested the effect of a gospel of moral redemption and personal reconciliation" (Ibidem).
3. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 285.
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religious achievement of any created being, however endowed by the spirit of God#^
Forsyth declares that it was not due to dogmatic interest 
but religious that the idea of the pre-existence of Christ 
the Son sprang up and flourished in the Church. "It was 
to give full and infinite effect to the condescending love 
of God, and to give range to the soul’s greatness by dis­
playing the vast postulates of its r e d e m p t i o n . W h i l e  
a limited form of reconciliation might be effected be­
tween God and man by someone who originated in time, such 
a person could never do the mighty and finished work that 
the pre-existent Christ did for men. "A man might recon­
cile us to God but he could not unite us for ever with 
God in the way that an eternal holiness requires."3 No 
*'adoptionist" theory of the Person of Christ can there­
fore be countenanced. It was solid faith in a redeeming 
Christ who in Himself was the never beginning and never 
ending holy Love of Eternal God that called forth —  and 
will continue to call forth —  the life, the praise, 
and the worship of the Church Universal.
The Cross was the reflection (or say rather the historic pole) of an act within Godhead. The
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 269*
2. Ibid., p. 277.
3. Ibid., p. 282.
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historic victory was the index and correlate of a choice and conquest in Godhead itself* Nothing less will carry the fulness of faith, the swelling soul, and the Church’s organ voice of liturgy in every land and age. If our thought does not allow that belief, we must reduce the pitch of faith to something plain, laic and songless, and, in making it more homely, make it less holy, less absolute, less adoring,1
It is apparent that it is mainly on ethical and 
experimental grounds that Porsyth argues the case for the 
pre-existence of Christ. However he turns more to logic 
when he approaches the subject from the standpoint of 
preserving the unity of God’s nature. If at one moment 
in the midst of time Christ performed his reconciling 
work, if it had no context in eternity, then there would 
have to be a change in the very nature of God. Yet the 
unchangeableness of God is guaranteed by His holiness, sro 
that no temporal event can be allowed to alter His es­
sential character. Therefore there must be some kind of 
underlying continuity between what Christ did as the Son 
of God in the flesh and his ante-natal existence in the 
Godhead. It is this problem that Porsyth has in mind 
when he says *
What God felt and did • • • was not through some relation to us that came into being with Christ’s earthly life, but it was through something that underlay it. For had it come into being then, to
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 2?0f.
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see and judge the world in Christ would have been a step so new as to affect the unchangeableness of God. Grace would have begun, and so been finite. But it was a step which lay in the nature of God­head forever, in the eternal, personal, holy, and obedient relation of the Son to the Father, and in the act of. renunciation outside the walls of the world.^
Thus the earthly work of Christ is conceived as being "but 
the exercise in historic conditions of an eternal resolve 
taken in heavenly places. Forsyth even goes so far as 
to say that "the heavenly side of salvation was • . .
historic, though it was premundane history."3 In this
way of thinking the forgiveness of God is not reduced to 
a mere temporality, rather is the eternal quality of the 
grace of God asserted and His sovereignty maintained and 
assured.
There ^  the danger of introducing an element of 
docetism into Ghristological thought by an emphasis on 
the pre-existence of Christ and Porsyth is aware of it.
He therefore inquires % "Could a pre-existent Christ be a 
real man?"^ The answer is both positive and cogent. "A 
personal unreality could never become the first personal
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 273*
2. Ibid., p. 270.
3. Ibid., p. 272.
4. Ibid., p. 289.
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influence in history that the Christ from heaven has 
become, Porsyth then goes on to a forceful reaffirma­
tion and a pertinent observation*
His pre-existence . . . has not robbed him of the reality that is shown in vast historic effect. Andit may be observed • • . that if the influence ofthe Church upon the world is less today than it once was, that loss of effect is at least concur­rent with an unprecedented weakening of belief within the Church itself in His life before life and His ante-natal will.*^
Porsyth is much in agreement with the teaching of 
Irenaeus in emphasizing the deity of Jesus Christ in terms 
of His pre-existence. But there is a distinction between 
the methods by which the two thinkers work out this idea. 
Irenaeus affirms the pre-existence of Christ as the etern­
al pre-existence of the Logos. He believes that the Logos
is the Yahveh of the Old Testament and the Son of God of
the New Testament. He interprets Christ as essentially 
equal with God and therefore an object of worship.
Porsyth, on the contrary, does not develop his view of 
the pre-existence of Christ in terms of the Logos. In­
stead he utilizes such phrases as "life before life" and . 
"ante-natal will" in his interpretation of Christ’s pre­
existence. On the other hand he is in agreement with
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 290.
2. Ibidem.
\
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Irenaeus in believing that Christ is an object of worship 
in His being essentially equal with God.
Closely related to Forsyth’s emphasis on the pre­
existence of Christ is the importance he attaches to the 
cosmic significance of His Person. A word which occurs 
many times in his Ghristological writing is the German 
Weltanschauung or "world view." A system of thought 
which claims to explain life and experience as a whole 
may be expected to present a satisfactory view of the 
world, and, for the Christian in whose faith Christ is 
central, He must be shown to be the summit from which the 
true world-view is obtained. This the Christian thinker 
essays to do by the theory of the supra-mundane, cosmic 
Christ. If in Christ God is seen in personal action 
within history in and for mankind, the thought may reason­
ably be extended to God’s eternal purpose for the world 
as a whole, especially if the maxim is accepted that the 
moral is the real.
If in Christ we have found the heart of God and the secret of His action with men, we have also found the divine purpose for the whole world, the divine action in the world, and the divine principle of history. We have the ground of all things in the goal of all things. The total ef­fect of Christ’s redemption is not to be sought
in the soul alone, as if it were only by His action on the soul . . . that He secured the great consummation. For the whole creation groans
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for Redemption, and is included in the process which works for the manifestation of the Sons of God.^
In His being eternal and transcendent Christ is also the ■
Lord of creation. And the God who rules the universe is
also the same God who has revealed Himself in the face of
Jesus Christ, Furthermore, Forsyth sees the very closest
connection between Creation and Redemption, between
Creator and Redeemer.
The ground plan of an evolving creation, and in­deed of Being, is God’s redemptive will. . . .  We are born into a redeemed world. We are created for redemption, created by One who knew in creating that He had in Himself all the resources wherewith to deal with freedom’s abuse of His creation. Be­neath, behind, and above God the Creator is God the Redeemer.^
Thus, in the thought of Porsyth* Christus Creator 
est Christus Redemptor. This is a theory discussed and 
advocated a generation ago by H. W. Clark in his scholarly 
book. The Cross and the Eternal Order.3 it is interesting 
to find this writer observing that the Christus Creators 
Christus Redemptor synthesis of Paul had been quite lost
1. P., The Principle of Authority, p. 206.
2. Ibid., p. 184.
3. H. W. Clark, The Gross and the Eternal Order, A Study of Atonement In Its Cosmic Significance(London and Redhilli Lutterworth Press, 1943)# pp. 110-16?.
110
sight of all through the long period of Greek and Latin 
theology; and, even in modern times, except for the stress 
put upon the conception of "Christ as Head of the Race" by 
a few British theologians of the nineteenth century 
(Erskine of Linlathen, McLeod Campbell, and P. D, Maurice), 
no one had yet come forward with a convincing statement 
regarding the Pauline correlation of Creation and Redemp­
tion. "Verily Paul’s synthesis remained at the end of the 
days far, very far away."  ^ It is indeed strange that 
P. T. Forsyth's contribution is overlooked in this survey 
of thought. Although he is quoted three times in Clark’s 
work, there is no recognition of his effort to restore 
the Christus Creator* Christus Redemptor synthesis. Yet 
Forsyth’s Christological thought moves strongly in this 
direction*
Is the Kingdom of God the consummation of creation? Then surely the Saviour and King of the Kingdom must be one with the Creator of creation. The world which was made for such a Christ must have been made by Him. The largest conception of cre­ation is much more than cosmic in range* it is also redemptive in power. It thinks of the cosmos as the arena or the base of God's salvation. The ground plan of creation -- what is it if it be not found in the final plan of salvation? Has creation any ground plan else? . . • The goal to which the whole creation moves —  is it not that Eternal Re­demption? • . . The whole cosmos is great with the redeemed Kingdom. But if so, surely then the Kingdom's
1. Clark, The Cross and the Eternal Order, p. 139-
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Saviour and King is Creation's Maker and Humanity's God. ^
This was the conviction that combined faith and logic 
brought to the apostle Paul. "He [PaulT] worked back from 
the faith that all things were made for Christ to the con­
viction that, as the end was in the beginning, all things 
were made ^  C h rist."2 Furthermore, in the whole New 
Testament witness, "His death and resurrection made the 
greatest thing His great historic and cosmic Person did."3 
Through the ministry of the Holy Spirit this greatest work 
of the cosmic Christ becomes effectual in the life of man. 
"The Lord the Spirit, by the Word of the Gospel, makes the 
person of Christ so near as to be the ever-present revela­
tion and ever-creative redemption by G o d ."4
If redemption is creation's plan, then a "cosmic" 
redemption must be in that plan. "The soul's Redeemer was 
the soul's Creator divested of everything but the holy 
love in which he created, and raised by the deep and long 
renunciation to a power in which lies the salvation for 
ever and ever of the whole created race and world."5
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp.pp. 325-326. Gf. P., The Justification of God, p. 219f.
2. Ibid., p. 269.
3* F., This Life and the Next, p. 123*
4. F., The Principle of Authority, p. 116.
5« F,, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 353# Cf.
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Other thoughts follow in natural sequence* "Such a re­
lation between Christ and other men carries us, as soon as 
we reflect and ask about it, into a Christ supra-histpric, 
supra-human, and pre-mundane^ Porsyth then brings his 
Christus Creator* Christus Redemptor view to a climactic 
conclusion. "It is only the Christ of the New Creation 
that can be the Christ of a complete Weltanschauung, and 
wear the crown of a new world wherein dwelleth the 
righteousness of a holy God.
(3) Kenosis* The Self-emptying 
Once the pre-existence of Christ has been granted 
as a postulate of Christian faith, Porsyth believes that 
it is not possible to continue a fruitful Christological 
discussion without employing some theory of kenosis, or 
"divine self-emptying" as he calls it in his sermon on 
Philippians 2*5-8.
If there was a personal pre-existence in the case of Christ it does not seem possible to adjust it to the historic Jesus without some doctrine of Kenosis. We face in Christ a God-head self-reduced
P., "Revelation and the Bible," The Hibbert Journal ,(Octo­ber, 1911), p. 241* "If God's treatment of us be redemp­tion . . . its content is the living, loving, saving God; its compass is cosmic."
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 355f#
2. Ibid., p. 356.
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but real, whose Infinite power took effect in self- humiliation, whose strength was perfected in weakness, who consented not to know with an ignorance divinely wise, and who emptied Himself in virtue of His divine fulness.
While he is aware of the difficulties that have always ap­
peared in conjunction with kenotic theorizing, Forsyth be­
lieves that the main problems arise unnecessarily. They 
come up because kenoticists persist in trying to spell out 
some exact answer to the question how God should become 
Christ rather than in concentrating on the fact that He 
did become Christ. The former concern relates to theologi­
cal science, while the latter has to do with religious 
faith. And in Forsyth's judgment, "the science of it can 
wait, but the religion of it c a n n o t . "2 He thus indicates 
his intention to reverse the priority in his own labours 
looking toward the resolution of the great paradox that 
"God was in Christ."
Before any explanation of Forsyth's theory is at-^  
tempted it should be pointed out that he does indeed have 
a different approach to the problem of the Person of Jesus 
Christ than that,of previous kenoticists such as A. M. 
Fairbairn, D. W. Forrest, or even Charles Gore to whose
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp. 293-294.
2. Ibid., p. 294.
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thought his theory is said to bear a resemblance.^ In­
stead of formulating a linear equation by inductive, 
empirical methods, the solution to which is the Kenotic 
Theory, Porsyth sees the Theory as a logical, necessary 
deduction from the existential situation which is the 
result of Christ's redemptive act. Thus any exposition 
must begin not with a theological conviction or meta­
physic but with positive, personal religious experience 
of Him. As has been shown, Porsyth maintains that this 
experience implies and necessitates the pre-existence of 
Christ, which in turn makes it necessary to deal with the 
fact that the heavenly Christ laid aside His glory and the 
earthly Christ underwent humiliation. Surely then some 
kind of kenosis is involved, but a true conception of the 
kenotic process is of one which —
does not think of the divine self-consciousness as going out of existence, but only of its retraction, concentration, or occultation, in one constituent of the Godhead. The suicide of God is no part of
1. W. L. Bradley in P. T. Porsyth* The Man and His Work says of Forsyth's kenotic doctrine, "There is . . . an affinity to Gore" (p. 94). Actually such an affinity is rather tenuous since the two theologians represent two different types of Kenotic Theory. According to the scheme worked out by A. B. Bruce (The Humiliation of Christ, p. 179), Gore's theory would be labeled "Real but Relative" while Forsyth's would be called "Real but Potential." There is far too much originality in the latter's thinking for him to have been very heavily in­debted to any previous thinker.
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the kenotic idea, which turns but on self-divest­ment as a moral power of the eternal Son; who re­tains His consciousness but renounces the con­ditions of infinity.in its procreate form.
It must be readily admitted that there is certainly no 
"scientific” answer to the question of "how a divine con­
sciousness could reduce its own consciousness by volition. 
One would have to be God Himself to be privy to such know­
ledge. Yet Forsyth feels it may be possible to throw some
light -- even though faint —  upon the matter from the 
"lamp" of human a n a l o g y . 3 In fact, he adduces four
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 295^ '»
2. Ibid., p. 29^f.
3* Ibid,, pp. 296-299* To those who object that such an attempt to depict the ways of deity in human terms isridiculous and doomed to failure it can only be repliedthat a human being has no sensible alternative but to think and speak of God "anthropomorphically," This is the very best that the thinker can do if he is to avoid meaningless abstractions. After all, this is the same language employed by the New Testament writers themselves in their endeavour to explain and give expression to their faith in God. Analogy would seem to be a perfectly legit­imate way of giving form to metaphysical thinking. Indeed Miss Dorothy M. Emmett: The Nature of Metaphysical Think­ing, (^Macmillan & Co., Ltd: London, 19539denies that to call God "Father" is to speak anthropologically. The term is used, she affirms, to illustrate the relation of de­pendence that obtains between creature and Creator (q.v. p. 180). Analogy may therefore be freely used in the human effort to picture infinite things, provided the analogy employed is appropriate to the relationship described.
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analogies from the plane of human existence to show how 
a voluntary contraction of consciousness might be con­
ceivable, The following seems to be the most persuasive, 
logically speaking* Consider the case of a brilliant uni­
versity student who has special aptitude in philosophy 
and who finds exceeding joy in this study. However, his 
father dies and, at the behest of filial duty, it devolves 
upon this young man to turn his back on his beloved field 
of interest and devote himself to a career in business 
that is at utter variance with all that went with his in­
tellectual pursuits and philosophical inclinations. Due 
to the necessary absorption in the pressing affairs and 
conflicting demands of the workaday world, by ,and by he 
ceases to remember much of what he once delighted in 
knowing. The joy of philosophical thinking is only his 
in poignant and nostalgic retrospect. And Forsyth now 
inquires *
Is this not a case where a moral and sympathetic volition leads to a certain contraction of the consciousness; not indeed by a single violent and direct act of will, but by a decision whose effect is the same when it is spread over a life? . . •In applying the illustration to the theology of a kenosis in Eternity, where a thousand years are but as one day, the element of time between choice and result in the earthly case is negligible.1
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp.298-299.
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From the best of motives the subject of this parable im­
poses upon himself a drastic self-limitation. Forsyth*s 
point is that this happens —  has happened —  and is the 
consequence neither of a spiritual process or of a forced 
martyrdom, but of a resolve made willingly and clearly in 
the full knowledge of all it entails. The inference is, 
if this is possible with us frail mortals, how much more 
might it be possible for holy loving God in the person of 
His Son to limit His divine capabilities to a degree be­
yond the bounds of any human analogy.
Just because He was holy God, the Son would be morally capable of a self-dispowering more complete than anything that could be described by human analogy. As God, the Son in His freedom would have a kenotic power over Himself corresponding to the infinite power of self-determination which be­longs to deity.1
No one can tell what it cost the brilliant young uni­
versity student to forego his congenial pursuits and 
stifle his intellectual powers, and who can tell how 
costly it was for One who had all the riches of eternal 
glory in His possession to become poor for our sakes that 
we through His poverty might become rich? Moreover, the 
sacrifice is all the greater when it is in no way exacted 
but is made as a positive moral act of will.
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 300.
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Forsyth's insistence on the interpretation of 
kenosis as a reduction from actuality to potentiality is 
a very important point in his thinking. It is in this 
respect that he becomes creative and original in his 
Christological thought to the most marked and impressive 
degree. This is where he makes a positive contribution 
to "Kenotic" description of the Person of Jesus Christ.
To explain again: The attributes of God when they are 
"kenoticized" are not destroyed but concentrated. "The 
self-reduction, or self retraction, of God might be a 
better phrase than the self-emptying."1 He finds no 
difficulty in ascribing such an ability to Deity. It was 
because Christ was God that He could divest Himself 
temporarily of some of His powers. "He could not have 
emptied Himself but for His Godhead."^ Under the impetus 
of holy Love God enters dynamically and purposefully into 
a complete creaturehood in which His attributes are latent 
or potential rather than actual. It is thus that the 
divine integrity is maintained even as God becomes true 
man.
Accepting what he calls "the principle of Christian
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 308.
2. F., God the Holy Father, p. 33#
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theism" that infinitum capax finiti, Forsyth goes on to 
say that % "Omnipotence means not that God should be able 
to do anything that fancy may suggest; but that, in work­
ing his will of love, God is, from His own free resource, 
equal to all it involves. Of omnipresence he declares* 
"Omnipresence . . • means that God is not hampered by 
space, but can enter spatial relations without being tied 
by ttiem, can exist in limits without being unfree or 
ceasing to be G o d . C o n c e r n i n g  what happens to the 
attribute of omniscience (a point that is often debated 
most vigorously by both proponents and opponents of 
Kenoticism) Forsyth is more explanatoryx "In its eternal 
form, it is an intuitive and simultaneous knowledge of all 
things ; but when the Eternal enters time it becomes a dis­
cursive and successive knowledge, with the power to know 
all things only potential, and enlarging to become actual 
under the moral conditions that govern human growth and 
the extension of human knowledge."3 It is thus that the 
so-called "relative" attributes are brought under the
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 309# Cf. Ibid,, p. 313. See also F., God the Holy Father.
P • 35 •
2. Ibidem.
3. Ibid., p. 30?f. Cf. Ibid., p. 3IO.
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governance of the theistic principle to which this kenotic 
theologian adheres, namely, Infinitum capax finiti, which 
means that ;"If the infinite God was so constituted that He 
could not live also as a finite man, then He was not in­
finite."^
According to Forsyth, an attribute of God is "only
the Being Himself in a certain angle and relation."^
Therefore it is not really possible to speak of the
surrender or renunciation of any of the divine attributes.
"Instead of speaking of certain attributes as renounced
may we not speak of a new mode of their being?"3 However,
when Forsyth suggests this terminology for the Incarnation,
he is not asserting the historic modalist position, i. e.
that Christ was the sole self-expression of God during
the Incarnation phase.
The divine energy was concentrated for the special work to be done. The fulness of the Son's Godhead
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 315*
2. Ibid., p. 309* This should not be confused with Gore's "sphere" or "period" of God's existence which he sets forth in his Dissertations on Subjects Connected With the Incarnation {q.v., p. 94)'» Though the concepts are superficially similar, there is no idea of "po­tential" in Gore's theory.
3. Ibid., p. 307.
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was still the essence of Christ, That Godhead lost nothing in the saving act. It took the whole power of Godhead to save; it was not the Son's work alone; far less was it the work of any im­paired Son, ^
By this viewpoint Forsyth seeks to avoid the charge of 
tending either to Tritheism or to Modalism.
Having devised a kenotic scheme that escapes the 
intolerable consequence of the "suicide of God'% that in 
fact affirms His complete deity in becoming man, Forsyth 
is forthwith confronted with another serious problem.
Could such a God be genuinely incarnate and, in all re­
spects, representative of man? This problem comes to a 
focus in the so-called "sinlessness" of Jesus Christ.
Here the question arises* Could He sin or even be tempted 
to sin? If this question is answered negatively in both 
its parts, how then is the sinless and untemptable char­
acter of Christ to be reconciled with His true humanity?
In his zeal to maintain the Deity of Christ the theologian 
may become docetic in his thought and thus do violence to 
the concept of His being vere homo.
Forsyth does not hesitate to say that Christ was 
free from sin and that the limit of non potuit peccare 
bounds this sinlessness. But the temptable conditions
1, P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 319#
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were there which related Him in a real way to the moral 
struggle and conflict of humanity. He was indeed tempted 
in all points as other men, yet He could not sin. And 
now Forsyth brings another analogy to his aid* "I could 
remind you how possible it is for you to steal some 
article from a shop on your way home, and yet how impos­
sible. You could, but you simply could not,"  ^ The 
phrase "simply could not" denotes the moral imperative in 
contrast to the metaphysical,possibility of the first 
"could." So, Christ "could" sin, but He "simply could 
not." That which was for Him metaphysically possible was 
at the same time ethically impossible. Christ was sinless, 
not that He did not feel the lure of sin, but that He did 
not yield to its appeal. Forsyth goes on to explain that 
"what is truly human is not sin, but the power to be 
tempted to s i n . T h i s  helps to clear the way for a view 
of Christ that keeps His humanity and His deity in unim­
paired balance. "Because Christ was true man He could be 
truly tempted; because He was true God He could not truly 
sin; but He was not less true man for that."3 What
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 301.
2, Ibid., p. 302.
3# Ibidem.
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Forsyth seems to mean is that with Christ there was 
never any will to sin, but that nevertheless He could 
feel the attractive power of temptation# The potential­
ities of His Person did not include sin but did include 
temptation, and Forsyth elucidates as follows*
Among all His potentialities that of sin was not there ; because potentiality is only actuality powerfully condensed; and had potential sin been . , there its actuality would have been but a matter of time and trial. But temptation was potential; and it became actual in due course* He could be tempted because He loved; He could not sin because He loved so deeply, widely, infinitely, holily, because it was God He loved —  God more than man.^
It is not easy to follow the thought of this subtle
theologian when he describes the type of temptation to
which Christ was peculiarly susceptible*
The only temptation with real power for Him was a temptation to good —  to inferior forms of good.It was not the temptation to forsake the righteous­ness of God, but to seek it by other paths, less moral and less patient paths, than God's highway of the holy cross.^
This surely is giving an unusually wide interpretation to
the word "temptation" which has reference generally to
wrong choice. To speak of being tempted only to good
would seem to detract seriously from the true humanity of
Jesus and to take away the God of Christian faith who is
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp.302-303.
2. Ibid., p. 303.
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"not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our 
weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted 
as we are, yet without sinning" (Hebrews 4*15 RSV). If 
Forsyth can be understood to mean by "inferior forms of 
good" some kind of second-best choice made in preference 
to the best, then the temptation to choose the second best 
rather than the best, which has the prior claim, would 
seem to be a temptation to evil. It was this sort of 
temptation to which Jesus was subjected in the wilderness 
trials and which He steadfastly resisted as having thel^r 
source in Satan himself. In any case, Forsyth does not 
intentionally betray any inconsistency in his thought, for 
he holds that because Christ was true man He could be 
truly tempted, yet without sin.
Returning to the subject of the divine omniscience 
and its reduction in the Person of Jesus Christ, Forsyth 
says %
By His own will God in Christ reduced His intel­ligence from being actual to being potential, within the kingdom of power or nature; while from that potentiality, as Christ grew in grace, it de­veloped and regained actual omniscience by living it back, by the moral way of the kingdom of grace, till He left the world behind, to be determined as the Son of God in power.^
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 316,Forsyth here gives the impression that the self-reduction of attributes only involved the divine omniscience.
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This statement points to another significant aspect of 
Forsyth's Christological thought. He believes that all 
of the reduced attributes must be restored to their 
original actuality. This is done by what he calls the 
movement of "Plerosis" which he proposes as a counter­
balance to the movement of Kenosis. Apart from the con­
cept of Plerosis his view of the Person of Christ cannot 
be fully understood.
(4) Plerosis; The Self-fulfilment 
Even while he is developing his thoughts on the 
divine self-limitation with impressive singleness of pur­
pose, Forsyth lets it be known that he has in mind a com­
pensatory idea. Thus, in the midst of the chapter on 
"The Kenosis or Self-emptying of Christ" he declares;
The diminuendo of the Kenosis went on parallel with the crescendo of a vaster Plerosis. He died to live. And His post-resurrection power is other in form than that of His earthly life. The form of a servant gives place 'again to the form of God.*
To look at only the negative side of the experience of
Christ in the Incarnation, as kenotic theorisers usually
do, is to stop at the half-way mark and be left with the
"spectacle of a humbled God" by a view which does not take
1. F.,'The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 311.
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account "of a redeeming and royal G o d . F o r s y t h  explains
the corrective that he would offer for this one-sidednessi
We must keep in view, and keep uppermost, the more positive process, the effective, ascending and mastering process which went alongside of the renunciation in Christ, nay, was interwoven with it, as its ruling coefficient, I mean that, be­sides the subjective renunciation, we must note the growth, the exaltation, of His objective achieve­ment, culminating in the perfecting at once of His soul and our salvation in the cross, resurrection and glory. I should not decline to speak care­fully of a progressive incarnation.^
Forsyth is determined that his idea of a "progressive in­
carnation" will not be misinterpreted, as could so easily 
be done. Caution is indeed the order of the day* For 
him the concept does not mean in the slightest degree that 
Jesus was a man who gradually became God. No such meta­
morphosis was possible to one who was already divine.
Christ worked out the salvation He was. . . .  He was exercised unto the godliness He brought with Him. The deepening of His faithfulness was the emergence of His deity. He_was not acquiring deity, He was unfolding it.
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 329# Cf. Ibid., pT 349* "Alongside the Kenosis and its nega­tions there went a corresponding Plerosis, without whichthe Kenosis is a one-sided idea."
2. Ibid., pp. 329-330.
3 . Ibid., p. 3 5 0, Cf. F., Religion in Recent Art,p. 197< "He grew not to God but in God."
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3y such asseverations is the deity of Christ maintained, 
whole, intact and unimpaired.
In Forsyth's approach to an understanding of the 
Incarnation it is no more desirable to think of two 
natures of Christ than it was in time past to think of 
two persons or two consciousnesses. None of these ways 
of thinking of Him does any justice to the interest of 
salvation, which he conceived as a communion of persons 
and not as the deification of man. He therefore sets 
down an alternative italicised proposal; "I_t might be 
better to describe the union of God and man in Christ as 
the mutual Involution of two personal movements raised 
to the whole scale of the human soul and the divine.
Forsyth realizes that it will be no easy matter to 
expound such a doctrine of the Person of Christ. To 
assist him in this enterprise he turns to the spiritual 
history of mankind in which a two-fold movement can be 
seen at work. "I allude . . .  to the vertical action, so 
to say, in which man is constantly seeking unto a God and 
God is constantly passing into m a n . T h e s e  movements 
can be exemplified in prayer and the answer to prayer, in
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 3 3 3.
2. Ibid., p. 334.
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evolution and inspiration. "And they give us the cate­
gories in which God and man meet. Furthermore, "they 
meet in action rather than in being; and the unity of be­
ing is just such as is required for mutual action and com­
munion."^ By such illustrations and by vivid imagery 
Forsyth tries mightily to extablish his position that --
In Christ's life and work we have that divine mobility . • • that coming . • . to be what He always vitally was, by what I have called a pro­cess of redintegration. He moved by His history to a supernal world that He moved 3^ by His nature. . . .  On the one side we have a person­ality originally existing under those spiritual and discarnate conditions . . . taking the form and conditions of a corporeal life, in order to be the arena and the organ of God's revelation and man's redemption. . . . And, on the other side, we have Him growing in this corporeal per­sonality, this increate but creaturely life. . • . We have His divine mobility, therefore, trans­lated into human growth. We have together within one historic life the gradual descent and the growing ascent, by a moral process in each case.3
All of which is to say in brief compass that "Christ . . .
embodies the two movements of spiritual reality in which
man and God meet,
It becomes apparent that "growth" is a very im-
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 336.
2. Ibidem.
3. Ibid., pp. 338-339.
4. Ibid., p. 339.
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portant element in Forsyth's concept of Plerosis* And 
it is undoubtedly true that Christ did "grow" in a number 
of ways* It would also seem to be true that all forms of 
His growth and development, all that is involved in the 
unfolding of His unique vocation, fall within the bounds 
of His finitude and are therefore the affirmation and not 
the renunciation of His Incarnation. But Forsyth wants 
all of these things (embraced in his idea of Plerosis) to 
be considered as falling within the bounds of His in­
finitude. The progressive development of Jesus is thus 
represented as the "undoing" of His Incarnation. This 
thought extends even to His death on the Cross and goes 
counter to the teaching of Paul in Philippians 2*8 where 
the Apostle says of Christ Jesus " . . .  and became 
obedient unto death", thus making this event the climax 
of the kenosis rather than its nullification. On the 
other hand, Forsyth clearly indicates that what he would 
like to do is to represent the Cross as both the "nadir 
of that self-limitation which flowed from the supra- 
mundane seIf-emptying of the Son" and "the zenith of that 
moral exaltation which had been mounting throughout the 
long sacrifice of His earthly life."^
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 232.
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Acknowledging the rational difficulty inherent 
in such a concept as "conjunction of natures," Forsyth 
again firmly asserts that "it is only in the alogical 
unity of a person for whose action and growth they are 
necessary that we find the harmony of several antinomies 
that defy rational adjustment*"^ In spite of the ob­
scurity which must always partially invest such a sub­
ject, he believes that through his explication, with its 
emphasis on the dynamic and the moral in a view that 
constructively employs Kenotic theory he has been able 
to show:
What we have in Christ . , . is more than the co­existence of two natures, or even their inter­penetration* We have within this single increate person the mutual involution of two personal acts or movements supreme in spiritual being, the one distinctive of man, the other distinctive of God ; the one actively productive from the side of Eternal God, the other actively receptive from the side of growing man; the one being the pointing, in a corporeal person, of God's long action in entering history, the other the pointing of man's moral growth in the growing appropriation by Jesus of His divine content as He becomes a fuller organ for God's full action on man. The two supreme movements of spiritual being, redemption and re­ligion, are revealed as being so personal that they can take harmonious, complete and final effect with­in one historic person, increate but corporeal.^
In and through the Kenosis and the Plerosis is the achieve-
1. F. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 345*
2. Ibid., pp. 343-34-4.
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ment of the divine objective of the whole reciprocal pro­
cess. "The growing involution of those two movements of 
descent and ascent was the procession also of the recon­
ciliation of God and the w o r l d . T h e  moral and dynamic 
unity of the Person of Christ has a soteriological basis. 
"It is the work of Christ that gives us the key to the 
nature of Christ.
(5) The Relation of Jesus Christ to God
The relation of Jesus Christ to God in the thought 
of P. T. Forsyth should be viewed in the light of his 
definition of the article of belief in Christ's deity.
He defines it as "the theological expression of the evan­
gelical experience of His salvation, apart from which it 
is little less than absurd, and • . . incredible."3 This 
experience always has a compulsive "Christological" 
effect upon believers. "We are . • . driven, by the real 
existence of an Eternal Fathër and our experience of His 
grace, to demand the existence of an equally real eternaf 
Son —  both being equally personal and divine."^ A
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 350.
2. Ibid., p. 346.
3. Ibid., p. ?4.
4. Ibid., p. 282f.
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crucial query then arises* "The question, then, is what is 
the relation between the Godhead of the Eternal Son and the 
man Jesus Christ, and how did it come to pass."^ Prom the 
pages of the history of Christian dogma Forsyth draws 
three notable interpretations of the Person of Christ which 
suggest three answers to the question of His relationship 
to the Father. These are* "the Ebionite (or Socinian), 
the Arian, and the A t h a n a s i a n . T h e  Socinian estimate 
of Christ establishes him on the human level as one who 
has been created by God. "Like us, He is only created ad 
hoc, for a special function, and as a special organ of the 
Holy Spirit."3 This view has great appeal to the theo­
logically naive mind in that it represents "what is true 
enough if it be not called f i n a l . A t  certain times and 
under certain circumstances Socinianism becomes especially 
attractive to the pro-ethicist and/or anti-supernaturalist 
type of religious mind.
Socinianism is a very natural concomitant of an age like the Reformation, or our own, when a new ethical departure is correcting many of the abuses and corruptions of the religious life, and joining with science to criticize the true supernatural out of the historic record or the personal ex­perience.5
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. ?83.
2. Ibid., p. 76. 3. Ibid., p. 78.
4. Ibid., p. 76.
5 . P., ^Revelation and the Person of Christ," op. cit.,p. 133.
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The system thus allows for a moral emphasis and at the 
same time reduces the stone of offence of supernaturalism 
to a mere pebble —  or removes it altogether. If the 
Christian faith were a matter of having a lowest common 
denominator, this position would be jJb. Nevertheless, 
the Socinian estimate of Christ must be rejected as in­
ferior to the grand elevation of the New Testament wit­
ness to Him and His work, and to His relationship to God.
Next to be considered is the Arian view which 
occupies a middle position in the Christological scheme.
The nature of Christ is beyond the reach of man's highest 
aspiration and yet it cannot be equated with the nature 
of God.
He Lçhris-0 is a secondary God. So that our high­est possible development of human communion with God could never reach that of Christ. Yet He is not of one nature with God. He is a creation —  an intermediary creation. If He is not of Humanity, neither is He of deity.1
On the formal side the theology of the New Testament gives 
a considerable degree of credence to Arianism and Forsyth 
points out several supporting texts in making this ad­
mission, However, these and other passages of Scripture 
belong to an initial and tentative way of regarding the
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 79*
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person of Christ and do not provide a legitimate stopping- 
place for mature Christological thought.
It is one thing to see but an Arian Christ while the theology of the Gospel was in the making. It is another thing to stand arrested there and de­nounce an Athanasian Christ now that the providence of the Spirit has revealed, in the tremendous ex­perience of the historic Church, a Gospel which is possible on that profound base alone#^
So, as has been intimated, it is the Athanasian concept of
Christ which is to be preferred over the Socinian and
Arian estimates. "Christ is too great for any smaller
answer. For greatness is in the nature of A t h a n a s i a n i s m . " 2  
Forsyth even confidently predicts that the greatest
Christological thought will perennially relate to these
spacious bounds of creedal reference.
The passion for amplitude and plerophory to the measure of Christ will always send the human mind to some form of Athanasianism, with such meta­physic, whether in the Bible or not, as makes that answer possible, according to the state of con­temporary thought at any specified time.^
It is here and here alone that the inadequacies of Socin­
ianism and Arianism can be made up. In these two systems 
Christ, in His relationship to the Father, appears respec­
tively as "God's prophet" and "Cod's plenipotentiary",
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 82.
2 . Ibid., p .  8 4 .
3. Ibid., p. 8 4 f .
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while the ultimate need is to find in Him "God's real
presence."
It is within the ample and congenial framework of 
Athanasianism that Forsyth develops his own Christological 
thought in which Christ is related to God in the most com­
plete and intimate way. It is with the insight and in the 
spirit of the great Church Father of the fourth century 
that this theologian of the twentieth century views the 
Person of Jesus Christ. No estimate of Kim is high enough 
in any stage or age of Christian thought that stops short 
of seeing in Him, as Athanasius saw in Him, "the supernal 
man, the Lord from heaven."2 According to Forsyth, the 
crucial question for the Church in modern times is;
. • • whether in Christ God sent or went into the world; whether in Christ He announced Himself or gave Himself; whether Jesus, who spoke in God's name, really stood in God's place, where the first Church, by its worship of Him, put Him.-^
In each case it is the second alternative that must be
declared and maintained. It is true conformity to
Scripture and to the Athanasian viewpoint to say that the
redemptive' action of Christ was the redemptive action of
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 83*
2. Ibidem.
3. Ibid., p. 84.
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God. "It was the sublime act of Christ's will and God's
will combined, of Son and Father ever one."^
Forsyth believes that there is a unique relation­
ship between Christ and God. It is one of election and not 
of creation.
In The Old Testament as in the New Testament the son is no created being, but a chosen. Israel in the Old Testament, and Christ in the New, are theSons of God by His election and not by His creation.Christ is increate. • . . God is, directly, the Father of Christ alone. He is our Father only in Christ. God has but one Son; the many sons aresons in Him; and He is Son in none.^
When, as some thinkers do, Christ is related to the Father
as the realization of the divine idea the effect is totally
reductive. "If you reduce the Eternal Sonship to an idea
you will reduce the Eternal Fatherhood to the same
tenuity."^ To think of the Son of God as the realization
of the divine purpose is an improvement in that "it brings
Christ into immediate relation with God's will and action
rather than with His thought."^ However, this view is also
1. F., God the Holy Father, p. 40
2. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 14?. Of. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 113#"There was an election of men by Christ as of Christ by God." '
3. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 286.
4. Ibidem.
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inadequate. While it makes Christ the "supreme object of
the divine election", it does not make Him "the eternal
object of an eternal e l e c t i o n . T o  impute to Jesus
Christ an acquired Godhead, which seems to be the only
Christological alternative when kenosis is rejected as an
untenable theory, means that "we then have a progressive
incarnation of God and a progressive deification of man
in a rising scale of mutual involution; which requires
some form of a d o p t i o n i s m . T h i s  is really to deprive
Christ of any Godhead at all, and is fundamentally a
contradiction. "No creature could become God."3 Adop-
tionism is, for Forsyth, quite beyond the pale of serious
theological consideration and he explains why *
No . . . Adoptionist Messiah could cope with thedevilry revealed in . . . the moral convulsion of a world with no resource but war. He could not deliver a single soul from the racial evil which infects it
1. F ., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 286. Forsyth makes the further critical commenti "He has no personal pre-existence."
2. Ibid., p. 232.
3. Ibid., p. 294.
4. F., The Justification of God, p. 31^ '* Forsyth was writing during the bitter raging of the First World War, but his sense of the inadequacy of an "AdoptionistMessiah" would have been just as strong under any other circumstances. This perceptive theologian was under no illusions about human natur^.
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Therefore, as he sees it, there is only one recourse, only 
one way of looking at Christ in relation to Eternal God.
We are driven back to before the foundation of the world —  to a Redeemer who was there, who is deeper and older than His human nature, whose redemption of the world is only possible because of His part in its creation, who took the responsibility of creat­ing because He knew He possessed the power to re­deem and retrieve whatever creation might come to.No created being could save the creation.^
The only true and adequate interpretation of Christ is
that which regards Him as the Son who is co-existent with
the Eternal Father.
In the relationship of the pre-existent Christ, the
Eternal Son, to God the Eternal Father, Forsyth does not
hesitate to affirm the subordination of the Son. "Of
course the Son must be subordinate to the Father, though
both are in the same Divine form or f a m i l y . "2 The correct
interpretation of Philippians 2:6 is that —
Christ as Son • . . did not aspire to equality of power or knowledge [with God] , but to obedience.And so He kept and enhanced that glory which He had with the Father before the world was. . . .There is place and order in the Godhead, and He kept it.3
Subordination should not be looked upon as demeaning but
1. F., The Justification of God, p. 32.
2. F., God the Holy Father, p. 42,
3# Ibidem.
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as exalting. At least this is true of the Athanasian view 
of Christ as opposed to the Arian. In Arianism "His sub­
ordination is that of a creature. • . • And it carried 
with it inferiority."^ However, it is quite otherwise in 
Trinitarian Doctrine.
Subordination is not inferiority, and it god­like. The principle is embedded in the very co­hesion of the Eternal Trinity . . .  It is not amark of inferiority to be subordinate, to have anauthority, to obey. It is Divine.^
As in the relationships of the human family —  young
people to their elders and woman to man —  there is, as
Forsyth sees it, a certain subordination that enhances
personality rather than detracts from it, so also in the
"family" of the Trinity the same principle obtains.
Forsyth thus relates his view of the subordination of the
Son to the Father to the Godhead, or the deity of Jesus
Christ, rather than to His humanity.
There is of course a difference between Christ the
Son in heaven and Christ the Son on earth which derives
from the humanity Of Jesus;
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 79*
2. F., God the Holy Father, p. 42. Here and elsewherein his writings Forsyth appears to be remarkably know­ledgeable of the constitution of the Trinity. Cf. F., "Christ and the Christian Principle," London Theological Studies (London; Hodder and Stoughton, 191]), pp. 164-165.
1^0
There was that ih the earthly personality of Christ which in the heavenly could not be. For instance# in the earthly personality there was growth ; in the heavenly there could be none. • • . The growth of a divine personality in eternity is a much more im­possible thing than the co-existence of three.^
A word of warning is therefore in order * "Amid all that we 
recognise in Him of human conditions and human growth . • • 
we shall be most careful to note that any growth in His 
sense of Godhead was not the growth or acquisition of that 
Godhead itself."^ There is a distinct difference between 
Christ the Mediator, as He is often called by Forsyth, and 
the Pather-God. To disregard this difference means to 
lose the real significance of the Person of Christ and to 
render unintelligible the divine plan of Redemption. Yet 
to insist on this distinction is to move toward a tri- 
theistic viewpoint. The only way to avoid this danger is 
by thinking in qualitative rather than in quantitative 
terms. The relationship of Jesus Christ to God must al­
ways be considered in terms of personality rather than 
"substance" to avoid serious theological complications 
and confusion. By adhering to this procedure there is no 
splitting up of the Godhead into separate units as would 
otherwise be the case.
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 284.
2. Ibid., p. 353.
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(é) The Résurrection and the Living Lord
It is Forsythes contention that the Gross "was the 
Father's first gift and great grace to the Son; the 
Resurrection was but the second."^ Moreover, "it was 
Pentecost and not the Resurrection that enthroned Hiin in 
the majesty which to Christian thought He has inhabited 
ever s i n c e . W h i l e  he thus downgrades the Resurrection 
qua Resurrection, Forsyth more than compensates for this 
slight by the stress which he places on the reality of the 
living Lord. "The same Jesus who died also rose, and 
lives as the King of heavenly glory and Lord of human 
destiny."3 His reality is made self-evident as He works 
in and through the personal experience of believers. The 
presence of the living Christ is far more important to 
Christian faith than any miraculous rising from the dead, 
and Forsyth sees the physical conditions of Christ's 
Resurrection as having a secondary significance. "The
1. F., Missions in State and Church, p. 28.
2. F., Religion in Recent Art, p. 82.
3. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 1?4. Cf. F., The Person and Pla.ce of Jesus Christ, p. 300; "He achieves the plerosis in resurrection and ascension."This is one of Forsyth's rare references to the Ascension and the statement is somewhat at variance with his earlier intimation that the Cross was the zenith of the Plerosis.
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empty tomb I would leave a question as open as the Virgin 
Birth • . . God could prepare, and Christ could take, for 
His purposes a body as It pleased Him."  ^ The historicity 
of the Resurrection has value only for faith, not for un­
faith. And Forsyth makes the incisive comment;
It is worth little as a weapon against the skeptic compared with its worth as a seal to the believer. Its force as a converting agent is but secondary.It is not for the world, but for the Church, It is not a condition of faith, but credible only to faith. It was believers who first believed it.This is an old sneer. We can only confound the enemy by accepting it, and extract the sting by glorying in the fact.^
It is a mistake to treat the Resurrection as a proof of
Christ's divine power instead of its exercise. The day
is past for building faith by appealing to the merely
miraculous. Christ was no thaumaturgist, coercing faith
by working wonders. Nevertheless, while the Resurrection
of Christ is not evidential, it is surely most real. This
is the testimony that comes from the long past;
The apostles did not critically examine the evi­dence for the resurrection; they hailed the risen Lord. It was not a resurrection that impressed them, but a returned Saviour. The matter of the moment is the reality of the risen Lord, the
1. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind,pp. 174-I75I Cf." F.'.' The Cruclality of the Cross, p. 87.
2. F., "Revelation and the Person of Christ," op. cit.,p. 136.
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identity of the Christ now in heaven with the Jesus of the finished victory on the Cross, The great thing is the power given to believers to say and feel with real meaning that they are in Christ and Christ in them.^
To those who are uneasy about the vitality of their
Christian faith Forsyth throws out a challenge;
Realize a living Christ and He will produce in you a living faith. Visit His holy sepulchre in Scripture, and as you pore and wait He will sur­prise you from behind with His immortal life. A living faith, a living Christianity, a living Christendom, means a living Christ.^
Forsyth believes that just as Adam was the first potential 
man, Jesus is the first actual and victorious man, the One 
who died and lived again and who is alive forevermore. In 
so doing He recapitulated in Himself the actual making of 
a man from the beginning. Therefore Christ is the summary 
and the ultimate of human and divine nature. Forsyth also 
understands the Resurrection of Jesus Christ as forecast. 
The Pauline teaching of dying and rising with Christ is an 
experience both for individuals and for society. Individ­
ual life as victorious and eternal and the Kingdom of God 
as victorious and eternal were forecast in the event of 
the Resurrection. As the matter now stands; "We see not
1. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 175*
2. F., God the Holy Father, p. 8 8.
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yet all things put under righteousness, but we see Jesus 
already crowned with that glory and honour."^
ii. The Concept of the Humanity of Jesus Christ
In considering this aspect of Forsyth's thought it 
should be observed that he is writing in reaction to the 
"Jesus of History" trend in Ghristology. He therefore 
assumes that many of the common assertions about the man­
hood of Christ are known and accepted by the reader. "We 
have no call today to prove the real manhood of Jesus.
For that is universally owned ; and it is all that many can 
o w n . I t  is not surprising then to find that the human­
ity of the Son of God qua humanity is given brief treat­
ment in Forsyth's discussion. There are however certain 
angles of Christ's life as man on earth that do merit and 
receive his earnest attention, and these will now be taken 
up.
(1) The Self-consciousness of Jesus Christ 
In his answer to the question whether "Jesus was 
in His own doctrine of God in His supreme revelation of 
God as Father,"^ Forsyth turns to the text to which he
1. P., The Justification of God, p. 219.
2. P., The Person and place of Jesus Christ, p. 327f.
3. Ibid., p. 111.
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resorts time and again.in the course of his Christological 
construction, namely, Matthew 11:1?: "No man knoweth the 
Son but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father 
but by the Son, and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal 
Him." Upon this passage Forsyth willingly bases his con­
viction that Jesus consciously believed His Sonship to be 
of a unique kind, inclusive of His pre-existence.
He believed and said He was more than a historic servant of God raised for a temporary purpose and then done with. He knew and said He' was before the world . . . and that He would outlive the world. . . And such doctrine does not depend on the fourth gospel alone.^
Acknowledging the difficulty of adjusting this awareness
to other facets of Christ's consciousness, he adds that we
cannot suppose that His self-consciousness embraced the
later trinitarian categories.
The foregoing views must be understood in relation
to Forsyth's concept of the self-emptied Christ as being
"a part of the consciousness of G o d . T h i s  he clarifies
by interpreting Paul's follow-up of the statement in I
Corinthians 2;l6: "We have the mind of Christ."
Paul uses the psychological analogy of our self- consciousness . Man, he says, made in God's image, has the marvellous power of being at once the thinker
1. F., God the Holy Father, p. 8 9 .
2. F,, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. II5 .
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and the object of thought, of facing himself, of observing himself, of understanding his own under­standing, of reporting on himself. And this be­cause he is a living Spirit. . • . His conscious­ness is a self-consciousness, which is the only means of our knowing Him. So also God knows Him­self —  by His Spirit. Now the Lord Christ is that Spirit. Christ is part of the consciousness of Godhead.i
If Jesus "possessed the certainty and communion of 
the Father in Himself,"^ then what is to be said about His 
growth and development to which the Gospel writers bear 
witness? In answering this question Forsyth concludes 
that the Synoptics are inadequate in what they report, so 
he turns to the Epistles. Here there is explicit testi­
mony about the growth of Jesus.
He grew as Saviour. He developed as Rêdeemer. . • • He learned a redemptive obedience —  not indeed to acquire Its nature, but to unfold its form as the crisis deepened. . ♦ . Not the man Jesus was per- . fected but the Saviour, not the moral character so much as the work possible only to that character.3
What Forsyth finds here is not a process of Incarnation 
but of Redemption. The apostles do not tell about the 
perfection of the man Jesus but they testify to "the dy­
namic development of a Son of God in power which was at 
last determined in His r e s u r r e c t i o n . I n  the process
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp.115-116.
2. Ibid., p. 133.
3. Ibid., p. 126. 4. Ibidem.
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of Christ's redemptive -work which culminated in the Cross 
and Resurrection He was fulfilling His moral vocation. 
Forsyth believes the Messianic consciousness of Jesus in­
cludes the awareness of Himself as Redeemer, Judge and 
King. Although He did not say a great deal about His 
knowledge of being Redeemer, His life and work spoke 
abundantly of it. In the consciousness of Jesus He was co­
eternal with God the Father and was the Eternal Son or "the 
Humanity eternal in G o d . H i s  '^vast self-consciousness" 
comprehended also in a very impressive way His sense of 
finality, upon which is founded the truth of His being not 
"a revelation of God but the revelation, the final revela­
tion, Forsyth sees nothing in the New Testament or in 
the thought of Christ to indicate "another coming from God 
to complete His work."3 The only thing to follow was the 
Spirit who applied His work in the lives of believers.
According to Forsyth, Jesus had a constant sense of 
unity with God in terms of His divine vocation. This was 
manifested in "a perfect obedience, which is just as divine 
as perfect authority is. It was the obedience which 
marked His sense of unity with God which explains why
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 91.
2. Ibid., p. 9 2 .
3 . Ibidem. 4. Ibid., p. 94.
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Christ in His incarnate' life did not exercise more initia­
tive and independence over against the Father.
Forsyth is very sure that "in the Church's history 
a faith in the God in Christ underlay a faith in the man 
in Him."l And the self-consciousness of Christ was a 
vital part of this faith in Him as the Son of God and the 
Son of man.
(2) The Relation of Jesus Christ to Man 
When Forsyth deals with the relationship of Jesus 
Christ to man, he points out that Christ had truly human 
characteristics like all other men. "The Son of God must 
be a real man. The people of Nazareth found Him such at 
least. Whatever made the difference in Him was not per­
ceptible by any of the ordinary faculties of men."^ His 
limitation of knowledge and lack of political and aes­
thetic sympathies were simply the "result of His being 
the true son of His age and servant of His special voca­
tion. "3 Furthermore, He is a genuinely historic figure in 
the annals of mankind.
There was such a man. The story of Him is not
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 323.
2. F., Religion in Recent Art, p. 193.
3" F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 6?.
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an Invention. Even if it were conceded that every­thing told of Him is not literally true. He was a reality. His figure is real and palpable in history. There is a distinct and powerful character among thegreat figures of the past -- called Jesus, living ina certain land, at a certain time, with certain aims, doctrines, actions, ways of life, and manner of death.^
In Forsyth's opinion Christ's oneness with Humanity can be
seen in His personality and its development which bear
concrete resemblance to that of mankind.
It should be remembered that human personality is not a ready-made thing, but it has to grow by moral
1. F ., God the Holy Father, p. 84, The sermon on "TheLiving Christ" from which this quotation is taken holds in­teresting and convincing evidence that Forsyth did not posit a distinction between the "Jesus of History" and the "Christ of Faith.". He believes that for those who study Jesus Christ as a mere figure in history there is always the possibility —  even probability —  of there coming forth that reverent admiration of Him which is "the pre­lude of a living faith" (Ibid., p. 8?). Of those who arethus affected it can be said that "they have no deadfaith. Yet they have not a living faith" (Ibidem). How­ever, no such wanderer between two worlds need fret him­self and feel frustrated. "As you pore and wait He will surprise you from behind with His immortal life" (Ibid., p. 8 8). True faith in a Christ both historic and more than historic then comes into its own. "It is faith in the practical reality of His unseen Person, now living, reigning, guiding from His unseen throne the history and the hearts of men to the Kingdom of God" (Ibid., p. 8 9).And Forsyth declares that this is "what faith in a his­toric Christ arrives at when it grows up and comes into its own, when it finds its true self and soul, its mean­ing and fulness, its wisdom and stature in an eternal light" (Ibidem).
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exercise, and chiefly, in the Kingdom of God by prayer. The living soul has to grow into moral personality. And this should not be ignored in connection with the moral psychology of Christ.He no more than we came into the world with a completed personality —  which would be not so much a miracle but a magic and a prodigy.^
It can be further stated that the immediate and per­
fect relation that Jesus Christ had.to God from the very 
beginning "did not give Him any immunity from the moral 
law that we must earn our greatest legacies and appro­
priate by toil and conflict our best g i f t s . H i s  close­
ness of connection with Humanity was indeed qualified with 
respect to His non potuit peccare. "Yet to His own ex­
perience the moral conflict was entirely real, because 
His self-emptying included an oblivion of that impossibil­
ity of sin."3 Thus, if He did not know that He could not 
sin there was no play-acting involved in His stand against 
the power of temptation and the forces of evil. While His 
sinlessness was divine, the struggle that He waged against 
sin was the bona fide moral engagement of any man and 
every man.
Forsyth effectively summarizes his understanding 
of the identification of Christ with Humanity as a wholei
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 340.
2. Ibid., p. 341.
3. Ibidem. Cf. Ibid., p. 301.
151
He was all men's creator in a true man's life*And His identity with Humanity lies not in prolong­ing, as it were, to the sky the rarest matter of the race, but in His own voluntary act of self- identification with it. His identity with man lay in no mere continuity of substance, nor even in par­ticipating in personality, but in His assumption of man's conditions of personality, and His renuncia­tion of God's. It lay in His active acceptance of the human and sin-laden conditions of communion with God in such victorious and sinless way as to make that communion possible and real for every other personal soul.^
Because of Christ's oneness with Humanity He was able to 
make His victory over sin and death available to all men, 
but, on the other hand. His divine ability to be the Re­
deemer of mankind depends upon His absolute intimacy with 
Eternal God,
Unless the Saviour be commensurate with mankind, it is but partial relief. But if He be commen­surate with man, He is other than the greatest man. And if He be not the deepest in very God, it is no redemption.^
(3) The Uniqueness of Jesus Christ 
Jesus Christ is unique and is so understood by 
Forsyth. "In Jesus Christ we have one who was conscious • 
of standing in an entirely unique relation to the living 
God."3 In the first place Forsyth clarifies the unique-
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp. 352-353.
2. F., Missions in State and Church, p. 35•
3« F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 285.
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nesrs in relation to the divinity of Christ, which is pre­
requisite to the understanding of His uniqueness in re­
lation to His humanity. The Godhead of Christ means that;
As the Eternal Son He was the complete and final action of the Holy and gracious love of God our Saviour ; that His holy Humanity went up always as an absolute satisfaction and joy to God; that God saw in Him the travail of His Own Soul and was sat­isfied; that in Christ's historic person God of-- fared Himself in His saving fulness to and for man­kind with the omnipotence required for His saving work.^
Likewise, Christ is unique with regard to His human
nature, as is expounded by Forsyth;
The essence of Humanity is conscience. It is man's moral relation to a holy God. And Christ's manhood, therefore, consists in the moral reality of His experience, His conflict, and His growth.It means His true ethical personality growing in an actual historic situation, , , . And above all it means that His action arose ethically out of what He was, that His carriage expressed His soul, that His vocation rested on His position, that . , , His manhood was in His perfectly active receptiv- . ity, , . , His human person was not the most illustrious of the many spiritual and providential personalities that had appeared on earth from God. It was in its nature exceptional and miraculous.^
Differing from other men, Christ brought with Him a soul
"bound morally . . .  to grow under His life's vocation, to
the personality that was the complete and final revelation
of God, the agent of man's redemption, and the locus of
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 351*
2. Ibid., pp. 351-3 5 2.
153
man's communion with God."1 His personality differed from
others in that its growth lay "in the unaided and sinless
appropriation of that which it already was."^ Christ's
relation to God was perfect and unbroken from the very
beginning, and this relation actually constituted His
unique personality. Forsyth elucidates;
He was not a person who became a Son, or was destined to be a son, but His whole personality was absolute sonship. • • . That is not so with us. . • . His person is born of God, ours is created. We are indeed related to a personal God, as His offspring, in a way that necessitates our being persons too. But not such persons. We can reach and develop personality without reference to God; He could not.3
Of Jesus Christ it can be said that His work was deter­
mined by His personality, while on the strictly human 
level a man's personality is conditioned by his work. 
Indeed the work of Christ is to be regarded as identical 
with His personality. Forsyth continues with his 
differentiation and reiterates;
Of no man can it be said that his relation to God constitutes the whole personality. But in the case of Jesus the whole relation to the Father, namely sonship, did constitute that personality.
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 341.
2. Ibidem.
3. Ibid., p. 285* Cf. F., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 1?1.
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Think it away and nothing is left 
In the thought of P. T. Forsyth it is apparent 
that Jesus Christ not only has traits and characteristics 
that are common to humanity, but that He also has others 
that give evidence of His uniqueness among the sons of 
men. Because He is both human and more than human He has 
effected the reconciliation of man to God. Reconciliation 
is therefore the very essence of the God-man.
3. The Work of Christ
i. Holy God, Sinful Man, and the Centrality of the Gross 
In any study of the reconciling work of Jesus 
Christ two avenues of approach are open to the theologian. 
He may proceed in his undertaking with man primarily in 
view, or he may proceed with God primarily in view. Mov­
ing agaipst a strongly opposing tide of theological opin­
ion, P. T. Forsyth chose the latter approach. W. L.
Bradley aptly delineates his procedure, so much at variance 
with a prevailing Liberal modus operandi that gave man 
priority over God;
1. P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 285 #The key word in this statement of Forsyth is "whole."Sin is the element contrary to sonship in man, the element
which destroys the integrity of his relationship to God. This element, of ïrourse, is not present in Christ.
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As he ponders the significance of the work of Christ, he thihlcs primarily of the relationship of Christ to the Father and of the effect of His work upon God's conscience* What did the Cross mean to God? Did He suffer with Christ? Does He suffer in any way because of man s  sin? These are the fundamental issues which concern Forsythi when they are met, we shall have time to deal with the question of man; but man, the creature, comes after God the Creator.1
Defending his manner of treatment which begins with 
God and works out to man, Forsyth stands fast on experi­
mental grounds. It is only through knowledge of God —  
through being known by Him —  that man can know of sin.
The conception of the possibility of sin is beyond human 
comprehension without a theocentrio system of thought.
"We can never know things at their worst, till we stand 
where they are at their best."^ To this strategic position 
Forsyth points with unwavering finger as he develops the 
concept of the holy character of God.
The significance of the phrase "the holiness of God" 
in Forsyth's writings is very important in arriving at an 
understanding of his Christological thought. While he 
never set down any clear-cut explication of this basic 
idea, scattered "definitions" give more than in inkling of 
that which was written so largely upon the tablet of his
1. W. L. Bradley, P. T. Forsyth: The Man and His Work,p. 1 1 6,
2. P., Religion in Recent Art, p. 24?.
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mind. In one of his best known books he defines God's
holiness in this way ;
The holiness of God is His self-sufficient perfection, whose passion is to establish itself in the unholy by gracious love. Holiness is love morally perfect; love is holiness brimming and overflowing. The per­fection speaks in the overflow. It is redemption.Love is perfect, not in amount but in kind, not as intense, but as holy. And holiness is perfect, not as being remote, or as being merely pure, but as it asserts itself in redeeming grace.^
It would appear that in the mind of Forsyth one of the
most significant aspects of the holiness of God is its
assertiveness or activity. Holiness is not a quiescent
quality hidden passively away in the deeps of God; rather,
it is that in God's nature which identifies Him as the
gracious Redeemer of mankind. However, since this element
of the definition comes to grips with the actual work of
Christ, further expansion of this line of thought must be
reserved until later.
It is further apparent that in the thinking of
Forsyth the holiness of God has a very close association
with the love of God. Indeed it can be said that "the
Christian revelation is a God of holy love."^ Holy love
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 145.Cf. F., The Principle of Authority, p. '6 ; F,, God the Holy Father, p. 26; F.7 The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 98#
2. F., This Life and the Next, p. 31. As a general rule Forsyth uses the modifier "holy" when he is writing of "love" to emphasize the moral grounding of the latter.
157
is stern and Judging but at the same time is infinitely 
gracious and compassionate. It is, so to speak, "agape" 
with added iron in its veins. God's love cannot be sepa­
rated from the thought^of His holiness, for it is holiness 
that confirms His love and makes it dependable. "If God's 
love were not essentially holy love, in course of time man­
kind would cease to respect it, and consequently to trust 
it. "1
Holiness is denoted by Forsyth as that which "brings 
sin home" to man and makes him aware of its offensiveness 
to God, "To bring sin home, and to bring grace home, we 
need that something else should come home which alone 
gives meaning to both —  the holy,"^ The holy God cannot 
close His eyes to sin, cannot wink at it, cannot comport 
Himsejlf as though sin had no real existence. God's holi-
The term "agape" had not yet been popularized in theologi­cal circles by the influential historical-theological an­alysis of Anders Nygren (Agape and Eros, English ed.,
1 9 3 0). Forsyth would have thoroughly agreed with the es- ■ sential significance of "agape" as the downooming Jlove of God to unlovable man, but he would have insisted that it includes the idea of the hallowing of God's name through love's selfless bestowal.
1. P., The Work of Christ, p. 113. Cf. F., ThisLife and the Next, p. 55*
2. P., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 22.
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ness is everlastingly contraposed to man's guilt, and man 
as guilty must inevitably come under His judgment, "Noth­
ing can arrest the judgment of the Cross, nothing shake 
the judgment-seat of C h r i s t . " I n  the Gross grace to sin 
is one with judgment to w r o n g . A  god of sentimental 
"love" might forget about judgment, but a God of Holy love 
can never suspend judgment upon guilty man. He must judge 
with a thoroughgoing judgment that emphasizes "the sinful­
ness of sin." However, this judgment that underscores the 
greatness of the distance between holy God and sinful man 
is not the last word of the Gospel. The judgment that 
comes into human affairs is really "the visitation of a 
Saviour."3 "The more judgment we see in the Holy Cross 
the more we see it is judgment unto s a l v a t i o n . I t  isI
the holiness of a judging God that makes atonement 
necessary.
1. P., The Justification of God, p. 20?. A. P.,Simpson in an article entitled "P. T. Forsyth* The Pro­phet of Judgment," The Scottish JournaJ of Theology"(June, 1951)» makes the astute comment* "It is impossible to grasp his doctrine of Redemption apart from the persistent stress he lays, in practically all his works, on Judgment" (p. 148).
2. P., "A Rallying Ground for the Free Churches —  the Reality of Grace," The Hibbert Journal (July, 1906),p. 8 3 2.
3 . P., The Justification of God, p. I89
4. P., The Soul of Prayer, p. 110.
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It is the holiness of God which makes sin guilt.It is the holiness of God that necessitates the work of Christ, that calls for it, and provides it. . . . The problem is how Christ can be a revelation, not of God's love simply, but of God's holy love. Without a holy God there would be no problem of atonement. It is the holiness of God's love that necessitates the atoning cross.^
A corollary of the dictum that "without a holy God 
there would be no problem of atonement" is, of course, that 
without the sinfulness of man there would also be no prob­
lem of atonement. In the eyes of Forsyth sin is a very
evident, very ugly, and utterly divisive factor in the re-?lationship between God and man. Over against the holiness
of God stands man in his gross sins. Yet the term "sin"
is not usually personal enough to suit the purposes of
Forsyth. Sin tends to become a generalization without the
individual application that is required. For this reason
he often prefers the word "guilt."
It is the sense of guilt that we have to get back today for the soul's sake and the kingdom's; not simply the sense of sin. There are many who recog­nize the power of sin, the misfortune of it; wha,t they do not recognize is the thing that makes it most sinful, which makes it what it is before God, namely, guilt; which introduces something noxious and not merely deranged, malignant and not merely hostile; the fact that it is transgression against not simply God, but against a holy God.^
1. P., The Work of Christ, pp. 79-80.
2. Ibid., p. 7 8 . Cf. P., The Principle of Authority, "We must, with stern moral realism, keep central the problem of guilt " (p. 7 2 ).
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Man may attribute the wrong that is at the core of his 
being to original sin, thus absolving himself of ultimate 
responsibility. Not so in the case of guilt. This is a 
personal thing that strikes through to the heart with dis­
maying effect. "The last enemy to be destroyed was guilt. 
. . .  I cannot understand how anyone with any sense of 
judgment can discard the atonement and live without 
t e r r o r . I n  Forsyth's opinion, it was more precisely 
guilt than wickedness that prompted the divine invasion
of earth's sinful milieu. "What drew Christ to earth (as
far as faith's knowledge goes) was the guilt of the 
world"^ Sin or guilt —  man is in a sorry plight, re­
gardless of any discriminative use that is made of the 
terms, and Forsyth does not mince matters in referring toI
the human situation:
Between us and the Holy Father there comes what does not come between us and any earthly father —  sin. Sin, hell, curse, and wrath* The wrath and curse of God, not on sin only, but on the soul.3
No individual man is ever a sinner in aloofness
from his fellows, and throughout his treatment of the Work
1. F., The Justification of God, p. 221.
2. F., "Ibsen's Treatment of Guilt," The HibbertJournal (October, 1915)» P* 112. But love was still the -
prior motivator, and Forsyth adds: "It was love at issue with such guilt."
3* F., God the Holy Father, p. 8,
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of Christ Forsyth places great emphasis on the "solidary"
character of sin. Every single man is a participant in
the sin of the race.
Sin is not an influence which affects but a sec­tional conscience, or troubles but a few members of the race. In so far as it is real, it affects and vitiates the whole conscience, the whole man, that is, and the whole race in its moral aspect and reliability. That follows from the unit of personality and the race, from our solidarity.^
So wide is the "range of wrong" that no one can really
conceive how extensive and how terrible it really is.
"It is impossible that the whole dimensions and heinousness
of wickedness, the abysmal perdition of humanity, should
be grasped by any created soul.
Yet for all his graphic representation of the
ravages of sin in the individual and corporate life of/
mankind, Forsyth does not subscribe to the doctrine of the 
"total depravity" of human nature. With respect to the 
conscience of unregenerated man to which God comes re- 
demptively in Jesus Christ, he makes this observation:
"The natural conscience shares the rest of man's mortal 
fate; it has not life in itself. . . .  It is too dead
1. P., The Principle of Authority, p. 404. Of. Ibid,, p. 202: "The real and inmost life of the race is the tragic conflict of man's egoism with God's purpose of holy love."
2. P., The Justification of God, p. 31.
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to save itself, too living not to feel d e a d , O b v i o u s l y  
the writer is pressing for a description of the desperate 
moral condition of humanity that will truly portray this 
condition and will at the same time allow for the preser­
vation of the prius in the soul of man. The same tension 
is observed in a striking passage in The Principle of 
Authority : *' [Redemption] is the new-creative action of the 
perfectly holy conscience of God on the helplessly guilty 
conscience of men. It is life from the dead."^ The 
declaration is flat and unequivocal. However, Forsyth 
appears to have immediate qualms lest he has overstated 
his case, and it is not surprising to find appended to 
"helplessly guilty conscience" the terse but meaningful 
footnote ; "I do not say 'totally corrupt.'"3 By this 
strategic footnoting the case for a moral a priori is 
sustained.
Regardless of the degree of man's infection by sin, 
there can be no underestimation of the need for atonement. 
The holiness of God and the sinfulness of man make clamant 
call for action in a dark and critical situation. Bradley 
sums the matter up succinctly and inclusively;
1. F., Missions in State and Church, p. 64.
2. F., The Principle of Authority, p. 58.
3. Ibidem.
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Communion with God, broken by the arrogance of man­kind as a race, needs to be restored; but this is impossible without atonement. Gpd's holiness must be satisfied; likewise man’s conscience demands an objective atonement. Such atonement must, and yet cannot, be made by man; for holiness demands an ad­equate holiness to satisfy it. Therefore reconcil­iation must be initiated by God, and .God will have to atone Himself through the person of Christ the God-man. This is the position at which Forsyth arrives
The elements of this summation should be borne in mind as 
an elaboration is made of Forsyth’s understanding of the 
accomplishments of Calvary.
The Cross is central to the atoning work of Christ 
and to the cognition of His person. No room is left by 
the theologian for any misapprehension on this score. 
"Christ . . . is to us just what His cross is. You do not 
understand Christ till you understand His c r o s s . H a r r y  
Escott declares that "the Cross is Forsyth’s abiding 
obsession."3 Be that as it may, the Cross is never con­
strued as a mere symbol in his thought. Whether explicitly 
stated or not, it is always the Cross of Christ to which
1. Bradley, op. cit., p. 148.
2. P., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 26. Cf. F.,"The Cross as the Final Seat of Authority," The Contem­porary Review (October, 1899), p. 60?: "Everything turnson the Cross and the nature of the Gross’s grace."
3. Harry Escott, Peter Taylor Forsyth; Director ofSouls. London: The Epworth tress, 19^b» p# l5#
164
he gives such earnest attention. It is Christ who gives 
virtue —  and the only virtue —  to the Cross. The "tree 
of Calvary" becomes effectual in solving the problem of 
man’s sin and in bridging the hiatus between God and man 
because Christ died thereon. It is certainly not fair to 
say, as some critics have intimated, that this instrument 
of Christ’s execution becomes, as it were, a "beam" in 
the eye of Forsyth that blinds him to the One who alone 
gives meaning and power to the Cross. Rather should it 
be said that the eyes of this Cross-obsessed man Were 
fastened with full and clear vision upon the crucified 
Son of God.
Forsyth understands the work of Jesus Christ as 
God’s sacrificial work of both reconciliation and atone­
ment.
Do not say it was Reconciliation only. It was Atonement. For when a relation like that of God and man is altered, it is altered on both sides. And, besides, there can be no ultimate reconcilia­tion of a race to a holy God without atonement. God's moral order demands atonement wherever moral ideas are taken with final seriousness; and man’s conscience re-echoes the demand.^
This work of Christ, answering to the demands of God's 
moral order and man's conscience, centers in the event of 
the Cross with all its associations with moral realism.
1. F., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 6?.
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The act of the Cross Is still the soul's centre, the centre of human destines and the centre of the real presence of God, , . . It is the centre of that evil conscience which is the pivot of the world's tragedy, and therefore, the world's destiny* . * . What moral realism finds at the dregs of life is guilt* And as yet the only effectual secret of guilt's treatment is the Gross* The reality of life is Christ —  and- not Christ's beauty, pity, or self-sacrifice, but His love as God's holy grace, His moral mercy, moral judgment, moral atonement, and moral victory of redemption,^
The ground of all Christian goodness, hope, and assurance 
for the future is God's salvation of the world in His work 
in Christ centering in His act on the Cross. The ob­
jective element in this act "is that God Himself made the 
complete sacrifice"^ for the redemption of man. The' sub­
jective element is man's response and appropriation of 
the reconciling and atoning work.
It is Forsyth's conviction that the forgiveness of 
God made effectual in the work of Christ must be inter­
preted in the light of God's holiness. He is opposed to 
the idea of the divine forgiveness as this idea is set 
forth in the thought of Ritschl and Harnack. He believes 
the interpretation of these thinkers empties the concept 
of reconciliation, as it is witnessed to in the Scriptures, 
of its expiatory content. This comes about because of 
their interpretation of the "Fatherhood of God" in which
1. P., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 128.
2. F., The Work of Christ, p. 92.
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they do not give due attention to the Pauline passages re­
lating to this doctrine. Forsyth maintains that the holi­
ness of God is both His true nature and the essence of the 
moral order. Christ's work on the Cross is God's settle­
ment of moral issues and the guarantee of man's historic 
and eternal destiny. In His work, in which He confronts 
man's sin with the holiness of God, Christ effects the 
forgiveness of man and manifests to him the essence and 
meaning of the moral order rooted in God's holiness.
The significance of the atoning Cross, as Forsyth 
understands it, is that here the eternal holiness of God 
is seen in redemptive encounter with sinful man. This 
does not permit interpreting the Cross-event as a per­
suasive spectacle which would lead men merely to follow 
the Man on the Cross. It also does not permit an inter­
pretation of the event as the manifestation of a kind of 
love which loses sight of the judgment of evil involved 
in the agape of the holy God at work in Jesus Christ. An 
Abelardian or "Moral Influence" view of the Cross of 
Christ has grave deficiencies. The one dimension of the 
divine agape is judgment and the other is mercy or grace -■ 
and both dimensions are revealed at Calvary.
According to Forsyth, God reconciles man to Himself 
in and beyond history. In the resurrection triumph of the
16?
perfectly good will of Christ manifested in His act on
the Cross, man sees God's purpose for the world, God's
action the world, and the divine pifinciple for history.
Involved in Christ's work of reconciliation is both the
holy and righteous judgment of God and His holy love.
The one meaning of an atoning Cross is the securing and establishing of God's holy and righteous judg­ment throughout the moral world to its victory in love —  His bringing forth judgment to such victory. It is the consummation of the holy con­science of God in the eternal action of love which incessantly creates a moral universe. If such an • atonement become otiose to our faith, . • . the note of the holy, i.e. of the moral, must fadefrom it ; and we are left with little beyond apiety either aesthetic, mystic or sentimental, but too easy for Judgment, too feeble for the control of civilization, and fit only to become a branch of its culture.i
Forsyth makes it clear that the fulfilment of man's need
of reconciliation with God can be accomplished in no other
way than by the work of Christ on the Cross. This becomes
effectual only when it is received and appropriated by man
through faith in God's gracious act in Christ, which is
God's holiness loving and judging.
In his exposition of this doctrine Forsyth asserts
that "the work of Christ meant not only an action on man,
it meant an action on G o d . W i t h i n  these two major
1. F., The Justification of God, p. 108.
2. P., The Work of Christ, p. 103»
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categories —  action on man and action on God —  in the 
final chapter of The Work of Christ he expounds "the 
three great aspects of the work of Christ.
These are —  1. Its triumphant aspect ; 2. Itssatisfactionary aspect; 3* Its regenerative aspect* The first emphasises the finality of our Lord's victory over the evil power or devil; the second, the finality of His satisfaction, expiation, or atonement presented to the holy power of God; and the third the finality of His sanctifying or new- creative influence on the soul of man*^
These three aspects of Christ's work are regarded by
Forsyth as being "wonderfully and prophetically entwined
in I Corinthians 1*30» where it is said that Christ is
made unto us (2 ) justification; (3) sanctification; and
(1) redemption."3
Following this preview of the main features of
Forsyth's soteriological position, in the succeeding two
sections his understanding of the work of Jesus Christ
will be further explicated and summarized. The first
section will deal with Christ's work primarily in relation
to God while the second will set forth His work primarily
in relation to man and evil power.
1. F,, The Work of Christ, p. 199.
2. Ibidem. These "aspects" resemble the three types" of atonement presented and analyzed by Gustaf Aulen in his
Christus Victor, trans-A. G* Herbert, (Hew York; The Mac- MIlian company, 1 9 5 1)#
3. Ibid., p. 200.
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il* The Work of Jesus Christ in Relation to Holy God
The work of Christ in relation to God in the thought 
of P. T. Forsyth needs to be understood in view of his in­
terpretation of Christ's work as it relates to God's holi­
ness and man's sense of guilt.
The finished reconciliation, the setting up of the New Covenant by Christ, meant that human guilt was once for all robbed of its power to prevent the consummation of the Kingdom of God. . . . It is the holiness of God that necessitates the work of Christ, that calls for it, and that provides it.^
The great issue is not merely the necessity of atonement 
to a fatherly love but rather to a holy God's love, or to 
God's holy love, inclusive of judgment and grace or mercy. 
It is the holiness of the personal God's love that made 
necessary the act of a Person on the atoning Cross on be­
half of other persons. As Forsyth asserts, "reconcilia­
tion is between two persons . . , and not between a fail­
ing person on the one hand and a perfect imperturbable 
process on the other.Reconciliation must be founded 
upon a justification. This justification is neither by 
nor for grace or faith alone, but it is "by holiness and 
for it alone."3
That is to say, • • . reconciliation is something that comes from the whole holy God, and it covers
1. F,, The Work of Christ, pp. 78-7 9.
2 . Ibid., p. 7 6 . 3. Ibid,, p. 81.
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the whole of life, and it is not exhausted by the idea of atonement only or redemption only. It is the new-created race being brought to permanent, vital, life-deep communion with the holy God.• Only holiness can be communion with the holy God. . . . However we be saved, we can only be saved in a way consistent with God's morality —  that is to say, with holiness.^
Reconciliation founded upon justification, which is based 
upon the holiness of God, is the gift of God through the 
act of Christ on the Cross.
When speaking of the reconciliation, Forsyth has 
consistently in mind the "great central verse, 'God was in 
Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.' This means 
that reconciliation, or the establishment of right rela­
tionship, was effected by God in Himself, by God's own 
judgment in Christ of the sin of mankind.
In reconciliation the ground for God's wrath or God's judgment was put away. Guilt rests on God's charging up sin; reconciliation rests upon God's non-imputation of sin; God's non-imputation of sin rests upon Christ being made sin for us. . .  . God by Christ's own consent identified Him with sin in treatment though not in feeling. God did not judge Him, but judged sin upon His head. . • • God made Him to be sin in treatment though not in feeling, so that holiness might be perfected in judgment, and we might become the righteousness of God in Him; so that we might have in God's sight right­eousness by our living union with Christ.3
1. P., The Work of Christ, p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 82. The Scripture reference is II Corinthiams 5*19 KJV.
3. Ibid., pp. 82-84-.
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During the progress of the discussion it becomes 
quite clear that "reconciliation has its effect not upon 
man only, but upon God also."^ It was "not only an action 
on man, it meant an action on G o d . T h e  effect upon God, 
the satisfactionary aspect of Christ's work, or His "ex­
piation or atonement presented to the holy power of God,"3 
Forsyth believes to be synonymous with the classical Bibli­
cal concept of justification. With respect to justifica­
tion, its real objective element "is that God Himself made 
the complete sacrifice, • , • not that it was made to God, 
but by G o d . G o d  suffered on behalf of sinful man. If 
this be Patripassianism, critics may make the most of it. 
But Forsyth does exercise care in defending his view;
The Cross is God working in Christ. Shall we saysuffering? "It is a Patripassian heresy." But there is the suffering of identity and the suffer­ing of sympathy. The Father did not suffer as the* Son (that were too Sabellian) but He suffered with the Son. • . • When He spared not His Son did He spare Himself? . . .  It cost the Father at least as much as the Son. . • • Our redemption drew upon the whole Godhead.5
Forsyth even goes so far a,s to speak of Christ's victory 
on the Cross "as costing God His l i f e . Y e t  it would be
1. F., The Work of Christ, p. 8 7 .
2 . Ibid., p. 1 0 3.
3 . Ibid., p. 1 9 9. 4-. Ibid., p. 92.
5* F., Missions in State and Church, pp. 28-29.
6, F., The Justification of God, p. 14-7.
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absurd to take this phrase literally. So, again, a
cautious explication is in order :
In the literal sense the death of God would leave the victory with the enemy of God. If God could be abolished there could have been no real God. But the theologian knows there is a sense in which the phrase is not nonsense. . . . Sin is the death of . God. Die sin must or God. . . . But the meaning of the Incarnation is that God was capable, in His self-emptying in Christ, of a self-limitation, i.e. a self-mastery of holy surrender, whose moral effect was more than equal to the foreign invasion by sin. He died unto sin, as man dies by^  it. . . . God so died as to be the death of death. He com­mands His own negation —  even when it pierces as deep within Himself as His Son.^
This, however, leaves unanswered the question of the effect 
of the expiating work of Christ upon God. For, if God 
reconciled Himself, and if His holy love constantly en­
dures and His grace is from His own holy eternity —  as 
indeed must be forever true, wherein did Christ change 
God's relationship to man? In answering this question 
Forsyth distinguishes between "a change of feeling and a 
change of treatment, between affection and discipline, be­
tween friendly feeling and friendly relations. In each 
pair of distinctions it is the second member that had to 
change. If the attitude of God to His creation is not 
altered, the relationship is, for reconciliation is a
1. F,, The Justification of God, pp. 147-149,
2. F., The Work of Christ, p. 105. Cf. F., The Cruciality of the Cross, p .
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personal communIon and communion is mutual. After 
communion has been restored God is free to act differently 
than He did before. And man is free to respond differ­
ently in a reconciled condition. This is what ensues from 
God's reconciling act in Christ on the Cross. This is 
what Forsyth means by the satisfactionary aspect of the 
work of Christ presented to the holy power of God. And 
the holiness which Christ offered in satisfaction to God 
was "not obedient suffering but suffering obedience • • . 
the hallowing of His name by perfect and obedient answer 
to His holy heart from amid conditions of pain, death, and 
judgment.
What Christ as Expiator offered to God was Himself 
as man's Surety. While this expression has its limita­
tions, what Forsyth intends that it should mean is "the 
Creator's self-assurance of His own regenerative power. 
This is to say that ; "Christ, as the Eternal Son of Holy 
God, can offer Him a holiness which creates and includes 
that of the race, and does not simply prophesy it."3 It 
also could be stated that: "Christ alone in His sinless 
perfection can feel all God's holiness in judging sin; 
and therefore He alone could confess and honour it."^
1. P., The Work of Christ, p. 205f*
2. Ibid., p. 212. 3 . Ibidem.
4. Ibidem.
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That which sinful man had no capacity for doing for him­
self Christ was able to do on his behalf because of His 
organic unity with man, His own perfect and impenitent 
holiness, and "His complete victory over the evil power 
in a life-experience of moral conflict,
According to Forsyth, Christ's work of satisfac­
tion to God we,8 not His suffering.
|ltr[ was also more than the spectacle of His own holy soul presented to God, It we,s that holy soul , . . seen by God as the cause and creator of the race's confession, both of holiness and of sin, in a Church of the reborn. The satisfaction to Godwas Christ, not as an isolated character, or in anact wholly outside us and our responsive union with Him; but it was Christ as the author of our sanctification and repentance.
In describing the change that takes place in God in 
reconciliation with respect to His practical relationship 
to man, Forsyth alludes to the parable of the Prodigal 
Son. Although the father's love followed his estranged . 
and wayward son, "his relations, his confidence, his 
intercourse were with his brother . . . The father's 
heart is the same, but his treatment must be different."3
So long as the son who flung himself away from the
father's presence remained a, prodigal he could not be 
treated otherwise. And Forsyth concludes;
1. F., The Work of Christ, p. 213.
2, Ibidem. 3* Ibid, p. 109*
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So God needed no placation, but He could not ex­ercise His kindness to the prodigal world, He certainly could not restore communion with its individuals, without doing some act which perman­ently altered the relation. And this is what set up the world's reconciliation with Him. It was set up by an act of crisis, of judgment.^
In His becoming both Victim of and Victor over man's sin
and guilt Christ made effectual God's holy love for His
children. Man's relationship to God was no longer one of
estrangement, nor was God's treatment like that of the
father toward the self-alienated son. It was a reconciled
relationship and treatment like that of the parent for the
returned prodigal, a relationship made possible and
actualized by the divine-human Person on the Cross.
In interpreting the atonement, Forsyth agrees with
Anselm that God is the object of the atonement of Christ.
He does not agree with Anselm in not including man as an
object of His atoning work, While the Anselmic view is
that God is reconciled to man through Christ's work of
satisfaction made to the honour of God Forsyth believes
that the broken relationship between holy God and sinful
man is restored by satisfaction made to the holiness of
God,^ Neither could he agree with the later Reformation
1, P., The Work of Christ, p. 109.
2. F,, The Principle of Authority, p. 330f. Cf. F., The Work of Christ, p. 223f,
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view that grounded the objective necessity of the atonement 
in God's justice. While the divine self-determination to 
restore communion is a moral decision, it goes much deeper 
than justice.
It should be further noted that whereas Anselm of 
Canterbury assumes a cleavage between the Incarnation of 
Christ and His Atonement, Forsyth sees them as a unity and 
interprets Christ's redemptive work accordingly. Further­
more, at this point the latter day theologian parts company 
with Irenaeus who defines the Incarnation-Atonement unity 
as one in which the Incarnation of Christ was the necessary 
preliminary of His atoning work. Forsyth views them as be­
ing in conjunction with each other, not as successive to 
one another. In harmony with Irenaeus he believes that 
God is manifested as the Reconciler and the Reconciled in 
the work of Jesus Christ. Both agree that the agape of
God removes the barrier between God and man and establishes
a new relationship between them. The new relationship is 
not a legal one of justification but one of agape, a new
creation, a new quality of existence.
Forsyth's strong emphasis, both on the agape of 
holy God and the'principle of persons or beings in rela­
tionship, enables him to overcome the Objective-Sub­
jective antithesis which interprets the work of Christ as
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effecting a change exclusively in man's attitude toward 
God or in God's attitude toward man. According to the 
Forsythian viewpoint, change in relationship must be under­
stood within the framework of the holy love of God. This 
involves God, Christ and man. Consequently serious atten­
tion must be given to the ethical dimensions of the work 
of Christ.
As has been previously indicated, Forsyth takes 
the position that Christ in His reconciling action 
effected change in God. For further clarification of the 
work of satisfaction, some particular ways in which Christ 
accomplished this change should be considered. The first 
way was through utter and complete obedience on the part 
of the Son of God. "Everything turns, not on His life 
having been taken from Him, but on its having been laid 
down."  ^ Furthermore, "it was complète obedience on a uni­
versal scale to the moral requirements of grace, i.e. to 
a holy grace, to what the holiness of grace required in a 
situation of racial s i n . I t  was thus that Christ set 
up a real kingdom of holiness. Faith can understand that 
which theology has difficulty in explaining, namely:
What Christ presented to God for His complete joy and satisfaction was a perfect racial obedience.
1. F., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 8 6 .
2. Ibid., p. 97.
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It was not the perfect obedience of a saintly unit of the race, It was a racial holiness. God's holiness found itself again in the humbled holiness of Christ's "public person," He presented before God a race He created for holiness.^
To understand this properly it must be remembered that 
man's faith in Christ is centrally founded upon the con­
cept of union with Him. Forsyth makes it clear that the 
moral element in the work of Christ is directly bound up 
with His obedience in relation to God. His obedience is 
the positive side of His work as it related to Eternal God.
The second way in which Christ effected change in 
God was in the acceptance and endurance of divine judgment.
No obedience to a holy God is complete which does not recognise His judgment, and recognise it . . . by accepting it —  not necessarily in amount but in principle; not equivalently, as to amount of suffer­ing, but adequately, as to confession of sanctity; and it confesses it practically, silently, in«act and suffering.^
Christ yielded Himself wholeheartedly to final judgment on 
the race as the grand will of God. "Christ's death was 
atoning . . . because it was sacrifice unto holy and radi­
cal judgment. . . . unto the final judgment of holiness."3 
The consequences of accepting this judgment must be con­
sidered Christ's work in relation to God. The wrath of
1. F., The Work of Christ, p. 129. Cf. P., Missions in State and Church, pi 241 ; "Christ * s work was the work of a race's head, and it affected a whole race's destiny."
2. F., The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 99«
3• F ., ThèlWork of Christ, p. 135•
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God toward sin was historical fact, and in bearing "the in­
iquity of us all" Christ bore the wrath of the holy God of 
love. In a certain sense (which must be carefully defined)
He even experienced the withdrawal of God.
God never left Him,but He did refuse Him His face. The communion was not broken, but its light was withdrawn. He was forsaken but not disjoined. He was insolubly bound to the very Father who turned . aw0,y and could not look on sin but to abhor andcurse it even when His Son was beneath it.1
Christ accepted such partial and temporary withdrawal be­
cause it was required by God in maintaining His holiness.
"The dereliction upon the Cross, the sense of love's de­
sertion by love, was Christ's practical confession of the 
holy God's repulsion of s i n . F r e e l y ,  though in accord­
ance with divine will, Christ accepted humanity's sinful 
status before God. And in consequence ;
God made Him sin, treated Him as if He were sin;He did not view Him as sinful. That is quite another matter. God made Him to be sin —  it does not say He made Him sinful. God lovingly treated Him as human sin, and with His consent judged humansin in Him and on Him.3
Although the act on the Cross was adequate confes­
sion, this is not to say that it was a confession like 
that of the guilty. Therefore, it must never be said that
1. P., The Work of Christ, pp. 243-244.
2. Ibid,, p. 1 5 0,
3. Ibid., p. 150f.
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He, the Guiltless, received punishment at the hand of God.
To say that Christ was punished by God who wasalways well pleased with Him is an outrageous thing., . . But we may say at the depth of that great act of self-identification with us when He became man,He did enter the sphere of sin's penalty and the horror of sin's curse, in order that, from the very midst and depth of it, His confession and praise of God's holiness might rise like a spring of fresh water at the bottom of the bitter sea and sweetenall.i
In submitting to the penalty of sin, He suffered, and in 
His suffering obedience on the Gross He turned the Old 
Testament principle of sacrifice and self-surrender into 
a moral reality. Christ's relation to God was exalted in 
that historical yet timeless positive act of Self-sacrifice, 
the ultimate consequence of accepting judgment upon sin by 
which He satisfied divine holiness and effected God's 
reconciled relationship with man.
1. P., The Work of Christ, pp. 147-148, Both here andin his The Cruciality of the Cross Forsyth tends to linger on the threshold of a Penal Theory of the Atonement, In the latter volume he injects a restrained word of warning % "We have to be cautious in using the word penalty in con­nection with what fell on Christ. We must renounce the idea that He was punished by the God who was ever well pleased with His beloved Son" (p. 41). In his contribution to the theological symposium on the Atonement at the turn of the century Forsyth tries to smooth over a very real difficulty by making a distinction between "penal" and "penitential": "The penal judgment or consequence or curse of sin did fall on Christ, the penitential did not. . . .The penalty was His, the repentance remains ours. His ex­piation does not dispense with ours, but evokes and enables it" (The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought, London: James Clarke and Go., I9 0 0, p. 7 6),
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A third way in which Christ's work brought about a 
change in God was in His confession of God's holiness in 
order to confess man's sin. For man's guilt only revealed 
his sin as it confessed God's holiness. But Christ's con­
fession was of a different nature.
He confessed God’s holiness in rea,cting mortally against human sin, in cursing human sin, in judging it to its very death. He stood in the midst of human sin full of love to man, such love as enabled Him to identify Himself in the most profound, sympathetic way with the evil race ; fuller still of love to the God whose name He was hallowing; . . • as if the whole race confessed through Him, . . , as though the whole race did justice to God through His soul.^
As over against the old view of substitutionary expiation, 
here the emphasis is on "solidary reparation, consisting 
of due acknowledgment of God's holiness and the honouring 
of that and not of His honour."^ The sin-bearing of Christ 
converted the judgment of God into a blessing which issued 
in praise and thanksgiving on the part of man. And it 
brought about the communion of God with man on a recon­
ciled basis in that it robbed sin of its divisive power.
It is along these lines of argument that Forsyth 
cogently contends that the redemptive work of Christ is 
primarily work in relation to God, wherein He brings men
1. P., The Work of Christ, p. 150.
2. Ibid., p. I64f.
182
to God by making satisfaction to His holiness. "He repre­
sents before God . . . the new penitent Humanity that His 
influence creates,"  ^ Christ presents to God His confidence 
in Human!by and His antedated action on Humanity. Through 
faith in the Saviour whose holiness becomes man's holiness 
before God, man receives the precious boon of reconciliation.
It is only through an understanding of Christ's work 
as it relates primarily to God that His work in relation 
to man can be comprehended. If the mind does not in some 
way grasp the idea of .the satisfactionary work of justifi­
cation, it is unlikely to lay hold upon the true meaning 
of Christ's regenerative work on the soul of man and His 
victory over evil power.
iii. The Work of Jesus Christ in Relation to Sinful Man 
Prerequisite to the understanding of the work of 
Christ in relation to man is the understsending of His work 
in relation to God, which has been presented in the pre­
vious section. A second essential is awareness of ideas of 
the atonement which are unsatisfactory in Forsyth's 
estimation.
We must . . . avoid every idea of atonement whichseems to reduce it to God's dealing with a mass of individuals instead of with the race as a whole —
1. F., The Work of Christ, p. 193.
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instead of a racial, a social, a collective salva­tion, in which alone each individual has his place and part.^
This does not diminish the emphasis on the individual in 
his relation to God. It does, however, view the individual 
in the only way in which he is of ultimate importance, 
namely, in a regenerate and reconciled relationship to God 
and man through Jesus Christ. As Forsyth appraises the 
situation, this is the vital need of sinful man. "A man 
needs something to make him confident that his past sin, . 
and the great transaction of his moral life is done.
This great transaction took place in the act of Christ on 
the Cross "brought home by the resurrection through the 
Spirit."3 Although real and complete forgiveness is the 
appropriation of the world's atonement by each and every 
person, the basic issue is how Christ has worked and does 
work in relation to man to reconcile him to God and his 
fellow man, or how He accomplishes the great transaction 
of reconciliation.
(1) The Triumphant Work 
This aspect of Christ's work "emphasises the
1. F., The Work of Christ, p. 9 6 .
2. F., The Cruciality of the Cross, pp. 46-4?.
3. Ibid., p. 1 5 .
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finality of our Lord's victory over the evil power or 
d e v i l . T h i s  statement and others of a similar nature 
indicate the appeal that the "Christus Victor" idea has 
for Forsyth,^ He feels that the issue set forth clearly 
in the Cross of Christ is the eternal holiness in con­
flict for its life against Satanic evil. The whole being 
of God and His whole campaign in the world is staked upon 
this issue. In this conflict God's righteousness is 
either secured or lost to the world forever. In bold re­
lief against the Cross is "the absolute issue of the uni­
verse. "3 However, the divine resources were quite equal 
to the challenge of the evil power. On behalf of man, in 
the act of the Cross, God in Christ subdued Satan or over­
came evil, which man was unable to do because of his par­
ticipation in sin. Beelzebub and all his realm have been 
decisively defeated in the greatest conquest of all time 
and place.
The prince of this world is already judged. He actstoday as a power, indeed, but only as a doomed
1. P., The Work of Christ, p. 199*
2. R, M. Brown rightly observes, "Readers of Aulen's 'Christus Victor' will recognize . . . points of affinity between the position he presents as the 'classic' view [of]the Atonement and the position of Forsyth" (P. T.Forsyth I Prophet for Today, Philadelphia; The Westminster Press, 1 9 5 2» P • 84).
3* F,, The Justification of God, p. 14?.
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power. His sentence went out in the Cross. And he knows it. Humanity was rescued from him there.^
However, this rescue from Satanic evil is not only 
a rescue from something, it is also a rescue into some­
thing. The deliverance of man is not simply to take him 
out of hell, it is also to take him into heaven.
Christ does not simply pluck us out of the hands of Satan, He does so by,giving us to God. He does not simply release us from slavery, He commits us in the act to a positive liberty. He does not simply cancel the charge against us in court and bid us walk out of jail, He meets us at the prison-door and puts us in a new way of life.^
The victory of the theocentric goodness of Christ on His
Cross meant not only the destruction of sin but also the
reconstruction of the life of man. As Forsyth says:
No sinful man can "unsin" himself, however he amend.It can only be done by the creation in him of a new life. It can only be done by the sinless Son of God, who lived from eternity in God's holiness, entered man, lived that holiness out in the face of sin, and thus not only broke the evil power by living it down but created that holiness in us by living it in. 3
Christ accepted the judgment of God upon sin, but was Victor 
over it. Therefore, man in Christ becomes victor over sin, 
since he accepts both the love and judgment of Christ in 
relation to himself. Such is the triumphant aspect of the
1. P. T. Forsyth, The Taste of Death and the Life of Grace (London: James Clarke and Co., I9 0 1), p. 71.
2. The Work of Christ, p. 202.
3* Ibid., p. 209.
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work of Jesus Christ.
(2) The Regenerative or Redemptive Work 
The truth that God in Christ "not only broke the 
evil power by living it down but created that holiness in 
us by living it in"^ suggests the important place that 
Forsyth gives to the regenerative effect of the atoning 
Cross. Thus the triumphant aspect blends into the re­
creative aspect.
When he speaks of Christ recreating man Forsyth 
does not intend at all to imply that this is a oreatio ex 
nihilo. "Creation out of. nothing is a phrase of no mean­
ing; it is unthinkable."^ The Revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ, which "is in the same act Redemption, new Crea­
tion, " 3 is not to be equated with "a magician's power to 
bring out blossoms with a wave of his hand, or place coins
1. F ., The Work of Christ, p. 209*
2. F ., The Principle of Authority, p. I5 8 . To Forsyth a oreatio e'x~ni¥iXo being "unthinkable" is therefore an un­tenable concept. He thus takes a position contrary to that of Dr. Karl Barth who in his work, The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G. T. Thompson (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1 9 3 6), represents the newness of the Christian man as "a quite inconceivable novum in direct contrast to all his ability and capacity" (p. 222), clearly implying that the new man is indeed a "oreatio ex nihilo."
3 . Ibid., p. 1 5 6. Cf. Ibid., p. l64; "Again, Revela­tion is Redemption." See also, P., Revelation Old and New, J. Huxtable, Ed. (London; Independent”Press',’ Ltd,", 1962,pp. 9-22).
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suddenly where there were n o n e . W h i l e  the new Creation,
or the new Humanity to use a synonymous expression that
occurs again and again in Forsyth's theological writing,
particularly in The Christian Ethic of War is indeed a
"miracle of G r a c e , i t  does not represent the deed of any
thaumaturgist. The a priori of the huma,n constitution in
relation to Revelation as Redemption needs to be described
both negatively and positively:
It [is notQ a germ whose innate resources Revela­tion develops. But it is a recognising power, a receptivity, It is not an activity, but it is as active as that -- as the function of receptive per­sons, and not merely vessels. We are not as pass­ive as clay to the potter. We are not dead, perinde ac cadaver. . . .  it is the response of a will to a will, of the whole finite person, to a whole person, absolute and holy.3
Although it is true that "there is no final and innate
revelation of God in human nature, nothing so much deeper
and surer than the gospel that it can lend it a licence,"4
it is also true that the rationality and conscience of
natural man provide "points of attachment or modes of
action, an economy for a revelation when it comes,"5
While the Revelation-Eedemption act is not magical, though
1. P., The Principle of Authority, p. 157.
2. Ibid., p. l60. Of, Ibid., pp. 84, 169-
3. Ibid., p. 157.
4. Ibid., p. 122. 5. Ibidem.
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at the same time not solely rational, the important thing
to Forsyth is that it is thoroughly and vitally moral.
The regenerative work of Christ takes place within
man because man through faith is indwelt by the Christ who
accomplished His work on the historic Cross. According to
Forsyth, this means that —
The newness of the new creature is less in himself than in his tennant. Christ lives in him. And the newness in the man corresponds to the new and orig­inal thing in Christ. If in Christ there was noth­ing essentially new, if He was but man at his spiritual best, we could not so speak. But all that makes Him the Son of God goes to differentiate the new creature He inhabits. . . . The new crea­tion is not so much in me as in Him whose unique soul and life inhabits me as souls do souls. My knowledge is reborn beyond all science because I am known by Him whom I know; my life is reborn be­yond all nature because it is now not lived by me but lived into me. The new master makes the new man. ^
Practically, the significance of the new Creation is that 
the new Creator was in man "and the word was flesh in such 
a way that He and His are one by faith in a solidarity 
corresponding from beneath, mutatis mutandis, to the 
solidarity between Father and Son from a b o v e . I t  is • 
by "His revolutionary, causal, creative action on that in­
most reality whereby man is man"3 tlmt "Christ approves
1. F ., This Life and the Next, pp. 108-109.
2. P., The Work of Christ, p. 226.
3* P ., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 201,
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Himself as a divine reality"^ in and beyond man. Henoe,
life is a sanctity, for man is moral and holy in history
and destiny. And for man to live the life of faith "is
not another piece of work, but the new life which is the
source of all work, and which has for its ventures all the
capital of Christ's life behind it*"2 The way in which
man's "saved" condition is brought about must be made
clear and emphatic ;
We are not saved either by Christ's ethical char­acter or our own, but by His person's creative power and work on us. Christ's holiness is the satisfying thing to God, because it is not only the means but also the anticipation of our holiness, because it carries all our future holiness latent in it and to God's eye patentbecause in His saving act He is the power of which our new lifeis the product.3
Forsyth concludes that Christ's "moral and.spiritual 
victory was so deep and thorough that it gives Him power 
to subdue other consciences to His holy self, world with­
out end."4 so it is that man's regenerate freedom is 
actualized in his faith-full life as servant and trustee 
of God's gift of grace through the saving act of Jesus 
Christ.
1, P., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 201.
2. P., This Life and the Next, p. 12?.
3- P., The Work of Christ, p. 208.
4. Ibid., pp. 209-210.
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(3) The Royal Work as Lord
As Christ in holiness takes possession of redeemed
man, He brings man to the realization that he is saved for
God's absolute service and holy honour.
He is indeed Saviour and sole Saviour? but what He saves us into is His own absolute and holy Lord­ship. Personal Christianity is not simply being saved from ruin, but being saved into that active obedience. It is not being saved from hell, but saved into heaven. And that is our destined heaven —  to be in this Kingly Christ. God's real grace is not taking us out of despair but taking us into His service, • , , We acquire our soul only by glorifying God,^
It is Forsyth's conviction that the Christ of the atoning
Cross is He "whose one end, both as He lived, died, and
revived, was that He might be Lord both of the dead and 
l i v i n g . H i s  royal work is that of being Sovereign Lord,
By His perfect satisfaction of God*s'holiness, He became the trustee of it for God among men. Be­cause He took man's judgment He became man's judge,, . , The supreme sacrifice is in principle the final judgment, and the supreme victim the last judge, , . . And He who met the whole demand of holiness with His person becomes the law's Lord, in as much as holiness is above mere righteousness. So by the objective nature , , , of His work for us He becomes our King —  the conscience of the conscience. Himself the living and holy law which is our moral ultimate. He is the fountain of moral honour, and the centre of moral authority, for ever and for all.3
1, F ., The Principle of Authority, p. 37^*
2, Ibid,, p, 4 1 7 ,
3 , Ibid., p. ^06f.
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Christ's royal work as Sovereign Lord is that of being 
King and Keeper of the moral universe, of moral men in 
the moral universe. His sovereign ro^^al work has been 
and is being made final through the atoning Cross which 
"is the consummation of the holy conscience of God in the 
eternal action of love which incessantly creates a moral 
universe.
If the foregoing summaries of the work of Jesus 
Christ in relation to God and man seem to suggest a dis­
unity in the work which is at variance with the unity of 
His person, it can be definitely stated that it was not 
Forsyth's intention that such should be the case. It 
is well to let him speak directly about this matter:
. The active and effective principle in the work of Christ was the perfect obedience of holy love which He offered amidst the conditions of sin, death, and judgment, . . . This principle (I hope to show) co­ordinates the various aspects which have been dis­torted by isolation. This one action of the holy Saviour's total person was, on its various sides, the destruction of evil, the satisfaction of God, and the sanctification of men. And it is in this moral medium of holiness (if I may so say) that these three effects pass and play into each other with a spiritual interpenetration.^
Although the various aspects of the work of Christ have
been treated somewhat individually for purposes of explan-
1. F., The Justification of God, p. 108,
2. P., The Work of Christ, pp. 201-202,
192
ation and clarification, this procedure has followed that 
of Forsyth who is deeply conscious of their correlation in 
the one Divine-human Person and His eternal and decisive 
act on the Cross.
4. The Unity of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ 
The unity of the person and work of Christ is in 
evidence throughout the development of P. T. Forsyth's 
Christological thought. This is succinctly stated when he 
says, "The work of Christ, realised in the Church's ex­
perience through faith, becomes the avenue and key to the 
person of Christ.  ^ The unity is further emphasized and 
clarified when he reasserts the conviction of Melanchthon: 
"The knowledge of Christ is to know His benefits, taste 
His salvation, and experience His grace; it is not , • . 
to reflect on His natures and the modes of His incar­
nation."^
Forsyth regards the moral as the real and person­
ality as the key to being. Accordingly, he shifts his 
emphasis from the term "nature" to that of "person," from 
the metaphysic of being to the metaphysic of ethic. He 
begins his Christological construction "with the historic
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 220.
2. Ibid., pp. 220-221.
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reality and unity of Christ's p e r s o n . T h i s  paves the 
way for his use of conceptual tools such as "personality, 
history, and society, as can be understood when he ex­
plains that "the ideas of personality and society . . . 
are condensed in such an idea as marriage, which is at 
once the keystone of society and the. great symbol of 
Christ's relation to man."^ "The marriage relation is 
the brief epitome of the social principle of the kingdom 
of God,"^ which in turn "points to a social plurality in 
Him in whom His whole Church lives. Through His work 
the faithful in His Church come to know His person as He • 
is revealed to them in their experience of His redemption, 
regeneration and sanctification. This is Christ's moral 
action, which was and is centrally His act on the Cross.
According to Forsyth, "the ethical notion of the 
true unity as the interpenetration of persons by moral 
action must take the place of the old metaphysic of the 
union of natures by a tour de force."6 Upon such an 
ethical basis he interprets the unity of the person of 
Jesus the Christ and the unity of His person and work in
1. F., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 229f.
2. Ibid., p. 230.
3. Ibidem. 4. Ibidem.
5# Ibid., p. 2 3 1, 6. Ibidem.
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relation to persons in the Church and in the world. The 
implications and details of Forsyth's views have been 
explicated in the two previous sections of this chapter, 
the former in regard to the person of Christ and the latter 
with respect to His work. A more critical examination of 
major features of Forsyth's position will be undertaken 
in the final chapter when his Christolpgical thought will 
be compared with that of Emil Brunner.
CHAPTER III
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHT OP EMIL BRUNNER
1. Presuppositions and Theological Method 
The extensive theological ramifications of H. Emil 
Brunner's Christological thought dictate the giving of 
careful consideration to his presuppositions and method­
ology. For him all Christian doctrine is necessarily re­
lated to Christology. The Christ-centered mind of this 
theologian is therefore appreciative of the importance 
that attaches to the broad intellectual enterprise of 
dogmatics. In introducing the definition and place of 
dogmatics he seeks to clarify his understanding of the 
ground, the essential meaning, and the content of this 
Christian discipline:
Dogmatics is not the Word of God. God can make his word prevail in the world without theology.But at a time when human thought is so often con­fused and perverted by fantastic ideas and theories, spun out of men's minds, it is evident that it is almost impossible to preserve the Divine Word with­out the most passionate intellectual effort to re­think its meaning and its content. The simple Christian may, it is true, understand and preserve God's Word without theology; but those Christians who are involved in the thinking of their own day, and who, as children of their own day, are deeply
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influenced by these currents of thought, an all- inclusive and thorough effort to re-think what has been given to faith is absolutely indispensable.This is particularly true for those whose calling it is to proclaim this faith to others.1
In brief, dogmatics is the re-thinking of the faith that 
has been given with the Word of God. This engagement of 
the intellect "presupposes the Christian Faith and the 
Christian Church not only as a fact but as the possibility 
of its own existence."2 Having stated these presupposi­
tions, Brunner proceeds to further explication. "Dog­
matics . . .  is the Science of Christian teaching or 
doctrine. But the subject always exists before the 
'science* of the subject can be studied. . • . Dogmatics 
is a function of the teaching Church."3 This in turn pre­
supposes "life within the Chürch, and jju its doctrine,"4 
for "dogmatic thinking is not only thinking about the 
Faith, it is believing thinking,"5 wherein the Church
1. Emil Brunner, Dogmatics, Vol. I ; The Christian Doc­trine of God (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), p. v. cT. Brunner, "The Present-Day Task of Theology," Religion In Life (Spring, 1939)» p. 1?B: "Theology is an intellectual elaboration of the knowledge of God and His Word which is inherent in the simple faith of the Christian mother, but on the basis of the whole of the Scriptures and the think­ing of the Church."
2. Ibid., p. 3. Cf. Brunner, The Philosophy of Re­ligion (London: James Clarke & Co., Ltd.,™Ï95o ed.), p. 1?: "Only as a member of the community of believers is the thinker in a position to think theologically."
3. Ibid., p. 4. 4. Ibid., p. 5* 5* Ibidem.
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reflects upon its own teaching. This does not mean that 
Christian teaching has no other form than that of dogmatics. 
In pastoral and evangelistic work, in preaching, and in 
the general program of Christian Education the Church en­
gages in a variety of teaching. The difference between 
these pedagogical forms and dogmatics lies in the degree of 
stress placed upon the doctrinal element. "In all these 
other ways of teaching the doctrinal element is not em­
phasized to the same extent as in dogmatics, hence it does 
not predominate."^ Along with his acknowledgment of the 
breadth of the field in which Christian doctrine is 
operative, Brunner explicitly declares that "dogmatics * • . 
is doctrine based upon the divine revelation, thus upon 
absolute Truth."2 This is no extravagant or boastful 
claim, because man is not the creator of this truth. Man 
can only speak the divine Word after God, and so is liable 
to err in any statement and presentation of doctrine. A 
valid system of dogmatics must evidence an awareness of 
both the revelation of absolute Truth and the fallibility 
of man in handling this Truth. "If it forgets the first, 
then it becomes an individualistic 'religious conception',
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. ?8.Since this chapter is devoted to the thought of Brunner, hereafter in this part of the thesis his name will be designated in footnotes simply by the initial B.
2. Ibid., p. 84.
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which is without authority; if it forgets the second, then 
it becomes guilty of idolizing human forms of thought.
Brunner observes the relationship of dogmatics to 
Christian faith when he says, "It is not the mistress, but 
the servant of faith and of the community of believers; 
and its service is no less, but also no more than the 
service of thought to f a i t h . T h e r e  is no safe and easy 
way for the dogmatic theologian to render such a service 
to his own generation. It is required of him that he be 
thoroughly conversant both with Biblical thought and the 
thought of men of his own day. Even so, his task is 
fraught with double peril. He is constantly walking a 
knife edge that exposes him to the danger of slipping over 
into "the wrong 'offence* of being unintelligible . . .  on 
the one hand, and the avoidance of the genuine 'Offence* 
of the Cross on the other."3 Furthermore, in view of the 
limitations of dogmatics the best theological proficiency 
is not enough and the theologian who is not driven "to 
pray frequently and urgently from his heart ; 'God be 
merciful to me a sinner', is scarcely fit for his job."^
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 8^.
2. Ibid., p. 85. 3. Ibid., p. 84.
4. Ibid., p. 8 5 . How critically important the job of the theologian can be is confessed by Brunner in an article on "The Present-Day Task of Theology" appearing in the Spring (1 9 3 9) issue of Religion In Life;"I, myself, would
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Faith, as Brunner identifies it in the course of his 
discussion, is not related to any doctrine or to any creedal 
statement requiring subscription on the part of the be­
liever, but "it is the obedience of faith , . . to Jesus 
Christ Himself, who bears witness to Himself in the Word 
of the Scriptures through the Holy Spirit in the heart, 
conscience, and mind of man as the t r u t h . T h i s  is to 
understand that the Bible is central to the faith, for it 
is the form of God’s revelation of Himself —  the supreme 
Reality and absolute Truth. Brunner often interprets 
Scripture in a free, i.e.' non-literal, sense and he shies 
far away from the slightest suggestion of bibliolatry.
The content, which is the essence of faith, is the holy 
love of God as revealed in Jesus Christ as witnessed to in 
the Scriptures and ma,de effectual in man by response and 
appropriation. In the Bible the form is never separated 
from the content. Hence the Scriptures are authoritative; 
"because Christ, whom I am convinced in my conscience is 
the Truth, meets me in the Scriptures —  therefore I be­
lieve. "Where revelation is concerned, it is not the
probably never have become a Christian without the help of theological thinkers and my own theological thought"(p. 179).
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 107.
2. Ibid., p. 110. Cf. B., The Philosophy of Religion, p. 34. Brunner deplores the change from the pliant
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Book that matters first of all."l It is not the Scripture 
qua Scripture that is authoritative. Rather it is "an in­
strumental authority, in so far as it contains that element 
before which I must bow in the truth, and which also itself 
awakens in me the certainty of t r u t h . T h i s  all-important 
element is Christ, the Revelation. "The authority of 
Scripture . . .  is not based upon the Scriptures as such, 
but upon the encounter of faith with the Christ of 
Scripture."3
The interpretation of the place and authority of the 
Bible points to what may well be called Brunner’s "magnif­
icent obsession" in all his theological writings : "his
attitude of the Reformers toward the Scriptures to the iron-clad attitude reflected in later Orthodoxy (which meant a change from indirect to direct identity of the word of Scripture with the word of God) s,nd quotes with approval the teaching of Luthers "Scripture is the cradle in which Christ lies."
1. B ., Dogmatics, Vol II ; The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption (Philadelphia; The WestminsterPress , 1952')™ p. '2ÔI. Cf. B. , The Philosophy of Religion,p. 22; "The Scriptures do not figure in Christian theol­ogy . . .  as the expression of faith, but as the ground and norm of faith; hence they cannot serve as our starting point but rather as our abiding standard of reference."
2. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 110. Brunner adds, "This is what Luther means by the 'Word of God’, which is therefore not identical with the Word of Scrip­ture, although it is only given to me through the Scrip­tures, and as the Word of the Scriptures."
3 . Ibidem.
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preoccupation with the dimension of the p e r s o n a l . P r o ­
found thoughts on this dimension are brought sharply into 
focus in the notable book entitled The Divine-Human 
Encounter.^ Here the pervasive theme is "the personal 
encounter between the Creator and the human c r e a t u r e " ,3 or 
"when God meets man, Christian truth comes into being.
As he enters upon the explication of the theme of 
his definitive work, Emil Brunner points out that the 
antithesis of subject and object, which is generally
1. A. W. Loos in "The Translator’s Preface," B., The Divine-Human Encounter (London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1*944), p. ?. Of. E. L. Allen, Creation and Grace - A Guide to the Thought of Emil Brunner (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1 9 5 0)» p. 12. Allen says of Brunner that "the whole style of his thinking is Biblical, with an emphasis on the per­sonal and the historical as against abstract concepts."
2. This may well be considered the most original of Brunner’s writings. Actually it is the key to the sub­sequent three volumes of Dogmatics which endea,vor systemat­ically to fill in the outline sketched here. In 1964 a new and enlarged edition of The Divine-Human Encounter came from the press. The title, Truth as Encounter, is a much more exact translation of the Wahrheit als Begegnung under which the work was first published in German. The enlarge­ment of the new edition consists of a long Introduction (q.v.) in which Brunner relates the concept of "Truth as Encounter" to the philosophical and scientific conceptions of truth, performing what he considers to be a task of Christian philosophy rather than of theology. See also B., Dogmatics, Vol. Ill: The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation (London: The Lutterworth Press, T 9 6 2) , pp. ; B , , Revela.tion and Reason (London:S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 19^7')V'"pp.' 36'2'-37?I
3 . A. W. Loos in "The Translator's Preface," B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. ?•
4. Ibidem.
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regarded as a mould into which all thinking must in­
evitably run, is a Greek concept which is foreign to the 
Biblical thought of God in His relation to man. Further­
more, it is his conviction that "our understanding of the 
message of salvation and also of the Church’s task is still 
burdened with the Subject-Object antithesis which orig­
inated in Greek philosophy."^ He goes on to emphasize 
this point and to interject a caveat;
The Biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped through the Object-Subj ect antithesis ; on the contrary" it is falsified through it. This does not mean, to be sure, that we should avoid using this conception, since it is indispensable for natural-rational knowing, or that we can do without it in every respect ; indeed we should have to stop thinlcing altogether if we entirely gave up using it. This thesis does mean, however, tha.t where the heart of faith is concerned -- the relation between God’s Word and Faith, between Christ and faith —  the Objective-Subjective correlation must be re­placed by one of an entirely different kind.^
The relation of subject and object, so familiar 
even to a philosophical dilettante, needs little exposi­
tion. In it the thinlcing subject stands over against the 
object of thought with a manifest gulf between. The 
problem of the bridging of this gulf has been an age-long 
challenge to philosophy. In the course of a prolonged
1. B. , The Divine-Human Encounter, P'oreword, p. 6 . Cf. B., Truth as Encounter, Introduction, p. ?.
2. Ibid., p. 13f.
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controversy the consensus has been that the thinking 
subject is active in relation to the passive object and has 
a certain kind of authority and right of possession over 
it. In any case the distinction has been vividly felt. 
Cognizant of these facts, Brunner reviews the vacillating 
course of Christian thought operating in the line of the 
objective-subjective categories.  ^ In the history of the 
Church Christian thinking has tended to shift back and 
forth between an objectivism and a subjectivism which are 
both alien to Biblical truth. By objectivism is meant a 
tendency of man’s spirit and will to get something into his 
power, to hold it and to manipulate it. Thus the theo­
logian takes the divine truth and forms it into a sacro­
sanct body of doctrine, while the churchman expresses the 
truth in a sacramental system, and there it imperiously 
stands —  this body of doctrine or this sacramental 
system —  over against the human mind that has worked it 
out. Then in contrast, and often in definite reaction, 
there comes the swing in the direction of subjectivism.
Here the bent is to make religious truth center in the 
mind and feelings of the thinlcer who, without the aid of 
the concrete events of history, believes that he is able 
within the depths of his own soul to lay hold upon God
1. B ., The Divine-Human Encounter, pp. 9-29
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and to commune with Him. The familiar pattern of Church 
history reveals how the pendulum has smng between the 
stifling rigidity of orthodoxy or institutionalism on the 
one side and the individualistic laxity of pietism or 
mysticism on the other.
The picture is quite otherwise, Brunner maintains, 
when we turn to the Bible. There God and man are found in 
the most intimate and personal relation, a quite inescap­
able relation outside of which it is impossible for man to 
stand so as to make God merely the object of his thought. 
The relation is always and essentially the relation of 
"I" and "Thou."
The Biblical relation in the Old and New Testa­ments deals with the relation of God to men and of men to God. It contains no doctrine of God as He is in Himself [Gott-an-sichl, none of man as he is in himself fKenschen-an-sichj . It always speaks of God as the God who approaches man [Gott-zum Menschen-bin] and of man as the ma,n who comes from God rMenschen-von-Gott-herl. That God —  even in His "I-am-ness" []An-sich-Sein"] —  wishes from the first to be understood as the God who approaches man is precisely the meaning of the doctrine of the Triune God; that man, even in his natural being, is always the man who comes from God is the meaning of the doctrine of the image of God and of original sin. And both are known in their fullness only in Jesus Christ, in whom as the incarnate Son of God both the God who approaches man and the man who comes from God are revealed.^
1. B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 31. Cf. B., Revelation a.nd Reason, p. 3?0f.
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The actuality of this relation can only be attributed to 
the will and creative act of God. "God creates for Himself 
a person as a counterpart of Himself."  ^ In some respects 
the Bible seems to stress the omnipotence and all-efficiency 
of the Creator in a way that leads up to the boundary of 
Pantheism —  up to but never over this boundary. Man is 
an entirely dependent being, and yet he has been endowed 
with a certain measure of independence. Therefore, accord­
ing to Brunner, Determinism is absolutely excluded, for 
man’s freedom, though circumscribed, is very real and must 
never be disparaged. In and because of the Divine-human 
relationship man is both free and dependent in a propor­
tionate ratio, "Man’s freedom is grounded precisely in 
his dependence on God, so that a miximum of freedom is at 
the same time a maximum of dependence.
Brunner is under strong conviction that the unique, 
personal relation between God and man could be made known 
to man only through a divine revelation. In His infinite 
grace God met this requirement by entering History in the 
person of Jesus Christ. By such divine initiative and
1 * B ., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 35•
2. Ibid,, p. 37,
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action "personal correspondence"^ is established between
/
God and man. "God does not reveal this and that —  He re­
veals Himself by communicating Himself."2 The relation 
thus revealed can be expressed in two words, "Lord" and 
"Fellowship." To say that "God is Lord" means "first of all 
simply that God can do what He wills with what He has 
created. . . . Clt^ is basically nothing other than to 
take with entire seriousness the idea of creation."3 How­
ever, in relation to man, "God wills to be acknowledged 
as Lord in freedom, since it is by virtue of such free 
acknowledgment that He is Lord in the highest sense."4 
Yet above all and on a unique basis God wills to have 
fellowship with His human creatures. "God creates a 
counterpart who in freedom acknowledges Him as Lord, but
1. This expression appears quite often in The Divine- Human Encounter but seldom thereafter, and not at all in Revelation and Reason which was written only three years later and which contains a great deal of similar subject matter. This does not mean, however, that there has been any real change of accent. By "personal correspondence" Brunner is seeking primarily to express the correlation between the Word of God and faith and secondarily to show the formal relation between God and man. He defines and illustrates the term on a number of pages in the earlier work. Cf. especially pp. 4?, 50, 54, 92, 95» 96, 106f.
2. Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation, Vol. I (London; Nisbet & Go., Ltd., 1948), p. 37%
3. B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 3 8.
4. Ibid., p. 3 9 .
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God does this in order that He may communicate with this 
creature in love.
Man’s response to this divine approach is no affair 
of mere rea,son, as if he were in a position to stand over 
against the divine Word and judge of its truth or false­
hood. There is here in the deepest sense, a.s Brunner sees 
it, a. personal encounter which demands a personal response. 
The Word, when it is made effectual to the soul, is the 
8elf-communication of God a,s Person to person, which re­
veals to man God’s Lordship and Love in such a way that 
he acknowledges and axcepts them as integral to the rela­
tionship. This response to the Word of God, "an act in 
which the whole person is summoned and responds in order 
to receive the self-giving of G o d , i s  in the New Testa­
ment called pistis, i.e. faith or ohedience-in-trust.
This is a word of rich meaning, replete with all that is 
significantly involved in man’s participation in his 
encounter with God;
In pistis is contained the personal acknowledgment of the Lord as Lord, obedience, and the personal acceptance of the divine self-giving love in
1. B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 41.
2. Ibid., p. 48. Cf. B . , The Christiaan Doctrine of theChurch, Faith and the Consummation, p. 172; "To the self- c ommuhicat lonT 01' God "there corresponds the double act of acceptance and self-surrender which takes place in faith."
208
grateful responding love. Faith is the complete self-giving of man which is consequent upon haying received the unconditional self-giving of God,^
The way has now been prepared for Brunner to declare forth­
rightly and with cogency in favor of the method which 
emphasizes personal relationship over the false "Objective- 
Subjective antithesis" procedure in arriving at an under­
standing of Biblical truth;
There is no longer a place here for the Objective- Subjective antithesis. The application of this pair of concepts in this connection is entirely meaningless. The self-revelation of God is no object, but wholly the doing and self-giving of a subject —  or, better expressed, a Person. A Person who is revealing Himself, a Person who de­mands and offers Lordship and fellox^ship with Him­self, is the most radical a,ntithesis to everything that could be called object or objective. Likewise, the personal act of trust is something quite other than subjectivity —  that subjectivity which can become actual only when it is over against an ob­ject, that subjectivity which appropriates what is foreign to it . 2
Personal correspondence between God and man is the basic 
structure that embraces "all that the Bible has to say 
about God’s being and doing, about time and eternity, 
about the divine purpose and creation, about sin and re­
demption, about grace and works, about faith and penance,
1. B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 49. Cf. B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Con- summation, ppi 1 62-Ï7 5 . See also B,, Revelation~and Reason, pp. 32-42.
2. Ibid., p. 5 3 .
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about Church and Sacrament."1 Furthermore, all of these 
specified parts of the Biblical proclamation formulate in 
a specific way this underlying relation. So vital is this 
fundamiental presupposition in Brunner’s studied estimation 
that he declares almost vehemently that everything that 
contradicts it "must be rejected and fought against as an 
un-Bbilical and even anti-Biblical error of speculation or 
doctrinal d i s t o r t i o n . W h i l e  the objective and subjective 
categories in the philosophical and scientific realms 
serve a useful purpose in achieving the closest possible 
correspondence between thinking and being, Brunner be­
lieves that they simply do not work when knowledge of God 
is the concern of the thinker. When this is the case 
three serious inadequacies become evident. These come to 
light in view of the fact that God is absolutely "someone" 
and in no sense "something." To know, to think "something" 
rather than "someone" is "first of all, something over
1. B ., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 53* In "A Spiritual Autobiography," the fourth lecture given at the spring conference of Kyodan-related missionaries at Yumoto on April 1, 1955» published in The Japan Christian Quarterly, No. 3» 1955» Brunner gives a, strong testimony anent the "personal correspondence" thesis; "You cannot understand the Gospel unless you let yourself be personally engaged, which is the same as being challenged by the Thou which you encounter. This has become since 1 9 3 ^ thelodestar of my theological thinking, first expressed in the little book Wahrheit als Begegnung (The Divine-Human Encounter) in 1938" (p. 24*37^  Italics are his.
2. Ibidem.
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which I have disposal; secondly, something that does not
essentially change me; and, thirdly, something that leaves
me solitary*"^ In contrast, the meeting of absolutely
personal God with man in faith encounter has entirely
opposite effects:
If the Word of God meets me in faith, this is all reversed. Then I do not have something like property which is at my disposal, but I myself become property; then I myself become disposable. This is what faith stammeringly says in the word,"My Lord" . . . "my" means . . . not that Godstands at my disposal, but I at His. Herewith, inthe second place, a radical reversal occurs.Faith . . . does not give me "something", but doeschange me in the very core of my person. • • « Alord of self becomes one who obeys. And, thirdly, solitariness is now also past. . , . Into the solitariness of the "Thou-less" I, God has stepped as Thou. . . . Faith is the radical overcoming of the I-solita.riness. . . . now there is unconditional fellowship.^
It is thus that Brunner sets forth the merits of 
that method in theology which emphasizes personal relation­
ship in understanding the truth of faith as opposed to the 
tendencies of Objectivism and Subjectivism and the rational 
concept of truth determined by them. In so doing he makes 
the significant point that in the divine-human encounter 
an exchange occurs "which is wholly without analogy in the 
sphere of thinking."3 The one and only analogous encounter
1. B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 6l .
2. Ibid., 6lf, 3 . Ibid., p. 59.
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is that between human beings, the meeting of person with 
person. Yet this meeting must be considered only rela­
tively analogous for the reason that the "something" 
element is more or less intrusive in every encounter on 
the human level. Whereas, "when I stand opposite to God,
I am face to face with Him who unconditionally is no 
’something*, who in the unconditional sense is pure 
’Thou.’"^ In this critical and determinative moment when 
God becomes "Thou" in the experience of the man of faith, 
"He ceases to be an object of my thinking and transforms 
the Object-Subject relation into a relation of personal 
correspondence.So, as Brunner believes, the age-old 
dilemma between Objectivism and Subjectivism is transcended 
by the personal correlation between God and man.
In his dialectical theological approach, stressing 
the dialogue between God and man, Brunner is obviously 
strongly bound to the Barthian presupposition that there 
is a radical discontinuity between God and man, the 
Eternal and the temporal, the Creator and the creature.
In Revelation and Reason he emphatically declares, "The 
contrast between Creator and creature sets an infinite 
distance between God and me,n, the distance between Him
1. B ., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 60.
2. Ibidem.
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whose Being is unconditioned and independent, and him 
whose being is conditioned and dependent. Anent this 
line of argument, a succinct comment of Birch Hoyle on the
thought of Barth and Brunner merits quotations
From two axioms these Swiss theologians proceed as they approach the problems of philosophy and theology* These are regulative of all their think­ing on the formal side. One is taken from the old Reformed doctrine as applied to the dual nature of Jesus Christ ; F initurn non est capax infiniti .. . the other is drawn from Kierkegaard the Dane:"There is an infinite qualitative difference be­tween time and eternity : God is in heaven, man on earth."^
This raises the issue of the nature of revelation and its
relation to nature and to natural man —  man as creature.
According to Brunner there is both a special and a
general revelation. With respect to the former he is
clear a,nd unequivocal:
The Christian religion . . .  is based wholly upon something which has actually happened, within this world of time and space, and indeed, to put it still more plainly, it is based upon something which has taken place once for all. . . . In the Christian religion "salvation" is always in­dissolubly connected . . . with the fact of the
1. B., Revelation and Reason, p. 25* Cf. Ibid., p.45; "The sovereignty of God, absolute transcenda.nce, is very closely connected with what the Bible calls the holi­ness of God. As the Holy One, God is the Wholly Other, the Incomparable, the Sole Rea,lity, , . . the Unfathomable, . . . that is, as One who cannot be known; and it is thus that He makes Himself known."
2, R, Birch Hoyle, The Teaching of Karl Barth (London:S. C. M. Press, 1930), p. 98.
213
Incarnation of the Divine Word, with the fact of Atonement by Jesus Christ. Although the time and space element, that is, the element of historical contingency, does not, in itself, constitute a revelation, yet the revelation upon which the Christian faith is based is founded upon this fa,ct alone.^
■^"urthermore, any possible severance of special revelation 
from this unparalleled and unrepeatable event would be 
theologically disastrous. "The whole meaning of this 
revelation would be destroyed if it could be severed from 
this unique event which took place once for all.
As for general revelation, which Brunner in his 
extended discussion in Revelation and Reason chooses to 
call "The Revelation in the Creation",3 there is again no 
question of reality. This revelation is for him a fact 
thoroughly attested by the Biblical witness to which he 
purposes to be true. "We teach a general revelation, or 
a revelation in the Creation, because the Holy Scriptures 
teach it unmistakably, and we intend to teach it in 
accordance with the Scripture."4 in further confirming 
his position Brunner can appeal to a long tradition in
1. B., The Mediator (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 194?), p. 24f.
2. Ibid., p. 2 5 .
3 . B., Revelation and Reason, pp. 58ff.
4. Ibid., p. 5 9 . Brunner goes on to say, "The factthat the Holy Scriptures teach the revelation of God inHis works of creation needs no proof" (p. 6 0 ).
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Church and creed, especially to the Reformers —  notably 
to Calvin and Luther.
The difficult question that now presents itself is 
not whether there are two kinds of revelation, for this 
question can be answered flatly and affirmatively. The 
troublesome question is how the two revelations, that in 
the creation and that in Jesus Christ, are related to each 
other. Professor David Cairns goes to the heart of 
Brunner’s answer to this question when he says, "The 
relation of the special revelation to what man has made 
of the revelation in creation is dialectical, consisting 
at the same time of a ’Yes* and a ’No’".  ^ Brunner himself 
gives typical confirmation of such a judgment when, after 
declaring the uniqueness of the Christ-event, he goes on 
to affirm that this event can only partially relate to the 
revelation in nature, being "neither an absolute denial 
nor an absolute affirmation, but both at the same time, 
the Christian conception of a general revelation is in 
principle ’dialectic*."^ It is by such a theological
1. David Cairns, "The Theology of Emil Brunner", a contribution to Theologians of Our Times, A. W . Hastings and E. Hastings, Eds., (Edinburgh: T. & T, Clark, 1964), p. 92.
2, B., The Mediator, p. 33* Cf. B., Revelation and Reason, p. "UZi "In the teaching of the Bible and the Reformers the revelation through the Creation is certainly. not a ’side line’; it is not something that has to be placed alongside of the revelation of God in Christ, but
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stance that he provides for his understanding of general 
revelation and is enabled, as he believes, to explain how 
man can be the recipient of this revelation in addition to 
the revealing of God in Jesus Christ. The dark and stark 
fact that militates against this recipiency is that man is 
a sinner. For Brunner the factor of sin in the life of un­
redeemed man is indeed a formidable barrier.• This con­
tention is pervasive in Man In Revolt and throughout the 
pages of his Dogmatics. Yet the dialectician is not minded 
to press this point to a dead-end conclusion. To avoid 
this a nicety of expression is required. Brunner is choos­
ing his words carefully when he says, "What the 'natural 
man' knows apart from Christ is not half the truth but 
distorted t r u t h . T h i s  is due to the sinfulness of man 
in whom the image of God became twisted and misshapen in 
the Fall, but was not completely destroyed.
In Na>tural Theology (comprising a translation of 
Katur und Gnade and the reply "NeinI" by Dr. Karl Barth) 
Emil Brunner attempts to resolve the complexities in 
which he becomes inevitably involved in working out the
its relation is quite different ; that is, it is dia­
lectical in character."
1, B ,, The Mediator, p. 33»
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relationship between general and special revelation.^ The 
background and foreground of this discussion constitute an 
important part of the well known polemic engagement with 
Karl Barth. While the father of so-called "Neo-Orthodoxy" 
claims that "creation is only known in C h r i s t , h i s  
fellow protagonist argues that "we know through Jesus 
Christ that God has revealed Himself to us before, but 
that we did not properly admit this revelation."3 Barth 
will not concede that God's testimony comes outside of 
ChristÎ he will admit a general grace, but not a general 
revelation. Brunner elaborates his own position by saying 
that it is first possible to reason concerning the creation 
in the light of the special revelation in Jesus Christ. 
Because of sin, natural man cannot receive the general . 
revelation. Through Christ we can rightly know the works 
of creation, and only through the second revelation can 
man come to a knowledge of the first. On the basis of this 
brief exposition of Brunner's position vis a vis that of 
Barth it would seem to be obvious that it is the former's 
intention to emphasise the objective possibility of know­
ing the revelation in creation, and at the same time to
1. B. , Natural Theology, Comprising "Nature and Gra.ce" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply "Neini" by Dr. Karl Barth. Peter Fraenkel, translator %London, Geoffrey Blesi The Centenary Press, 19^6), pp. 15-64.
2. Ibid., p. 6lfn. 3* Ibidem.
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indicate that this possibility does not necessarily involve 
the subjective possibility of this knowledge, because the 
reason of man has been broken and blinded by sin. The 
revelation remains in its objective and creaturely reality, 
but man cannot see it because his whole nature has been 
darkened.
The tides of verbal and conceptual conflict between 
Brunner and Barth swirl around the idea of the imago del 
in man, and Brunner develops concepts of the "formal" and 
"material" images of God in man as he utilizes the Reform­
ers' dialectical interpretation of the relationship be­
tween reliquiae imaglnis del and restoratio imaginis del 
propter Christum.^Their "vestigial image of God" becomes 
his "formal image of God" which remains in man after the 
Fall. Their "restored image of God through Christ" be­
comes his "material image of God" restored through the 
Begegnung or encounter between God and man in and through 
Jesus Christ, the incarnate and atoning special revelation 
of God. Brunner contends that natural man kept his formal 
image of God after the Fall and that this image consists
1. B., Natural Theology, pp. 23-24, 35-50* Cf. B.,The Divine-Human Encounter, pp. 9I-9 6 ; The Christian Doc­trine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 5 7 1 6 1, 75-76î Man In Revolt (London; Lutterworth Press, 1939)» PP* 82-204; God and Man (London: SCM Press, 1936), p. Il6fn. These multiple references are indicative of the fact that "the image of God" is an oft repeated and extensively treated theme in Brunner's writing.
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of his '’capacity for words (Wortmaohtigkeit) and re­
sponsibility."^ These qualities distinguish man from the 
beast and enable him to stand outside himself. The formal 
image of God in man is the "point of contact" (Anknupfungs- 
punkt)2 for the Word of God in the Gospel which comes to 
man in faith-encounter. In taking this position Brunner 
is making a definite parallel between his teaching about 
the image of God and that of the point of contact in that 
he again makes the distinction between the formal and the 
material. The point of contact is the formal image, human­
ity, responsibility.
In regard to the conscience of man, Brunner holds 
this to be the central point in natural human self-under­
standing. In the relation of fallen man to the Word of God 
"this 'point' is the general point of contact, insofar as
1. B ., Natural Theology, p. 31. Brunner goes on to say of the relationship of these constitutive elements of the formal image : "The possibility of his being addressed is al­so the presupposition of man's responsibility. Only a being that can be addressed is responsible, for it alone can ma.ke decisions."
2. Ibidem, Of. B., Man In Revolt, pp. 527-546. Cf. also, "Die Frage nach dem 'Ankntfpfungspunkt ' als Problem der Theologle. " In; Zwischen^derTS^iten, lOl l932', heft 6, pp, 
5 0 5-5 3 2. In this article Brunner gives direct and critical attention to the question of how the word of faith can be spoken to and heard by the natural man. A burning mission­ary zeal and a deep desire to preach the gospel to non-be­lievers are the determinants of the significance of this question for the theologian. "The question of the 'pointof contact' is fully understood and urgent only for those who have part in the work of the church as preachers, missionaries and pastors" (p. 529). Translation mine.
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it is the general immanent possibility."^ Beyond this con­
cession he is quite unwilling to go. Actually he believes 
that conscience is a dark and sinister factor in man's ex­
istence. "The sinister thing about conscience is precisely 
this, that primarily it has nothing to do with God at all, 
that it attacks man like an alien, dark, hostile power. 
Therefore, it is only proper to speak of a bad or accusative 
conscience. Brunner points out that what is subjectively 
known as the evil conscience "is the same thing as that 
which is objectively called standing under the wrath of 
God,"3 The point of contact in the conscience is not a 
neutral point, but is a negative quality. There is both 
continuity and discontinuity. However, "the continuity 
always refers only to the formal 'that*, whereas the dis­
continuity touches the content *what'."^ "Therefore, the
1. B ,, "Die Prage nach dem ' Anknüpfungspunîct * , " p. 516. Translation mine, as is true of other quotations from this article. Cf. B., Man In Revolt, p. 63; "According to Kierkegaard, the sense of 'guilt' engendered by conscience belongs in contradistinction to the sense of sin, to the sphere of immanence."
2. Brunner, The Divine Imperative (London* The Lutter­worth Press, 1937)I pV 156* Shortly thereafter Brunner says, "As conscience it does not speak of God, but it is the flaming sword which drives us away from the presence of God" (p. 157).
3. B, , "Die Prage nach dem * Ankniipfungspunkt * " , p. 524.
4. Ibid., p. 5 2 5 * It should be noted here that Brunner uses the word "only" (nur) with respect to the formal side, indicating his disparaging attitude toward all form.
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same words; but also, all words receive a new significance 
in Christ."! Redeemed man with his "material image" of God 
through Christ, has knowledge of what God is like, how God 
is minded toward sin, how man is to live having misused his 
freedom and not having carried out his responsibility be­
fore God, what his ultimate destiny is, and what the will 
and holy love of God really are.
Emil Brunner affirms in his dialectical theology
that the special revelation of God to men is both eternal
and unique, therefore decisive. It is of prime necessity, 
he feels, to make the double asseveration of eternality 
and uniqueness.
If it were eternal only, it would not be decisive. For in that case it would be the common element which lies behind all that is common to humanity as a whole. It would not be an event at all, but only an idea, which would shine through the events of history as their "background." That which is merely significant is never decisive. On the other hand, if revelation were wholly and only unique, then it would be so absolutely remote and unintelligible • that we could have no relation to it at all. It is decisive because it is both unique and eternal.^
It is the absolute uniqueness and, in consequence, the
absolute decisiveness of the Christian revelation that
forces man to come to grips with "the problem of history."3
1. B,, Die Frage nach dem *Anknupfungspunkt*, p. 525*
2. B ., The Mediator, p. 304.
3. Ibid., p. 303*
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Brunner holds that the revelation of God in Christ 
is both from beyond history and within history. In general 
revelation and in the formal image of God in man there is 
indeed a sense of the seriousness of existence. But only 
in special revelation and in the material image of God in 
man has "every historical element ♦ . . gained a new 
quality."! And this quality is to "have a new conscious­
ness of time and history"^ possessed in faith alone, which 
to Brunner has this significancei
The moment gains the quality of an absolutely de­cisive moment through Christ . . . in so far as we ' receive the Word which in Him has become "flesh.**To say that history has become problematic means : whereas previously men lived simply within history, . . .  we have now, so to speak, raised our heads above history.3
Consequent to this unique and decisive revelation, man as 
man in history is enabled to see from beyond history the 
sin which permeates this realm? he is called upon by the 
exacting reality of Jesus Christ to make an existential 
decision, to take his entire existence seriously, where­
upon he gains a new meaning of his existence and a new 
awareness of time and eternity. History, for Brunner, is 
the encounter in faith of the "I" by the "Thou." This 
absolutely unique event of the coming of God to man in
X. B., The Mediator, p. 3 0 6.
2. Ibidem. 3. Ibid., p. 306f.
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Jesus Christ alone gives human existence and history their 
true meaning. This point is succinctly set forth in the 
last chapter of The Mediator, where among other things, 
the author saysi "History in the qualified sense exists 
only through Christ."! Within the broader field of human
Ihistory in general there is then the "particular thing"
called "saving history" (Heilsgeschichte), or the history
of revelation, and this history is absolutely determinative
in coming to a knowledge of God. "Outside this particular
history, the specific history of revelation and salvation,
we do not know the living God.
Commenting on special revelation versus general
revelation in the teaching of Emil Brunner, Professor
Cairns has said *
It is not possible to build the knowledge of God given in the special revelation uponrthe sure founda­tion of natural knowledge of God given in the general revelation, for the simple reason that general reve­lation is not a sure foundation. The light of the special revelation shows that natural knowledge of God is inextricably mingled with error. And as man's understanding of God is mingled with error, so is his own understanding of himself partly true and partly false. For man's very being is wholly de­pendent on God, and if he is wrong in his thought about God, he will be wrong also in his thought about himself. Faith is thus concerned both to affirm and to deny the teaching of natural anthro­pology, ethics and philosophy, as it finds such
1. B., The Mediator, p. 614.
2. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp* tion, p. 1 9 6.
223
teaching true and false.!
In his Dogmatics I Brunner notes a certain similarity be­
tween theology and philosophy with respect to a common 
aim and concern in the quest for Ultimate Truth;
In its relation to the Ultimate, the Absolute . . . dogmatics is like philosophy. Its aim is not to establish facts, but to seek to discover the ulti­mate and final truth behind the facts. . . .  In contrast*;, to all philosophy, however, theology does not need to seek for this truth by its own efforts after knowledge; its task is rather to illuminate by means of thought that revelation which is given to man through faith.Like philosophy, it is concerned with the Eternal Logos, but in contrast to philosophy it is concerned with the Logos which became flesh • « • it is not concerned with an abstract idea, but with the Logos who is the Son of the Father.^
These statements, considered along with the previous dis­
cussion of his thought, are indicative of Brunner's con­
viction that both theology and philosophy have a place in 
gaining true knowledge. Furthermore, his assertions 
demonstrate his belief that philosophy has validity and 
usefulness in relation to theology. However, a further 
clarification of his position is required at this pôint.
As previously indicated, Brunner believes that 
theology is the servant of Christian faith; its service is 
that of thought developing and formulating the meaning and
1. David Cairns, "Introduction," B., God and Man, pp. 15-1 6 .
2. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 6 3 *
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implications of faith. This faith, "to which theology 
gives the form of scientific conceptions, is the knowledge 
and acknowledgment of God's self-revelation in Jesus 
Christ."! Through special revelation faith, so defined, 
can gain knowledge of ultimate and absolute truth. In 
relation to theology and to the faith to which theology is 
subservient, philosophy is seen as playing an undeniably 
co-operative role;
Whether from the point of view of philosophy, or f3?om that of faith, we may deplore this co-operation of philosophy and faith in Western philosophy . . . we cannot deny its existence as a fact. . . .  A great number of the philosophical conceptions which today every philosopher uses naturally, as part of his intellectual ectuipment, have been created by Christian philosophers,* on the other hand, no Christian theologian . . . can carry on his work without using conceptions that are derived from philosophy. The synthesis-of philosophy and Christianity, in some way or other, . . .  is part of our destiny.^
However, this synthesis is both factual and troublesome. 
Brunner notes with approval the stern insistence of Emile 
Brehier (quoted by M. Etienne Gilson) that reason in its 
own sphere —  which is inclusive of philosophy —  be grant­
ed an unhampered autonomy.3 The opposition of believers 
to the synthesis is of a different nature. In this case
1. B., The Philosophy of Religion, p. 15. This does not mean "to make faith rational by giving it scientific form", which Brunner previously insists "can never be re­quired of Christian theology" (p. 14).
2. B. Revelation and Reason, p. 375* 3« Ibidem.
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philosophy oer se is deeply suspect. Biblical support for 
this view is found in certain teachings of the Apostle Paul, 
to whom appeal is often made.! annals of Christendom
in some quarters and in some aras bear record of a distrust 
not only of philosophy but also of reason itself, as in 
Tertullian's Against Keretics. And yet there are great 
Christian thinkers such as Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard 
who "remind us that the warning against a synthesis of re­
ligion and philosophy, believed to be injurious to faith, 
is not intended to discredit the use of reason, but is 
directed only ap;ainst philosophical thought as such. " ^  
Kierkega^ard is hailed as an outstanding Christian who was 
"not only a theological but a philosophical thinker, . . . 
who used his great philosophica.1 powers in the service of 
his faith."3 The development of his argument shows that 
Brunner is concerned to allow philosophy to be the hand­
maiden of theology, which is faith thinking and illuminat­
ing the Revelation it receives. The theologian as a 
Christian philosopher is free to employ philosophy as a 
valid interpretative instrument for his theology.
In the latter pages of Revelation and Reason
1, B ., Revelation and Reason, p. 376. References 
given are I Corinthians l*19ff and Chiossians 2:8,
2. Ibidem. 3. Ibid., p. 377*
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Brunner makes further and significant reference to his pro­
longed debate with Karl Barth. Over against the rational­
ism which is thoroughly eschewed by both thinkers Brunner 
sees in Barthianism "an equally exclusive and radical 
fideism which, alongside the Word of revelation does not 
recognize any second, independent source of knowledge for 
any sphere of life."! just as the rationalist makes reason 
absolutely and everywhere authoritative, so the fideist 
makes Christian revelation absolutely and everywhere 
authoritative. Reason and revelation thus become entirely 
and completely opposed to one another. While the position 
of the rationalist is conceivably defensible, the position 
of the radical fideist is obviously contrary to sound 
judgment and common sense. "Does anyone' seriously main­
tain that all questions in mathematics, physics, biology,
pand astronomy are 'answered in the Word of God?*" Such 
a view would be absurd, for all such things belong to "the 
sphere of that which man 'knows of himself*, or which he 
can learn by himself, with the aid of purely natural human 
methods."3 Brunner proposes to stake out a position be­
tween the two extremes of viewpoint. This he assays to do 
by setting up a "law of closeness of relation';’ enunciated
1, B ., Revelation and Reason, p. 376*
2. Ibidem. 3* Ibid., p. 360.
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in terms of a "proportional statement'' ;
The nearer anything lies to that center of existence where we are concerned with the whole, that is with man's relation to God and the being of the person, the greater is the disturbance of rational knowledge by sin; the further anything lies from this center, the less is the disturbance felt, and the less dif­ference is there between knowing as a believer or an unbeliever.!
Thus there are gradations of the intensitjr of sin's dis­
turbance between acquiring a knowledge of mathema,tics and 
acquiring a knowledge of God, with this disturbance at an 
absolute minimum in the former and at a,n absolute maximum 
in the latter. And while "the word 'Christian' suggests 
the way in which rational knowledge is corrected by the 
knowledge of faith . . .  in the case of the idea of God it 
is not merely a case of correction, but of a complete sub­
stitution of the one for the o t h e r , I n  other words, 
there are varying degrees of autonomy of the reason with 
respect to worldly matters, as worldly matters, "but the 
more we are concerned with the world as God's Creation, 
the less a.utonomy is left to the reason. "3 Furthermore —  
3,nd Brunner is very emphatic in affirming the thesis of 
the first part of his book —  the Christian concept of God 
"remains wholly bound up with revelation, and . . .  it can
1. B ., Revelation and Reason, p. 38g.
2. Ibidem. •
3. Ibid., p. 304.
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be rightly understood . . . only in faith."! This con­
ception "is'and remains suprarational" and in the most un­
qualified way "the Being of God is 'revealed Being'.
Every systematic theologian, then, is actually 
playing a dual role : "He is a theologian in so far as he 
is occupied with the problems that are raised directly by 
the message of the Bible ; he is philosopher in so far as 
he is occupied with the problems that are in the back­
ground of Biblical revelation."3 The philosopher to whom 
Brunner consistently refers is the Christian philosopher.
His philosophic8,l activity is both possible and necessary, 
since Christians are everlastingly obliged to thinli. The 
real obstructionist in this activity must be identified:
"It is not reason, but rationalism, that makes Christian 
philosophy appea,r impossible, Moreover, it must be in­
delibly set down that the Christian always "philosophizes 
from that point at which God's revelation sets him."5 
Brunner is now prepared to summarize what he considers to 
be the true rela.tionship of theology and philosophy:
1. B ., Revelation and Reason, p. 388. Italics mine.
2. Ibidem. 3. Ibid., p. 390.
4. Ibid., p. 392, Cf. B ., The Divine Imperative, p. 89: "It is not the existence of the reason which is in opposi­tion to Cod, but only the perversion of rea.son from à reason which is founded on God to one which is based on itself."
5. Ibid., p. 393.
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They both stand under Christ, the one in an inner, and the other in an outer, circle ; the one with the task of understanding the message of Jesus Christ in its inmost depths of meaning, and thus of purifying the proclamation of the Gospel and ever anew ba^sing it upon the Jord of revelation; the other with the ta.sk of making clear the truth of faith in order to throw light on the problems of Christians living in the world, and to help them deal with these problems in a crea,tive way.!
It is apparent both in nature and Grace and in the 
later Revelation and Reason that Brunner feels he has de­
lineated a theological position that both avoids the error 
of rationalism a,nd also saves him from the Barthian pitfall 
of "radical fideism." Ke would have it clearly understood 
that he does not intend to truckle one whit to natura.l 
theology (theologia naturalis), but at the same time he 
wants to invest with genuine meaningfulness the evangelical 
idea that man is a responsible creature before God. Though 
his negations with respect to natural theology would seem 
to rule out a.ny real significance in the existence, of 
general revela.tion, Brunner seeks to maintain this signifi­
cance on several grounds. Scriptural testimony (Barth to 
the contrary) is irrefutably in support of a revelation in 
creation. It is only over against such a revelation, with 
its implication of some sort of universal knowledge of G o d , 
that all men can be adjudged to be sinners —  a basic 
Christian tenet. Furthermore, the inditing of a Christian
1. B . , Hevela.tion and Reason, p. 396.
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ethic involves a recognition of the commandment of God and 
"the orders of crea.tion" —  vital elements in a, general 
revela.tion. !
The earlier theological posture of the Zürich pro­
fessor —  a posture which to his later, though unadmitted, 
discomfiture was too conforma.ble to that of Karl Barth —  
is well illustrated in The Divine Imperative. In this im­
portant work, published in 1932 under the title of Das 
Gebot und die Qrdnungen, Brunner vigorously attacks philo­
sophical ethics and emphasizes tha.t while the Christian 
ethic may be presented scientifically, such a presentation 
"can never represent the Good as a general truth, ea.sy to 
be perceived, and based on a universal principle. To do 
so would be to act treasonably toward the Christian Faith, 
since it is only in faith that the Good can be recognized. 
The alleged goodness of the natural man is not true good­
ness, for "the Good must descend from above, not be striven 
for from below, otherwise it Is.cks genuineness and depth. "3 
It must be further stated tha.t the Christian ethic "can be
1. B ., The Divine Imperative, pp. 220ff. Gf. B . , The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 24ff,
2. Ibid., p. 89,
3 . Ibid., p. 1 6 3. Brunner becomes even more explicit as he further decla.res, "the Good can never be a natura.l fact. . . , The secret of being good . . . lies neither in the act of the will, nor in the fact of natural birth, but in the new birth."
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scientific solely and simply if it represents its own sub­
ject in a strictly objective, orderly process of reflec­
tion, and in a method which is suitable to its subject and 
precisely not after the pattern of a causal (e.g. that 
which was presupposed by Spencer) or normative (e.g. that 
which was presupposed by Kant) science."1 For Brunner, 
the revelation of the Word of God as perceived by faith 
must be the ground for a valid Christian ethic. While he 
does admit "the possibility of a philosophical ethic based 
on r e v e l a t i o n , h e  immediately counters that "I must con­
fess that I simply cannot imagine a philosophical ethic 
which would deal with revelation not as a reality but as 
a possibility,"3 He believes that existing systems of 
philosophical ethics deal with revelation as a possibility, 
not as a reality, and attacks them accordingly.
Brunner believes that reason has a legitimate 
service to perform with respect to faith. He explains 
this service as follows:
Theological reflection . . .  is intended to serve the purpose of making a distinction between the valid and the genuine, and the non-valid and the non-genuine ; . . . its aim is also to tra.nscend theremoteness of the Biblical witness to revelation and to ma.ke this intelligible; . . . finally its
1. B . , The Divine Imperative, p. 90. Parenthetical inclusions mine*
2. Ibidem. 3. Ibidem.
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aim is to bridge the gulf between secular and natural knowledge and the knowledge of faith.^
The contingent factor in the connection of reason with 
faith is the reality of person and personality both finite 
and infinite, . In what he regards as full subscription to 
his cardinal principle of "truth as encounter", Brunner 
observes that revelation "in the New Testament faith is 
the relation between person and person, the obedient trust 
of man in the God who graciously stoops to meet him,"^ 
Between God and man there is a two-sided but never inter­
changeable relationship*
The relation of God to man is clearly primary, creative, and without presuppositions . . . And, contrariwise, man's relation to God is secondary:. it is consequent upon and determined by the already existing relation between God and man, established through no human effort.3
The emphasis is heavily laid on the God-side of the two-
sided relationship. "The initiative . . .  is taken by
G o d , which essentially means to Brunner that "God calls
man into existence out of nothingness, even though in doing
so Ke uses material which He has prepared previously,"^
This is no overstatement, he believes, since the Bible
1. B . , The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 64.
2. B . , Revelation and Reason, p. 9*
3. B ., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 33#
4. Ibidem. 5# Ibidem.
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teaches specifically a one-sided relation between God and 
man. Tha,t is to say, the fundamental viewpoint of Scrip­
ture is that "man can know God only as God gives himself 
to be known", and even "that man can know God only because 
and in so far as he is known by G o d . I t  is thus that the 
Bible underscores God's unconditional priority in His 
relationship to man.
In the thought of Brunner the faith-relationship, 
which originates with God and rests primarily with Him, is 
made effectual in the moment of encounter wherein man is 
forced into decision, wherein he recognizes the contra­
dictions resident in his crea.turehood and becomes aware 
that the Eternal has entered time. On the one hand, in 
the faith-encounter man becomes aware that he has indi­
viduality as a human being and that this individuality is 
neither comparable to, nor comprehended by, another human 
being. On the other hand, he is reminded that he is a 
human creature with a physical body and existence like all 
other human creatures. Caught in the tension of this 
situation his reason seeks to give an objective and co­
herent interpretation, while his faith, contingent upon 
decision, is expressing itself as a subjective appropria­
tion of a relationship to the Eternal. At the same time
1, B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 34. Gf. The
Mediator: "Through God alone can God be known" (p. 21).
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that man grasps the claim that God is in Christ reconciling
the world to Himself, he is made keenly aware of, and
tempted to deny, the contradictions in his life. As
Brunner explains it :
Q'ian is] the little creature who is for ever seeking himself, and therefore also fleeing from himself; one who is for ever being drawn and attrape ted by something higher, and yet is ever seeking to release himself from this higher element; the creature who is both aware of his contradiction and at the same time denies it.!
Despite man* s para,doxical situation which is brought 
home to his consciousness in the faith-encounter, "knowl­
edge and act, knowing and happening, are in this instance 
a single process. Faith asserts itself a,s an act, a 
response of the total self to the self-disclosure of God 
in Jesus Christ, to the "Thou" who wills fellowship with 
man. This faith is given by the "Thou" or the Person —
God -- whom man encounters, and this encounter centers in 
Jesus Christ. "The Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ Himself, 
takes possession of our hearts and Himself makes His home 
there."3 Brunner holds that "in this paradoxical unity of 
Word and Spirit, of historical revelation and God's con­
temporary presence, of 'Christ for us* and'Christ in u s '"^
1. B ., Man In Revolt, pp. 24-25.
2. B ., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 45.
3" Ibid., p. 20. 4. Ibidem.
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lies the secret and the power of the Reformation. Then 
and always, in the encounter with God in and through Christ, 
where the dialectic between sin and grace, law and gospel, 
creation and redemption come into focus —  there the dia­
lectic of human existence between responsible and irrespons­
ible living, fulfillment and frustration, hope and despair, 
godliness and bestiality is comprehended.
Brunner constructively utilizes the category » of 
"person" in reference to God and man, which in turn sup­
ports his theologica.1 principle wherein "faith is knowledge 
as encounter"! between Person and person, and person and 
Person. Through and in encounter of persons, revelation, . 
"the foundation and the norm of a,ll the knowledge of 
fa.ith"^ takes place. This involves whole persons in re­
lationship and therefore involves reason.
This critical self-examination of the Church's claim to revelation . • . includes . . . the con­tinual relation to each other of the divine revel­ation and the human . . . reason. . . . In revela­tion the unconditioned and the conditioned sub­jects, the Absolute, the Infinite, and the creaturely spirit meet. Therefore revela,tion always passes through a process of understanding by man. . . .Timt is the reason why genuine theology must be dialectical. It is always a conversation between God and man, in which the human partner in the con­versation is not ignored, but, even though he is ' entirely receptive, he is apprehended with his whole
1. B ., Revelation and Reason, p. 9#
2. Ibid., p. 12.
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nature. It is . . . the characteristic element inthe Biblical revelation that although all salvation is ascribed to "grace alone", man . . .  is always treated as a. responsible subject; thus revelation does not extinguish the human rea.son, but claims it wholly for this process of reception.!
On the one hand Brunner is ready to emphasize
strongly that there are positive relations between revela­
tion and reason and that "whoever studies theology —  even 
if on the most conservative lines —  always and inevitably 
stands on that borderline where there is intercourse be­
tween the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of reason. 
However, he wants it clearly understood that in this posi­
tion there is no faintest whisper of compromise with his 
original and thoroughly Barthian premise that revealed 
knowledge is at the opposite end of the pole from rational 
knowledge, indeed that the "two forms of knowledge are as
far from each other as heaven is from earth."3 Within the
framework of the dialectical principle and of his theo­
logical principle of truth as encounter, Brunner assays to 
make two assertions meaningfully and with legitimate free­
dom; the assertion that human reason is a trooper in the 
Christian ca.use and the assertion that reason is a traitor 
in the same camp.
The implemental principles he commends will, in
1. S., Revelation and Reason, pp. 15-16.
2, Ibid., p. 16. 3. Ibidem.
237
Brunner's opinion, take the modern theologian beyond the 
limitation in the watchword of the Scholastics ; credo ut 
intelligam. While this principle was in the realm of 
"ideas" his principle of truth as encounter is in the in­
clusive realm of "persons" involving "acts of Knowledge" 
as well as ideas.! gg believes that the problem of the 
historically competing tendencies of Objectivism and Sub­
jectivism is resolved by resorting to the ground-principle 
of Begegnung between ultimate Truth (God) and man in com­
munion. Furthermore, this communion is God's holy love 
revealed in a special way in the person of Jesus Christ 
received by unredeemed man in faith —  an act of knowledge.
The theological presuppositions and methodology in 
the thought of Emil Brunner have woven themselves into the 
fabric of the foregoing exposition. In order to under­
stand his Christological thought these must be understood. 
Their specific mea,ning in relation to certain aspects of 
Christology will become evident as Brunner's concepts of 
the person and work of Christ are expounded. His brief 
summary statement regarding the task of dogmatics sheds 
much light upon his theological methodology :
It is not the mistress, but the servant of faith ... its service is no less, but also no more than theservice of thought to faith. Its high.dignity con­sists in the” fabfthat it is service to the highest
1. B ., Revelation and Reason, p. 1?.
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final truth, to that truth which is the same as true love, and it is this which gives it the high­est place in the realm of thought. Sut the fact that it is no more than this service of thought —  which, as such, does not maintain that love and loyalty which must he expected from the Christian, as its limitation; a dogmatic which is aware of this, shows it is genuine.!
In the prayerful spirit of the humble and contrite Publican 
whose deportment he commends to every theologian worthy of 
the name, Brunner proceeds to develop his understanding of 
"truth as encounter" in its relation to each dimension of 
Christology, constantly acknowledging his reasoned thought 
to be a servant of Christian faith, the fundamental pre­
requisite of Christian knowledge of truth.
1. B . , The Christian Doctrine of God, p* 85.
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2# The Person of Jesus Christ
Before dealing with the various aspects of the 
doctrine of the Person of Christ in the thought of Emil 
Brunner, it should be pointed out that his Christology is 
developed from the perspectives of revelation, faith and 
reason (in the service of faith) as these perspectives 
have been previously explained. He believes that the 
"Word made flesh" —  Jesus Christ who is the "special" and 
"material" revelation —  is the core of the Scriptures 
which bear fundamental witness to Him.! It is to the 
Scriptures therefore that he turns as the source and norm
for his development of Christological doctrine. According
to Brunner,
The God of the Bible is a God who speaks, and the Word of the Bible is the Word of this God. The "formal principle", the Word of God, and the "material principle", redemption through Jesus Christ or justification by faith alone, are not two but one and the same principle seen in two aspects#^
By "principle" he means his theological principle of
revelation and faith implying his central concept of
revelation as "truth as encounter." "Revelation and
faith —  this is our principal article of belief which
1. B., Revelation and Reason, pp. 8ff.
2. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 8 7.
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determines all else —  are personal e nc o u nt e r . B r u n n e r  
does not believe that any interpretation of the person 
and work of Christ can be true and adequate if it is not 
done in terms of this definition of revelation and unless 
the interpreter accepts and trusts the reality of such 
revelation.
In the thought of Brunner God is supreme or 
ultimate Reality. And this is "God's quality of being 
Person, revealed in Jesus Christ, [which] is itself of 
such a nature that it establishes fellowship."^ It is the 
being of God revealed in the person and work of Jesus 
Christ which is to be accepted and trusted by man in faith 
and which in turn provides this faith in man as a person. 
This can only come about in man's experience on the basis 
of personal encounter with God in the Word made flesh.
The ultimate Reality thus encountered gives meaning and 
essence to all contingent realities through the dual con­
cept of what Christ is and what He does.
Faith-encounter is the principle and starting point
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. 11. Brunner further declares % "The step forward from the Old Testament to the New consists in this, that the Word of God is no longer 'mere word', but a Person, the Word of God incarnate in Jesus."
2. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 15^•
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for the development of Brunner's doctrine of the Person of
Jesus Christ. Faith is therefore a central factor in his
thought. For him, "the Christian faith most simply ex-.
pressed is faith in Jesus Christ."^ To say this is to
mean that Jesus Christ is the content of faith. It must
then be clearly understood that "Faith is not primarily
faith in something true —  not even in the truth 'that*
Jesus is the Son of God; but it is primarily trust in and
obedience to this Lord and Redeemer Himself.
That Jesus Christ, the content of faith, is
Redeemer becomes of paramount importance in Brunner's
more mature Christological construction. To hold this
view, he maintains in Truth as Encounter, is to keep on
the track of Scriptural revelation;
The Incarnation as such is not the pivotal point of the Biblical revelation, but rather the work of the Redeemer. Jesus Christ did not come merely to come, but He came to redeem. To be sure, only the
1. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 153* Cf. B . , The Chris­tian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Gonsumma.tion, p. 2 5 8: "Faith is the relation to the historical revela- tion, to Jesus Christ."
2. Ibidem. In his various discussions of faith Brunner rarely misses an opportunity to stress the point that faith is, above everything else, "person" related rather than "fact" related. Cf. Ibid., pp. 110-112. See also B . , The Mediator, pp. 153"*i60; B. , The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation,p. 230f. ;
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Incarnate Lord —  very God, very man —  can be the Redeemer. But the Bible guides us to ponder less the secret of the Person of Jesus than the mystery of His work.^
Faith therefore means to know Christ's person which "can 
be discerned from His work . . .  a line which has already 
been traced for us beforehand by one of the most profound 
statements of Reformation theology; Hoc est Christum 
cognoscere, bénéficia eius oognoscere. T h i s  inductive 
or a posteriori method of coming to know the person of 
Christ through His work thus becomes the method employed 
by Brunner in the development of his own thought, as the 
content of this dissertation will reveal.
This chapter deals first with the Person and then 
with the Work of Christ, following the pattern of the 
Zurich professor in his comprehensive Christological 
treatise, The Mediator. As in the previous chapter this 
procedure is being followed because it seems natural and 
logical to the writer. It is believed that the order of 
treatment is inconsequential in expounding the thought 
under consideration. To write, as Brunner does, from a
1. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 155* This passage re­flects a change of emphasis in Brunner's theologizing which will be discussed in the section on "The Work of Jesus Christ."
2. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p." 2 7 1. The citation is from the Introduction of Melanchthon*s Loci theologici.
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background of experienced redemption and reconciliation 
means inevitably that the background comes into the fore­
ground when the Person of Christ is being discussed. In 
evangelical theology the identity of the Subject can 
scarcely be separated from His activity.
Again following the example set originally in 
Per Mittler, the present section will be concerned first 
of all with the Deity of Jesus Christ and then with His 
humanity. This is the traditional vere Deus, vere homo 
(God-man and not man-God) sequence, "expressed with 
lapidary simplicity, for the first time, by the Confessio 
Augustana. A n d  although Brunner, taking his cue from 
the inductive methodology of Martin Luther,^ reverses the
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption , p. 357•
2. In the opening paragraph of his chapter on "The Person of Jesus Christ" in Dogmatics : Vol. II, Brunner quotes Martin Luther, his favourite Reformation theologian, as saying; "The Scripture beginneth very gently and leadeth us to Christ as to a man, and after that to a Lord of all Creation, and after that to a God, Thus I come into it gently, and thus I learn to know God. . . .  We must begin at the bottom, and afterwards rise to the heights" (p. 3 2 2), In Dogmatics ; Vol. Ill the same quotation is given with the reference; Weimarer Ausgabe I, 2, p. 297. In a footnote, after observing that both G. Thomasius and Karl Barth con­structed their Dogmatics on a Christological basis, Brunner goes on to remark; "But neither of them does full justiceto what Luther means in the sentence quoted above, namely that the starting point should be Christ as a man. In Thomas ius this failure is conditioned by the 'latent docetism' of the Church doctrine of the humanity of Jesus,
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mode of presentation in his later dogmatic writing, there 
is no appreciable gain in so doing. In reality, as it is 
with "Person” and "Work”, so it is with "Deity" and 
"Humanity" from the evangelical point of view. There is 
here a necessary and inevitable correlation of categories 
that makes nonsense of any quibbling over priorities. As 
Brunner eventually says ; "We only see Him aright as He 
really is when, while insisting He is "True God', we do 
not forget . . . that at the same time He is 'True Man'.
i. The Concept of the Deity of Jesus Christ
Emil Brunner believes that the event of the In­
carnation, in which God became man or the "Word became 
flesh", is utterly unique. However, in this usage, i.e. 
as it applies to Jesus Christ, "uniqueness" is a term 
requiring exact definition;
His uniqueness is something quite different from that which the modern man means when he uses the word "uniqueness." For uniqueness in the mod­ern sense means something relative and gradual, "the uniqueness" of the primus inter pares. Here, however, there is no idea of a primus inter pares, but of One who^ is essentially the only One, the uiOS'9 who can have no equal, whose
in Karl Barth by his beginning with the doctrine of the Trinity, i.e. 'from above' instead of 'from below'"{p. 2 3 6).
1. 3., The Christian Doctrine of Creation andRedemption, p. 357.
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uniqueness lies in His very nature.^
Such an interpretation leaves no room whatsoever for any 
idea of relativity. "Jesus, the Human, is fundamentally 
in contrast to all which is otherwise called human, to all 
which has come to pass before Him or after Him on the 
human side, to all morality and r e l i g i o n . I t  is entirely 
off-beam, Brunner holds, to relegate Him to the category 
of mere Idea. All speculative and rationalistic approaches 
to the understanding of His Person must be ruled out.
"Jesus cannot be found through reflection*"3 It also com­
pletely misses the mark to reduce Him to the category of 
mere man. The highest Humanistic conception of Christ as 
the "firstborn among many brethren" will never do, nor 
will the idea of Jesus as the Founder of Christianity.
"This Jesus is no man as we a r e . T o  fall into either
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 24o. Throughout his Christo­logical writing Brunner shows great appreciation for the uniqueness and the once-for-all-ness in Jesus Christ as will be further noted.
2. B., Die Absolutheit Jesu, Berlin? Furohe-Verlag 
1 9 2 6, p. 14. Translation mine, as are the other quotes from this source. Reckoning with the fact that Relativity dominates the temper of the modern mind, Brunner seeks in this brochure to present Jesus Christ as the Absolute inthe midst of the relative, the one in whom "God speaks tomen and deals with men as He has never spoken or dealt before" (p. 1 5)•
3 . Ibid., p. 9 .
4. Ibid., p. 11.
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the speculative or the humanistic error of estimation is 
to invalidate the very essence of this truly unique and 
historical revelation.
(1) The Incarnation; The Self-Movement of God 
Brunner takes the very firm position that the In­
carnation can he understood only in the faith-Begegnung.
It is here alone that God, in His self-movement, makes 
Himself known to the individual believer. He reveals to 
man the mystery that at one point in history the border­
line between Creator and creature was crossed when "it 
pleased God to identify Himself with a definite, local­
ized finite given entity . • . Jesus of Nazareth."^ This 
coming and this identification must be understood in the 
Biblical illumination of the human situation and the 
divine purpose determined by it.
We can only really understand what the Bible means by the coming of God, and this unique event, when we interpret it from the point of view of the presupposition of the Bible itself. The pre­supposition of this movement is the gulf between God and man, the abyss which lies between the holy God and the sinful creature. The Incarnation of the Son of God is determined by sin. God comes. He must "come." He will come, because the creature has turned away from Him.^
1. B,, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 262.
2. B., The Mediator, p. 291.
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In the act of the "Word made flesh" God in self-movement 
bridged the chasm between time and eternity, finiteness 
and infinity, the human and the divine —  most supremely, 
and precisely, between His own holiness and man's sin­
fulness.
According to Brunner, the Biblical proclamation of 
the coming of holy God to sinful man and the Biblical 
affirmation of the absolute unchangeable being of God are 
completely congruous. As he explains in the first volume 
of his Dogmatics, the fact that there has ever been a 
problem in this connection arises from the abstract idea 
of the undifferentiated Absolute which for so long 
dominated theological thought.  ^ When this rigid idea is 
equated with the Being of the God of revelation it becomes 
an instrument of total negation. —  used by such a thinker 
as D. P. Strauss —  against the Biblical teaching of the 
down-coming love and mercy of God in Christ Jesus. The 
secret of the congruency of unchangeableness and movement 
in the divine Being resides in the fact that "the God of 
Christian faith, the Three in One, the Living God is in 
Himself motion, because in His very Nature He is Love.
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 293-294.
2. B., The Mediator, p. 285.
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This Love which cannot deny itself by being "static" is a 
love which "constitutes the very essence of G o d . T h u s  
the redemptive mission of holy loving God does not do 
violence to the concept of the divine immutability. Or, 
to state the matter positively, it can be said with per­
fect propriety that "in the Son, as the Son, God is the 
self-moved, the God who Himself descends into the world.
In his discussion of the Incarnation, Brunner sees 
the development of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth as an 
obvious attempt to explain biologically how God who comes 
down to man can come as the Sternal S o n . 3 The affirmation
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 285. Cf. B.., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 294; "If there be no'motus* in God, then there is neither wrath nor love in God."
2. Ibid., p. 286.
3. Ibid., pp. 322-3 2 7. Cf. B,, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 35^-3551 This is a doc- trine which receives no little attention from Brunner and over which he carries on a running argument with Karl Barth. The latter, in his Church Dogmatics (Vol. I, 2nd half-volume. Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark, I9 5 6), strongly disagrees with Brunner's contention that the Virgin Birth is meant to be a "biological interpretation" of the How of the Incarnation. If this were true Barth himself, in loyalty to his theological presupposition of complete dis­continuity between the natural and supernatural, would of course be forced to stand with Brunner. The criticism which he directs against his opponent's objection to the disputed doctrine ends on a stern note; "Brunner's denial of the Virgin Birth is bad business. . . .  It throws an ambiguous light over the whole of his Christology"(p. 184)
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that Jesus was "born of the Virgin Mary" in the so-oalled 
"Apostles'" Creed is a demonstration of a vain and un­
seemly inquisitiveness as to the ways of God which are 
past finding out. Furthermore, there is a strong trait 
of docetism in this idea in that it does violence to the 
true Humanity of Christ. Brunner inquires rhetorically; 
"Is a man who is born without a human father a 'true man'? 
Does he not lack the most essential thing for a human be­
ing, the fact that he has been born in exactly the same
way as we all are?"^ And again, this ancient article of
faith is established upon a shaky Scriptural foundation. 
Matthew and Lulce, who provide the "proof texts" for the 
controversial doctrine, know nothing at all of an Eternal 
Son. When they began their story Christological thought 
had not matured to this extent.
The starting-point of their narrative is that stage in the growth of Christology in which the thoughtof the "Sternal Son" and of the "Incarnation" hadnot yet become explicit. But they were evidently already aware of the necessity to say something about the origin of the Son of God, Jesus Christ.' Their idea of a parthenogenesis is an a,ttempt to answer this question of "whence", and an attempt to interpret the "I am come" of Jesus.^
Brunner calls attention to the patent fact that the 
idea that Jesus, the Son of God, was born of a virgin
1. 3., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and He-demption, p. 355*
2. Ibid., p. 352f.
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plays no part at all in the teaching and preaching of.the 
Apostles. "None of them says anything about 'how* the In­
carnation took place; they simply witness to the fact of 
the Incarnation."  ^ On the other hand, the birth accounts 
given by Matthew and Luke deal exclusively with the origin 
of the Person of Jesus Christ. The later reading of the 
doctrine of the Incarnation of the Eternal Son into the 
introductory sections of the first and third Gospels was 
"an attempt on the part of the Church to 'harmonize' its 
doctrines ; as if this part of the Gospel record were only 
concerned to explain how the Eternal Son of God could 
become man."^ Such theological adaptation finds little 
favor with Brunner who notes a continuing tension between 
the two doctrines —  the one declaring the primary miracle 
of the Incarnation, the other declaring a secondary 
"biological" miracle in a negative relationship to the 
first. "We cannot believe in the divinity of Jesus as the 
Eternal Son of God on account of, but only in spite of.
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 351* Cf. B., I Believe in the Living God. In this book of sermons on the Apostles' Creed, Brunner writes of the witness of Paul to the Incarnation in Gal- ations 4;4-7 and includes the comment; "The apostle does not speak of a virgin either here or anywhere else. He does not want to emphasize what distinguished Jesus from us, but rather what makes Him like us ; birth and law"(p. 55)•
2. Ibid., p. 352.
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the doctrine of the Virgin Birth."1 To state the matter 
categorically, "All depends upon the miracle of the In­
carnation of the Son of God —  in the strictly Pauline and 
Johannine sense ; but nothing depends upon the manner in 
which it took p l a c e . A s  might be expected from the fore­
going explication, Brunner, in summarizing his understand­
ing of the meaning of the Incarnation, turns to the views 
of the Apostles, though, at the last, he is willing to 
concede a limited value to the concept of parthenogenesis;
The great, unthinkable, unimaginable miracle of the Incarnation which the Apostles proclaim, is not that the Son of God was born as the son of a virgin, but that the Eternal Son of God, who from all eternity was in the bosom of the Father, uncreated. Himself proceeding from the Being of God Himself, became Man; that He, the eternal and personal Word of God, meets us in Jesus Christ as man, of our flesh and blood, as our Lord, who in His existence manifests to us the Being of His Father, and as the Redeemer, in whom we have reconciliation and free access to God and are true sons of God, if we be­lieve in Him. In spite of this, it cannot be de­nied that the idea of parthenogenesis does express an important religious idea; Jesus IS "by nature" God, He receives His divine authority not through divine inspiration but He possesses it in His Nature.3
To what degree is the knowledge of God dependent
1• B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 3 5 5«
2. B., The Mediator, p. 326.
3. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 3 5 6.
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upon the Incarnation? Brunner is both succinct and ex­
plicit; "The personal God can be known only in His per­
sonal revelation and His personal revelation is the in­
carnation of the Word."^ It is here that "His quality of 
being person and . . . His will to fellowship"^ are re­
vealed. This is true because love and self-communication 
are qualities of personhood, qualities evident in "that 
love which through all eternity the Father has for the Son, 
and the Son for the Father."3 In the Incarnation the 
grace and truth of God are manifested. "Truth like grace 
is encounter between God and man; grace and truth came into 
being in Jesus Christ."^ Not only are these two entities 
made known in the Incarnation of the Son, but in Him their 
real intentionality comes to fruition. "Jesus Christ not 
only reveals, He at once fulfills and realizes the will of 
God."3 He is the revelation of God to redeemed persons 
through their faith-encounter with Himself. "The God who 
is apprehended in Christ through faith . . .  in [th^ 
movement of self-communication . . . wills to communicate
1. B ., Truth as Encounter, p. 154. Cf. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 348f;B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. 370; B., The Scandal of Christianity, p. 74,
2. Ibidem. 3 . Ibidem.
4. Ibidem. 5 . Ibidem.
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Himself perfectly in His love.
With reference to the Incarnation and its relation­
ship to an "eternal purpose" for the world, Brunner sees 
the closest possible connection.
The incarnation of the Son is not only redemptive fact, but at the same time . . . the divine real­ization of the eternal purpose to comprehend the universe in Christ as its head. We may not divide the nature from the will of God. • . • His will isHis nature ; and His nature, His will. • • . andwhat is meant by His will can be briefly stated; the Kingdom of God, revealed and grounded in the incarnate Son.^
It can be said with further emphasis that "Jesus Christ
must be thought of as the highest revelation of the will
of God to realize His rule as a rule of love, and not
merely as the bringer of salvation."3 To speak of God
the Creator is to be speaking also of His will which
is the Kingdom of God grounded and revealed in the
incarnate Son, Jesus Christ. Following logically his view
of God wherein His will and His creatorhood are a unity in
His Being or Person, and understanding His will to be the
Kingdom of God, Brunner concludes that in the incarnate Son
the beginning and fulfillment of the Kingdom is reality.
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the C onsummait i on, ' p . 34Ï1
2. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 154f.
3. B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p*I 204.
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Moreover, the power of this Kingdom is extended through 
the faith-encounter of man with the incarnate Son*
(2) The Sternal Godhead of the Son 
In introducing this aspect of the divine nature of 
Christ, Brunner again quotes Luther; "And finally to Jesus 
as to a God , . . This immediately intimates his af­
firmation of the pre-existence and eternality of Christ as 
the Son of God, co-eternal with the Father*
In Jesus we meet Him who is endowed in His Person with the divine authority of revelation, with reconciling redeeming power and with divine Lord­ship. Jesus is the Man in whom God Himself meets us as the One who reveals Himself, as the Reconciler, and as the Lord personally present.^
This is a disturbing mystery, even to unbelievers. How­
ever, it "becomes evident to faith as the mystery of the 
divine and human Subject in the action and speech, in the 
suffering and in the death of J e s u s . " 3 Brunner supports 
his explanation of the meaning of the eternal Godhead of 
the Son by using as a point of reference the Scriptural 
text : "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Him­
self . Pressing for an evangelical understanding of a
1• B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, pi 34o .
2. Ibid., p. 342. 3. Ibid., pp. 342-343.
4. Ibid., p. 343. (II Corinthians 5:19)#
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somewhat obscure confession, he rejects several defective 
theories and doctrines that have cropped up from time to 
time in the history of the Church.^ Adoptionism is the 
first to receive his veto. Pauline writings, in Brunner's 
opinion, tend to refute this doctrine rather than support 
it. The ground for its refutation lies in the fa,ct that 
such a view would place Jesus "on a level with Old Testa­
ment prophets."  ^ While this estimate is high, it is not 
high enough, "There is no higher category than the pro­
phetic category, save that which (by its very nature) is 
exhausted in one solitary example , . . the Mediator, the 
Reconciler, the Son of God."3 Adoptionism defines the pre- 
and post-resurrection activity of Jesus as different in 
kind and as lacking in unity, which is not true according 
to Brunner's interpretation of Scripture.
Also on the proscribed list of this theologian is 
the Sabellian doctrine which, when it ignores the dif­
ference between God the Father and God the Son, is tanta­
mount to a "Patripassian" understanding of Jesus from 
which he strongly recoils. "We can well understand the
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 343-349I
2. Ibid., p. 3 4 4.
3 . B., The Mediator, p. 24o. Of. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 335*
256
horror which the Patripassian heresy aroused in the 
Church,"1. In The Mediator Brunner identifies another 
dangerous form of Sabellianism in present-day thinking 
which "desires to free us from the difficulties of the 
'Two Natures* doctrine and from the doctrine of the 
T r i n i t y . W h i l e  a "clear and simple" theology is pro­
duced, a very high price is paid for this advantage. "For 
this theory weakens and modifies the fact of Christ till 
it becomes merely semi-divine, merely a human event of a 
very remarkable character."3 When a choice must be made 
between rational clarity and paradox, Brunner does not 
hesitate. He definitely sides with thinkers such as 
Athanasius and Basil, "because they found that these con­
tradictory statements expressed the fundamental paradox 
that God became man . . . the Holy of Holies of the 
Christian F a i t h . S a be l l ia n is m  like Adoptionism, though 
in a different way, nullifies the unity of "revelation- 
authority" and the Person. Revelation becomes a mere 
symbol and Jesus is revelation in a relative rather than 
in an absolute sense.
1. 3., The Christian Doctrine of Creation andRedemotion, 3 4 6 1
2. B., The Mediator, p. 278.
■3. Ibidem.
4. Ibidem.
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Turning to Arianism, Brunner expresses entire ap­
proval of the condemnation of this heresy by all the 
eminent Church Fathers.■ But he also calls attention to 
the fact that this doctrinal deviation can appeal to a 
number of passages of Scripture for support. "These are 
all passages which teach a subordination of the Son to the 
Father, and indeed suggest that the Son arose out of the 
F a t h e r . I n  addition to this acknowledgment, it must be 
further granted that the relation of subordination is to 
be found even in the classical doctrine of the Church. 
However, there is really no reason for uneasiness on the 
part of the faithful. The Church, on sound Biblical 
authority, "provides against Arian 'subordinationism* by 
the distinction; not created but begotten, not a creature, 
but God from all eternity, of the veTy nature of God. 
According to Brunner, "It belongs to the very nature of the 
incarnate Logos, to the very nature of the Son who goes 
through the world in the form of a servant, that He should 
subordinate Himself to the Father."3 The concept of sub­
ordination thus relates to the humanity of Jesus Christ 
rather than to His Deity.
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 347%
2. Ibidem.
3• B . , The Medi8,tor, p. 353.
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Having dealt with the "negations", Brunner turns
to a more positive presentation and joins the Fathers in
grounding his view of the Eternal Godhead of the Son in
the unity of His person and work.
God alone oan reconcile the sinful creature with Himself. . . .  If Jesus be really Reconciler and Lord, then He is God. Faith knows that this is ‘ what He is. "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself." . . . This is the very heart of the truth of Jesus as the Christ, that in Him God really meets us, and that this meeting with God is itself based upon the personal being of Jesus, and is one with Him.^
As faith encounters God in the person a,nd work of Jesus
Christ, it meets more than man. The truth which then —
and only then —  becomes apparent to faith is that: "This
Person, in spite of the fact that He meets us as a human
person, is at the same time divine Person, the Son from
all eternity, the 'Son of the same substance with the
Father*, and yet distinct from the F a t h e r . I n  this
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,“‘p. 348-349”.
2. Ibid., p. 3 4 9. Brunner's acceptance of the creedal formula that the Son is "of the same substance with the Father" needs some clarification and a footnote in The Mediator is helpful. Referring to Luther's expression that Christ is "naturally God", Brunner says; "We might here use the word 'substance* were it not for the fact that it is burdened with as naturalistic a sense as the word 'Nature*. To the early Fathers * substance * meant nothing material, but the subject of the predicates which is not absorbed into the predicates" (p. 245). Later usage of the term "substance", e.g. in The Christian Doc­trine of Creation and Redemption, p. 357» should be under­
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declaration Brunner is not presuming to solve the mystery 
of the eternal Godhead of the Son, Jesus Christ. He 
frankly states that "this ^  the mystery of Jesus, of the 
Man whom we meet in the pages of the Gospels, that in Him 
we meet the Man in whom God Himself meets us. Brunner 
holds that man meets Christ and knows Kira to be what He 
truly is in the experience of faith-encounter• In this 
encounter man experiences Christ both as co-eternal with 
the Father and as the second Person of the Trinity. In 
the salvation which he receives from God through Christ's 
work of revelation, reconciliation, and in His royal work 
as Lord, man comes to know Jesus Christ as the eternal 
Son.^ Jesus does not first become God's Son and then 
reveal God as Father. That He reveals God the Father is
stood with this explication in mind. Actually "essence" with its "verbal" and functional significance is pre­ferred over "substance" and Brunner declares in The Chris­tian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation; "We are not concerned with the substance of the Son, but with His function" (p. 443).
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p~. 349% — —
2. Ibid., pp. 334-340. In these pages Brunner gathers up —  and mostly repeats —  what has been more elaborately set forth in the preceding chapter on."The Saving Work of God in Jesus Christ" under the venerable rubric of the Threefold Office. The object here is to show how the"action" of Prophet, Priest and King determines the identity of the "Person" of Jesus Christ.
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due to His being the eternal Son of God. He simply is 
what He is and does what He does as the God-Man whom 
faith comes to know in encounter.
In His revealing, reconciling, redeeming and royal work we feel compelled to express the mystery of His divine Person. Because He reveals God to us, as no human being could reveal Him, because He reconciles us to God as no human being could recon­cile us to God, because He makes us trustful ser­vants of God, as no human being could do, we know that we must confess Him to be the God-Man.^
It is the invariable position of Brunner that "the 
question concerning the Person of Christ is not a histor­
ical (geschichtliche) question but one of f a i t h . T h i s  
viewpoint is to be understood in the light of the meaning 
of revelation as expounded in the previous section on 
"Presuppositions and Methodology". For Brunner, revelation 
in relation to its origin and goal is the unity of 
Urgeschichte, primordial history, and Endgeschichte, the 
consummation of history.3 However, in terms of its 
actuality, i.e. event or act in which it is actualized in 
and throughout history, revelation is Geschichte. In 
defining the relationship between the two as manifested in 
the eternal Son, he says;
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,^'. 340%
2. S., Die Absolutheit Jesu, p. 13#
3. B., The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 123-127.
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The eternal as an event, the revelation, as suoh, possesses no historical extension. The eternal in history, the revelation as the absolutely unique, cannot be perceived in terms of historical ex­tension. Revelation is not the actual fact which is made known through history; the life of Jesus and the historical personality of Jesus —  but the invisible secret of the Person of Jesus, hidden be­hind the veils of history and of human life, not the Christ after the flesh but the Christ after the Spirit, the "Word made flesh.
What is here declared is that Christ either has a para­
doxical relationship to the absolutely unique Event of 
Revelation, which has to do with Geschichte, or He has 
little to do with it at all. With Brunner it is the 
former.
The Word is the Word of the Beginning, "before" all history, and that of the End which lies "behind" all history. All history seeks for that which takes place in Jesus Christ, and is "here." Hence, it means the fulfilment of history. But all history too flees from that which is "present" in Jesus, and therefore it means the abrogation of history.^
While this is not at all logical to reason, to faith it is 
"truth revealed in encounter" wherein Jesus Christ is met 
and experienced as co-eternal with the Father, as the be­
ginning, centre and goal of history. In spite of his pro­
nounced aversion to metaphysics, at this point Brunner's 
thought can only be interpreted ontologically.
1, B., The Mediator, p. 305-
2. Ibidem.
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The meaning of the eternal Godhead of the Son, as
he understands it, can be summarized in Brunner's words in
which he reaffirms the beliefs of the Apostles :
Jesus can only be the true Revealer, Reconciler, and Lord, if He is "from above", from the sphere of true transcendence, from the uncreated sphere, from God, and this transcendence, this absolute author­ity is vested in His Person. Hence, this Person, in spite of the fact that He meets us as a human person, is at the same time divine Person, the Son from all eternity, the Son "of the same substance with the Father", and yet distinct from the Father. This is what John teaches, and this is also , . . what Paul teaches, and . . . what was • . . im­plicit in the very earliest confession of faith; Jesus, the Messiah, the Son of God, the Lord.^
Only in the dialectic of faith-encounter oan the truth of 
the Godhead be comprehended.
(3) The Relation of Jesus Christ to God 
In entering upon this phase of the discussion of 
the Person of Jesus Christ, it is well to note that 
Brunner uses the name "Jesus" and the title "Christ" in­
terchangeably and with freedom. This must be attributed 
to his understanding of the unity of "Person" and "work", 
of "Deity" and "humanity" in the one God-man, Jesus Christ.
In the preceding exposition of the eternal Godhead 
of the Son, the relationship of Christ to God was included 
to a certain extent. However, further clarification of
1* B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 349.
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this relationship is here in order. Utilizing the central 
category of Person in relation to Christ, Brunner makes 
the positive assertion that "His Person is not the trans­
parent veil through which gleams the divine, but He is Him­
self the Divine ; hence He is not that which is divine, but 
G o d . A s  a truly "orthodox" theologian, Brunner will 
have nothing to do with any doctrine which says that the 
God-man attained or had bestowed upon Himself the divine 
nature or quality through some event in His life, such as 
His baptism or resurrection. All that faith can say is 
that through His work and Person He is experienced to be 
One of such authority and power in holy love that He 
must needs be God. More than that remains the mystery of 
His Person. "The mystery of His Person consists pre­
cisely in this, that He is of a different origin from 
ourselves, that He is ' from above %  " 2 j^ nd this is to say 
that: "The mystery of the Person, authority, the dimension 
behind history . . .  is what is meant in the Christian 
faith by the deity of the Person of Christ."3 To 
someone without faith Christ becomes Jesus, merely a 
human being ; whereas, perceived in the faith-encounter,
1. B., The Mediator, p. 2?4.
2. Ibid., p. 2 7 2.
3* Ibidem.
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He is known, trusted and obeyed as the Person who is the
eternal Son of God. He is the content of Revelation which
is actualized in His humanity. According to Brunner,
Christ the Revealer, and God, the One who is revealed,
have the same identity and yet they are different; they
are co-eternal and yet they are not without distinction.
That which is revealed and the Revealer are identi­cal, it is true, and yet there is a distinction. There is One who reveals and One who is revealed. They are identical, they are one and the same, the One God, But God, in so far as He reveals Himself, is yet different from that which is revealed, otherwise revelation would not be a real happening. The divine authority of the Revealer is the per­sonal authority of God. There is no other author­ity. And yet the Revealer does not stand merely on the same side as God, the revealed, but at the same time He stands "alongside" Him as the Revealer of that which otherwise is not revealed.^
Rejecting a metaphysical explanation of the re­
lationship existent within the Godhead, the most that 
Brunner will say is that man in confronting the Incarnate 
Son finds Him to be a person with the authority character­
istic of God. Appealing to logic and utilizing the cate­
gories of "Revealer" and "that which is revealed", he 
attempts to throw light on the relation that Christ bears 
to the first person of the Trinity. Actually, this remains 
a mystery, as he very readily admits. Although he refers
1. B., The Mediator, p. 275*
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to the doctrine of the Triune God in his attempted clari­
fication, little is accomplished by this recourse. This 
is largely due to his insufficient treatment of the Holy 
Spirit -- "the question of the Holy Spirit can only be 
mentioned in p a s s i n g . O f  the Trinity —  which tends to 
become binary in his thinking —  Brunner does assert that 
it expresses a truth that is the "real doctrine" of the 
Church, namely :
The Word, the process of self-communication, exists eternally in God Himself. When God reveals His being to the world as One who gives himself, as Love, this is what He is in Himself, in His very Nature. Therefore also this relation between the Revealer and that which is revealed exists within Himself from all eternity, as the inherent and essential Reality of the Divine Nature. The eternal Logos is that in which God expresses Himself.^
Yet, in the final analysis, the trinitarian idea only
"suggests an impenetrable mystery."3 The doctrine is not
in any sense an explanation, "but it does intend that
nothing pagan or Jewish should be proclaimed instead of
the mystery of C h r i s t . B r u n n e r  proceeds to elaborate
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 283.
2. Ibid., p. 280f. Cf. B., The Divine-Human Encounter,p. 88.
3. Ibid., p. 2 7 5. Brunner does not want to be mis­understood here. "The point is thisj We are summoned to stand in humble reverent silence in the presence of a real mystery, not in the presence of an illusion" (Ibid., p. 275f. Italics mine).
4-. Ibid., p. 276.
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upon this statement by indicating the fallacies in the 
contrary viewpoints of both ethical and speculative Ideal­
ism and of Mysticism. In their efforts to solve the 
mystery of Christ in His relationship to God, they deny 
love and personality to God in losing sight of the 
mystery of Christ’s Person as true God and true Man.
Brunner heavily emphasizes the fact that Jesus did 
not claim to have a word from God, but claimed rather to 
be the Word; in His very Person rested His authority, 
that of God Himself.^ Jesus further claimed to be bring­
ing in the Kingdom of God as a gift in His own Person, 
and to be Messiah with authority to seek sinners as For­
given of sins and Revealer of God as Son,^ With deep 
conviction Brunner lays down the alternatives: either 
Jesus was the One whom He claimed to be as the Person of 
the Logos, the Mediator, the God-man, the Son of God co- 
.eternal with the Father, or else He was self-deluded and 
psychopathic,3 The experience of faith in encounter 
confirms Him as the former.
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, pp. 334— 336. Cf. 3., The Divine-Human Encounter, pT78.
2. Ibid. , pp. 336-34*0 . Cf. B., The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 7 8 ,
3. Ibid., p. 326.
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Utilizing the principles and categories of modes of 
existence —  i.e. Revealer, Redeemer, Lord —  Brunner in­
terprets the Person of Jesus Christ who is very God and at 
the same time different from God. Employing this inter­
pretation of Christ’s Person, along with an emphasis on 
the inevitable element of mystery, Brunner proclaims 
that Jesus of Nazareth actually is "the personal eternal 
God" and, as such, the completion of revelation*
The divine personality, in whom the hidden God makes Himself known unto us, is not a mere prosopon, a mimus theatralis, a transitory phenom­enon in the form of God, a transparency, a symbol, but is in itself the personal eternal God. It isthis idea which finally completes the Christianconception of revelation.^
Hence the deity of Christ is so real that it is both
actualized and confronts man in His Person through the
faith-encounter; it is so clearly related to God that it
means God Himself in the person of the Logos. Man knows
this through faith in which he experiences the holy love
of God in Christ Jesus.
Brunner does not mean that the full revelation of
God culminated in Jesus of Nazareth. "He who reveals to
us the True God is indeed wholly God, but this revelation
does not exhaust the whole mystery of God."^ The God-man
1. B., The Mediator, p. 278.
2. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 225*
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was not the terminus of divine revelation. In and through 
the exalted, living and indwelling Christ, the special 
revelation of the holy love of God eternally streams forth 
into human history and society through the experiences of 
"faith-ful" persons. "For faith is the entrance into the 
movement of God in Christ, and it must also prove its 
reality by making sure that this movement actually takes 
p l a c e . I n  the lives of the faithful, the life, teaching 
and work of Jesus of Nazareth take on their full finite 
and infinite, temporal and eternal meaning and signifi­
cance. The essence and significance of the kerygma come 
to be truly understood.
(4*) The Risen and Exalted Lord 
Prior to presenting his view of the resurrected 
and ascended Christ, Brunner defines the event of the 
Crucifixion as "the final point of the kenosis of the God- 
Man . . • where He ’meets' us, . . . takes 'what is ours* 
upon Himself, in order that 'He may give us Himself*.
In this event the Incarnation was completed. In His death
on the Cross, Christ, in the likeness of man and self- 
emptied of all His divine attributes, fell into the abyss 
that is our deserving and not His. And yet the impotence
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 6 1 9.
2, B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, pi 3531
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He assumed is the spoliatio diaboll, the ruination of the
Devil.^ The self-surrender of the Son of God disarms him.
The victorious power of God in the all-pervasive love of
Christ overcomes death itself. Furthermore, that which
came to pass on Calvary cleared a "place" in the world
"where the ban of human sin is broken, where unfettered
communion between God and Man can be established,"^ Here
in the truest, deepest sense man experiences salvation.
When we enter this '*place" x^ e are free from the accusations of the Law and from its curse, and a,t the same time we are also set free from the inmost core of resistance against God, from our arrogant self-assertion. . . , . This **place" is the meeting* point of God and man. . . . this means, however, that here, through faith in Jesus Christ the Cruci­fied, man accepts God’s judgment on himself, and becomes nothing, and that in faith he believes in God's incomprehensible, self-giving love, mani­fested in this utmost humiliation.3
In this self-humiliation God in Christ causes man to see
himself as he really is and to desire to abandon his self-
centeredness and live in agape, the love of the holy God
in Christ Jesus.
Only in the Resurrection does faith understand the
1. B *, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, pT 'S6~3tZ
2. Ibid., p. 364*.
3. Ibidem.
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Cross as incomplete without the Resurrection. Indeed,
"The Gross would not ^  the Cross of Christ without the 
Resurrection."^ The prerequisite to the confession of 
the Risen Christ as Lord is the paradoxical event of the 
Cross where "the Incarnation of the Son of God . « ♦ 
reached its climax."^ Prom a worldl^r perspective, this 
was the point at which the ministry of Jesus was termina­
ting in failure, but from the perspective of faith the 
revelation of God in servant form is here fulfilled. At 
Calvary Christ was simultaneously Victor over the powers 
of evil that enslave men and over death itself.
Even the Apostles could not sustain their faith- 
relationship to Christ as Messiah without its Easter 
confirmation.
It was the encounter with the Risen Lord which rescued the disciples from their perplexity and helplessness, restored their broken faith, and . . filled them with jubilant certainty of victory, which xfas, and remained, the vital element in the Primitive Church, and gave the first Christians the power to be . . . "martyrs" for the truth of Christ.3
The ultimate confirmation of the divine nature of Christ
1. B., The Mediator, p. 581. Cf. B., Sternal Hope, p. 143: "Had nothing further happened [after Good Friday] faith in Christ would have collapsed."
2. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption/^y. 37*21
3* Ibid., p. 366.
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in the God-man lies in His Resurrection and in His living 
relationship with believing men as from apostolic times.
It is Brunner's conviction that Christ did not and does 
not reveal Himself as Risen Lord to other than the faith­
ful. This revelation is dependent upon the dialectic of 
God meeting man and man meeting God in the experience of 
faith in Jesus Christ. With reference to the "appearances' 
of the Risen Lord, Brunner says;
He had to attest Himself thus to the Apostles by those appearances as the Risen Lord, in order that they should believe in Him, see Him again, and really see Him as He is. He does not make Himself known to us in the same way. He makes Himself known to us through the collective witness of the Apostles, through the story of His life (in the Gospels), and the explanation of this story which the Apostles give us, through which we see Himself, and can ourselves learn to know Him as they saw Him and knew Him.4
This does not mean that the Resurrected Christ is not also
in direct communion with the believing Christian, and
Brunner does not intend to imply this, for he says of the
Christian, "He believes in the Risen Lord not because the
Resurrection is told as a narrative of something that
happened, but because he knows Christ as the living
present Lord.
What, then, is to be made of the varied and often
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 3?1*
2. Ibidem.
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divergent lines of testimony to an actual rising from the 
dead that are found in the Gospels? Brunner does not 
equivocate; "Easter, the Resurrection of the Lord, is not 
an 'historical event* which can be reported. If it were, 
could it be Easter?"^ Such a question can only be an­
swered in the negative. "Easter, the Resurrection commu­
nication of the Christ, is itself revelation, the divine 
self-testimony, which, as such, allows of no objectivity 
because it is addressed wholly to f a i t h . T h e  door of 
faith in a living Christ does not open on the hinges of 
an attested physical réanimation of the dead Jesus and a 
tomb emptied of the body of His flesh. Brunner avows a 
theological consistency in his position* "We remain true 
to our canon at this particular point, because only so do 
we gain a real understanding of belief in the Resurrec­
tion. " 3 It is true here, as always, that the believer is 
required to walk by faith and not by sight.
1. B., The Mediator, p. 575*
2. Ibidem. Brunner almost becomes sarcastic over the idea of an alternative view* "What use are * eye-witnesses * for the event of Easter? What sort of an occult process do people imagine it to have been that it could be de­scribed in semi-scientific terms?" (Ibidem).
3. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 370.
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In a break with traditional interpretation, Brunner 
argues that the Risen Christ and the Ascended Christ should 
be considered synonymous terms. This is to reject the 
Lucan account of a forty-day interval between Resurrection 
and Ascension and in so doing to obviate the difficulties 
involved in the concept of a physical "going up" to Heaven, 
originating from this solitary witness. Yet the idea 
itself has something in it to be zealously guarded. "The
idea of 'Exaltation* is of central significance for us be­
cause it expresses the truth that through the Resurrection 
of Jesus humanity and divinity are henceforth bound to­
gether * in Heaven*. It can be said that; "The'Exal­
tation* is the return to the pure transcendence of His 
pre-historical existence.Interpreting Paul in Philip- 
pians 2, Brunner sees this "return" as the completion of 
a parabolic movement between heaven and earth;
The Gospel of Jesus Christ, as Paul shows in thebriefest compass in the second chapter of theEpistle to the Philippians, is a movement from God to man. In this passage Paul seems to be describing with his finger the course of a parabola, which be­gins from above, descends, and then once more as­cends to its original plane, and then says* "This is what I mean!"3
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, "pi 37^”
2. Ibidem. 3* B., The Mediator, p. 561.
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The doctrine of the Ascension emphasizes the fact that not
only has Jesus Christ been Mediator between God and man,
but that He is so now and will continue to be to all
eternity. The exaltation to the "right hand of God" is
the climactic and necessary certification of the personal
divine authority of the Saviour of mankind.
The Crucified is the One from above —  this alone gives meaning to His Cross. Otherwise it would simply be a remarkable incident. The Crucified returns to the region whence He came: through this alone does it become credible that He really did come from above.^
In the Incarnation-Atonement-Exaltation ambit the amazing
grace of God to sinful men is comprehended. Here are the
essential features of the self-movement of holy God in the
Person of His eternal Son. "They all denote the parabola
from the super-sensible world, whose angular point touches
the world of sense in this event of Jesus Christ.
When faith encounters the exalted Christ it finds
Him to be the "guarantee of Saving History . . . moving
towards a goal"^and the One who "leads humanity to this
g o a l . H e  is also the guarantee of the goal of the
1. 3., The Mediator, p. 562.
2. Ibid., p. 2 7 2.
3 . B . , The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 374-
4. Ibid., p. 375*
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cosmos, for "the universe as a whole depends upon Him for 
its life; He is also its Telos, its goal and its End."^
But, according to Brunner, this concept is to be considered 
only of secondary importance; "It is . . .  in harmony with 
the whole attitude of Scripture that this cosmic character 
of the Lordship of Christ is emphasized far less than His 
Lordship over human history."2
In bringing the writing of this section to a close 
it is appropriate to underscore again the Brunnerian in­
sistance on the primary role of faith in identifying Jesus 
Christ as the eternal Son of God. When man the sinner is 
confronted by the Living Christ, his sinful consciousness 
is illuminated by the Spirit and to it is revealed man's 
broken relationship to God. This in turn precipitates a 
crisis in man's life in which he, in faith-encounter, ex­
periences the reality of the Risen and Exalted Lord who 
calls forth trust and obedience, and consequently reveals 
the holy love of God. Here again is the substantial ex­
pression of the dialectical theological principle in 
Brunner's thought. In the encounter of faith Jesus is no 
longer simply Jesus of Nazareth, the great saint. "Some-
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 375*
2. Ibidem.
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thing happens to us as to Peter —  'Verily thou art the 
Christ, the Son of the living Godî' Then will He also say 
to us, 'blessed art thou, for flesh and blood hath not re­
vealed it unto thee, but my Father in heaven'.
ii. The Concept of the Humanity of Jesus Christ
According to Emil Brunner, the primary task of the 
Christian faith is that of maintaining the revelation of 
God Himself in the person of Jesus Christ, which neces­
sitates taking His real humanity seriously. To do so is 
to follow in the footsteps of Irenaeus of whom it can be 
said, "Before Luther no one ever took the vere home so 
seriously as Irenaeus."^ The reality of Christ's humanity 
does not debase his deity but rather enhances it, and in 
glorifying God His humanity is in a moral relation to God. 
Brunner believes that the human Jesus shared and exhibited 
the natural characteristics of mankind, including the
1. B ., Our Faith,fLondon; SCM Press, Ltd., 1949),
2. 3., The Mediator, p. 328fn. Brunner has several reasons for choosing to emulate Irenaeus, as he states in the Appendix to the eighth chapter of The Mediator. Sig­nificantly among these reasons is the fact that "the doc­trine of the Work and the Person of Christ are so closely connected in his thought that his Christology is always soteriological, and his soteriology is always Christologi- cal" (p. 249f). It is therefore natural for Brunner toturn to this great theologian for the motto of his chief Christological work; "Jesus Christ, in His infinite love, has become what we are, in order that He may make us entirely what He is" (p. 3).
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actual temptation to sin. At the same time He was dif­
ferent from other men. He was uniquely related to God as 
the eternal Son in human form. Though tempted to sin, 
Jesus remained sinless. Hence He was the genuine Reality 
of man in God and God in man.
{1) The Mystery and Uniqueness of Jesus
Although he has sometimes been charged with being
docetic in his Christological thought, in all fairness to
Brunner it must be affirmed that he clearly and explicitly
acknowledges the real humanity of Jesus. Referring to the
descriptive phrases in Galatians 4:4, he says ;
The words "born of a woman" express the fact that (jesus] shares our common humanity . . . .  He was true man. "Born under the law" means; He was born as a Jewish child; He was educated as Jewish chil­dren were educated; He lived in the tradition of the Jewish people. . . .  He was subject to all the natural laws of growth. . . .  He shared the limita­tions common to humanity. . . .  He eats and drinks; He is tired; He sleeps; He feels physical pain; He is exposed to ill-treatment; He suffers the agonyin the Garden of Gethsemane, being "sore troubledand amazed" . . .  He dies of exhaustion on the Cross.1
Brunner adds to these human traits His baptism and tempta­
tion, for "to accept baptism for the forgiveness of sins,
and to be tempted of the devil, are events which pre­
suppose a truly human p e r s o n . B u t  now the problem comes
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 322f. Cf. B., The Mediator, pp. 361-369*
2. Ibid., p. 3 2 3.
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to the surface of the Christological discussion concerning 
that quality x-fhich differentiates Jesus from all other 
men —  His uniqueness, which is not revealed to the theo­
logian who is preoccupied with the "how" of His being 
rather than the "why". And here Brunner is turning his 
guns on the school of Rationalism, which does not accept 
the "mystery", the quality in Jesus which is not open to 
historical criticism but only to faith-encounter.
The Gospels present to us Jesus of Nazareth, a man 
who is not only like ourselves, but who is also unlike 
ourselves. As Brunner says, "He stands before us as One 
who, at every point in His life, is wholly one with the 
will of God; who really does not allow Himself to be 
ministered unto, but who 'ministers® and gives His life 
a ransom for many."  ^ Here in Jesus of Nazareth there was 
such a personification of the Eternal Word or Logos, of 
the holy love of God, that even unbelievers recognized the 
element of mystery, though they did not understand it.
The "Messianic authority" claimed by Jesus is decisive —  
absolutely so.
This is indeed the new element in His message, not in degree, but in principle, namely, that He defin­itely distinguished Himself from all the Prophets
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redempt i on, ~p. 3% .
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as One who no longer merely promises the coming of the Kingdom of God, but who proclaims that the new age has actually dawned in His own Person.!
Brunner is actually saying that Jesus was truly human as 
pictured in the Gospels, by the Apostles, and in historical 
study. But the Apostles, in their faith-encounter with the 
Risen Christ, perceived and fully accepted the eternal 
quality in Christ xfhich continued to be an enigma to the 
unbeliever who relied on mere historical data. What the 
Swiss theologian is attempting to do is to declare in a 
convincing manner that Jesus was truly human, uniquely 
human, and more than human at one and the same time. This 
is indeed a complicated undertaking, demanding the utmost 
in theological expertise. It is not surprising that the 
progress of the discussion is tortuous.
Central to the problem is the concept of history, 
which has been lightly touched upon in a preceding section. 
Into the discussion, with its inevitable involvement with 
history and the historical, Brunner from time to time in­
troduces the explication of such paired and contrasting 
ideas as the "supra-historical Christ" and the "Jesus of 
History","Christ in the flesh" and"Christ after the 
flesh", Jesus Christ as "Person" and Jesus as "Personality".
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 325'.
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It is no easy task to sort out these intertwining threads 
of thought. In pursuing this objective, the modification
of the theologian's viewpoint between the publication of
The Mediator and the writing of the second volume of his
Dogmatics must be kept in mind.
In his earlier writing Brunner, initially, does not 
hesitate to say, "All depends upon the fact that the Word 
did become flesh, and this means that the Sternal has en­
tered into the sphere of external historical fact."! In­
carnation involves entering into the realm of that which 
is visibly factual, being the object of police reports, 
subject for photographers, journalists, etc. This "event" 
(the term being used "in the most matter-of-fact literal 
sense") is both fundamental and peculiar to Christian 
faith. "It is precisely this connection with a 'brute 
fact' which is the distinguishing mark of the Christian 
religion, contrasted with every other kind of religion and
p h i l o s o p h y ."2 On the other hand, Brunner believes that it 
is a grave misunderstanding to hold that the object of the 
Christian faith is a fact of history. A distinction must 
be made between the "Christ in the flesh" and the "Christ
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 153*
2. Ibid., p. 1 5 4.
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after the flesh", in accordance with Romans 1*3; 9*5» and 
II Corinthians 5 *!6.! The "Christ in the flesh" affords a 
common point of interest both to the historian and the be­
liever. "The believer believes in the Christ of whom the 
chronicler also must have something to report."2 But the 
Christ who is brought to view by all who are historically 
disposed (historical-minded) is the "Christ after the 
flesh." Only the believer perceives that there is more in 
the "Christ in the flesh" than the "Christ after the 
flesh."3 This distinction is only another way of saying 
that while the Incarnation is really and truly historical 
it, at the same time, transcends all historical barriers.
Historical actuality is the way in which theEternal Divine Word, as the Eternal Son, touchesthe historical world. This actuality means a real entrance into the historical mode of existence, but so far as its significance is concerned this en­trance merely touches the fringe of existence.4
Thus, the acknowledgment of the brute facts of history is 
"a necessary presupposition, but . . . never an adequate 
ground for the knowledge of Christ."5
According to Brunner, the crucial point in the re­
lationship of faith in Christ to critical science is
1. B., The Mediator, pp. 156ff,
2. Ibid., p. 157* 3* Ibidem.
4. Ibidem. 5. Ibid,, p. 158. .
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located in the "results" of this science.
Faith can be combined with all kinds of historical criticism which do not alter the historical image of. the existence of Jesus to such an extent that —  so far as faith is concerned —  it would be im­possible to understand the apostolic testimony to Christ. . . . However, faith is wholly undisturbed, even when scientific research and criticism lead to entirely negative "results".!
As a matter of fact, a certain tension can be detected in
the theologian's thought along this line. At times he
seems to adopt a cavalier attitude toward history in its
relation to Christian faith, as when he declares* "If
faith were dependent on history, in the scientific sense of
the word, it would then be as remote from Christianity, in
the Christian sense of the word, as it would be if it were
severed from the facts of history altogether."2 And again*
"Faith in Jesus Christ is not dependent on the courtesy of
history."3 on the other hand, he is willing to appeal to
!. B., The Mediator, p. l68.
2. Ibid., p. 1 5 6. Brunner continues with grim earnest­ness : "For dependence on History as a science leads to a state of hopeless uncertainty. Therefore, when a thought­ful person refuses to build his relation to the eternal on anything so unsafe as historical science, he is acting rightly ; for such a building is indeed a glaring example of building one's house upon the sand."
3 , Ibid., p. 3 9 5. Cf. Ibid., p. 309* "History in the human sense is a matter of indifference for faith."
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the findings of historical and critical scholarship —  
though in a reserved sort of way —  to support his denial 
of the historicity of the Virgin Birth. After warning 
against "proof-texting" the doctrine, he goes on to say* • 
"This . . . implies a second point, which is only of 
slight importance* . . . There is practically histori­
cal evidence at all for the argument that this doctrine 
is based upon a statement of the parents of Jesus."! But’ 
again, Brunner's concern is all for the independence of 
faith in regard to typical "Life of Christ" literature.
In his opinion, the many and varied studies of the "figure 
of Jesus" are simply so many examinations of, and reports 
on, the "personality" of the Man from Nazareth, Brunner 
even goes so far as to say that*
All these representations of Jesus are as far re­moved from the Jesus Christ of faith as the mystery of God is removed from the general conception of God, as "general" revelation (which is really no revelation at all) is removed from "special" revel­ation, as the Word of God is distinct from moral
1. B. , The Mediator, p. 324. The clause "xfhich is only of slight importance" indicates that Brunner is aware of the danger of weakening his previous argument against the value of the historical in matters pertaining to faith. His dilemma is this* If he underrates history, docetism creeps into his Christological construction; if he over­rates history, the "purity" of the sola fide principle becomes adulterated.
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and religious humanity,!
Therefore, "Jesus" must be thought of as belonging to the 
general, to the empirical, certainly not to faith.
In the years after the publication of The Mediator, 
and especially after the appearance of Wahrheit als 
Begegnung (1938), Brunner began to place a fuller emphasis 
on the unity of the "Jesus of History" with the "Christ of 
Faith." This is to be seen most markedly in the second 
volume of his Dogmatics, The Christian Doctrine of 
Creation and Redemption. In this work he devotes the en­
tire tenth chapter, "The Foundation of the Christian Faith", 
to the problem. As in the earlier writings, he maintains 
that the historian in his academic quest cannot come to a 
knowledge of Christ. However, a change of emphasis be­
comes apparent. Brunner adopts a "softer line" toward 
historical criticism. He now holds that "after the pro­
cess of critical examination has been achieved, it can be 
said: this historical Jesus is the same as the One whom 
the Apostles call the Christ, the Kyrios, the Son of God,
1. B., The Mediator, p. ?6f. The parenthetical desig­nation of "general" revelation as "really no revelation at all" is the most negative assertion that Brunner makes on this subject. The dominance of the Barthian "absolute dis­continuity" concept is very apparent here. History, of course, is regarded by Brunner as a part of "general" revelation.
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the Incarnate Word of God,"! Although no simple unity is 
to be found in the New Testament with regard to Jesus 
Christ, nevertheless, the objective situation is such that 
on the one hand there is a picture of the life of Jesus, 
and on the other hand there are a number of doctrines 
about Jesus the Christ. But it would be a mistake to 
cling exclusively to either of these two elements, since ; 
"It is in the providence of God that both have been given 
to us."2 Furthermore, "It is a mistake to contrast 
'Jesus Himself* with the witness of the Apostles; for the 
doctrine of the Apostles does not aim at saying anything 
other than xfho 'Jesus Himself is, and what 'Jesus Himself 
means for us."3 The burden of proof is not on believers to 
prove this congruence, but rather on unbelievers to prove 
that Jesus is not the Christ.
Brunner returns to the same point in the later 
chapter on "The Person of Jesus Christ." Here he states 
that :
In His historical reality Jesus proves that He is the Christ, but it is only faith that perceives
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 2^5•
2. Ibid., p. 2 5 1.
3, Ibid., p. 251f.
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this full historical reality. To see the true Jésus of History and to believe in Him as the Christ, is the same thing. Faith in Jesus the Christ is identical with the true perception of the historical reality of Jesus.!
In a similar vein he writes on another page: "The histor­
ical evidence supports the believer, not the unbeliever; 
although the verdict ; 'Jesus is the Son of God* is a 
verdict of faith, and not of mere historical insight,"2 
These citations will suffice to show the swing of the 
pendulum in one area of Brunner * s Christological thought. 
How profound a change from his older viewpoint they ac­
tually represent x^ill be considered and estimated in the 
next chapter.
Closely parallelling the foregoing discussion is 
the treatment of the concept of the "incognito." It is 
Brunner's earlier contention that insofar as Jesus' life 
was historical, it was not the revelation of God:
It is true that Jesus of Nazareth is a historical phenomenon, and his life a historical event. But as far as this goes it is no revelation of God. This appearance in history is the "incognito" of divine revelation, which can only be brought to light by faith.3
Where Jesus discloses Himself to faith in faith, "history
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 327*
2. Ibid., p. 326.
3* B., The Philosophy of Religion, p. l47f. Cf. B.,The Mediator, p. 271*
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disappears and the Kingdom of God has begun."! He then 
ceases to be an historical personality and is God's eter­
nal Son. Christ, as it were, wears the mask of history.
"This is His i n c o g n i t o , T h e  effectiveness of the dis­
guise can be readily appreciated, for nothing is more 
usual than human personality, "It is complete, because 
to us there is nothing more ordinary, less striking, more 
familiar than a human person like ourselves,"3 In this 
way God comes indirectly to offer Himself for decision.
This incognito was necessary in order to make room for 
the decision of faith. Christ's appearance in the splen­
dour of His divine glory would have slammed the door 
against faith and cudgelled man into believing. Any 
possibility of free decision would have been denied. Ac­
cording to Brunner, only the completely indirect communi­
cation makes possible the completely free decision of faith.4 
It becomes apparent in The Mediator that the card­
inal revelational category for the whole life of Christ is 
the incognito which signifies, in Brunner's dialectical 
treatment, revelation in absolute concealment. The true 
humanity of Christ implies His concealment in the flesh
1, B., The Mediator, p. 346, 2. Ibidem.
3. Ibid., p. 334. Cf. Ibid., p. 337.
4. Ibid., pp. 334-340.
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without glory and without direct knowability. The im­
pression is given that the humanity, the "revelation" in 
the flesh, actually has nothing whatsoever to do with rev­
elation, since its x^hole function would seem to be to hide 
rather than disclose.
But again, the later writing of the Swiss theolo­
gian shows a somexMhat modified viewpoint. In Dogmatics II 
the term "incognito" is dropped from the discussion of the 
Person of Christ and Monophysitism is briefly commended 
for the way in which it stresses "the truth that Jesus, 
in the xfnoleness of His Person, is revelation."! Brunner 
now says of Christ's humanity, "The very thing which seems 
to conceal His Godhead, His flesh, the weakness of earthly 
creatureliness, is an essential element in the divine 
glory of revelation."^ This is particularly true of 
Christ on the Cross. "It is precisely the exinanitio . . . 
which is the supreme height of the self-manifestâtion of 
God."3 However, this is a truth that is deepest mystery 
and that can only be accepted by faith.
In The Mediator Brunner attempts to deal with the 
mystery and uniqueness of the God-man by means of a Person/ 
personality differentiation. In so doing he proceeds by
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion , p . 36ÏI ! ^
2. Ibidem. 3* Ibidem.
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analogy to make a distinction between the "biographical" 
picture of a human life as it appears to the historian and 
the "personal mystery of responsible being."! Hidden in 
this mystery is the fact of sin, which is only unmasked be­
fore Christ and is thus the object not of historical in­
sight but of faith alone. "As persons we cannot be known, 
only b e l i e v e d . T h e  same kind of statement (though on 
different grounds) must be made about the God-man. In His 
true being, His supra-historical Person, He cannot be dis­
cerned except by faith. All that is cognizable of Him in 
His earthly existence to other than faith is His "person­
ality" x^hich is His humanity. It is by way of the same 
experience that the insight of faith into human personal­
ity and into the personality of the God-man is made real. 
Seeing Him by faith as the Word made flesh, we see our­
selves, as sinners, with the penetrating vision of faith 
alone.
The uniqueness of the revelation in Christ is a 
strand of thought that is well-woven into Brunner's 
Christological writing and should receive here additional 
consideration. The significance conveyed by this idea is
1. B., The Mediator, pp. 318-320; 345-354. This method of treatment belongs exclusively to this xfork.
2. Ibid., p. 319.
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plainly statedî "It is this unique event which, to be 
unique, can only happen once, and therefore is an in­
comparable fact ; this is the revelation."^ In The 
Mediator the interpretation of the "once-ness" that be­
longs to Jesus Christ is put in the following words :
The Word of God comes to us from the further side, from beyond the border-line which separates God and man; it is God's own Word about Himself,His secret, based on the fact that He alone is God; it is something in which the world, man, and human reason have no part, that which is reserved to God Himself, that which separates Him,- the Creator, from His creature. The Word of God, revelation, means the issuing forth of this hidden One from His concealment through God's incomprehensible self* communication. Thus it can only come absolutely from God Himself, and, indeed, in a sense that differs entirely from all that is created, natural and historical . . .  It means . . . theientrance into history of that which, by its very nature, cannot enter into history, because it is eternal.^
Here is the typical Barthian accent on the strict dis­
continuity between God and man, between the Creator and 
all that is a part of His creation. However, when Brunner 
comes to the writing of the third volume of his Dogmatics, 
The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and the 
Consummation, he is careful to point out the double 
significance of the uniqueness which must be predicated to 
the Lord of Christian faith*
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 333*
2. Ibid., p. 238.
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The category of uniqueness, in contrast to the perpetual recurrence of natural events, constitutes the nature of the historical as such. For this reason Christian faith is the faith which possesses an unconditional historical character through its two-fold relationship to the unique —  namely to the historically and relatively unique, and to the ab­solutely unique as faith understands it . . .  to what has happened in Christ.^
While "The uniqueness which in the New Testament is ex­
pressly predicated of Christ goes far beyond the general 
historical sense of the word,"^ Brunner is willing to con­
cede that "His uniqueness in this . . * sense is an 
essential part of the fundamental confession of the 
Christian faith."3 That Jesus Christ "suffered under 
Pontius Pilate" is an important historical fact, but faith 
has a perspicacity unknown to the historian in that faith 
understands the Crucifixion as the decisive and unrepeat­
able event of the Atonement. "Here . * . alone we find 
this circumstance, that an event which is unique in the 
relative sense known to world history is apprehended by 
faith as an event which is absolutely or unconditionally 
unique."^ Brunner's steadfast insistence on the once-for- 
all nature of the Person and work of Christ is a useful
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and the Consummation, p. J69™
2. Ibid., p. 368. 3* Ibidem.
4. Ibid., p. 369.
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safeguard against Docetism in his Christological thought. 
For, as he points out, all alleged theophanies and in­
carnations outside of the Christian religion lack reality, 
in that what is "said to have happened several times 
really means that nothing happened at all.
The uniqueness of Jesus, the man, is the mystery 
that remains mystery and is only grasped in faith, "the 
act of 'grasping reality,' . . , the open eye for the true 
historical actuality of J e s u s . t h i s  "actuality" 
means His supra-historical existence in historical 
reality. References to "supra-historical existence" and 
the "mystery of His Person" are not intended by Brunner 
to undermine the concept of the real humanity of Jesus, 
though this danger lurks in the background. Especially 
in his later work is it evident that he considers the 
whole kerygmatic core to be necessary to a right under­
standing of Jesus of Nazareth. Here Jesus cannot be the 
object of study for empiricism alone or determined to be 
the Son of God by "mere historical i n s i g h t , for He is
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 26.
2. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,p. 32?.
3. Ibid., p. 326.
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both part of the historical continuum and at the same 
time He is of the quality beyond history which is re­
vealed only to faith in personal encounter. Such faith 
declares without hesitancy: "To see the true Jesus of 
History and to believe in Him as the Christ, is the same 
t h i n g . W i t h  His work serving as the key, faith grasps 
the saving significance of this strange figure, Jesus of 
Nazareth. The residual mystery of His Being —  the "Love 
l^ap^ of God, which is the principle and the force which 
constitutes and determines His human life, and. which He 
gives to us with His divine power"^ —  is "the heart of 
the revelation of God which takes place in the Person of 
Jesus,"3 This is the central message of the Gospel, the 
message of the down-coming, self-giving Love of God in an 
absolutely unique Person. But this is the crucial 
question; "Whether we simply hear this message, or whether 
it finds the heart, whether we apprehend it as the truth, 
whether we hear God Himself come to us in Jesus calling 
us to Himself. If and when the latter takes place,
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 32?.
2. Ibid., p. 25?.
3. Ibidem.
4. B., Our Faith, p. 60.
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Jesus the Galilean is at once real humanity and real 
divinity, the very Mystery and Reality itself.
With respect to the "Natures" concept of the Greed 
of Chalcedon, Brunner both gives assent to the truth in­
herent in the Two-na.ture Doctrine and at the same time is 
strongly critical of the metaphysical theorizing and mis­
understanding that have followed in the wake of this form­
ulation. "The doctrine of the Two Natures itself is right, 
but it is the metaphysical misunderstanding that causes 
difficulty.Specifically, the Lutheran teaching of the 
communicatio idiomatum which involves the blending of the 
two natures in the historic individual, Jesus Christ, 
represents a type of theory fraught with hazard.
It is dangerous, not merely because a conflict with historical science thus actually became inevitable, but, above all, because it seemed as though the divine-humanity would have to be posited as an in­dependent entity. Thus the God-man as the God-man could be perceived by all. . . . The deity was materialized, the decision of faith was ruled out . . .  . Revelation became a theophany, theIncarnation an actual transformation of the Divine Logos —  in so far as the humanity was taken
1, B., The Mediator, p. 343* In an earlier discussion of this subject Brunner lets it be known in no uncertain terms that he is wholly in accord with the "heart-truth" of Chalcedon and is in no sympathy whatsoever with those modern critics of a historical positivist or phenomenalist persuasion who use an avowed antipathy to the form of the
Two-nature doctrine to screen a fundamental opposition to New Testament revelation itself. (Cf. Ibid., pp. 335-33?)
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seriously at all, as, for instance, in the Kenotic theory.1
All of these consequences, so deplorable from the evangel-, 
ical point of view, are regarded as ensuing from "the de­
sire to explain the Divine Humanity of Christ, to make it 
metaphysically c l e a r . S u c h  a desire, according to 
Brunner, is thoroughly wrong. Therefore he is prepared to 
say that "the whole complex of problems raised by the doc­
trine of the Two Natures is the result of a question which 
is wrongly posed."3 This question is concerned with 
wanting to know what is simply unknowable, that is, "how 
divinity and humanity are united in the Person of Jesus 
C h r i s t . T h e  conclusion of the matter, in Brunner's 
opinion, is that the theologian should put far from him 
the temptation to think abstractly of the schema of 
"NaturesY and that the side-by-side affirmations of 
Chalcedon should be allowed to stand inviolate and un­
investigated as a kind of creedal monument to an insoluble 
mystery, namely, that Jesus in His Person is at one and 
the same time vere Deus and vere homo.
1. B., The Mediator, p. 343.
2. Ibidem. This is exactly the same kind of "wrong desire" that Brunner thinks he detects behind the develop­
ment of the Virgin Birth doctrine.
3. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,"pi 3^2. Cf. B., The Mediâtor, 322fn.
4. Ibidem.
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(2) The Relation of Jesus Christ to Man 
To understand the relationship of Jesus Christ to 
man in the thought of Emil Brunner, it is necessary to 
aclmowledge his affirmation that Jesus the Christ is both 
vere Deus and vere homo, true God and true man, Brunner 
makes both of these statements with firmness and without 
reduction. Furthermore the concept of the indwelling 
Christ must be included in the discussion of the relation­
ship.
The deity of Christ is the content of revelation in
that God and Christ are of the same substance and co-
eternal, His humanity is the actualization of revelation,
the fact that
. . .  at this one point in the world and in history it is true that the borderline between the Creator and the creature has been crossed, that from the standpoint of natural knowledge, there is a human creature who is God, and that it has pleased God to identify Himself with a definite, localized finite given entity, with the historical Person, Jesus of Nazareth,^
Therefore, Christ was related to man in that He was not 
only in the form of man, but man Himself, like all men, 
but without sin. Therefore, He related to man in that 
He was not only in the form of man, but man Himself, like
1, B ,, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, .  362%
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all men, but without sin. Brunner deals with the problem 
presented by the sinlessness of Jesus Christ in connection 
with the Person/personality analysis discussed in the 
previous section.
Christ has indeed assumed human nature, but not a human person. Thus He may have assumed the possi­bility of being tempted —  the possibility of sin which is connected with the historical personal­ity —  but He did not assume the corrupted person­ality spoilt by Original Sin, that is the necessity of falling in temptation. To fall in temptation —  in spite of Original Sin —  is never a natural fact, but always and only a personal act. Hence it is said of Christ ; He was tempted in all points like as we are -- yet without sin.^
Into the breach between God and man, into the abyss of
"sinful flesh" stepped the Mediator. "He came in order to
enter into the abyss and thus to build the bridge, but not
in order to make the gulf wider . . .  by committing sin
H i m s e l f . B r u n n e r  concludes his argument by saying,
Hence, although He assumed human nature with its possibilities of being tempted, even an historical personality after the manner of men, He did not assume human personality in the sense of the ultimate mystery. Instead of the human mystery of personality, sin, he possesses the divine mystery of personality; divine authority.3
Therefore, Jesus Christ is related to men as the holy Love 
of God who reveals God, judges as God, and redeems and 
reconciles as God. If He were only divine, He would
1. B., The Mediator, p. 319#
2. Ibid., p. 320. 3. Ibidem.
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become an impersonal Idea apart from man and God who is 
person. If He were only human, then, corrupted by sin, He 
could not be free to reveal.God who is not subject to sin. 
His relationship to man is that of the God-man, but not 
of the world, One with the Creator and One with man under 
the conditions of creaturehood, but not limited by the 
power of sin.
In faith, Jesus Christ, the Redeemer and Reconciler, 
is perceived as the eternal Son, the Personal Word, the 
Divine Christ. Otherwise, He is understood as Jesus, the 
great religious teacher, an Example (advantaged over 
others by being primus inter pares), the greatest of the 
Prophets, or He is assigned to some other niche of human 
pre-eminence. As the divine Christ, the God-man is the 
fulfilment of all of these, which are but qualities of 
His divine yet human nature. But here the matter cannot 
rest for the Christian. His knowledge in faith can 
scarcely be better expressed than in the "simple con­
fession . . . which alone is explicitly contained in the 
New Testament: Jesus Christ the Lord, Jesus Christ the 
Son of God, the Redeemer."1 Furthermore, "Fellowship 
with the living Lord who is present with us : this is what
1. B ., Truth as Encounter, p. 153#
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faith in Christ in the New Testament preeminently 
m e a n s A n d ,  with added emphasis on this Biblical 
doctrine, Brunner affirms: "Jesus Christ, God Himself
in persona is the real gift. The Word of God in its
ultimate meaning is thus precisely not *a word from God*,
but God in person, God Himself speaking, Himself present,
Immanuel."^ And this redemptive self-giving of God in
Christ relates, in Brunner's thought, exclusively to man
rather than creation as a whole.
The purpose of the Incarnation refers rather to sinful fallen humanity and the creature than to the creature as such. The coming of the Son into the world is not a coming into God's Creation, but into sinful creation. . . . It is connected with closing the gulf which yawns not between the creature and the Creator, but between man who is sinful and a wrathful God.3
Interpreting Roijians 8:19-23 in his commentary The Letter
to the Romans, Brunner says: "One cannot fail to recognize
that this concept * creation* mostly denotes humanity for
Paul, and that he nowhere else speaks of the world of
nature."^ While God is related to nature in a formal
sense in general revelation, the. special revelation in
1. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 153#
2, Ibid., p. 1 3 2.
3 . B., The Mediator, p. 314.
4, B ,, The Letter to the Romans - A Commentary, p. 75*(London: Lutterworth Press, 2nd Imp,, I9 6I).
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,Christ the Redeemer is directed entirely to man and his 
need.
Brunner believes that Jesus Christ, in disregarding 
all other possible concerns and in only seeing human 
beings and human needs, strikingly manifested "His exis­
tential attitude."1 In harmony with this attitude, the 
reconciling mission to sinful men engaged the exclusive 
attention and was the sole interest of Him who was in sol­
idarity with the whole human race and also in "solidarity 
with that which separates humanity from God . . . with 
the divine wrath which works death.
As for man vis k vis Immanuel, Brunner holds that 
faith itself is consequent to the indwelling Christ who 
comes to man in the faith-encounter. The formal imago 
dei in man gives him the receptive capacity, while the 
material imago dei of the faith-decision yields the con­
tent. The basis of the relationship and the relationship 
itself is indeed dialectical involving faith and encounter, 
with the primary move being made by God Incarnate and the 
secondary move or response being made by man. Understood 
in this perspective, the indwelling Christ, the Incarnate 
Lord, deals with His own in their religious and ethical 
experiences. Actually, other than in terms of His function
1. B., The Mediator, p. 496, 2. Ibidem.
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or work, Brunner does not distinguish between the Eternal 
Son and the indwelling Christ —  in fact, they are con­
sidered to be one in his thought. Through the human Jesus 
they are both manifested to faith.
In his treatment of the revelation in Jesus Christ, 
Brunner undoubtedly intends to acknowledge the manifesta­
tion of both the immanence and transcendence of God.^
He holds that these two aspects of the divine being are 
included in the Person and Work of the Mediator —  the 
Person being discerned from His Work. "The transcendent 
character of this proceeding must be stated unmistakably.
. . . This emphasis on the other-worldly character of this
1. Cf. B., The Word and the World, pp. 7-8. In the preface to this slender volume of lectures Brunner reacts toward certain critics who have directed their barbs at what they observed to be a weakness in the Barthian theo­logical armour. His words are worth quoting: "Much non­sense has been talked about the 'Barthian Theology* having perception only for the transcendence of God, not for His immanence. As if we too were not aware that God the Creator upholds all things by His power, that He has set the stamp of His divinity on the world and created man to be His own image! It is just because these things are so, and only for that reason, that real contradiction is possible. Only the man created as the image of God can be a sinner, a contradictor; only the man to whom God as Creator is ever near can be farther off from God than any star on earth ; only the man in whose reason there is a divinely caused unrest can so err in his reason as to be no longer capable of recognizing God in His own creation, but only where God manifests Himself to him in the low­liness of the Son of Man. All that our critics have written about 'transcendence* and * immanence * really does not touch us" (p. 7f).
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act does not do away with the Divine Immanence in the world 
• , . it presupposes it $"  ^ In developing His doctrine of 
the Person of Christ from this position, he utilizes the 
categories and concepts of "faith-encounter", "mystery" 
and "paradox*" On the one hand he believes that they pro­
vide for an understanding of the one Person which both 
retains His true humanity —  His one-ness with all other 
men; and His true deity —  His one-ness with God. On the 
other hand they furnish a Christological view which acknow­
ledges in the divine-human person the disclosure of God 
who is both immanent and transcendent.
In the succeeding chapter Emil Brunner's interpre­
tation of the Person of Jesus Christ will be critically 
evaluated along with that of P. T. Forsyth.
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 390. On this point cf. Brunner's last dogmatic writing, The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, in which, comment- on the one and only time in the Gospel of John where Jesus addressed God as "Holy Father" (John 17:11), he says : "Obviously what is meant by this is that here, at the con­clusion of Jesus* revealing work, the holiness of God -- that aspect of the divine Nature which describes God's distance from the world, His total otherness. His trans­cendence of the world —  no longer implies a dividing barrier, but that His holiness has been revealed as one with His self-revealing love" (p. 327)#
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3. The Work of Jesus Christ
Under this heading the divine activity of reconcil­
iation which, since the enunciation of the Wahrheit-als- 
Begegnung principle, Brunner has firmly held to be the key 
to the Person of Christ, will be discussed. The first 
sub-division of this section will deal with certain deter­
minative features of the reconciling work. The second sub­
division will concern itself more particularly with 
Brunner's assessment of traditional Atonement theories and 
his own doctrine of Atonement.
i. The Divine Drama of Reconciliation
One might well describe the work of Jesus Christ in 
the thought of Emil Brunner as "The Divine Drama of Recon­
ciliation." The participants would include the God of 
holy Love, sinful man and the Mediator, Jesus Christ. A 
comprehension of the role of the Mediator requires a prior 
knowledge of Brunner's concept of the character of the 
other members of the "cast." The significant factors in­
volved in such an understanding are the holiness of God 
and the sinfulness of man. These factors will be con­
sidered in proper order as they relate to the dramatis 
personae: holy God and man the sinner. In theological 
terms, this means the examination of certain aspects of
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Brunner's doctrine of God and doctrine of man. The scope 
of our study must widen at this point to include a bit of 
his Christian "theology" and of his Christian anthropology. 
It is only through this approach that the more "purely" 
Christologioal consideration of the Mediator in His 
reconciling role can be seriously attempted. And finally, 
account must be taken of the fact that the whole "drama" 
is enacted against the background of the Cross. It is 
therefore fitting that Brunner's specific views on the 
Atonement should be set forth under the sub-titles 
"Interpreting the Cross." It is on the eminence of 
Calvary and in the illumination of the Cross that Chris- 
tological vision is the clearest —  that God is seen in 
His holiness, that man is seen in his sinfulness, and 
therefore the Crucified is seen as the all-sufficient 
Mediator, the personal manifestation of all that is com­
prehended in the love (Agape) of holy God for man the 
sinner.
(1) God and His Holiness 
Chapter 14 of Brunner's first volume in the series 
on Dogmatics, The Christian Doctrine of God, is an in­
teresting dissertation on "holy" as an attribute of the 
divine Being. It begins thus:
Prom the standpoint of revelation the first
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thing which has to be said about God is His Sovereignty, but this first point is intimately related with a second one —  so closely indeed that we might even ask whether it ought not to have come first: God is the Holy One. * Hallowed be thy Name' —  it is very significant that in the prayer of the Christian Church this clause comes first. The one concern of the Christian Faith is the Holy Name, and the 'hallowing' of this Name. Although in the New Testament the idea of the Holiness of God as a divine attribute is emphasized somwhat less than in the Old Testament, yet it is everywhere presupposed, and it appears at decisive points, where the whole revealing and saving work of Christ is gathered up as the revelation of the Name ; 'Holy Father, keep them in thy Name which Thou hast given me. ' ^2Book Three of The Mediator abounds in the use of the terms 
"holy" and "holiness." There is also an extensive and 
interchangeable usage of the closely related -- or 
identical, as Brunner thinlcs of them —  words of "glory", 
"majesty" and "sovereignty*" He says, "The sovereignty of 
God means the Holiness of God, the fact that God God.
He does not hesitate to give solid and prior emphasis to 
the Holiness of God and to all that is indigenous to the 
expression. There is ample Scriptural authorization for 
such a procedure. "The Bible is the book in which the 
glory of God is the first concern and the salvation of
1. B,, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 157# In a footnote Brunner observes that the modification of the Em­phasis on holiness in the New Testament "is more apparent than real when we reflect that the New Testament lays so much more emphasis on the Holy Spirit."
2. This part of Brunner's magnum opus bears the titles "The Work of the Mediator."
3* B., The Mediator, p. 470.
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man comes second.
On the one hand the Scriptures reveal the absolute, 
unconditional and exclusive aspect of God's holiness;
God the sovereign Lord, the One whose will is identical with Himself, and who can therefore be known as identical with His will, who is the enemy of all caprice, whose will can be relied on ab­solutely; this Lord, Yaweh, the "I AM THAT I AM" —  this is the Holy God of the Bible. . . . this divine self-affirmation is that which the Bible calls the Holiness of God. . . . It is on account of His Holiness that God says; "My glory will I not give to another." For, to "give His glory to an­other" would mean cleaving His will in two. It is of the very nature of the holy God that He should be supreme, that His sovereignty should be absolute and unquestioned.^
Thus, according to Brunner, the divine Holiness is in­
separable from "that character of absolute intolerance 
that distinguishes the Biblical idea of God."^ This is 
the negative aspect; this is the "exclusiveness" of the 
holy will.
But there is a positive aspect. "God wills to be 
recognized as G o d . H e  is not indifferent to man's dis­
position towards Him. He is not a static Being with
1. B., The -Mediator, p. 408.
2. Ibid., pp. 46o-46l.
3# B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 160. Cf.B ., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the
Consummation, p. 290; "God's holiness is His will to be acknowledged as God alone."
4. Ibidem.
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static attributes; He is the God of revelation. It is a 
matter of paramount concern to Him that He should be ac­
knowledged by man as "the Holy One, the One who is wholly 
O t h e r . T h i s  is the opposite movement of the divine Will 
as it is comprehended in the Holiness of God. This is the 
movement to expand and include.
This line of reasoning leads Brunner into a dis­
cussion ~  not without close relatedness —  of the subject 
of the "Wrath" of God. His thought may be followed in a 
particularly illuminative quotation:
Both the negative and the positive aspects of the divine energy of will are inseparable from the divine being of God. What kind of God would He beif He did not care whether people took Him se­riously or not? Since God takes Himself absolutely seriously, He gives seriousness to life. . « •This " seriousness" works itself out negatively as resistance provoked by resistance, and indeed as resistance which ultimately is the rock against which all other resistance founders. . . . This is the Divine Wrath, the working out of the Divine Glory upon those who refuse to give Him glory ; the working out of the Holiness of God against him who irreverently, godlessly, does not acknowledge Him.. . • The idea of the Divine Wrath cannot be sev­ered from that of the Holiness of God.^
However, it is also true —  and more significantly so —
that the Love of God is bound up with His Holiness. "The
living God is the God whose love is united with holi-
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, p. l6i.
2. I b i d . p .  I6lf.
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ness."^ This unity is plainly taught in the Book of Hosea
and in scattered passages in the prophecy of Isaiah. It
also becomes the logical terminus of Brunner's progressive
thinlcing up to this point;
This is the ultimate dialectic . • . .the dialectic of Holiness and Love. As the Holy One, God wills to be separate from all creatures ; as the Holy One He also wills that all creation should be filled with His glory, and thus should have a share in that quality which is His alone. Thtis the holiness of God is the basis of the self-communication vfhich is fulfilled in love.2
While the wrath of God is very real, it is never, like 
love, of His essence. "Scripture says that God is love, 
but never that God is w r a t h . "3 The Holiness of God there­
fore includes the inseverable idea of Wrath and the essen­
tial idea of Love, and this concept in all of its meaning­
fulness must be understood over against the concept of man 
in his sin.
(2) Man and his Sinfulness 
According to Brunner, "Wrath" is "that which God is, 
so to speak, forced to do by man for the sake of His Holi-
1. B., The Scandal of Christianity, p. ?8.
2. B., The Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 163-164.
3* B., The Scandal of Christianity, p. 80. Cf. The
Mediator, p. 519* "The wrath of God is not the ultimate reality; . . .  In Himself God is love."
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ness/'l The question then arises; What is it that "forces" 
holy God to comport Himself in wrath and anger toward men? 
All orthodox theologians would immediately answer that it 
is man's sin. Brunner makes the conventional reply, but 
he does so in terms of the starkest realism and in a spirit 
of the greatest earnestness and gravity. This involves 
the employment of a vast number of vivid descriptives and 
designations, of which a representative sampling might 
include the following; Sin is an "unfathomable abyss? 
that is entirely unbridgeable from man's s i d e i t  is a 
"wall of partition blocking our access to God" which God 
alone can d e m o l i s h ; 3 it is the awfulness of "life without 
G o d " i t  is a "fatal disharmony" with G o d ; 5  it is the 
"personal act of apostasy, of disobedience, of aliéna-
1. B., The Mediator, p. 483.
2. Ibid., p. 446. "Abyss" and "gulf" are used by Brunner more frequently than any other terms to describe sin and its consequences•
3. B., The Great Invitation, p. 58* This is a collec­tion of strongly evangelical sermons preached by Emil Brunner over a period of several years to his congregation in Zurich and published shortly before his departure on his two-year teaching mission in the International Christ­ian University of Tokyo. The original title^of the book was Fraumunster-Predigten, Zwingli-Verlag, Zurich, 1953#
4. Ibid., p. 121. Brunner adds, " . . .  —  that is what Paul means by sin."
5# B., The Mediator, p. 484.
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tion from God ; it is that which characterizes "man in 
revolt" against God;^ and, most importantly perhaps, sin 
"in the last resort . . .  is the denial of God and self- 
deification; it is getting rid of the Lord God, and the 
proclamation of self-sovereignty3 For Brunner, "Both 
*sin* and 'guilt* express the truly personal relation be­
tween God and man.Furthermore, they are both universal. 
"Sin is not only something which affects us all in the 
same way, but it is something which concerns us all as a 
whole."5 Or, to state it in a more Scriptural way; "We 
stand before God as one 'Adam', as a humanity which is 
totally infected with an indissoluble identical burden of
1. B *, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 109# In this volume of his Do.gmatlcs Brunner devotes a chapter (number 3) to the discussion of "Manas Sinner."
2. Ibid., p. 124. Man In Revolt is the title of one of Brunner's major works, q. v. passim, but note espec­ially Chapter VI; "The Destruction' of the Image of God."
3. Ibid., p. 93-
4. B., The Mediator, p. 444. Here, as in his thinking on the Person of Christ, Brunner gives the due attention to the dimension of the personal which is required by his underlying principle of "truth as encounter."
5 # B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 9 6 . Brunner goes on to say: "Here we stand be­fore a mystery . . .  a mystery, however, which is a mys­tery of faith for everyone who stands before Jesus Christ as his Lo’rd”and Saviour" (p. 9?f)#
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guilt•
Though he uses the strongest terms in setting forth 
the heinousness of sin, Brunner maintains that : "The ex­
pression * the total depravity of man,* which in later 
Calvinism has become a slogan, is not biblical."^ However, 
"the truth of this concept is that it is the totality of
man, not a part of him, which is responsible for sin."3 
Brunner has his own choice of terms to express this same
truths "The broken relation with God means the perversion
and poisoning of all the functions of l i f e . T h e  idea
of "perversion" is much to be preferred over that of
"corruption" since it "corresponds far more closely to the
contradictory character of sin . • & than the idea of
corruptio which has more of a contrary and therefore
natural character."5 Statements of this sort skirt the
edge of the vexed problem of the imago Dei which occupies
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption , p . 104, G f. B ., Man in RevoIt', pp. 139-142.
2. 3., The Scandal of Christianity, p. 6 5 .
3# Ibidem.
4. B., Man In Revolt, p. 136f. of. B., The Mediator, p. 4 4 3, Brunner here declares guilt to be "something absolutely infinite" and sin is "the perversion of human nature through the perversion of the human attitude toward God. "
5 . Ibid., p. 13?fn.
312
so muoh of Brunner’s thought. In his historic and heated 
controversy with Karl Barth he professes to regard the 
treatment of the problem in the work of John Calvin —  
in spite of some differences of expression -- as being 
congenial to his own view. Although the imago Dei is 
basic to Calvinistic anthropology, the concept "points 
across to Christology, since Christ is the original of 
that likeness, the human imago."  ^ And, on the narrower 
base of soteriology, the relationship is even closer, 
"since the full content of the imago Dei can only be known 
from the reparatio, from the regeneratio through Christ 
and the Holy Spirit.
It is Brunner’s conviction that, in the spirit of 
Galvin if not in his language, he can make a meaningful 
anthropological distinction between what he calls the 
"formal" and the "material" images in man which will serve 
a dual Christologioal purpose. Such a procedure, in his 
opinion, will have the double merit of retaining in man 
a "point of contact" for the down-coming grace of God in 
Jesus Christ, and, at the same time, of insuring loyal
1. Natural Theology, Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply "No!" by Dr.Karl Barth. Translated by Peter Praenlcel, Geoffrey Bles; The Centenary Press, London, 1946, p. 40.
2. Ibidem.
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adherence to the Biblical and Reformed principle of sola 
gratia. In other words, his object is to give a relevance 
to general revelation in the relationship of God to man 
which will in no sense infringe upon the absolute necess­
ity of the special redemptive revelation of God in Christ. 
The *^ 8um and substance" of the attempted distinction and 
its significance, as set forth .in Natural Theology, is as 
follows Î
We have to consider the image of God in man in two ways ; one formal and one material. The formal sense . . .  is the human, i.e. that which distin­guishes man from all the rest of creation, whether he be a sinner or not. . . .We can define this by two concepts; the fact that man is a subject and his responsibility* . • • Man . . .  is a subject, a rational creature. . . . Not even as a sinner does he cease to be one with whom . . . God can speak. And this is the very nature of man; to be responsible. Upon these two characteristics, that of his capacity for words and that of responsibil­ity, which in their turn are closely interrelated, depends not only man’s special position but also the connection between this special position and the form of the redeeming revelation, namely that God becomes man.If the formal side of the imago Dei is thus con­ceived, it does not in any way result in an en­croachment upon the material concept of justitia originalis, nor in a lessening of the weight of the statement that this justitia originalis is com­pletely 'lost. . . .  We distinguish categorically; formally the imago is not in the least touched —  whether sinful or not, man is a subject and is responsible. Materially, the imago is completely lost, man is a sinner through and through and there is nothing in him which is not defiled by sin.^
1. Natural Theology, pp. 23-24. Brunner believes that what he calls the "formal" side of the imago is virtually
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Such is the kernel of Brunner's anthropological view with 
its Christologioal implications —  a view in which he seems 
to be saying that man is both utterly shut away from God 
by his sin and, at the same time, somehow "open" to the 
divine bestowal of grace in Jesus Christ,
In all considerations of the range and depth of 
man's sinful plight one must not lose sight of the way in 
which sin and guilt have an inescapable bearing upon God's 
Holiness, "The idea of guilt expresses not only the soli­
darity of humanity, the totality of life, but also, and 
above all, the inviolable Holiness of G o d . I n  Brunner's 
estimate of the enormity of sin he lays great stress upon 
the fact that sin is against divine Holiness, against that 
which "makes God God" -- not just against the honour that 
attaches to His sovereign office, as in Anselm, not merely
the same as what Calvin calls the "remnant" of the imago. However, in his sharp rebuttal of Brunner's argument, Karl Barth shows rather decisively that in Calvin's teaching the possibility of natural man's deriving any genuine knowledge of God from the created order (which includes any inherently "human" attributes) is entirely hypothet­ical, being so determined by the absolutely significant conditional clause that the Reformer brings into his dis­cussion, namely : "£i integer stetisset Adam." According to Barth, the adamantly hard fact of the matter, both for Calvin and himself, is that Adsun did fall and that natural man ever since has remained totally devoid of any innate ability to lay hold upon the truth of God. (of. Ibid.,pp. 1 0 6, 1 0 9)
1. B*, The Mediator, p. 463.
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against the law, as in Calvin. So, when he uses the 
language of Anselm in saying that "Sin . . .  is an attack 
on God’s h o n o u r , a n  explanation is in order; "His 
honour is His Godhead. . . . God would cease to be God if 
He could permit His honour to be attacked. . • • The 
Holiness of God requires the annihilation of the will 
which resists God.
Brunner declares that any appraisal of man’s pre­
dicament, or proposal for the relief thereof, that glosses 
over the real nature of sin and guilt, and the objective 
reality of the consequent "gulf", can only beget a deeper 
guilt. A true facing up to the grim facts leads to the 
conclusion that whatever is done to remedy the situation 
must be done by holy God. Yet the gravity of man’s sin­
fulness cannot be detected by human reason* Such knowl­
edge only becomes apparent to faith*
The true perception of sin is a gift of rev­elation, a religious truth, never the object of a rational demonstration. But faith recognizes guilt as a fact of unfathomable gravity and the necessity of atonement is based upon this fact. The human situation is desperate, and it cannot be trans­formed, fellowship with God is impossible save through an intervention in the human situation, a re-establishment of man’s relation to God by God
1. B., The Mediator, p. 44^.
2. Ibidem.
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Himself.1
Drastic measures must be taken to deal with a dark and 
dismal human condition. If the inclusive Holy Will of God 
to possess man for Himself across the unfathomable abyss 
of sin and guilt is to be realized, God must act to bridge 
the chasm. How has God acted to accomplish this purpose? 
Brunner propounds his answer to this question in his ex­
plication of the role of the "Mediator".
(3) The Mediator and His Role 
In exploring the above line of Emil Brunner's 
Christological thought it should be borne in mind that 
this profound thinker is a "Theologian of the Word of God." 
This is to say that he inclines to a "Logos" Christology. 
For him, "the Christian religion is summed up in the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ: . . • the Logos as the 
personal Divine Presence, and His self-communication. 
Brunner believes that when.the Christian Church originally 
answered the question, Who is He?, by saying that Christ 
was the Divine .Word, it was an answer of the keenest in­
sight. "Rightly understood, this reply contained the
1. B ♦, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 2 9 2.
2, B., The Mediator, p. 212. Cf, B., The Word and the World, pp. 2ëff. "
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whole truth. He Is that which God has to say to us —  
what can there be beyond that?"l The Logos, then, is 
primarily what God says to man; it is God's announcement 
for man's salvation of His own Name and His own Person. 
However, Brunner does not mean to put all of his Christ­
ological emphasis on the concept of the Logos. "Christ 
is not merely the Logos, He is not merely that which God 
has to say to us, but He is at the same time also the 
Mediator."^ There is sound logic behind this designation:
For this very reason He is the Mediator, because He shares in t§^o worlcQ , because He has to point in both directions. He has a share in thesinful corrupted world and He has a share in thedivine eternal world of perfection. He is the Bridge between both.3
In the paradoxical Nature of the Mediator is the revelation
of the basic human contradiction and need —  and the answer
to that need. "The Mediator in His Person, by His very
'constitution*, is the mediation between the Creator and
the fallen creature in a double connections as the Mediator
of revelation and the Mediator of reconciliation."^ This
title very definitely includes the divine reconciling
action.
1. B., The Mediator, p. 234.
2. Ibid., p. 581.
3. Ibid., p. 532. Brunner appends the important re­minders "The Bridge, however, is there to be crossed."
4. Ibid,, p. 4o6.
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When we speak of the "Person" and the "Work" of the Mediator we mean exactly the same thing. . . • ■He what He does and He does what He is, and both of these statements mean that He reunites man, who is separated, indeed practically severed from his divine origin, with God.^
Actually, "Mediator" is a name that is charged with 
functional significance. And, with the passage of time, 
Brunner's thought moves steadily in the direction of a 
"functional" understanding of the Person of Jesus Christ 
and full subscription to Melanchthon's oft-quoted dictum; 
"To know Christ is to know His benefits."^ Yet to con­
tinue a theological discussion along this line under the 
sovereign principle of "Truth as Encounter" demands that 
"benefits" be set in a personalized frame of reference.
To meet this requirement Brunner calls into service the 
traditional concept of the three-fold office of Prophet,
1. B,, The Mediator, p. 490.
2. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 2 73Î Hoc est Christum cognoscere, bénéficia elus cognoscere. Gf. 3., The Mediator, pp. 8 0 , 26Bfn., 40? The early references are somewhat in the nature of obiter dicta, for Brunner is not yet prepared to draw out the im­plications of the Reformer's famous Christological axiom in accordance with the ruling concept of Wahrheit als Begegnung. In fact, in one passage of The Mediator his reserved approval of Melanchthon's formula is followed bya serious objection; "It contains the germ of the wholeanthropocentric point of view of later Lutheranism, and this simply means of religious egoism. Man occupies the centre of the picture, with his need for salvation, not God and His glory" (p. 408).
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Priest and King. In the second volume of the Dogmatics 
this venerable rubric is largely employed in dealing with 
the saving work of the Mediator, and rightly so, because; 
"In the doctrine of the Three 'Offices' of Christ we are 
once again reminded of the truth that we know Jesus through 
God's action in H i m . I n  all of these offices —  espec­
ially in that of "Priest" —  Christ, the divine-human 
Mediator, is active on behalf of man the sinner. What the 
Mediator does as Prophet, Priest and King manifests what 
He in the same categories, and vice versa. In summary
form, the triadic treatment of the work of Christ means
to the believer through encounter in faith that —
We are reconciled "through the Blood" of Jesus Christ, redeemed from the power of darkness, and transferred in "the Kingdom of the Son of His Love", and in faith we receive the highest revelation of His merciful Will, . . .  As the sinful heart is that which is separated from God, blind to God, andopposed to God, so faith —  which is the oppositeof sin —  is the inward eye which is opened to the reality of God, the heart which is reconciled to God, and the will which is united to God in obedience.^
While it is not necessary in this discussion to examine in
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 273* Brunner devotes all of Chapter 11, plus the major part of a lengthy appendix, to an interpretation of this "reminder in triplicate."
2, Ibid., pp. 306-3 0 7, This gathering together of the threads of thought on the "benefits" of the three "Offices" makes good devotional reading. It sounds much more litur­gical than theological, as does indeed the whole pre- . ceding elucidation.
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detail Brunner's explication of the Kunus triplex, it 
should be emphasized that the categories embraced in this 
functional scheme do lend themselves with a certain natu­
ralness to the inductive methodology to which, as he 
states and justifies in the opening of the eleventh chap­
ter of The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
he is now committed;
Since, . . .  in this section of the present work of Dogmatics we are going to use an inductive, and not —  as is usual —  a deductive method, we shall be­gin not with the Person, but with the Work of Christ. For the Person of Christ can be discerned from His work. In so doing we are following a line which has already been traced for us beforehand, by one of the most profound statements of Reformation theology; Hoc est Christum cognoscere, bénéficia eius cognoscere
This methodology receives even prior support in the Chris­
tological deliverances of St. Paul, and especially in the 
Pauline oriented doctrine of the early Church. "Here the
1. B., Op. cit., p. 2 7 1. It is worthwhile to note that later on, in the beginning of his chapter on "The Per­son of Jesus Christ", Brunner adduces the divine example in the Incarnation as a sufficient warrant for an a posteriori method in Christology; "It is the miracle of the divine condescension.towards us that He wills to meet us in a human being. If God has opened this way to Himself for us, we ought to follow it too ; we have no right to try■to re­verse the process. That is why the Gospels, the record of the human life of Jesus are placed first in the New Testa­ment, in order that, meeting the Man, Christ Jesus, we may through this encounter, come to the knowledge of God"
(p. 322)4
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work, the gift —  and, if this word may be allowed —  the 
'achievement' of Christ is always in the foreground, while 
the mystery.of the Person is in the background,"  ^ Though 
there is no real clash of Christologies in the New Testa­
ment, nevertheless, "The Christology of the Primitive 
Church —  as against the Johannine Christology —  is de­
termined more by the verb than the substantive#"^
As has been intimated, Emil Brunner put much more 
emphasis on the Incarnation in The Mediator than he did 
in his later theologizing. In a preliminary note on 
Section III : "The Dominion of God", he declares : "Prom
the outset our concern has been directed towards the cen­
tral point, where time and eternity merge into each other 
and become one, and where the Christian faith took its 
rise ; the Incarnation of the Word,"3 But after a decade
1. B ,, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and He-
2, Ibidem, Cf. Truth as Encounter, pp. 88, 1 5 6,
3# B,; The Mediator, p. 5^7# Yet this is not an ex­clusive preoccupation. Several passages portend a move­ment of thought in another direction, e, g.; "His 'being* as the Mediator, however, cannot be severed from His 'work® as Mediator; for this Person is not static but dynamic." (p. 493) And on an earlier page he says %"While we lay so much stress on the fact that the Person of the Mediator is in itself the revelation, at the same time we do not wish to suggest —  as will be seen directly -- that we either ignore the *^Work" of the Mediator or even relegate it to a subordinate position." (p. 407),
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of further reflection, in his Wahrheit als Begegnung (1938)f 
he is ready to confess to a change of mind;
I must correct at this point certain empha^s in my own book The Mediator, . . . [Ancient dogmaj gave the Christian faith a false orientation about the being instead of the work of Christ, • , . The Per­son of the Mediator must also be understood as an act of God, namely as His coming to us in revelation and redemption, . ♦ . Even the Person of the Mediator is comprehended with the verb, if I may soexpress it, not with the substantive. One couldactually say ; Jesus Christ, even and especially in His divine-human being as Person, is God's act, just as He is the Word of God.^
True to the acknowledgment of having "seen the 
light" in this matter, Brunner's promised "corrective" 
appears in The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­
tion (1 9 5 0). Here the concentration of thought is no long­
er on the "Person" but the "Work" of the Mediator. And
apostolic sanction for this shift of attention is reit­
erated;
The distinctive element in the apostolic language about the Divine Son is this ; that it never —  as was the case in later periods of the development of doctrine in the Church —  was regarded as an iso­lated doctrine, but always one which was in direct and immediate connexion with the Work of Jesus, with the salvation given in Him, with the revelation, reconciliation and royal Lordship of God.^
1. B., Truth as Encounter, p. 155f*
2. S., Op. cit., p. 3 5 0. Brunner concludes with astatement that reflects his ruling theological "passion"; "Christological doctrine in the narrower sense, the doc­trine of the Person of Jesus, is also 'truth as encounter^."
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His amended viewpoint is most obvious in the reversal of 
the order of treatment of "Person" and "Work" —  "Work'^ 
now comes first and, as has been pointed out, in the 
strong dependence on the old Munus triplex doctrine to 
carry the weight of the new emphasis. So thoroughly does 
the theologian set himself to vindicate the value of his 
altered approach to his subject that, at the end of the 
chapter on "The Saving Work of God in Jesus Christ" and 
the appendix that follows, he apparently runs out of ideas 
for the development of constructive thought in the next 
chapter on "The Person of Jesus Christ." However, this 
point will be criticized later.
In Brunner's last major piece of writing, his 
Dogmatics ; Volume III, some statements can be found which 
tend to present a more unified picture of Person and Work. 
"It is precisely the complete congruence of Word and ac­
tion which gives us certainty of His divine authority."  ^
So, in spite of vacillation, and regardless of final judg­
ment on his efforts, what Brunner would seem to be try­
ing to say is that neither the Work nor the Person of 
Jesus Christ can be truly understood unless conceived in 
relation to each other in the one Mediator. Neither the
1, B . The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. I9 8 . Cf. Ibid. , pp. 101, 17% .
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Incarnation nor the Atonement can be interpreted properly 
if considered in isolation and from the standpoint of ab­
stract speculation. The God-man can only be understood 
and confessed in the integrity of His being by considering 
His Person and Work in harmonious relationship each to the 
other. God is asserting His gift and His act. This 
single solitary Person in "being" and "action" must be —  
and 3^ —  the Sinless One who identifies Himself wholly 
with man and yet is absolutely united with God. In a 
totally unique union and unity He does for sinful humanity 
that which man in no wise is able to do for himself.
Through these dimensions of the Mediator, the key figure 
in the drama of Reconciliation, Brunner believes that God 
reveals Himself specifically and acts concretely —  facts 
which become known in the encounter of faith.
ii. Interpreting the Gross
In dealing with the "Priestly" Work of Jesus Christ, 
Brunner places great emphasis on the "Cross" and its mean­
ing. In the section on "Reconciliation" in the latter 
part of The Mediator, Martin Luther gets a vigorous nod of 
approval for his definition of Christian Theology as 
theologla orueis, and in this connection the whole struggle 
of the Reformation is seen as a striving "for the right
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interpretation of the G r o s s . T h e  understanding of the 
Bible and the understanding of God as He is revealed in 
Jesus Christ can only ensue from the understanding of the 
Gross.
(1) The Gross in History and in Faith-enoounter
In discussing the idea of a theodicy —  the attempt 
to justify the ways of God to men —  Brunner can see no
evasion of the fact that the living God is "The God of
History" and goes on to say.
The problem of |theodio'2 is presented in its most acute form at the centre of the Christian revelation, at the Cross of Christ. The crucifix­ion of Jesus is an event in history, from the standpoint of the Christian faith it is the central fact in history.^
The Christian is confronted with the harsh reality of all 
manner of injustices in history —  epitomized in the cruel 
death of Jesus -- but he is also confronted with the un­
deniable fact that God is Lord of all this history. How, 
then, in the face of this two-fold fact can the Christian 
maintain his faith in the God of righteousness and love?
It is the Cross alone that provides a sign-post in the maze 
of this dilemmas
• B., The Mediator, p. 435#
2. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 1 7 7#
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Here, at the Gross, it becomes evident that evil is that which God does not will and does not do, and at the same time, that God has such power over this evil, which He does not will, that He is able to make it an instrument of His saving work. . . .  At this point it is granted to us to have a glimpse into the mystery of the divine government of the world; . . .  As soon as we look away from the Cross and try to explain world history . . . the curtain falls once more, and we are left gazing into im­penetrable darkness.^
The Cross in the midst of history and the Cross as the 
illuminant of history is the solution of the problem of 
theodicy, not theoretically but in an "existential" and 
practical way.
One of the basic assumptions which underlies all of 
Brunner's theology must not be overlooked in this dis­
cussion, namely, the absolute distinction between time 
and eternity. This appears, as has been noted, in his 
treatment of the Incarnation. Out of the differentiation 
that is made between the historical appearance of the 
Mediator and His real nature as the Saviour through whom 
God and men are reconciled there emerges the concept that 
the Atonement as such, in its inner meaning, is not a fact 
of history. In keeping with the deity of the God-man it 
belongs to "super-history", and is known through spiritual 
perception, i.e. by faith. However, this is not to say
1. B *, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 102. ' ~
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that Brunner thereby denies the actuality of the Cruci­
fixion, "The cross of Christ on Golgotha is a historic 
fact Just as truly as the murder of Julius Caesar in 
R o m e . I t  is only the significance of the Cross to 
faith —  the Atonement -- which takes place in"super­
history" • He explains the matter thus %
The Atonement is not history. The Atonement, the expiation of human guilt, the covering of sin through His sacrifice, is not an^^thing which can be conceived from the point of view of history.This event does not belong to the historical plane. It is super-history; it lies in the dimension which no historian knows in so far as he is merely an historian. It is an event" which is only an **event" for faith.^
It is only in the contemplation of the Cross that 
the Holiness of God can really be known. It is there that 
the boundlessness of His Holiness and Love are convinc­
ingly manifested: "The Cross is the only place where the 
loving, forgiving, merciful God is revealed in such a way 
that we perceive that His Holiness and His Love are 
equally infinite."^ By way of the Cross there also comes
1. B., Faith, Hope and Love, p. 21. Cf. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 24*3:"No serious historian doubts |that] I I T*Jesus of Nazareth . . . was hated by the Jewish religious leaders, and finally . . . was crucified by them, and by the Roman Procurator Pontius Pilate."
2. B., The Mediator, p. 504.
3. Ibid., p. 470.
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the disclosure of the sinfulness of man. No matter how
much men may turn their eyes inwardly upon their souls,
they cannot see themselves as they really are until they
behold the Cross of Christ. "Only at the Cross does man
see fully what it is that separates him from G o d . A n d
again; "It is the mystery of the divine wisdom that the
same event which reveals to us love and righteousness,
also discloses to us our actual s i t u a t i o n . T r u l y  here
at the Cross there is implicit "a strange and wonderful
dialectic."3 Here in faith-encounter there is for man a
double i'dentification which Brunner describes and comments
upon as follows :
When I, the sinner, identify myself with the man who was crucified as a blasphemer against God, there also takes place a second identification, namely an identification with Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God. It is not the negative word "You are a sinner" that is the authentic message of theCross. It is only the presupposition for . . .truly hearing also the authentic message. . . .What man all his life long has vainly attempted to reach through morals, through education and self- education, through piety and religion —  peace with God, salvation, life in fellowship with God —  God bestows this upon him in free and kingly grace. He bestows upon him reconciliation with God. He
1. B., The Mediator, p. 452.
2. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 29SI
3* B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. I9 6 , Cf'. B., I'aAth, Hope and Love,p . 21.
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bestows upon him righteousness, that is, he makes him right with God. He quite simply declares, "You are right with me.^
It is at the Cross in the encounter of faith that the 
whole man is "summoned" to receive a completely new 
character as a person in an act in which he "is purely re­
ceptive, in no way actively takes the initiative.
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. I96I C'f i Ibid. , p. 2B?.
2. Ibid., p. 1 9 7" The role of man in receiving the benefits of the Cross-event is as much a matter of con­cern to Brunner in this volume of Dogmatics as it was some fifteen years before when Natural Theology came from the press. There is the same desire and intention to predi­cate to man a more "active" participation in his "salva­tion" than that allowed by the "block and stone" (trunc- us et lapis) status of the Confessional writings, and at the same time keep inviolate the Scriptural and evangel­ical principles of sola gratia and sola fide. There is, of course, immediate and intensive engagement with this problem in the chapter on "Conversion" (q.v., pp. 276- 
2 8 9). Here Brunner is naturally critical of Churches whose dogma favours "a divine monergism, in which nothing of the dialogue-character of our relation to God is left" (p. 2 7 7)# His own conviction is stated with a ring of boldness; "We ourselves have also something to here, whether this is labelled synergism or not" (p. 2 8 2.Italics mine). Actually Brunner is in little danger of being called a synergist. For, as he has previously ex­plained, when man does his "something" in repentance —  which means hearing the message from the Cross and "turn­ing" far "back" to the Fall from God's Creation and find­ing there in the beginning his own authentic "God-created being" —  it is in reality a divinely initiated and divinely effectuated "returning," because; "This can never happen through our own action; it happens when we let our­selves be told *He has done it for you®" (p. 281), So,Brunner is forced to acknowledge; "It is once again the same paradox as everywhere appears where faith is the theme; the new life is effected on the one hand only through the repentance of man, and on the other hand only
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(2) The Scriptural Witness and the Gross Triumphant 
Brunner finds the salient conceptions having to do 
with the interpretation of Christ's death on the Gross 
thoroughly interwoven in New Testament fabric. Our under­
standing of the meaning of the Cross as God's "mighty act" 
of Salvation "leads us to the heart of the central doctrine 
of revelation and salvation in the New Testament as a 
w h o l e . M o r e o v e r ,  the teachings of Jesus are "never to 
be separated from His [redemptiii^ action. They are the 
commentary on His a c t i o n . Y e t  it was the Apostle Paul 
who first connected the two elements ; "the death of Jesus 
and the forgiveness of sins."3 Paul x^ as the first to in­
terpret in theological terms all that the disciples had 
received directly from the lips of Jesus. The teaching of 
Jesus could only be perceived in full clarity, in relation 
to His life and death, "after His life on earth had been 
closed by d e a t h . W h a t  Paul has to say about the re­
through the act and speech or speech and act of God*^(p. 283).
1. B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and - demption, p.^YSyl Apropos of this centrality Brunner later says I "The Cross has therefore rightly become the Sign of Christianity"(Ibid., p. 297)#
2. Ibid., p. 293.
3. Ibid., p. 2 9 2 .
4. Ibid., p. 2 9 4.
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demptive and reoonoiling xfork of the Mediator and His Cross 
is a natural sequel to the Synoptic Gospels.
Both diversity and unity are found in the Scrip­
tural message of the Atonement. And, according to Brunner, 
there is something of merit in all the traditional 
theories of the atoning work of Christ with their ground­
ing in different portions of Scripture. In several pages 
of The Mediator and the second volume of Dogmatics a strong 
savour of the "classic" view of the Atonement can be de­
tected.^ While he holds no brief for absolute dualism be- 
txfeen good and evil, Brunner believes with Paul —  and 
with Jesus Himself —  that Christ the "Victor" xms, in 
the work of redemption, in active opposition to a very 
real power of evil. The total expression of the life of 
Jesus is divine energy on the offensive against all the 
forces ranged against God*
Here we see and feel the elements of conflict and
1. Gustaf Aulen (Chrlstus Victor, 1951), a vigorous exponent of this viexf, is reluctant to accept Brunner as a felloxf protagonist. Bather does he assign him to the Anselmian-Calvinistic school of Atonement thought. Yet he does concede that Brunner is to be commended for his appreciation of Irenaeus who first among the Fathers set doxm the Patristic (classic) doctrine of the Atonement in a clear, comprehensive and Biblical way. "Brunner is fully justified in claiming, in his excellent study of Irenaeus in Per Mittler, that the death of Christ has es­sentially the same significance for Irenaeus as for Paul" (p. 29) .
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victory, of haste and expansion, of pleading and seeking, of an urgent and aggressive movement, in xfhich the leader strides forward in hot haste. It is a heavenly offensive against the historical sphere dominated by the "Prince of this xforld, ", . . We are glad that today we . . * see in Jesus , . • first and foremost the royal Hero who wages a dangerous battle and who is filled absolutely with the will to conquer.1
Brunner draws heavily upon the epistles of Paul for the
reinforcement of this view. He conceives of the idea
embodied in the term redemption as definitely bolstering
the triumphant aspect of the atoning Cross ;
Here the idea is that of a struggle for power be­tween God and the hostile powers of darkness which enslave and corrupt man, from which, however, God through Christ rescues the booty, by delivering man from "the power of darkness" and translating him"into the Kingdom of the Son of His love" (Colossians 1:13). The Cross achieves a real spoliatio hostium which ends in a triumphal pro­cession for the victor (Colossians 2:15). In this process sinful man is , . . snatched away from the powers of darkness into God's keeping, but in the process he experiences his own liberation —  that is redemption.2
In the teaching and preaching of Brunner the re­
generative aspect of the work of the Victor over sin is 
definitely recognized. The liberation effected by the 
conquest of Christ is not only a "freeing from", it is 
also a "freeing into." This great Atonement-truth is
1. B., The Mediator, p. 511.
2, B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 2 8 5.
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forcefully presented in a sermon on "The Meaning of the 
Last Supper;"
The death of Jesus Christ # • • becomes the victory of God over you and your godlessness, then He draws you into His own eternal life, enabling you toshare in His resurrection and making you by thismeans a new creation.1
There is a Kingdom of God, both realized and potential, 
which is the rule of One who through His holy Love over­
comes the resistance of the Evil One, exercises His kingly 
power through the forgiveness of sins, and re-creates the 
heart that was once hostile and rebellious, making it 
over into one which is full of the will to serve. Under 
the sub-title of "The Royal Work of Jesus" Brunner em­
phasizes the objective, sanctifying influence of the 
Christ isrho died on Calvary : "Through the word of the
Cross received in faith, the new man, the man who serves
God is created (Romans 12:Iff), x^ ho no longer lives on 
himself and for himself, but on and for the love of God, 
But this is "jumping the queue" in Brunner's progression 
of thought.
1. B., The Great Invitation, p. 122.
2, B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 300. Cf. Ibid/, p. 2%% ""The man who per­ceives and accepts the forgiving love of God from theCross of Christ, . • . lives no longer on his own efforts,but upon grace."
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(3) Objective and Subjective Theories of Atonement 
Among the various theories of the Atonement that 
have appeared in the history of dogma, that of Anselm of 
Canterbury contains, in Brunner's judgment the larger 
share of truth. His reasoning is cogent: "What gives
Anselm's thought its superiority is the fact that it 
starts from the objective fact of guilt."! is only 
against the background of this reality that God's self­
movement and forgiving love appear in all their depth and 
magnitude. A shalloxf and minimizing view of guilt begets 
a like view of the Incarnation and Atonement, and Anselm's 
viexf of guilt is never shallow or minimizing. However, 
there is a serious weakness in his theory in that it 
"tends to become one-sided and crudely objective."^
Brunner therefore feels obliged to says
It is here that our way parts from Anselm, who thinics it possible to deduce a priori from his concept of God the fact of re’concillation. It is this a priori construction that gives his doctrine the fatal trait of rational calcula.tion, which makes this theory look not merely strange, but also sinister. In this connexion I should like to point out one thing more. We agree with Anselm that there is an objective necessity in reconciliation, but we completely disagree xfith him if he thinks of this reconciliation as being a sacrifice by xfhich God's wrath has to be appeased. In Biblical testi­mony God is never the object of reconciliation; no-
1. B,, The Scandal of Christianity, p. 8?.
2. B., The Mediator, p. 475#
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where do we find the idea that God has to be recon­ciled by Christ. God is always the subject ofreconciliation. He reconciles man to himself.^
It is most unfortunate that post-Reformation theology, 
taking its cue from Anselm, "passed beyond Biblical testi­
mony and , . . caused the misunderstanding that the
Christian doctrine of Atonement is a relapse into prim­
itive sacrificial m y t h o l o g y . The death of Christ on the 
Cross becomes a kind of peace-offering to a vengeful
Deity. Instead of being man's Salvation, Christ becomes
the mere instrument of his salvation.
The "subjective" theory of Atonement originated by 
Abelard receives a measure of qualified approval from Emil 
Brunner: "What Abelard says is true, but it is not the
whole truth, nor indeed is it the fundamental truth 
This mediaeval theologian "fathered" that conception of
1. B., The Scandal of Christianity, p. 88f.
2. Ibid., p. 89.
3• B ., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 28'BI This statement actually represents^ degree of moderation of the antipathy expressed some years before in The Mediator, q.v., p. 530, where Brunner writes of "the Rationalist Abelard" whose doctrine was "eagerly adopted and carried forward by those typical Rationalists, the Socinians" with such nullifying effect that "during the period of the Enlightenment the doctrine of the Atone­ment almost entirely disappeared, and could not be regained even by German Idealism." Brunner's heaviest blows against the subjectivist viewpoint were of course delivered in Die Mystik und das Wort, (1924)•
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the Atonement xfhich, growing and increasing in strength in 
the teaching of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, became the 
model of modern liberal theology. In its initial form the 
concept was simply this : "that the death of Jesus on the 
Gross gives us a supreme demonstration of the Love of God 
which should kindle a corresponding love in our hearts."^ 
However, drawing out the implications of Abelard's com­
paratively simple and innocuous doctrine, modern Ideal­
istic thought has claimed that —
if man is to give himself wholly to the work of the present, he must leave his past entirely behind him. It is not guilt which needs to be eradicated, but the sense of guilt. It is not man's separation from God which needs to be overcome, but merely the —  mistaken —  opinion that he is separated from God. Reconciliation (or atonement) consists in clearing up a misunderstanding, namely, that man isnot from the very outset already united with God.^
Such has been the deplorable "advancement" in the sub­
jectivist view of the Atonement since the days of its 
origin. The denial of real objectivity to man's guilt is 
devastating in its effect upon evangelical Christology, 
for, in Brunner's critical judgment, ipso facto, the door 
is opened wide to a Socinian estimate of Jesus Christ. He
is no more vere Deus and vere homo, but, He becomes the
1. B., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, pT^ffS.
2. Ibid., p. 289.
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Ideal of manlclnd in another form —  religious, aesthetic 
or moral. It could be said that the subjective theory 
invalidates the line of "necessity" in evangelical atone­
ment thought —  the reality of great guilt requires a 
surpassingly great objective deed, which, in turn, re­
quires a Doer of that deed x^ ho is none other than God 
Himself.
(4) The "Balanced" View of Atonement 
Brunner believes that in contrasting the Anselmic/ 
Abelardian viewpoints he has prepared the xmy for setting 
forth his oxm understanding of the Atonement:
This contrast betx^een txfo opposing classical theories shox-srs us the way for our ox\rn interpreta­tion. On the one hand, certainly xfith Anselm, we are concerned about this "must" —  how are we to understand it? —  not as an a priori, deductive, unconditioned truth, but as a posteriori, and con­ditioned —  but we are llkewTse dealing xfith an Event which includes faith, as in the viex^ of Abelard. We are not dealing Xfith a purely sub­jective or a purely objective process, but with an Event xfhich is both objective and subjective at the same time, a truth of "encounter."1
While it becomes apparent in the course of his developing
thought that he leans heavily toward the "objective",
Brunner does try xfith evident sincerity, even in The
Mediator, to make a real place for the "subjective" in
1. B ., The Christia,n Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 290.
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his Atonement theorizings "The emphasis on the objective 
character of the Atonement does not rule out the necessity 
for a subjective process; indeed, this subjective process 
is really the aim of the A t o n e m e n t . T h i s  is to says 
"It is only in this subjective experience, in faith, that 
the Atonement becomes r e a l . B u t ,  for all the forth­
rightness of these statements, Brunner again seems to 
take away with his left hand what his right hand bestows.
He immediately counters his preceding affirmations by 
saying: "But this subjective experience is completely 
objective in character. For this is xfhat it means: that 
my 'self* is crossed out, displaced and replaced by Christ, 
the Divine Word."3 His argument is now deadlocked and the 
only way out of the impasse is to says "the Atonement in 
its paradoxical combination of the subjective and the ob­
jective . . .  is the unfathomable mystery of G o d . Y e t  
Brunner doggedly maintains that for all of its paradoxical. 
and mysterious nature the truth about the atoning work .
1. Op. cit., p. 522.
2. Ibid., p. 524.
3. Ibidem. Italics mine.
4. Ibid., p. 528. As such, like other great mysteries relating to the Person and Work of the Mediator, it is a mystery "into which we cannot and ought not to penetrate."
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of Jesus Christ is still truth in both of its aspects;
That which is expressed outx^jardly and that which is spoken within the heart, the Christ for us and the Christ in us, are one and the same God. This is the reason why faith, which is most subjective, personal, and interior, is at the same time also most ob­jective ; and that the Atonement, which is so wholly objective . . .  is at the same time the most per­sonal and the most subjective fact there is. In­deed, we are . a . on false lines when we separate the thought of the fact of salvation from the ap­propriation of salvation. . . .  Salvation is neither doctrine nor conviction concerning a doc­trine, but the Word of God in Christ as it speaks to us in the heart; indeed it is God Himself as He speaks in us.^
According to Brunner, any theory of the Atonement 
which, in contrast to Abelardian subjectivism or the ex­
tremely objectivist viexsrpoint of Anselm, approach more 
nearly the "whole truth" and the "fundamental truth" 
should be truly objective, substitutionary, and with a 
Godward direction. He further believes that the truth 
about the Atonement xfhich should be central in Christian 
teaching is that which deals with the ideas of satisfaction 
and penalty. He points out that these are ideas that ■ 
great theologians before him emphasized and that many 
teachings of the Scriptures ,support. The New Testament —  
in spite of "humanistic" objections from numerous sources —
,1. B., The Mediator, p. 528. Thus, long before the day of Wahrheit als Begegnung, in his thinking about the Atone­ment Brunner seeks cope with the problem of Objectivism versus Subjectivism through the interjection of the truth- as-encounter principle, though he does not yet employ this term.
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is not afraid of pressing the conception of guilt. 
Brunner's own words may well be quoted in this connection;
The New Testament is not afraid of pressing this general conception of guilt —  this economic legal image. . . .  A debt must be paid. Man cannot pay. Guilt costs. Man cannot pay the price. . « . The conception of the "cost" and the "price" denotes the objective condition for the revelation of grace, an objectivity which is alien to God, and yet is none the less retained by Him; the reality of wrath, the necessity for punishment. This must take place, the movement ifhich leads to maxi must pass through this point. But this "necessity" forms part of the Divine Holiness.^
It must be strictly noted that this "necessity" does not
come from the side of man, so it cannot be said by man
that the Gross had to happen. Rather is it true that the
Cross is the only means by which the absolute Holiness and
the absolute Mercy of God can be revealed together.
"Hence, the Cross, conceived as the expiatory, penal
sacrifice of the Son of God, is the fulfillment of the I
Scriptural revelation of God, in its most paradoxical, 
incomprehensible guise.
But Brunner has something more to say about the 
doctrine of the Atonement and in saying this "something 
more" he makes a positive contribution to the subject. He 
points out that in the New Testament there is no one-sided-
1. B., The Mediator, p. Cf. B., The ChristianDoctrine of Crea.tTon and Redemption, p. 2B5 .
2. Ibid., p. 4 7 3 .
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ness visible in the doctrine as it is there presented.
The message of the Cross has both diversity and unity —  
and unity in diversity. The Cross has a number of re­
vealing and complementary facets. This truth is con­
firmed by the fact —  and a very important fact to Brunner 
—  that two series of parabolic statements explaining the 
meaning of the Atonement are to be found in the New Testa­
ment. The first series, dealing with the economic-legal 
angle has already been mentioneds the second, overlooked 
by Anselm and the Reformers, has by its omission resulted 
in a poorly proportioned view of the atoning work of 
Christ. Thereupon Brunner gives his attention to the 
latter with the purpose in mind of developing a better 
balanced and more harmonious view.
The second series of analogies is drawn from the 
practice of the cultus, with its emphasis on sacrifice 
and the shedding of blood. Of its relationship to the 
one earlier considered, i.e. the one taken from the 
practice of law dealing with debts, Brunner writes; "Both 
merge into one in the idea of expiation, and indeed of 
substitutionary and complete expiation, which constitutes 
the divine objective basis of the Atonement*^ "  ^ Of all the
1. B ., The Mediator, p. 45'S
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kinds of sacrifice that have ever been offered in the 
religious history of mankind, the most important by far is 
the expiatory sacrifice which is intended to remove some 
obstacle that disturbs the personal relation betweeii God 
and man. Man, debarred from fellowship with God by his 
dreadful sin and guilt —  guilt which has in it the very 
sting of death —  finds himself in a sore predicament : he 
cannot live without God, but, on the other hand, he cannot 
live with God as long as guilt remains with him. Yet the 
removal of such greatness of guilt requires an equivalent 
greatness of personal sacrifice which man is totally un­
able to make. Since man cannot offer an equivalent sacri­
fice and thus remove the barrier and restore communion be­
tween himself and his Maker, it must be God alone who can 
do this.
God alone can make this sacrifice. He alone can expiate, can "cover" guilt as though it had never been. . , . It is indeed God Himself who takes everything upon Himself. "He who spared not His ovrn Son, how shall he not freely with Him give us all things?" Thus in the New Testament the Cross of Christ is conceived as the self-offaring of God. It is God who does it, it is God Himself who suffers, it is God who takes the burden upon Him­self . 1
Brunner is convinced that all the vital elements impinging
1. B,, The Mediator, pp. 482-483. Cf. 3., The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 284.
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upon the Person and Work of Christ may be gathered up in 
the one idea of substitution. "If the Cross really means 
the dealing of God with humanity, then we cannot interpret 
it in any other way than in the sense of the doctrine of 
substitutionary atonement."^ The Passion represented by 
the Cross has divine significance if it is not merely 
human suffering but divine action. Brunner is sure of the 
latter. Christ as the priestly Mediator is both the One 
sacrificing and the One being sacrificed. "It is indeed 
God Himself who takes everything upon H i m s e l f . T h e  
point must be made again and again it is God in His 
very own Person who expiates and reconciles.
(5) The Universality and Finality of the Gross 
While the divine reconciling act is, in a real 
sense, directed toward the individual, it is never for the 
individual apart from his fellowmen. "God was in Christ 
reconciling the world unto Himself." Brunner believes 
that "world" in this Christological confession Hhould 
receive a heavy accent, and he states the ground for so 
believing;
The fact that [chris'tl' is thus one with God, in
1* B., The Mediator, p. 503»
2. Ibid., p. 482.
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such a way that the cause of God is absolutely His 
omi cause . . • makes it possible for Him to make Himself the servant of humanity, who gives His life for the race. The fact that He is one with God con­stitutes the basis of His solidarity with man. Such an identification with humanity is beyond the power of any mere human being; this can only be done by the man who was God.^
Man was not created as an isolated individual and neither
can he be redeemed as such. "God always deals with humanity
as a w h o l e . H e r e i n  is the marvel of His redeeming grace :
The wonder of redemption is only known for what it really is when we see that the God who sees us be­fore Him as sinful humanity has had mercy upon us all. This is what is meant . . .  by the doctrine that the Son of God assumed human nature. By doing this He made it evident that humanity as a whole is the object of His activity; it already implies the universality of the divine will of redemption, the significance of the fact of Christ.3
The achievement of the Gross is indeed amazing in its mag­
nitude, and doubly so. It is something done for man by
1. B., The Mediator, p. 499*
2. Ibid., p. 321.
3. Ibidem. In a footnote Brunner says, "It is obvious that this does not imply any 'Universalism®, any uncon­ditional salvation of all, which would diminish the seri­ousness of the Judgment. We know the universalism of the divine will to reconcile and redeem only in a sense which calls for decision, thus as a will which it is possible to disobey." This footnote is good protection against the charge which, in the first volume of Dogmatics, he levels at Barth: "That through Jesus Christ, all, believers andunbelievers, are saved from the wrath of God and partici­pate in redemption through Jesus Christ . . .  is what Karl Barth teaches" (The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 348).
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God Himself, and done by Him for the whole of humanity. 
These are truths of staggering proportions which can only 
be known in the encounter of faith.
In concluding this division of the section on "The 
work of Jesus Christ" it is appropriate to quote Brunner's 
view of the finality of the Cross :
If this be the meaning of the Cross, then the Cross, and thus the Atonement and Revelation, are absolutely unique. If here the act really pro­ceeds from God, and if it is true that here some­thing was actually done, on the Gross, then this event is such that by its very nature it is capable niether of repetition nor of extension in time and in space. It is a "moment" and only one "moment".It is the decisive event, alongside of which there is no other. It is a point which only faith can see, but it is a point at which all else is decided.^
There is then in the message of the Cross, as Emil Brunner 
interprets it, diversity and unity, uniqueness and fi­
nality, because these qualities are also integral to the
1. B., The Mediator, pp. 503-504. Cf. B., Faith, Hope and Love, pp. 21-22. Here Brunner says of the Cross ; "if it is really true that there we meet God in His incredible love for us in spite of what we are —  and faith knows that this is so —  then this fact is of unique importance. It means that God, mystery in Himself, has removed the veil and revealed His heart to man, has changed man's condition entirely, from that of a godless rebel to that of a beloved son. . • . For the believer . . . this uniqueness is not relative but absolute, because nowhere else in history has God revealed Himself in the Cross of His Son. It is ab­solutely unique because only there has that change in the situation of man taken place that is not merely a change but the change which we call 'redemption® or * réconcilia­tion* . "
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Crucified. In the Work of Jesus Christ, as in His Per­
son, —  and because it is the key to His Person —  there 
is more than "eye can see" or "tongue can utter", even 
"eye" and "tongue" of faith itself. So "mystery" and 
"paradox" veil the "Tree", even as they veil the Man on 
the Tree. But in the encounter of faith man can stand in 
the shadow of the Cross and know that here the God of 
holy Love has measured and met his critical need in a 
wondrous and utterly gracious way. For, as Brunner says : 
"The message of the Cross is . . . the revealation of the
incomprehensible, unconditional love of God, . . . The
1love that . . • reveals itself as pure
1, B.p The Christian Doctrine of Creation andRedemption, p. 295#
CHAPTER IV
A CRITICAL COMPARISON OP THE CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHTOPPETER TAYLOR PORSYTH AND EMIL BRUNNER
The writing of this chapter is undertaken with a 
dual intent. On the one hand the purpose is to determine 
and clarify the similarities and differences in the 
Christological views of Porsyth and Brunner and in this 
way to show the relationship of the theologians to each 
other. Hopefully, this will be effected by the comparison 
of the major issues discovered in the respective approaches 
to Christology and treatments of this theme to be found in 
the works of the two thinkers. On the other hand the 
intention is to glean from their doctrines the essential 
elements believed to have abiding significance in Christo­
logical construction on an evangelical basis. It should 
be further stated that prior to an advance upon the main 
objective it is deemed advisable to reconnoitre with some 
care the respective theological presuppositions and 
methodology of Porsyth and Brunner. Such a preliminary 
tactic should provide clues as to the relative strength of
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their Christological positions and contribute to the 
success of the major undertaking.
For evaluative purposes the following norms will 
serve as standards of judgment* In the first place it is 
believed that the doctrinal views under consideration 
should be consistent within themselves, that they should 
be as free as possible from weakening inconsistencies and 
self-contradictions. In the second place, it is believed 
that the Christological thought of the two men should be 
congenial with the evangelical experience of the Christian 
Church, this being regarded as the experience in faith of 
Jesus Christ as the true and only Son of God incarnate 
and atoning, "Who for us men and for our salvation came 
down from heaven." The pattern of Christological teaching 
as represented in classical formulae, particularly that of 
Chalcedon, and in kenotic theory will be kept in mind in 
the progress of the chapter.
In this comparative enterprise a rather consistent 
method will be followed .as each aspect of the Person of 
Christ is brought under examination. In the first place 
the thought of Forsyth and Brunner will be compared in an 
effort to bring out their convergent and divergent points 
of view. Secondly, in elucidating their viewpoints, it is 
intended that any inconsistencies that are discovered in 
their thought will be noted and commented upon. Wherever
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additional exposition of their views is deemed advisable 
and opportune, such will be given. Finally, there will be 
a highlighting of those distinctive emphases which are 
considered to be most serviceable in the structuring of 
Christology on an evangelical foundation. Before launching 
into the proposed comparison, and by way of introducing it, 
there will be a short discussion of Brunner’s knowledge, 
or lack of knowledge, of the earlier theologian.
INTRODUCTION - Brunner’s Knowledge and Acknowledgment ofP. T. Forsyth
In an unpublished dissertation of the year 1940,
R. F. Thompson marshals an impressive array of evidence to 
support his contention that Forsyth was a "pre-Barthian 
Barth" but observes that "in some respects Forsyth is 
closer to Brunner than to B a r t h . T h i s  raises the 
intriguing question as to whether Brunner was familiar 
with the writings of Forsyth and, if so, to what degree if 
any he was influenced consciously or unconsciously -- 
by the British theologian. Thompson is helpful in point­
ing toward a conclusive answer to such speculation. He 
quotes from a communication received in late 1939 from the
1. Robert Franklin Thompson, Peter Taylor Forsyth* A Pre-Barthian (An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Drew Theological Seminary of Drew University, Madison, New Jersey, 1940), p. 249.
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Reverend F. W. Camfield, one of Forsyth’s former students,
in answer to a letter of inquiry about Barth’s knowledge of
the Principal of Hackney College*
I have not come across any books or articles which tend to draw out the relationship between Porsyth and Barth, and I do not know that any have been written. Of direct connection there is none, for I have recently asked both Barth and Brunner whether they had heard of Forsyth and neither of them had.^
Another inquiry on the same subject, written about the same 
time to the Reverend H. T* Lovell Cocks of the Scottish 
Congregational Church in Edinburgh, elicited in part the 
following response* "Karl Barth’s son tells me that the 
work of Forsyth has only recently been brought to the 
attention of his father, while Brunner a few years ago 
said he had never heard of Forsyth.
From the aforementioned excerpts it can be definitely 
assumed that Brunner did not know that Porsyth or his writ­
ings had ever existed when Per Mittler was published in 
1927. At first thought this blank in his awareness seems 
rather strange, especially when it is recalled that as a 
divinity graduate he spent almost a year in England immed­
iately before the outbreak of World War I. At that time 
(1913-14) P. T. Forsyth was at the peak of his theological 
career. Some of his greatest books had come from the press
1. Thompson, Peter Taylor Forsyth: A Pre-Barthian, pp. 177-178. Italics mine.
2. Ibid., p. 179.
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a few years earlier and he was in demand all over Britain 
as a preacher and lecturer. However, a little reflection 
adduces several reasons why Brunner was unfamiliar with 
the older man. For one thing, in that short year his main 
attention seems to have been directed toward studying and 
mastering the English language, in which later on., he was 
to become quite proficient. For another thing, he had at 
that time a keener interest in theories and forms of 
government, such as religious socialism and English and 
American democracy, than in deeper theological investiga­
tion. And again, it may well be that Brunner shared that 
"fault of perspective" that has long obtained between 
Europe and other parts of Christendom —  a fault which 
W. M. Horton has in mind when he says, "Great Britain • • , 
knows more about the Continent than the Continent knows 
about B r i t a i n . A n d  Bishop John A. T. Robinson is even 
more to the point in his reference to those who "can still 
write as though the German-speaking world were the circum­
ference of the theological circlex witness the footnotes 
in Gollwitzer, Moltmann and PannenbergI"^
If the younger Brunner had a blind eye and a deaf
1, Walter Marshall Horton, Christian Theologyi An Ecumenical Approach (New York; Harper & Brothers Publishers",' 19^5)V p. 8.
2. John A. T. Robinson, "Not Radical Enough?",The Christian Century, November 12, 1969» P* 1447,
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ear for theological proficiency among thinkers who did not 
write or speak in German, it was not always thus with him. 
It is interesting to discover that when he came to write 
the second volume of his Dogmatics in 1949» he was suf­
ficiently aware of able theologians in Britain to make the 
following comment;
It is significant that in modern theology the doctrine of the Work of Christ has been developed to a considerable extent by British theologians. Thus in the middle of the nineteenth century John McLeod Campbell wrote an excellent book on The Nature of the Atonement, from which we can still learn today. Following him, at the beginning of this century, came Peter Taylor Forsyth, with a valuable book on The Work of Christ, in which he discusses with genuine Biblical understanding, various alternative modern theories.^
Brunner still leaves us in the dark as to whether he was
familiar with The Person and Place of Jesus Christ. But
in his discussion of kenosis in this same volume, where an
acknowledgment of such familiarity could have come in
naturally, he remains quite silent. The "argument from
silence" therefore leads to the surmise that he had not at
that time read this provocative and original work, a piece
1, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Re­demption, p. 315' Brunner goes on to applaud D, M,Baillie for his "extremely original work, God Was in Christ'^and expresses the opinion that his own Christologi­cal thought is quite harmonious with that of the Scottish theologian, Baillie, however, as will be further noted, strangely ignored Forsyth in his writing and was quite critical of some of Brunner’s views.
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of writing much superior to The Work of Christ which has 
favourable mention.
The only other reference to Forsyth ever made by 
Brunner, as far as the writer of this thesis has been able 
to determine, was in connection with a television inter­
view with Vernon Sproxton as reported in The Listener of 
February 16, I96I, In this interview Sproxton inquires: 
"Who do you think is our greatest British theologian of 
recent times?"^ In answer, Brunner, after a complimentary 
remark about C. H. Dodd, goes on to say, "As for my field, 
systematic theology, I would mention a man who died about 
forty years ago, P. T. F o r s y t h . F r o m  this terse response 
it is impossible to determine any point either of con­
geniality or disharmony that the Swiss theologian felt to 
exist between his own thought and that of Forsyth,- 
This can only be determined by making a comparative ex­
amination of their respective positions as these are ex­
pressed in their abundant writings. In conclusion, it may 
be stated with confidence that if their generations had 
been reversed Forsyth would have been an avid reader of 
Brunner’s works, and would in fact have been most knowl-
1, "Viewpoint", A Television Interview with Vernon Sproxton, The Listener. February I6, I96I,;p, 307*
2. Ibid,, p, 308.
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edgeable of all the great "German-speaking" theologians 
who came to such distinction in the second quarter of the 
twentieth century.
1. Theological Presuppositions and Methodology 
Porsyth and Brunner concur in the view, elaborately 
and emphatically set forth by the latter, that knowledge 
of ultimate or absolute truth can be gained by man only in 
the faith-encounter with God in the divine-human Christ 
(special revelation) in and through whom such truth is re­
vealed to man. Instead of employing Brunner’s term of 
faith-encounter (Begegnung) to describe man’s personal re­
lation to God in Jesus Christ, Porsyth time and again uses 
such phrases as "experience of communion" and "personal 
contact". However, it is evident that both are talking 
about essentially the same thing—^
In the thought of the two men there is agreement 
that the principle of personal relation presides over the 
fact that man in faith can come to a knowledge of ultimate 
truth, the holy love (agape) of God which is revealed to 
him. At the same time it is recognized that man cannot
1. A favorite expression of Forsyth's and one that he uses to describe his own "personal contact with Christ," is "vis-a-vis" (q.v. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 196). The expression is here identical with Brunner's "face-to-face" designation for the relation between God and man in Christ to which he refers so frequently in Truth as Encounter, pp. 91ff.
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know all there is to be known and that there must be 
communion between Infinitude and finitude, between Eternity 
and time, between Creator and creature, between God and man, 
if there is to be communication between the two* Such 
communion is made possible by and in Jesus Christ, the God- 
man, who bridges the dividing chasm* At once in Him the 
redemptive communion between righteous God and sinful man 
becomes communication in which man receives knowledge of 
ultimate truth, the holy love of God* In other words, in- 
Christ (special revelation) is the fulfillment of man’s 
relation to God. The redemptive relationship of man to 
God in Christ serves as the ground for knowledge of ab­
solute truth.
Porsyth and Brunner stand in common and firm 
opposition to what is usually called nineteenth century 
Rationalism. They would agree that philosophy is a valid 
discipline for gaining true knowledge only as an inter­
pretative instrument for faith-thinking, i.e. theologizing* 
In typically explanatory statements Porsyth says, " . . .  
unless you have a philosophy, you cannot express the things 
that theology handles most deeply,"^ while Brunner de­
clares, "No Christian theologian . . . can carry on his 
work without using conceptions that are derived from
1. Porsyth, The Work of Christ, pp.. 86-87.
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philosophy."^ In faith-response man reviews and interprets 
the revealed truth. This necessarily includes the faculty 
of reason.
As has been shown, Brunner goes to considerable 
length in setting forth the merits of the principle of per­
sonal relation over against Objectivism and Subjectivism 
in understanding the truth of God.^ While objective and 
subjective categories are useful in philosophy and science 
in achieving the closest possible correspondence between 
thinking and being they cannot be employed successfully 
when knowledge of God is the concern of the thinker. This 
is fundamentally due to the fact that God is the absolute 
"Someone" and in no sense whatsoever is He "something." 
Conceived as "something", truth is always at the disposal 
of the thinker, works in him no transformation and leaves 
him solitary. The meeting of absolutely personal God with 
man in the encounter of faith has exactly opposite 
results, as Brunner maintains in describing the superior­
ity of the personal relationship principle over the 
tendencies of Objectivism and Subjectivism and thé 
rational concept of truth which they determine.
What is made explicit in Brunner’s exposition is un-
1. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 395•
2. See above, pp. 202ff.
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doubtedly implicit in the teaching of Forsyth. The latter 
would agree that the personal relation principle prevents 
equating truth with an impersonal proposition in which 
ultimate truth, God, becomes an "it" —  a mere object to 
which neither God nor man as being or person can be re­
duced. ^  The principle both prevents absolute truth from 
being equated with rational understanding and recognizes 
the place of redeemed man’s reason in gaining knowledge of 
ultimate truth which is revealed to him in faith in and 
through Jesus Christ. Reason, a faculty of man’s being, 
interprets and seeks to make intelligible the ultimate 
truth received by man in his faith-response to God in 
Jesus Christ. In the redemptive relationship of man with 
God in Christ all other relationships are re-shaped and 
re-born. Man enters upon a new life and comes into a new 
relation with his fellow men.
Although Porsyth and Brunner put God’s revelation 
of Himself in Jesus Christ at the very centre of their 
conception of the knowledge of ultimate or absolute truth, 
which man receives in the encounter of faith, they differ 
on several related points. According to Brunner, the 
formal imago dei, which remained in natural man after the
1. Cf. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 53* Forsyth says in part, "Christian truth . . . is not propositional. . . .  It means communion with the God self-given to us in Jesus Christ."
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fall, consists in a capacity for words (Wortmachtigkeit) 
and responsibility. This formal image serves as the ,
"point of contact" (Anknupfungspunkt) for the special 
revelation of the holy love of God which comes to man in 
faith-encounter with Jesus Christ. Though Brunner, in the 
spirit of missionary outreach toward non-believers, had a- 
deep and sustained interest in finding a locus in natural 
man for the encounter to take place, his Anknupfungsnunkt 
never seems to acquire a definition that gives real mean­
ing to its purpose.
Correctly identifying a serious weakness in the 
Barthian system, Brunner commits himself most commendably 
to an earnest and sincere effort to remedy this weakness. 
Regrettably and somewhat ironically, failure in this effort 
can be largely attributed to his inability to dissociate 
his thought sufficiently from the rigid presuppositions of 
Karl Barth, In the latter*s thought the sola fide and 
sola gratia principles are given such rock-ribbed and in­
transigent interpretation that no real "open-ness" is 
conceded to sinful man for the coming of God in Christ.
Man is man and God is God in utter separation one from .the 
other, and for the "divine-human encounter" an act of 
naked omnipotence is required. Brunner recoils from such 
an extreme viewpoint but his revulsion is not strong 
enough to take him out of the Barthian orbit. For all
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his good intentions, he actually draws closer to the very 
position he protests by ascribing to natural man a merely 
formal imago dei and by conceiving of general revelation 
in such a way as to take away the possibility of its 
having any meaningful role as a divinely appointed 
"catylyst" in the encounter of God with man. The "law of 
closeness of relation," which Brunner proposes as a 
counteractive to Barth’s "radical fideism," tends in the 
unfortunate direction of effecting in the end a complete 
divorce of reason from any possible knowledge of divine 
truth. Man is thus set in an antithetical relationship 
to God which militates against the genuineness of that 
encounter which is so important in all Brunnerfs . theology. 
Brunner would seem to have become a proponent of the very 
doctrine which he so strongly disavows -- the doctrine 
of "a divine monergism, in which nothing of the dialogue-
character of our relation to God is left.
P. T. Porsyth, free from the duress of such rigid 
presuppositions as hamstring the thought of the Swiss
theologian, conceives of the relationship between God and
man in a much more constructive way. In his thinlcing the 
point of contact for the revelation of God as Creator and
1. The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. 177«
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Redeemer is man's will and conscience. This is in direct 
contrast to Brunner who holds that in natural man conscience 
has "primarily nothing to do with God at all,"  ^ and any 
feeling that one ought to do right is only "a sign that I 
cannot do it.
Porsyth starts from the conviction "that for life 
and history the moral is the real, and that the movements 
of the Great Reality must be morally construed as they are 
morally revealed."3 The holy love of God is behind both 
His activity in creation and His activity in redemption.
God ever creates and redeems. Both are continuing 
functions of the great Moral Reality. His redemption is 
ever fulfilling His creation and His creation is ever pro­
viding for redemption. Here again Forsyth is at variance 
with Brunner who tends to sub-divide the one God in a 
mechanical sort of way, (e.g. in the second volume of his 
Dogmatics), presenting Him first as the God who creates 
and then as the God who redeems, without sufficiently 
identifying Creator and Redeemer as one and the same God.
In natural man the point of contact for the moral • 
reality of God as Redeemer is the will and conscience.
1. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 156.
2. Ibid., p. 74.
3. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 222f.
361
This, as has been indicated, is a very important element 
in Forsyth’s principle of the moralizing of dogma.^ But 
care must be taken in this conception that morality does 
not swallow up religion. Such care is very diligently 
exercised by Forsyth. However, his proper caution does 
not involve any minimizing of the role of conscience in 
the redemptive coming of God to man. Further elucidation 
is needed here to clarify his position and set it in 
definite contrast to that of Brunner.
While conscience has no power in the best of men to 
bestow forgiveness, nor can it even bring the assurance of 
sins forgiven, nevertheless, Forsyth maintains, it will 
"give us a sound footing up to a point, till it rouse the 
sense of the holy, and then it creates in us the passion 
for forgiveness as life’s one need."^ Beyond this point 
conscience shares the impotence of rational thought in 
bringing man to a saving knowledge of God in Jesus Christ. 
In God the Holy Father there is an Interesting reference 
to "the moral soul of the Hebrew race which produced the 
living conscience of mankind."3 This must not be in-
1. See above, pp. ?4ff.
2. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 182. On a later page conscience is designated "the forerunner of the Gospel" (p. 402). In an article on "The Cross as the Final Seat of Authority" in The Contemporary Review October, 1899), Forsyth speaks of the conscience as "the herald of Redemption" (p. 605)
3. Forsyth, God the Holy Father, p. 66.
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terpreted to mean that there is no conscience in men who
have been isolated from the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
To deny that the conscience is universal is to go counter
to Forsyth's repeated contention that this is "the region
1where human unity lies," Every man has a conscience which 
indeed functions "up to a point, till it rouse the sense 
of the holy." To say this much is to provide proleptically 
a corrective to the Barthianism which Porsyth is often 
said to have anticipated, and from which Emil Brunner, to 
the regrettable cramping of his own theological thought, 
could not successfully detach himself. The ethical aspect 
of the imago del is surely not completely obliterated if 
universally there is even the semblance of a conscience to 
provide a prius for the coming of God to man in redemptive 
power. It is undoubtedly Forsyth's aim to demonstrate 
that there is such a prius and to vindicate its existence. 
While conscience is helplessly guilty, it is not, he 
maintains, "totally c o r r u p t , H e r e  indeed is the "point 
of contact", the Anknüpfungspunkt, as Emil Brunner was to 
call it later.
1. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 30. Cf. Porsyth, The JustifIcation of God, p. 20 ; This Life and the Next, p. 29, In the latter work the reference is to "the tap root of the unity of mankind, which , # . lies in the conscience and its salvation."
2. Ibid., p. 58fn.
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Forsyth believes that "contact" is not of itself 
adequate to describe the impingement of the Divine life 
upon human life. The urgent human need is for "One who 
is ethically, spiritually experienced by us as regenera­
tive, and reciprocally met by us in a relation that is 
more than c o n t a c t . G r o p i n g  for a better way to express 
what he has in mind, the theologian says, "The site of 
our contract with God . . .  is in the conscience."^ There 
are more overtones of the personal, the moral, the active 
and the mutual in "contract" than in "contact" and it is 
these overtones, not the literal sense of the term, that 
have interpretative value. The point that Forsyth would 
stress (with all due respect to Immanuel Kant) is that 
there a "word from without" that comes to the Impotent 
and grossly sinful, though not totally corrupt, conscience 
of mankind. This word is none other than the Word of New 
Testament doctrine, the constitutive Word on a recognizable 
moral mission, so that "the conscience owns in a sense of 
guilt, the approach of the absolute conscience . . . with 
a sheer regenerating p o w e r . "3 Forsyth is thus protected
1. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 62.
2. Ibid., p. 411. Italics mine.
3. Ibid., p. 196. Cf. Forsyth, God the Holy Father, p. 96* "0 how we need a Lord and Master . . .  a Conscience within our conscience, and a heart amidst our heart and its ruin and its resurrection."
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against the superficial judgment that he subordinates 
Revelation to the unredeemed consciences of ordinary men.
To reiterate, the plight of natural man is a moral 
plight. Although he is not conscious of Moral Reality as 
revealed in Jesus Christ, he does have a "dull ethic, 
which takes no measure of either his race's sin or a holy 
G o d . H e  has vivid religious Interests in Reality as 
Provider for his welfare. He is eloquent about words but 
remains silent about God's holiness and has little or no 
sense of divine judgment. His ethic "wrestles with many 
problems between man and man, class and class, nation and 
nation; but it does not face the moral problem between the 
guilty soul and God.
Although the will and conscience of natural man are 
not unrelated to the holy God and His redemptive qualities, 
they are wrongly related. When natural man experiences 
communion with God in Christ the holy love of God fulfils 
the morality of man. His conceptual world is renewed and 
reshaped by the renewal of man himself. His egocentric 
predicament is transcended. His religion is no longer 
oriented around self, it is reoriented toward God. That 
which was primary, man's self-welfare, becomes secondary;
1. Forsyth, Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 91#
2. Ibid., p. 24.
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that which was secondary, God, becomes primary* Morality 
manifests a ne?f status in the new relationship of man to 
God •
Forsyth, in his theological suppositions and 
methodology, holds that morality is the very nature of 
things. From this perspective he develops his logical 
thought. His every reference to morality in his moral­
izing of dogma is a reference to its status or regulative 
position. He does not presume to describe its contents or 
criterion. Man in communion with God in Christ experiences 
the holy love of God which is the content and criterion of 
morality. In his system, therefore, "morality is not 
closed but open," In consequence, as Professor N, H. G, 
Robinson so perceptively points out, morality thus affords
an "illuminable principle" which "does not detract from
1revelation but provides the means for its exaltation,"
As becomes evident in Forsyth's theological writing, 
his presuppositions and methodology, as opposed to those of 
Brunner, allow to natural man "a religious a priori" which 
is "not a passivity but a receptivity, a loyalty, an 
obedience, and this constitutes man's true "response" to 
the redemptive revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Such a
1* N. H. G. Robinson, Christ and Conscience, p. 14-2.
2, Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 174,
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concession in no way brings into question the universality 
of sin or its corrupting power and effects. Nor is there 
any compromising of the "Protestant position" that man's 
redemption is "wholly and solely of God's grace , • • that 
it is quite undeserved , , • and on God's side absolutely 
free."^ However, since conscience in man is the "point 
of contact" for the salvation of God in Christ, this 
saving activity is rightly and meaningfully recognized as 
something which happens in man's conscious and personal 
life and in which therefore his response is a necessary 
element. Hence, the Christology of Forsyth, indeed his 
whole theology, in contrast to that of Brunner is at 
once both strongly ethical and evangelical.
In his experience of holy love man at once becomes 
aware of the person that he really is and of the person 
that he is yet to become. He is aware of a new status of 
morality in the very nature of things. In the thought of 
Forsyth, man is conscious of Moral Reality but does not 
have full knowledge of this Reality which he experiences. 
For Moral Reality thus conceived demands wholly, but man 
responds in freedom. This sounds paradoxical, which 
indeed it is. Forsyth accepts the truth of paradox as
1, Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p, 350,
367
representing the seeming limit of man's rational powers of 
thought, yet a limit which should be put under unremitting 
pressure for extension by those same powers. An "effort 
to adjust" the great paradoxes which he finds in evangel­
ical theology could, he maintains, "only cease with the 
paralysis of thought."^
Emil Brunner as a representative of what has been 
often called the "Dialectical School of Theology," makes 
use of paradox far more than Forsyth, especially in the 
development of his Christological thought.^ This language 
of dialectic contributes to that heavy "air of mystery" 
which often seems to invest his treatment of themes re­
lating to the person of Jesus Christ. Furthermore,
Brunner differs from Forsyth in his attitude toward the 
chief interpretive instrument of Dialectical Theology.
With him paradox is both extensive and intensive. That it 
is intensive means that paradox embodies, from the 
rational standpoint, an absolute contradiction. There­
fore, in Brunner's view, Forsyth’s "effort to adjust" the 
great antinomies of the Faith would be considered utterly 
futile. In fact, as he holds, such attempts at paradox-
1. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 72
2. Emil Brunner, The Word and the World (London: SCM Press, 1932), p. 61 "Just as Christ could only reveal the glory of God through the form of a servant, so all speech concerning God, if in the sense of this revelation, is necessarily "paradoxical."
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solving can be quite wrong as, for instance, when efforts 
to cope with the paradox of the God-man shift the emphasis 
from the necessity of making the decision of faith to the 
necessity of giving an explanation.^
Unhappy results also ensue from trying to resolve 
the numerous paradoxes of Scripture. This invariably ends 
up in a departure from the Scripture, as is the case with 
the doctrine of double predestination, which posits "a 
primal wrath of God," and on the other hand with the "uni­
lateral rational" interpretation of the divine love at the 
expense of a doctrine of divine judgment.^ These typical 
examples of Brunner's thinking on paradox show that he 
would not be inclined to endorse Forsyth's proposal to 
resume "the long movement of the Church's thought to 
pierce and clarify the mystery of godliness in C h r i s t . "3 
As has been said before, Forsyth and Brunner stand 
shoulder to shoulder in their opposition to Rationalism 
which, in the realm of theology, ascribes to reason the 
capability of laying hold upon the most exalted truth.
Such an attitude on their part is entirely commendable,
1. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 344.
2. Brunner, Man In Revolt, p. 453, note 1 ; Brunner,The Mediator, p. 282, note 1.
3. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 240.
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but it is something else again when the objection to 
Rationalism includes reason itself. Such is certainly not 
the case with P. T. Forsyth, as has been indicated in the 
discussion of his concept of paradox. While he affirms 
the dictum that "the moral —  not the rational —  is the 
real" this does not imply any disparagement of reason. In 
faith's response to revelation reason has a place of 
service, and though it often moves unsurely and is forced 
to halt before the barrier of the antithetical, neverthe­
less its effort to transcend that barrier "could only 
cease with the paralysis of thought."
On the other hand, Brunner's position is not so 
readily determined. In one place in his writing he con­
tends that the Word of revelation to man in faith "does 
not ignore the reason, but it passes through the reason. 
Again, in "Die Frage nach dem Anknupfungspunkt" he seems 
to maintain without equivocation that reason is the sine 
qua non of faith, the organ of revelation.^ Yet in his 
law of contiguity or "closeness of relation," by which he 
defines the limits of reason in areas of mutual concern
1. Revelation and Reason, p. 413.
2. "Die Frage nach dem 'Anknupfungspunkt' als Problem der Theologie," op. cit., p. 518. Here Brunner teaches very plainly that the possibility of revelation "lies within Immanence."
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with faith, reason is put under increasingly rigorous re­
straint the closer it comes to the subject of personality. 
When it is actually contiguous to the "central" subject- 
matter of God and His relation to His creatures, it is 
obliged to bow completely out of the epistemological 
picture in favour of faith. Here, to a degree that 
Forsyth would never admit, reason loses its competence*
The concept of history which has been shown to 
underlie Brunner's Christological construction should 
now be critically examined. Of no concern at all to him 
is the story-book history of men and societies. He is 
in fact only interested in history as it relates to the 
decision of faith in response to special revelation. As 
he sees it, historical consciousness did not originate 
with the Greeks but is derived from Biblical thought.
This consciousness issues from the Biblical faith in the 
"onee-for-all." Hegel looked upon history as the unfold­
ing of an idea, but history cannot be so understood.^ St. 
Augustine, on the other hand, saw time as co-extensive 
with the world. In the coming of Jesus Christ he recog­
nized an event that is absolutely decisive for all time 
and for all men.^ History then, is where God speaks to
1. Emil Brunner, God and Man, trans. with introduction by David Cairns (London: S C M  Press, 1936), p. 52.
2* Emil Brunner, "The Christian Understanding of Time," Scottish Journal of Theology, March, 195^# pp. 1-3#
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men in time in the special revelation in Jesus Christ.^ 
History is where God encounters man decisively through the 
living presence of Jesus Christ of historical revelation.^ 
Brunner's use of the word "history" (Geschichte) is 
not always consistent, however, for in his Philosophy of 
Religion he distinguishes between "history" (Geschichte) 
and "primal history" (Urgeschichte). Here he writes ;
"What the 'historian* sees is never the historical element 
proper, the vital decision, but only the after-history 
(Nach-Geschlchte) or consequence that more or less approx­
imates decision."3 The decision is basically a secret 
which no'one can disclose —  for it is known to no one, 
not even to the autobiographer. In his decision, each 
person is a riddle, even to himself, since every man wears 
a mask in taking his part in the masquerade of history and 
can never remove it. There is a person behind the mask, 
but sin does not allow the disclosure of the person.
In the thought of Brunner the heart of all history 
thus becomes the primal history. This history (of which 
no chronological interpretation is permitted) applies only 
to men in their response to God's address. This encounter
1. Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation, p. 4o.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 355.
3. Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 121.
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can never be given a historical or psychological identi­
fication, It can only be believed. History, then, is the 
area of humanity ; it is the perverted image of God. It 
stands between that which has sense and that which is 
absurd. In this sin-accursed area there are only in­
dividuals ; there is no real fellowship and no unity 
because there is no true encounter. The unity is not 
historical but belongs to primal history. To the eyes of 
Christian faith history is an interim kingdom. In Christ 
can be seen both the sense and the nonsense of history, 
its created unity and its sinfulness, its relation to God 
and its distance from God.^ It is thus evident in the 
view of Brunner that history is not revelation, but is 
essentially humanity in need of revelation.^ "History as 
such belongs only to the sphere of 'general revelation'^ 
History here is not the encounter, for the encounter takes 
place behind the mask of history, in the primordial 
history. Brunner's terminology stands in need of 
correction at this point, for gnostic connotations attach 
to the distinction that what is seen is only a mask for 
what lies behind and under the plane of history.
1. Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 127.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, p. I53.
3. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 240.
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Apparently Brunner himself realized that he had 
got into some difficulty here for "history" (Geschichte) 
becomes more important to him in his later works. In 
Man In Revolt he writes that for Christian faith decision 
has fallen in history in Jesus Christ.^ The encounter 
does take place on the plane of history and in Jesus 
Christ it is history. The distinction is no longer between 
Geschichte and Urgeschichte,but between Geschichte and 
Hellsgeschlohte.2 This is the line followed in The 
Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption. Eternal 
Hope even bears the testimony that history is not the line 
of human reason, but of the revelation of God.3 Brunner's 
thought is indeed erratic, but in the main he gives the 
impression of not taking history seriously enough.
In comparison with the involved and changeful ideas 
of Brunner, the view of "history" taken by Forsyth is 
simple and stable. In a noteworthy passage in his 
Principle of Authority he examines the meaning of Lessing's 
famous saying: "The accidental truths of history can never 
become proof for the necessary truths of r e a s o n . I n  his
1. Brunner, Man In Revolt, pp. 426-427#
2. Ibid., p. 426.
3. Brunner, Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 195^), p. 17.
4. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 112.
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effort to determine the "real meaning" of this saying,
purged of its eighteenth-century rationalist associations,
Forsyth draws a distinction between "history as a tissue
of great ideas and powers (Geschichte) and history as a
mass of empirical events (Historié)
Historié is history as it may be settled by the methods of historical science, where our results, like those of all science are but relative, and either highly or poorly probable. Geschichte on the other hand is a larger thing, out of which Historié has to sift, but which may embody and convey ideas greater than the critical residum retains power to express.^
With these distinctions in mind, Lessing's phrase may be 
interpreted to mean that the eternal truths of Geschichte 
are not proved by the detailed facts of Historié. While 
he acknowledges this to be so, Forsyth nevertheless be­
lieves that, as a matter of experience. Historié may "con­
vey" where it does not prove. This is to say that "de­
fective documents may be great s a c r a m e n t s ."3 And here the 
language of Forsyth becomes quite illuminating with re­
spect to his view of the relation of general revelation 
to special revelation as opposed to that of Brunner.
It should be pointed out that "sacrament and 
"sacramental" are favourite terms in Forsyth's theological 
vocabulary. In his usage they consistently mean that God
1. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 112.
2. Ibid., p. 112f. 3. Ibid., p. 114.
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uses persons, things, events and interpretations of events 
as the means for His personal communion with man; He Him­
self comes to man in and through that which is not Himself*^ 
It is this "using"and this "coming" on the part of God 
that Forsyth describes as sacramental. God's moral and 
personal presence is always the decisive factor in revela­
tion. Forsyth will have nothing to do with any form of 
substance-sacramentalism. At the same time he believes 
that God really does make use of someone or something to 
convey His eternal truths, to make His presence known. In 
the case of Historié and Geschichte God uses them both in 
conjunction for His divine purpose in revelation. Forsyth 
therefore refuses to discard Historié for the sake of 
Geschichte, nor will he allow that Geschichte can be ulti­
mately divorced from Historié —  a position quite in con­
trast to that of Brunner in much of his theological writing. 
It is difficult for Brunner to give "history," as an el­
ement of general revelation, any consistent and genuine 
"sacramental" significance•
There is substantial agreement between Forsyth and 
Brunner that the question "which, in its religious form, 
is the first and last issue of life,"^ is the question of
1. P. T. Forsyth, The Church and the Sacraments (Lon­don: Independent Press Ltd.. 1947). P. 229. et passim.
2. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 1.
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authority. They recognize the fact that the three areas 
in which Christian thought has tended to locate authority —  
Church, Bible and experience —  cannot of themselves be 
ultimate authority, but can only be channels of such 
authority. The authority of these channels is measured by 
the degree to which they serve as conveyers of the final 
authority.
Specifically, Forsyth holds that ultimate authority 
is the Gospel. However, this assertion is not properly 
understood without knowing his definition of the Gospel.^
It is the immediate presence of the holy God who is active 
as Redeemer in Jesus Christ. In man's experience of 
communion with the Redeemer the holy love of God sensitizes 
his consciousness and will to the note and meaning of this 
authority. The solution of the question of authority for 
Christianity "lies in the absolute holy right of the new 
Creator of Humanity . . .  in His personality as effect­
uated in an act which changed the whole of human relation 
and destiny. If it merely came home to his conscious­
ness this authority would become effectual for man only by 
impression, a very limited concept of the redemptive re­
lation of God to man. God, in the life, teachings, death
1. See above, p. 64.
2. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 11.
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and resurrection of Christ renews the whole life of man 
which includes his conscience and will. For the realisa­
tion of this authority, both the faith of man and the 
revelation of God are essential.
The Gospel, which is the ultimate authority, is 
witnessed to in the.Scriptures. This means for Forsyth 
"that in the interpretation of God's act in Christ we have 
from the Apostles the version authoritative and insuper­
able."^ The New Testament in all its breadth and depth is 
"but apostolic Christianity, i.e. a theological Christian­
ity."^ To elaborate this statement is to say that
The New Testament, taken as a whole, is . . . canonical for conscience, sanctity, guilt and grace . . .  it is the revelation of revelation • • • [where] we have deposited with us an authentic but indirect interpretation from Christ Himself of the revelation direct in Him, and one final, though germinal and not s t a t u t o r y . 3
In the light of this interpretation of the New Testament,
Forsyth assumes its underlying unity with the revelation
of God witnessed to in the Old Testament. Furthermore,
in the light of this assumption and of his view of the
nature and function of the New Testament, he believes the
Bible serves "as the norm of all possible revelation, and
1. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 140.
2. Ibidem.
3. Ibid., p. I40f.
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the great sacrament of It —  coming in • . . to • • . give 
us direct contact with Him in a mediate immediacy.
Brunner differs from Forsyth in the conceptual 
language by which he identifies ultimate authority and 
describes the relation of the Bible to this authority.
For him, ultimate authority is what he terms the "Word of 
God." By this he means the Person of the Mediator, who 
stands, a third, "between the soul and God, between human­
ity and God, between the world and G o d . T h e r e  is no way 
from man and the world to God, but only a way from God to 
man and the world. It is along that way that God comes by 
His Word of revelation; comes finally as the Logos who is 
the personal God.
The Bible is described by Brunner as the "form" of
God's revelation of Himself as the Word. The "content",
which is the essence of faith, is the holy love (agape) of 
God revealed in Jesus Christ which is witnessed to in the 
Scriptures and made effectual in the faith-response and 
appropriation of man. In the Scriptures the "form" is 
never detached from the "content." To faith the Scriptures 
are authoritative in an instrumental way. They contain 
"that element [Christ, the Word of revelation] before
1. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. I4l.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 30.
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which I must bow in.the truth, which also itself awakens 
in me the certainty of t r u t h . E v e n  subjectively, the 
authority of the Scriptures "is not based upon the 
Scriptures as such, but upon the encounter of faith with
othe Christ of Scripture." Faith, as Brunner here uses
the term, means that man is convinced in his life, his 
feeling, and his conscience that Christ is the Truth. In 
this faith-relation of man to God and of God to man, the 
Scriptures are authoritative as the norm of all possible 
revelation.
Critics of a more conservative mind have not 
hesitated to call attention to the fact that Brunner 
actually has a great deal of trouble in settling his 
thought on the nature and authority of the Bible and tends 
to leave the matter adrift on a sea of uncertainty. His 
discordant ideas can be abundantly illustrated, but two 
quotations will serve here as a sufficient example. In 
The Theology of Crisis Brunner makes the strong declaration: 
"He who identifies the letters and words of the Scriptures 
with the word of God has never truly understood the word 
of God; he does not know what constitutes revelation."3
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 110,
2. Ibidem.
3. Emil Brunner, The Theology of Crisis»(New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 19,
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On the other hand, in his Christian Doctrine of God he 
apparently negates what he has formerly affirmed. He now 
concedes that human words in humanly constructed sentences 
are the necessary medium of Divine expression, "Here [in
human language] the Word of God is present in the form of
revealed human words, not just behind them . . $ but in 
direct identity, in the complete equation of the human 
word with the "Word of G o d , H .  D, McDonald in his 
Ideas of Revelation makes the following germane observa- - 
tiensi
Brunner has made the idea of "verbal inspiration" the focus of his ridicule, but when he comes to find some authority for the Scripture, he cannot do so apart from the words. . . . Brunner's difficulty is that he desires to draw a sharp distinction be­tween the Word and the words and yet he cannot maintain it. . . . Appeal is made to the Scripture because it contains, in its words, the revelationof God ; on the other hand, no decisive appeal canbe made to it just because the revelation of God in the Word is not "connected" with the words of Scripture.
Though he declares flatly in an early chapter of The Divine -
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 22f. Italics mine.
2, H. D. McDonald, Ideas of Revelation (London: Macmillan & Go Ltd, 1959) • p. 191. CfTTT K. Jewett,Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation (London* James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1954), pp. 127-135» I6B-I72, These are not, in this instance, the carpings of "hyper-Pundamentalists". McDonald and Jewett have put their fingers on a real weak­ness in Brunner's theologizing.
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Human Encounter that "the source and norm of all Christian 
theology is the B i b l e » a f t e r  the reader has followed him 
over a circuitous discussion-route in the later pages of 
this work and in various passages of Revelation and Reason 
and Dogmatics I, it becomes almost impossible to tell what 
Brunner's earlier statement really means,
While Forsyth's writing bears traces of involvement 
in the same sort of problem,^ it is a relief to turn to 
the relative simplicity and straightforwardness —  though 
some might call it naivete —  of his principle for judging 
the authority of Scripture:
The real answer I am giving to the question is . that the selective principle is the gospel of grace in Christ crucified. Whatever carries that home, whatever is indispensable for that, is of prime value and obligation.3
The application of this standard to the Bible as a whole
and in its each and every part is, in the conviction of
this theologian of God's grace in Christ, the very "highest
criticism" of all.
Apropos of the subject of criticism, Forsyth and
Brunner both hold that higher criticism, it is employed
1* Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 30.
2. See above, p. 64fn.
3. P. T. Forsyth, "The Grace of the Gospel as the Moral Authority in the Church," The Congregational Year- Book (London: Congregational Union of England and Wales, I9O6), p. 64. Italics mine.
382
by faith, contributes to the fuller understanding and valid 
interpretation of the "Gospel" (Forsyth's descriptive term) 
or the "Word" (Brunner's descriptive term) as witnessed to 
by the Scriptures. Forsyth declares, "It is only the 
Church that can wield criticism justly. For it is 
criticism of the record of One who has done thus and thus 
for my soul, and still more for . . . the Church He created 
and c r e a t e s . W h i l e  Brunner says, "The Church must learn 
to combine Biblical faith with Biblical criticism, just as 
she has had to learn that in perceiving the Godhead of 
Christ, she must not forget His true humanity.
2. The Person of Jesus Christ
i. The Concept of the Deity of Jesus Christ
(1) The Incarnation 
Forsyth and Brunner are of one mind in holding that 
the incarnate Christ is essentially one with God. In 
their thought, the Deity of Jesus Christ does not mean 
that this is merely a characteristic which Jesus, a human 
personality possessed to a greater degree than other human 
beings. Rigidly ruling out all Socinian estimates of His 
person, they define His Deity, as Brunner expresses it.
1. Forsyth, "Revelation and the Person of Christ," Faith and Criticism, p. 138.
2. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 2?6.
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"not merely in the sense of intensification of degree but 
also in the sense of a new quality"^ of person or being. 
He is "the One who proclaims the secret of God, the One 
who makes known the Will of God, which no man could know 
apart from this proclamation."^ Christ the Word made 
flesh, "not as a personality in the historical sense, but 
as the authority, as the most intensely personal Word 
[ "The Gospel" to Forsyth] of God."3 On his part Forsyth 
declares, "The last [ultimate] moral reality is a person 
. . .  in action in the world."4 He then goes on to build 
upon this foundational statement by saying "therefore, 
God's way of carrying home His love to the world was by a 
person and the scale of the world."5 With this in mind, 
Forsyth sees the Incarnation as "the union of two moral 
movements or directions, and not merely of two forces or 
things ; and we have their reconciliation and not merely 
their confluence, their mutual living involution and not 
simply their inert conjunction.
1. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 216. Cf. Forsyth, Missions in State and Church, p. 34; "A Gospel in which Christ differs from men only in degree leaves Him still but a man, and soon ceases to win men or to hold them."
2. Ibidem. 3# Ibid., p. 26?.
4. Forsyth, Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, 
p. 237.
5. Ibidem.
6. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 346.
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Brunner also has much to say about "movement" in his 
discussion of the Incarnation. The most critical distinc­
tion to be made in regard to this doctrine is that it is a 
movement from God towards man rather than a movement of 
man towards God. Conforming to this distinction, "the 
central truth of the Christian faith is this * that the 
eternal Son of God took upon Himself our humanity, not 
that the man Jesus acquired divinity. While it is true 
that the Incarnate Christ is known only to redeemed man, 
this neither means that redeemed man knows Him fully, nor 
that he knows how the Incarnation took place. However, 
he can employ his reason to interpret its meaning as it is 
revealed to him through the holy love of God in the work 
of the "Incarnate Son," Jesus Christ,
According to the witness of the Scripture, the 
"incarnation is interpreted to mean that Christ in His 
divine earthly life was veritably a man in the wholeness 
of man's being as an embodied and historic person . . .  in 
.the sense which the phrase 'became flesh' bears in the 
first chapter of the Fourth Gospel (John 1 * 1 3 ) It is^ 
undoubtedly the desire and intent of Forsyth and Brunner 
to remain true to this witness. Perhaps the word
1. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 3^6.
2. Herbert H. Farmer, "The Bible* Its Significance and Authority," The Interpreter's Bible (Nashville* Abingdon- Cokesbury Press,1952), Vol. I, pj 12.
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"inhumanization" or "Inhistorlzation" of the God of Holy 
Love would more aptly describe the Incarnation in harmony 
with their views and with New Testament teaching. It is 
the Forsyth-Brunner consensus, supported by the testimony 
of Scripture and confirmed in the evangelical experience 
of believers, that the divine Logos came as Holy Love all 
the way into earth's milieu, that He came as a personal 
Being, the Word made flesh, Jesus Christ.
In their attitude toward the controversial doctrine 
of the Virgin Birth both Forsyth and Brunner reveal 
respect for the findings of Biblical criticism and then 
diverge along different lines of reasoning. The former, 
though not aggressively against the doctrine, finds it 
lacking in moral appeal and implies that it is not in­
dispensable when judged by essentiality to the all-im­
portant work of Jesus Christ. The latter, using the 
cumbersome biological term of "parthenogenesis" in his 
discussion, professes in The Mediator his "indifference to 
this as to all other attempts to explain the miracle of 
the Incarnation"^ and proposes to "pass by the doctrine 
without attacking i t . T h i s  profession etnd this pro­
posal to the contrary, it becomes quite plain that Brunner 
is really dead set against this article of the Church's
1. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 326. 2. Ibidem.
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creed, chiefly because it is, as he understands it, a 
"biological interpretation of the miracle"^ of the 
Incarnation involving "inquisitive biological ideas.
Some years afterward, in his Dogmatics, he vigorously 
disputes the validity of the virgin birth of Christ on 
several grounds. Here he argues that the birth accounts 
in Matthew and Luke embrace the error of Arianism in that 
they teach Jesus Christ as having been created by God in 
time. Furthermore, he contends, as he did in The Mediator, 
that the idea is docetic. Christ cannot be a real man 
without having a human father. Again, picking up the main 
argument from his earlier work, he reiterates the charge 
that the Virgin-birth Doctrine was formulated to explain 
how God could become man and is therefore wrong from the 
very beginning.
Brunner's attitude toward this ancient doctrine of 
the Church throws into relief a basic problem in his 
thought. On the one hand, there can be little doubt that 
he is just as earnest as Forsyth ever was in wanting to 
maintain that God in Christ has really entered into human 
flesh, that there has been a genuine incarnation, and thus 
his fear of docetism in the Doctrine of the Virgin Birth
1. Brunner,.The Mediator, p. 325*
2. Ibid., p. 326.
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is a very real fear. On the other hand, there stands the 
view that it is a great misunderstanding to hold that the 
object of faith is an historical fact. He is therefore 
also afraid that by holding to the "biological" repre­
sentation of the birth of Jesus His Incarnation will become 
too involved in the form of history. It is far better to 
say with the apostles John and Paul simply that "He came" 
and to make no attempt to explain the nature of His coming. 
That Jesus Christ was truly man must be maintained, but 
that one may give physical or biological representation of 
this fact is to be opposed. Yet the question arises 
whether it is possible to maintain true manhood for Jesus 
and at the same time place an interrogation point over the 
physical and biological aspects of His manhood. There 
would seem to be justification for Barth’s strong protest 
against Brunner's criticism of the Doctrine of the Virgin 
Birth.^ As Barth has pointed out, this problem is one of 
no small proportions, for Brunner's chief criticism of 
this doctrine extends itself through other areas of his 
Christological thought, as will be indicated in the 
further progress of this chapter.
1. See above, p. 248fn.
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(2) The Relation of Christ to God 
It is the belief of Forsyth and Brunner that Jesus 
Christ and God are one and yet Christ is different from 
God. In an effort to avoid the error of a dooetic view on 
the one hand and an Adoptionist formulation on the other, 
they undertake to construct a doctrine of His person which 
will emphasize both His actual Deity and His actual hu­
manity, To this end they utilize the principle of persons 
in relation and the categories and concepts of Kenosis, 
Plerosis, paradox and mystery.
The two theologians agree that faith, in experienc­
ing the love of the holy God revealed in Jesus Christ and 
the power and authority encountered in Him, becomes aware 
that He, the incarnate Word, is God as holy Love. They 
both oppose the concepts that the God-man attained or had 
bestowed upon Himself the divine nature or quality in some 
event of His life, e.g. in His baptism or resurrection. 
Neither of them accepts the view that His person is a mere 
ghost-like appearance of the Logos. In His person and 
personality as God-man, Jesus Christ and God are one.
This rules out any acceptance of the Arian teaching that 
Christ was created ^  nihilo.
Grounded in their Christological thinking both upon 
the principle of persons or beings in relation and the 
concept of God as holy Love, Forsyth and Brunner develop
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their interpretation as to the relation of Christ to God. 
According to Forsyth, the holiness of God means His 
"wholly otherness" combined with His faithfulness. His 
judgment combined with His mercy or forgiveness. In the 
words of Brunner, it is "a two-fold movement of the Divine 
Will —  at first sight a contradictory movement, namely, a 
movement of withdrawal and exclusion, and a movement of 
expansion and i n c l u s i o n . T h e  holiness of God is 
ultimate, central and supreme. The outward movement of 
holiness is love, "You can go behind love to holiness, 
but behind holiness you cannot go,"^ for "Holiness is 
love's end, and it is only because He is holy that His 
Fatherhood is inexhaustible and our loves endure."3 in 
their respective thinlcing on this theme, Forsyth antici­
pates and Brunner acknowledges many of Rudolf Otto's 
findings in The Idea of the Holy
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. l62.
2. Forsyth, God the Holy Father, p. 5# Cf. Brunner,The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 157. While upholding the dominant idea in Barthianism of the sovereignty of God, Brunner is not sure that the closely related idea of the holiness of God "ought not to have come first,"
3. Ibid., p. 26.
4. See Gwilym 0. Griffith, The Theology of P. T .Forsyth, Chapter 5* "The Category of the Holy - Forsyth and Otto"; also Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 157. Cf. Brunner, The Mediator, pp. 68,69. Brunner quotes approvingly the conclusion of Otto's great work; "We can look beyond the prophet, to one in whom is found the Spirit in all its plenitude, and who at the same time in his
390
According to Forsyth, through the redemptive work 
of God in Christ, man is infused with His spirit or holy 
love and becomes conscious of the paradoxical truth that 
Christ in His person is God and at the same time different 
from God, On the one hand he is aware that in the person 
of the God-man there is ”a qualitative difference from any 
natural human passion or affection in Christ's holy love 
for the holy God, and in His no less holy, invincible love 
for an unholy w o r l d . O n  the other.hand he becomes con­
scious that the increate but creaturely Christ, the 
"eternal person living under the conditions of corporeal 
personality,"^ prays to and communes with God the Father.
He apprehends the truth that Christ and God are one and 
yet Christ is different from God. The person and person­
ality of Christ is the embodiment of two movements, 
namely ; the gradual descent of holy love (the oneness of 
Christ and God) and the gradual ascent of holy love 
(Christ's difference from God). Both movements are aspects 
of the moral process, "of the supreme mutual act of love 
and grace,"3 Christ is both God's deed unto men and the
person and in his performance is become most completely the object of divination, in whom Holiness is recognized apparent. Such a one is more than Prophet, He is the Son" (p. 69).
1. Griffith, The Theology of P. T. Forsyth, p. 48.
2. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 339.
3. Ibidem.
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Bearer of the deed. Within this moral and dynamic frame of
reference, Forsyth describes the relation of Christ to God
in terms of harmony or congruity of persons or beings. He
believes the uniqueness of Christ in relation to God is
one of election and not of creation.^ In other words,
while the sonship of man lies in his redemption by God the
Father who created him, the "Son-ship of Christ" assumes
He was elected from the beginning by God. His election
refers to His origin or position and not to His destiny,
as is true with reference to man. The divine Jesus is the
unique Son of God. He and God are one and, as such, He
confronts man as Judge, Redeemer and King.
Emil Brunner contends that in the encounter of faith
Christ confronts man as Revealer, Reconciler and Lord. In
this encounter man becomes aware that Christ and God are
one, a fact which is ultimately a mystery to other than
faith. Brunner develops his own view of the oneness of
2Christ and God in terms of revelation and authority.
Christ the Revealer is essentially God, the revealedness 
or the content of revelation. Unlike the relation of 
other men to God, one of faith to revelation, the relation
1, See above, p. 136f.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, pp. 267-275î Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, pp. 33^-336
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of Jesus Christ to God has the quality of the revealedness 
(content of revelation) of God and that of the Revealer 
(actualization in His person) of revealedness itself. 
Christ's divine authority as the Revealer is the personal 
authority of God, the Revealed. However when Brunner pro­
ceeds beyond this point and tries to explain by analogy 
how Christ is one with God and at the same time different 
from God he runs into difficulty, a matter which should 
have critical examination.^
Man, according to Brunner, has an empirical and 
observable personality. Man also has an ultimate "Ego", 
the subject of his being, which is masked by sin and is 
only uncovered before Christ. Until this event takes 
place the personal mystery of man's being cannot be known 
but only believed. So with Jesus Christ, says Brunner. 
What is observable in Him to eyes other than faith is only 
His human personality, His difference from God. But in 
the faith-encounter man has two illuminations. He 
perceives the mystery of the Person of Christ. He knows 
that in his own person he is a sinner, and he knows that 
Christ, not in His personality but in His person which is 
the subject of His being, is one with God.
Brunner's Person/personality analysis has drawn
1. See above, pp. 288f.
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fire from a number of quarters. D. M. Baillie in God Was 
in Christ rightly declares that "the transcendental and 
the empirical ego are not distinct entities at all, but 
the two sides of the same entity, the ego observed from 
without as object and the ego lived from within as sub­
ject. . • . each is a sheer abstraction when separated 
from the other, for a man is one ego, not two. " Aside 
from this, the troublesome question arises as to what was 
going on when Jesus was engaged in prayer to God (as re­
ported over and again in the Gospel story), God the Son 
was the sole "subject" in His experience. To which 
Baillie replies, "To explain this away would be sheer
1. D. M. Baillie, God Was In Christ (Londoni Paber and Faber Limited, 1948) , p'l 89. Cf. w7 M . Pittenger, The Word Incarnate (Welwyn* James Nisbet & Co., 1959). pp. 112-114. Although he does not specifically mention the Swiss theologian by name, Professor Pittenger undoubtedly has Brunner in mind when he writes, "No one can be a true man if his human experiences are not centered in an ego which, as the psychological centre of those experiences is fully human. It is for this reason that interpretations of Jesus Christ as one in whom God is the sole experienc­ing centre are not only absurdly untrue to the actual remembered historical picture of our Lord in the Gospels, but also tend to be (and usually are) heretical [i.e. ApollinarianII in terms of classical christological formulation" (p. 114). The same criticism of Brunner is implicit in J . 3. Lawton’s Conflict in Ghristology, when he sets down the first postulate for an intelligent study of Jesus Christ as an historic figure * "His person, His personality, must be a psychological unity, like the being of all other men" (p. 23).
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docetism."^ And in a review of The Mediator Professor
J. G. Riddell makes the comment*
The only link between our Lord’s humanity and ours appears to be on the superficial historical level . which must give place to the deeper penetration of faith. But on this deeper level of "personal mystery" His nature and ours fall apart, not merely because our nature is described as essentially sin­ful while He is without sin, but because His human­ity seems to be secondary, and even formal, always subordinate to His divinity
Forsyth does not have in mind such a "divided" Person when 
he describes the relation of Jesus Christ to God as the 
embodiment of two movements "in the unity of one historic 
person, to show that, however Inadequate earthly person­
ality is to heavenly, they are not incompatible, and are 
capable of the supreme mutual act of love and grace."3 
This view stands in marked contrast to that represented in 
Brunner’s Person/personality analysis. Forsyth would have 
said that the analysis was a psychologism.
Actually, Brunner would be more consistent with his 
central Christological viewpoint if he omitted the ex­
planation by analogy that Christ and God are one and pro­
ceeded with his assertion that man, in faith-encounter 
with Jesus Christ as Revealer, Reconciler and Lord,
1. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 89.
2. J . G. Riddell, "Emil Brunner’s 'The Mediator*", The Expository Times (July, 1953), p, 295.
3. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 339.
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becomes conscious of the fact which is ultimately a mystery 
to other than faith. Faith knows Him as the Logos who is 
co-eternal with the Father and who is the Second Person of 
the Trinity. In the person and personality of Jesus, man 
perceives that the God-man is "the Son of the same sub­
stance with the Father"^ and also man. This is to say 
that Christ as "the Revealer does not stand merely on the 
same side as God, the revealed, but at the same time he 
stands ’alongside’ Him as the Revealer of that which 
otherwise is not r e v e a l e d . T h i s  is to be understood in 
explicit reference to the ontological principle of the 
love of the holy God and its "existences" as man ex­
periences them in faith-encounter with God and describes 
them in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity.3 According 
to Brunner, the doctrine of the Triune God tells us that 
"the God who reveals His Nature to us is the Son who re­
veals the divine Nature, and that they are both the same 
God and yet distinct, as the Revealer and the Revealed,
In this interpretation Brunner detects the decisive truth
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation andRedemption, p . 349. Cf. The Mediator, p. 245. Brunneruses the confessional terminology with the understanding that "substance" be given its original meaning. See above, p. 2 5 8, note 2.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 275
3 . Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 157*^174; 183-199.
4. Ibid., p. 199.
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of "the unity of God's Nature and of His Revelation."^ The 
how of the paradoxical truth that Christ and God are one 
and yet different ultimately remains a mystery. It can be 
known and believed by faith but cannot be explained.
Both Forsyth and Brunner clearly believe that 
Christ is increate, that the Son is from everlasting to 
everlasting with the Father. The former uses the 
referent ; "The Pre-existence of Christî"^while the latter 
uses the referent, "The Sternal Godhead of the Son."3 It 
is Forsyth's bedrock conviction that an evangelical 
Christology must affirm the pre-existence of the Son of 
God, along with a real incarnation. If the evangelical 
principles of redemption and the forgiveness of sins 
through Christ be allowed, then a doctrine of pre-existence 
inevitably follows. "Nothing lower than the Holy God 
could re-hallow the guilty human soul."4 In keeping with 
his faithful adherence to the presupposition borrowed from 
Butler that "Morality is the nature of things," Forsyth 
thinks of all the deeds of Christ on earth as having had 
"a moral substratum in the act of His premundane person­
ality . This is to say that "they had all a volitional
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 199.
2. See above, p. 100. 3. See above, p. 254.
4. Forsyth, Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 281.
5. Ibid., p. 282.
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foundation in the heavens, which, because it was action 
and not mere substance, did not impair their reality but 
enhanced it.
There is little to be found in Brunner’s treatment 
of "The eternal Godhead of the Son" in his Dogmatics to 
compare with Forsyth’s intensely earnest writing on this 
topic. As has been shown, Brunner gives primary attention 
to the exposure of those fallacies and weaknesses in the 
estimates of Christ which do not support his eternal God­
head. The most positive statement he makes is the one
with which he opens his discussion* "Beginning with the
Man Jesus, in the Man Jesus perceiving the Christ and His 
royal authority, finally through faith we are impelled to 
believe in Jesus as the Son of God from all eternity."^
Yet it must be said that while Brunner deals with Christ’s 
pre-existence in a disappointing way in Dogmatics II, a 
major portion of The Mediator either directly or indirectly 
supports this doctrine.
Linked with Forsyth’s view of the pre-existence of 
Christ is his concept of the "cosmic" Christ who is ever­
lastingly the Lord of Creation, the Christ through whom
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 282.
2. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,"V. 3451
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all things were made and in whom all things cohere.
Forsyth very definitely holds to the Pauline correlation 
of Creation and Redemption. For him, Christus Creator est 
Christus Redemptor. Brunner, on the contrary, is in­
different to these ideas. His attitude, as it is reflected 
in The Mediator, has been criticized by Professor W. N. 
Pittenger;
An almost complete lack of interest in any of the cosmological questions which may be raised about the Word of God is evident in Brunner’s treatment of the Logos conception. . . . The Word of God as an eternal person in the Godhead is described in traditional language as "the process of self­communication existing eternally in God", but we discover that the self-communication which is predicated of Him, so far as the world is concerned, is largely confined to the "speaking of God’s name" to man.2
In a later comment Professor Pittenger very truly declares 
that Brunner "overlooks the emphasis which St. Irenaeus 
(his favourite patristic writer) gives to the Word as 
cosmological agent of Deity, the references to that Word’s 
endless activity both in creation and redemption."3 In 
the light of these criticisms, which the writer of this
1. See above, pp. lOSff.
2. Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, p. 135* The writer goes on to complain of Brunner’s having "an almost verbal sense of revelation. Presumably all God does is speak."
3. Ibid., p. 144. Professor Pittenger does not find any identity of position at all between the ancient Father and the modern theologian* "Brunner cannot really force St. Irenaeus into his mould" (Ibidem).
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thesis finds to be based on solid evidence, it would seem 
that at this point Forsyth, from the New Testament point 
of view, has a more "fully orbed" Christology than has 
Brunner.
To summarize the doctrine of the Deity of Christ in 
the thought of Forsyth and Brunner as these views have thus 
far been compared, it should be stated that they both use 
the principle of persons or beings in relation to formulate 
this doctrine. Constructing their Christology on this 
basis, they concur in the assertion that Christ and God 
are one. However, the two theologians vary in their con­
ceptualization of the unique relation of Jesus Christ to 
God. Forsyth uses the concepts of congruity, harmony and 
election in a moral and dynamic frame of reference.
Brunner uses the concepts of the Revealer (Jesus Christ) 
and the Revealed or "Revealedness" (God). The central 
belief that Christ and God are one is spelled out by the 
two theologians in terms of the relation of the Son (as 
person or being) to the holy Father of love (as person or 
being). The Son is increate and co-eternal with the 
Father. To Forsyth this is the "pre-existence" of Christ, 
morally and dynamically conceived; to Brunner it is the 
"eternal Godhead" of the Son who is of "the same substance 
with the Father." In Forsyth's thought, as not in 
Brunner’s the creative and redemptive activities of God
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are correlated in the pre-existent and "cosmic" Christ,
Both thinkers interpret Jesus Christ as the outgoing' of the 
holy love of God, the Love in person and flesh of the holy 
Father, whose nature is judgment and, at the same time, 
mercy or forgiveness• With each theologian the Love of 
holy God is fundamental to the interpretation that Christ 
and God are one.
Grounded upon the basic concept that God in His 
very being is holy love, Forsyth and Brunner interpret 
Christ’s difference from God in terms of His incarnation 
and humiliation. In their interpretation they employ to a 
greater or lesser degree and each in his own way the con­
cepts and categories of Kenosis, Plerosis, paradox and 
mystery. By utilizing these interpretive tools, they 
believe that they can defend the view that Christ and God 
are one and at the same time stay clear of the pitfall of 
Docetism. While a rather detailed exposition of the views 
of Forsyth and Brunner that relate to this particular 
aspect of their thinking has been given in.Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three, it is impossible to compare their positions 
without some reiteration of their line of thought. This 
is especially true in the case of Forsyth. However, the 
writer will try as much as possible to avoid plowing over 
already tilled ground.
P. T. Forsyth maintains that the twin notions of
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Kenosis and Plerosis are valid concepts for interpreting 
Christ’s difference from God without undermining the be­
lief that He is, at the same time, one with God. At 
variance with nineteenth-century kenotic theories which 
taught a renunciation of divine attributes by the Logos, 
Forsyth conceives of the Kenosis as the operation of 
these attributes in a new mode of existence.^ Kenosis 
does not mean that Jesus divested Himself of the attri­
butes of divine majesty, i.e. omniscience, omnipotence 
and omnipresence. What it actually means is that they 
were retracted from full actuality to potentiality in the 
person of Jesus in whom the Logos became flesh. Forsyth 
believes that this concept permits neither the destruction 
of the divine attributes nor their removal from the 
eternal realm. On the contrary, he believes it provides 
for meaningful interpretation of the continuing Deity of 
the incarnate Christ in all His limitation and humilia­
tion. The divine attributes are concentrated in the 
dimensions of the Logos made flesh, Jesus Christ. Kenosis 
is the voluntary contraction of consciousness, a limiting 
of His power by His will.
Basic to Forsyth's use of Kenotic Theory is a 
doctrine of God which conceives of Him not as static
1. See above, pp. Il4ff.
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divine substance or as passive being but as the personal 
God of moral action whose very nature it is to bestir Him­
self in holy love on behalf of sinful man. If God’s 
essential being as holy Love is "changeless change," to 
borrow Forsyth’s expression, then a theory of Kenosis can 
be fruitful in showing that God Himself came to men in the 
person of Jesus Christ without doing violence to His 
divine being but rather confirming it.
According to Forsyth, the Kenosis of the incarnate 
Christ requires His self-fulfilment (Plerosis), or growth,^
i.e. "a history of moral redintegration, the history of 
His recovery, by gradual moral conquest, of the mode of 
being from which, by a tremendous moral act. He came.
In other words, "the diminuendo of the Kenosis went on 
parallel with the crescendo of a vaster Plerosis. He died 
to l i v e , " 3  Forsyth does not attempt to psychologize the 
process, for he believes such a procedure to be presump­
tuous and required only by science, not by religious faith. 
Holding in abeyance critical comment on Plerosis and 
Kenosis as he understands them, attention will now be
1. See above, pp. 125ff.
2. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 308.
3. Ibid., p. 311.
403
given to Brunner's viewpoint, insofar as it relates to 
these concepts.
It is clearly apparent that in the earlier stages 
of his Christological construction Emil Brunner had a 
negative attitude toward Kenoticism. With all the glaring 
weaknesses of the older theories in mind, his thinking is 
definitely polemic. He stands in special opposition to 
those nineteenth century Christologies which were attempts 
to psychologize the God-man on a kenotic basis.^ Virtually 
all that he will concede in a positive way in The Mediator 
is to say that during His earthly ministry there was an 
"incognito" which concealed the fully divine nature of 
Christ and that the "self-emptying" which so character­
ized His life was evidenced by this disguise. Two years 
later, in The Theology of Crisis, Brunner simply states 
that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ necessarily 
involved a kenosis which gave the Son of God His human 
disguise I
The revelation of God can never be a true revela­tion without being, at the same time, a disguise, a "God incarnate" means that the Mediator,when He appeared in history was true man. The Son of God incognito walked among men. Faith only can pierce the veil.^
1. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 343n and p. 349n*
2. Brunner, The Theology of Crisis, p. 18. Cf.Brunner, The Mediator, p. 431.
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In his later writing the Swiss theologian is found 
to have moved somewhat nearer to a "kenotic" position.^
In the second volume of his Dogmatics he declares for the 
following view of Kenosis* "We can and must say, that God, 
as He confronts us in the man Jesus, and especially as He 
is manifested to us as the Crucified, has divested Himself 
of His attributes of majesty."2 But, it is "obvious that 
the Kenosis which belongs to the Incarnation constitutes a 
self-limitation of God, [whose] limits cannot possibly be 
defined,"3 and, furthermore, the question of how the 
divine and human natures can be combined in the Person of 
Jesus "is utterly beyond the power of human understand­
ing. "4 Even to ask such a question is unwarranted and 
unbecoming inquisitiveness.
To Brunner the mechanics of Kenosis is indeed 
little more than a vast mystery. At the same time the
1. 0. C. Quick in his Doctrines of the Creed (London* Nisbet & Co., 1938) makes this comment about Brunner and Kenoticism* "His Christology, like that of others influ­enced by Kierkegaard, is in a . . . general sense kenotic in that it emphasizes the human limitations of Jesus Christ and attributes them to the descent of the Son of God" (p. 133fn).
2. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p• 360* '
3. Ibidem.
4. Ibid., p. 361.
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fact of the self-emptying as declared in the Philippian 
passage is held to be of the utmost importance :
In this self-emptying alone . . • does God reveal the unfathomable depths of His love, the infinite desire with which He wills to give Himself to us —  here alone, where He • . • lays aside all His glory, . . . This love of His is . • . simply His unconditioned will to reveal Himself, His Deity, His Divine Nature, and to make it evident to man.^
Thus, in the thought of Brunner, the kenosis has supreme 
declarative value while its usefulness in explicating the 
Divine-Human relationship is denied. The declarative 
value inheres in the fact that the outpouring of Himself in 
love by God in Christ is a means of revealing, and not 
merely of obscuring, the divine nature. Yet Brunner sees 
the "obscuring" of kenosis becoming absolute in the event 
of the Crucifixion. "In His death the Son of God, who 
comes to us, does not only empty Himself of all His royal 
and divine attributes, but also of all that could dis­
tinguish the one from the o t h e r . H e r e ,  at the "real 
meeting-place" between God and man, the faith of man must 
make a leap into total darkness to lay hold upon the truth 
that Christ and God are one and, at the same time, that 
Christ is different from God. For Brunner this is a truth 
that belongs in the category of paradox and is ultimately
1, The Mediator, p. 29?f.
2. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,"p. 363. Italics^mine.
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an impenetrable mystery.
The contrast between Forsyth's and Brunner's views 
of kenosis could be stated as follows* Whereas for the 
former kenosis is central and paradox is an incident in 
the articulation of this theme, for the latter mystery or 
paradox is central and kenosis is merely a flash of light 
against this dark background.
Since the concepts of Christ's oneness with God and 
difference from God and His oneness with man and difference 
from man overlap in the thought of the two theologians, 
the ideas which have been discussed in this section will 
be further examined and criticized in the succeeding 
section on the humanity of Jesus Christ.
ii. The Concept of the Humanity of Jesus Christ.
As has been shown, Forsyth assumes a general agree­
ment among Christians of his day that Jesus Christ was 
truly a man.^ In his Theory of Kenosis he hopes to 
demonstrate that a concept of His true divinity need not ' 
be antithetical to that of His true humanity. To sub­
stantiate his theory, Forsyth alludes a number of times 
to the "kenotic" text, Philippians 2*6-8. However, he is 
more dependent on the tenor of Scripture than the text of
1. See above, p . 144.
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Scripture in developing his ideas of kenosis. For him the 
kenotic theme is sounded throughout the whole of the New 
Testament and even proleptically in Isaiah 53* That theme, 
to him, is that the eternal, glorious and majestic God has 
entered the earthly milieu "in the form of a servant."
Man, in the faith-experience of personal contact 
with God in Christ finds the confirmation of the kenotic 
motif witnessed to in Scripture. The One who does such 
great things for man's soul can surely be no less than 
correlative with the Heavenly Father and have eternal 
existence with Him. If, as Forsyth holds, the Incarnation 
was the result instead of the cause of the moral action of 
Christ, "then it was the result . . .  of a great and 
creative moral decision of His before He entered the world 
—  which preserved His pre-existence, and seems to require 
some form of kenosis. The only possible alternative to 
this theory, in Forsyth's Judgment, would be a theory of 
a "progressive deification of man in a rising scale of 
mutual involution; which requires some form of adoption- 
i s m . B u t  "some form of adoptionism" that structures 
Christology outside the spacious bounds of the Athanasian 
Creed is not, in Forsyth's opinion, adequate to bear the 
weight of Christian Faith. Since, in contrast to Brunner,
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 232.
2. Ibidem,
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Forsyth devotes his attention to the kenotic theory of 
the Incarnation, it is appropriate to give additional and 
critical consideration to his concept of kenosis in re­
lation to the Person of Jesus Christ,
The salient feature of P. T. Forsyth's type of 
kenotic theory is embraced in the descriptive designation* 
Real but Potential.^ This means that in the kenosis the 
attributes of God were not eliminated or destroyed but 
were reduced and concentrated by an utterly free and selfr 
consistent act of the divine will. This view must be 
understood in relation to the soteriological principle 
which demands that "all Christology must rest on a moral 
salvation, spiritually and personally realized, and any 
metaphysic involved must be the metaphysic of redemption 
which is only the superlative of a metaphysio of ethics.
Forsyth maintains that the Incarnation is a brand 
new act of God's Self-identification with the world, In 
so doing he escapes difficulties encountered by earlier 
kenoticists in trying to establish possible grounds for 
the "enfleshing" of God, e.g. man was created in the image
1. This designation logically derives from A. B, Bruce's arrangement of types in the Humiliation of Christ.H. R. Mackintosh's type of theory as expressed in The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ (1912), pp. 463- 507f is much like that of Forsyth. However, Forsyth as the earlier writer is more creative and original.
2. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 332.
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of God; therefore the Logos can become man, with resulting
problems raised of degree and kind of Incarnation. Such
%problems are circumvented by: the perceptive claim that God, 
who is bound only by His own|holiness, who could (if
necessary) "raise up children to Abraham" from the very
stones, is able to establish a new relationship between 
Himself and His Creation without resorting to precedent.
In this way Christ's uniqueness and conformity can be held
together. Christ is truly, yet newly man.
A very significant contribution that Forsyth makes 
to the progress of Christological thought along kenotic 
lines has to do with the person of the Incarnate Christ.
His type of theory makes it possible to say that the Son, 
after kenosis, retains His Sonship unimpaired. This is 
possible, not because of any dualism as devised or in­
timated by some kenoticists (e.g.,Thomasius and Gore), but 
because Forsyth's modal interpretation permits him to 
speak of the actual becoming:potential. Critically im­
portant for the support of this view is Forsyth's belief 
that the attributes of God are God in His Self-expression; 
therefore they cannot be detached from His person. We 
know that "God was in Christ!’ through our own experience; 
it follows then that the Divine attributes in their 
totality must somehow likewise be in Christ. As Forsyth 
sees it —  and his reasoning is cogent —  the only way
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this is possible is for them to be potentially there, ac­
commodated to the new state of Incarnation. In this way 
he can logically maintain the integrity of the Son through­
out the Incarnation without denying His manhood.
P. T. Forsyth does not think more highly of kenotic 
theory than he ought to think. He wisely recognizes the 
limits of even the most productive theory in shedding 
light upon the hidden things of God. Therefore he cannot 
be charged with engaging in far-out speculation on matters 
beyond mortal ken. Mystery hovers over the labours of the 
theologian, and Forsyth is ready to acknowledge this, but 
he is also committed to the position that as long as the 
mental faculties of the Christian thinker are in working 
order, there must be no cessation of effort to pierce the 
great mysteries of faith. With a boldness which does not 
characterize the attitude of Emil Brunner, he declares *
He [God] wills to be inquired of. It is not the questions that are intrusive. We are not called on to sacrifice our intellect, if only we do not idolize it.^
Though Forsyth makes valuable contributions to Ken­
otic Christology, there are weaknesses in his theory which 
should be pointed out —  weaknesses which the theologian 
himself would be willing to admit were probably there*
1. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ,p. 284.
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I am aware of the kind of objection raised to the theory. Many difficulties arise readily in one's own mind. It is a choice of difficulties.  ^ '
First, '.there would seem to be an ambiguity in Forsyth's
treatment of Christ's self-consciousness. On the one hand
he supports the view that Christ was conscious of His
divine mission and place.
Christ's sense of finality we must recognise; which is His faith, however implicit, in His own Godhead.We must acknowledge His sense of His own finality in the last moral issue of the world, the supreme human issue, the issue between God and man, life and death. He knew He was decisive in that issue. And who could be final or decisive there but God? • . . Must He not have known Himself for the incarnation of the Eternal saving Will of God, the Eternal agentof the Eternal purpose?^
While yearning to give an unequivocal "Yes" to this
rhetorical query, the most untutored Christian logician
may well hesitate. Forsyth is not permitted to shift the
argument from "Christ's sense of finality which is His
faith"3 to His knowing that finality, as though the one
1. Forsyth, Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 294.
2. Ibid., pp. 92-94.
3. Ibid., p. 92. In October, 1909» when his greatChristological work was first coming from the press,Forsyth contributed a scant page-and-a-half article toThe Expository Times under the heading "The Faith of Jesus." In his introductory paragraph he expresses some surprise and disappointment over the fact that no theologian of re­pute, to his best knowledge, had ever written on such a topic. Forsyth himself barely opens a discussion "which seems imperative of the relation between faith in our case and whatever takes its place in the case of Jesus as His relation to God" (p. 8). He then goes on to say that
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could be equated with the other. Evidently it is the 
"knowing" rather than the "sense which is faith" that 
Forsyth really has in mind, for in a later passage he asks 
"But if He [God] parted with His self-consciousness as 
infinite, would it not come as near to suicide as infinite 
c o u l d ? O n  the other hand, if these points are granted, 
could Christ truly be called human? Such a self-conscious­
ness would surely refuse licence to the theologian to say 
that Christ gave up the conditions of God for the con­
ditions of men. Indeed, were it not for His forthright­
ness in declaring for Christ's full humanity, Forsyth's 
theory might be considered docetic, as having an Apollln- 
arian taint. There is in his teaching here something of 
the same danger and difficulty that is encountered in 
Brunner's Person/personality explication. A tendency can 
be detected at times in both theologians to regard the 
presence of God in Christ as a divine manifestation rather 
than a real Incarnation, though both would have stoutly 
denied any such intent.
Closely related to the foregoing is Forsyth's
"From Him [Jesus] the expression of sin and of faith are alike absent; where we believe, He knew" (p. 9)- Such would seem to be true and yet, faith being the central ex­ercise of our religion, does not such an assertion put Him at one more removal from our humanity?
1. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ,p. 295.
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endeavour to preserve in Christ both a divine sinlessness 
and a genuinely human susceptibility to temptation. This 
problem can be resolved, he feels, by inquiring, "What if 
His kenosis went so far that though the impossibility [of 
sinning] was there He did not know of it? The limitation 
of His knowledge is indubitable —  even about Himself."^ 
When this last assertion is set alongside the positive 
declaration: "For Him God was His self-consciousness, 
an inconsistency becomes evident. If, in the reduction of 
the divine attributes there remains in Christ such an 
"unreduced" divine self-consciousness as Forsyth here and 
there ascribes to Him, does it not become implausible to . 
believe that Christ did not know that He could not sin?
And is not this implausibility further heightened by the 
Scriptural witness to the perfect moral and spiritual in­
sight that the Son of God had into the very inner life and 
thought of men? e.g. "But He knew their thoughts."3 Could 
One who knew others so deeply and so truly be rightly held 
not to know Himself in the same way? If the answer is
1. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, 
p. 295.
2. Forsyth, "The Faith of Jesus," The Expository Times (October, 1909), p. 9.
3. Luke 6:8. Cf. W. R. Bowie, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke, The Interpreter*s Bible, Vol. 8, p. 112: "The light of the truth of God that was in Him had a penetrating certainty."
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"No", Forsyth can be found guilty of undercutting his own 
argument, and at this point his theory may be said to lack 
consistency. While his line of reasoning is remarkably 
ingenious, it is not —  in this area of his thought —  
thoroughly convincing.
Again, it must be said that Forsyth's theory is not 
altogether free from the suggestion of Tritheism. This 
keen-minded theologian is quite insistent that it was the 
Son who became man and dwelt among us. "God sent; the Son 
came."  ^ The distinction between Father and Son must not 
be imperilled. But in the interest of the unity of the 
Godhead Forsyth qualifies this view. "Christ's emptying 
of Himself is . . . one of the powers of His Godhead, and 
not a denial of it. He could not have emptied Himself but 
for His G o d h e a d . H o w e v e r ,  it can be argued that the 
idea of the Godhead as potential in the Incarnation does 
not entirely satisfy the requirement for unity. To say 
that one person of the Godhead possesses the God-head in a 
Self-retracted way while the other two persons possess the 
Godhead in its fulness puts a strain upon the powers of 
reason. Indeed, the whole idea of "potentiality" by which 
Forsyth is forced to become involved in an abstruse
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 272.
2. The Taste of Death and The Life of Grace, p. 96
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argument is a very elusive concept and one is reminded of 
the comment made by A. S, Pringle-Pattisoni "Potentiality 
. . .  is perhaps the most slippery term in the whole vocab­
ulary of philosophy."^ Though he shows great originality 
in introducing the term to the vocabulary of theology, 
Forsyth cannot entirely control this innate "slipperiness" 
as he develops his Theory of Kenosis* However, as for 
complications with the Doctrine of the Trinity, H. R. 
Mackintosh has made a sage observationi "The doctrine of 
the Trinity is indeed a comprehensive expression of the 
new Christian thought of God; but it is reached and con­
trolled by that which we learn from the Incarnation, not 
assumed as dictating what the Incarnation has to teach us.
Forsyth's concept of the Plerosis as a movement 
that "went on parallel" with the Kenosis seems more dif­
ficult to conceive than the self-limitation of Christ.
This may be due to the fact that it is not as easy to 
throw light upon this movement from the "lamp" of human 
analogy as could be done, and was done, with much help­
fulness in the case of the K e n o s i s . 3 Or, it may be that 
the difficulty stems, in part at least, from Forsyth’s
1. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God (Aberdeent The University Press, 191?), P# 106.
2. Mackintosh, "The Revival of Kenoticism," The Expository Times (December, I909)i p. IO6.
3. See above, pp.
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lack of discrimination in the use of words and phrases toy 
which he seeks to interpret an unfamiliar concept. "Re­
covery", "reconquest", "evolution", "regained", "lived it 
back", "worked out the Salvation He was", "exercised unto 
godliness", "realised all that was in Him", "emergence of 
deity", "unfolding of deity" —  all are examples of the 
variety of ways in which Forsyth wrote about Plerosis.1 
And though he strictly qualifies the use of the term 
"progressive incarnation" and "speaks carefully" of it, 
the fact remains that the expression has too many heretical 
associations to be a felicitous description of what he has 
in mind.
Regardless of reasons, it is not easy to understand 
the kind of "growth" that Plerosis embraces. At first 
Forsyth says, "The history of Christ’s growth is . . .  a 
history of moral redintegration, the history of His re­
covery by gradual moral conquest, of the mode of being 
from which by a tremendous moral act He came. Later on 
he must warn, "We shall be most careful to note that any 
growth in His sense of Godhead was not the growth or 
acquisition of that Godhead itself."^ The two statements
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, pp. 323-357* Cf. J. H. Rogers, The Theology of P. T. Forsyth, p. 263. Rogers complains of Forsyth's being "inconsistent in his terminology," though he does not relate this inconsistency to the discussion of Plerosis*
2. Ibid., p. 308. 3. Ibid., p. 353.
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seem to make "growth" an ambiguous concept when applied 
to Jesus Christ. If Christ's life was a winning back 
of what was already His, if He became what He already was, 
if the essence of His Person was His Godhead which by 
definition cannot grow, then there can be no real growth 
in Christ and His difference from man is exaggerated by 
Forsyth. Then it may be argued that the Incarnation was 
not real; Christ did not really become man but merely 
cloaked Himself in human form* But Forsyth in his general 
Christological teaching is against such a view and con­
tends with great earnestness for a genuine Incarnation.
He has certainly not intended to weaken this affirmation.
Another objection arises in connection with 
Forsyth's development of the Plerosis concept. This has 
to do with his assertion that the Crucifixion is to be 
regarded not only as the "nadir" of the Kenosis but also 
as the "zenith" of the Plerosis. This viewpoint is ex­
plained of course by Forsyth's dominant soteriological 
interest. Nevertheless, to posit a plerotic climax in 
the Cross tends to detract from the glorious significance 
of the Resurrection and the Ascension, about which he does 
not have very much to say.
Before returning to the thought of Brunner in this 
section, it should be emphasized that Forsyth's primary
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concern in all of his kenotic theorizing is to glorify God 
and exalt His holy Name for the divine redemptive grace in 
Jesus Christ. He had above all things a deep religious 
interest in the amazing humiliation of the Son of God onI
man's behalf. He was under thorough conviction that no 
theory of the Incarnation can be complete which does not 
take into full account the outpouring, the Self-emptying, 
the Self-giving of God for man's redemption.
It should also be observed that Forsyth did not 
construct a closed systematic theory and therefore it is 
proper that all criticisms should be made within the frame­
work of his theory. On this basis the sharp attack bn 
kenoticism made by D. M. Baillie in God Was In Christ 
leaves Forsyth virtually unscathed. Dr. Baillie seems 
strangely unfamiliar with the type of kenotic theory to be 
found in the pages of The Person and Place of Jesus Christ.^  
Apropos of this fact, Principal Charles S. Duthie, a latter 
day successor to Peter Taylor Forsyth in the principalship
1. Baillie, God Was In Christ, pp. 94-98, There is no indication here that he had ever read Forsyth's great work. Cf. Bradley, P. T. Forsyth —  The Kan and His Work, p.201fnj "It is unfortunate that D. M, Baillie in his God Was In Christ, makes no reference to Forsyth, for Baillie never meets the argument for Kenosis as presented by Forsyth." 
Bromif P. T. Forsyth; Prophet For Today, p. 91fn., says much the same thing. These comments serve to emphasize the strange ignorance of Forsyth that has often prevailed among eminently knowledgeable theologians including, for a large part of his life, Emil Brunner.
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of New College (formerly Hackney College), makes some 
pertinent comments î
It is a pity that he CBaillie^ never refers to P. T. Forsyth's illuminating exposition of the idea. $ . . The three critical arguments that he employs to overturn the Kenotic view are not wholly convincing. In his first argument, in which he quotes with approval a passage from William Temple's Christus Veritas, he does not appear to have fully reckoned with Quick's answer to Temple's criticism in Doctrines of the Creed. His second argument attempts to show that a Kenoticist really commits himself to saying that "He who formerly was God changed Himself temporarily into man, or exchanged His divinity for humanity." It is striking, however, that he does not quote any responsible Kenotist as having made a statement to this effect. . . .  In the third argument, Dr. Baillie maintains that if the Kenosis is limited to His earthly life, then • God was successively God (before His incarnation), man (during His incarnation) and then God again (after His ascension). This leaves no room at all, he continues, for the permanence of the manhood which Christ carries with Him into His ascended life. To this a Kenotic theologian might well answer that he is very much concerned to preserve the permanent humanity of our Lord and that the only satisfactory way of doing this is to show first that He was really man on earth.^
In the light of Principal Duthie's summarization it becomes 
clear that Forsyth's theory of kenosis is largely exempt 
from the criticism made by Baillie in his profound discus­
sion of the Person of Jesus Christ. Viewed largely, rather 
than with meticulous concern for details, the Kenosis- 
Plerosis Theory has much to commend it over any other form 
of Kenotic Christology.
1. Charles S. Duthie, God In His World (London: Independent Press, Ltd., 1 9 5 4), pp. 29-31.
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It is also Emil Brunner's express intent to repre­
sent Jesus Christ as vere homo as well as vere Deus. In­
dicative of this is the fact that he initiates his Chris­
tological labours under a banner bearing the Irenaean 
legend: "Jesus Christ, in His infinite love, has become 
what we are, in order that He may make us entirely what He 
is. Affixed to the same banner is the corresponding 
sentiment from Martin Luther: "Nostra assumesit, ut 
conferret nobis sua»"2 Thus it is made doubly emphatic 
that Brunner proposes to present Jesus Christ as "bone of 
our bone and flesh of our flesh." It is to be expected 
that he will not be at all disturbed by the very human 
characteristics of Jesus that are brought out in the 
Gospel story. In reality, all of this is just as it should 
be, for the man of Nazareth who was "born of a woman" -- 
and for Brunner this Pauline phrase means "born Just as we 
are" —  is "man" in every sense of the word, except the 
sinful sense. He believes that —
the God, who although he cannot be grasped by the human mind, though He is infinite and self-sufficient, comes down to the level of humanity in the form of a real historical man, in the lowliness of an earthly human existence, and meets those to whom it is given to discover who He is in this form: this is the God of the revelation of Scripture.3
1. Brunner,.HThé.^Kediator  ^p. 3.
2. Ibidem. 3. Ibid., p. 329f.
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While in The Mediator Brunner gives no endorsement 
whatsoever to kenotic theory, he does have much to say 
about the "disguise" or "Incognito" which is the con­
sequence of the "Self-emptying.Indeed the term "In­
cognito" becomes in his early Christological thought a 
very important concept which needs to be examined with 
care. And it does not take long to learn, nor is it a 
surprise to learn, in this examination that the sig­
nificance of the Incognito is "concealment." By his 
human disguise the "God-ness" of the God-man is con­
cealed to eyes other than those of faith. The his­
torical element in Jesus* life is the Incognito of the 
divine revelation which can be known only by faith.
Thus Brunner holds that the revelation in Jesus Christ 
is indirect, a veiling. Only the indirect communication 
that is the "Kenosis," the "Incognito," makes possible 
the free decision of faith. However, to insure that 
faith free, and utterly so, Brunner feels under com­
pulsion to make the Incognito, the concealment of Deity, 
an absolute concept. The Incognito is stark humanity in 
which no faintest glimmer of divine glory can be de­
tected by the "natural" eye.
At this point in his theologizing, students of
1. See above, pp. 286ff.
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Brunner's Christology raise an alarm.^ The Swiss theo­
logian seems to be presenting a Jesus who is not Christ 
and a Christ who is not Jesus. There is in his thought no 
essential unity between the historical Jesus and the Christ 
of St. Paul. They relate to each other only in the most 
tenuous way. With such an insistence upon the indirect­
ness of the divine revelation, with such an emphasis upon 
the absolute nature of the Incognito, with the Deity of 
Christ completely hidden behind His humanity, God Himself 
seems to touch man and the world very lightly indeed in 
the Incarnation. This has led Professor Pittenger to ex­
press the opinion that "Brunner's christological essay has 
no place for St. Irenaeus' assertion, 'He became entirely 
what we are in order that He might make us entirely what 
He is. ' The divine revelation is so exclusively laid in 
Christ, when Brunner speaks of the "indirect identity" of 
Jesus with it, that it is hard to determine what the 
significance of the person of Jesus really is.
Brunner's position here brings to mind again his
1. See Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation, pp. 27-28. See also G. C. Berkeuwer, The Person of Christ (Grand Rapids, Michigan; Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 329-]64. Berkouwer devotes the last chapter of his book to criticism of the concept of the Incognito as developed by Brunner, and also by Karl Barth in an even more extreme form.
2. Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, p. 144.
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two statements with respect to the relation of Christian 
faith and historical fact#  ^ On the one hand, he declares 
that the Christian faith is absolutely interested in an 
external historical fact. On the other hand, he asserts 
that it is a great misunderstanding to hold that the ob­
ject of faith is an historical fact. Actually, Brunner 
finds it impossible to keep these two statements tied 
together. Instead, in the fashion so typical of him, his 
thought sways back and forth between them. This is shown 
in his use of the terms "Incognito" or "mask" whereby he 
indicates that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is 
not to be sought jn the historical appearance, but behind 
humanity, behind the historical appearance. The Deity and 
the humanity of Jesus Christ then become very remote from 
each other.
With respect to the Incognito, it is certainly true, 
and necessarily so, that there is in human nature a veiling 
of Deity. John Calvin made proper use of this idea in his 
Institutes.^ But this is not the whole truth, as Calvin 
knew, for the human nature which conceals Deity at the 
same time discloses it and, in the human sphere and in a 
human way, brings it to expression. In any case human 
nature is not an arbitrary or misleading disguise, as Emil 
Brunner would have it. The Incognito must not be made so
1. See above, p. 280f. 2. See above, p. 39fn.
424
absolute as to exclude the vital and valid insight of 
John 1;14; "We have beheld (in the Word made flesh) His 
glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father."
As was shown in Chapter Three, Brunner makes sev­
eral statements in his Dogmatics II which —  taken at 
their face value -- indicate a more positive view of the 
historic personality of Jesus Christ.^ However, there is 
also evidence that the theologian's heart is not alto­
gether in these statements. While the term "Incognito" 
is dropped, its essential meaning tends to linger on in 
other phraseology. Brunner here speaks of "kenosis" 
several times, though he develops no kenotic theory. The 
concept of the Divine Self-emptying which he barely pre­
sents, with much caution and qualification, is in clear 
contrast to that of P. T. Forsyth. What we see is the 
old view of the complete abandonment of the attributes 
of majesty. God in the man Jesus has altogether di­
vested Himself of these attributes. There must be no 
real sign of Deity in the human Christ that can be recog­
nized by other than faith. Though Brunner maintains 
that it is useless to speculate on the extent to which 
God had to "empty Himself" in order to come as the God- 
man, it becomes obvious that in his mind the kenosis is 
both extensive and intensive.
1. See above, pp.284ff.
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In his Dogmatics Brunner says of Jesus, "He was 
born like any one of us —  according to the flesh —  He 
died too, like any one of us."  ^ From the first day of 
His life to the last the God-man was "human" with a ven­
geance. But, Brunner also insists that the words of Jesusi 
"He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," are words 
that "express something which This assertion,
coupled with other statements that have been noted earlier, 
show that the Swiss theologian does make an effort to re­
late the "Jesus of history" to the "Christ of faith" in a 
more definite and meaningful way. It is unfortunate that 
his deeply engrained apprehensions which surface, for ex­
ample, in his discussion of the Virgin Birth, tend to make 
his effort less successful than it might otherwise be.
Mention should be made of Brunner's belief that "it 
belongs to the very nature of the incarnate Logos, to the 
very nature of the Son who goes through the world in the 
form of a servant, that He should subordinate Himself to 
the Father."3 The Son of God can really enter the human 
situation only as one who serves in a subordinate position. 
Brunner is thus found to side with the early fathers who
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 3331
2. Ibid., p. 336.
3. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 353#
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made the "subordination" passages of Scripture refer to 
the human rather, than to the divine nature.
On the other hand, Forsyth sees the subordination 
of the Son as part and parcel of the cohesiveness of the 
Trinity, "There is place and order in the Godhead and He 
[the Son] kept it"^in a divinely ideal "family" relation­
ship. Therefore, it can be said that "subordination is 
not inferiority, and it Godlike."^ Forsyth tries to 
make "subordination" innocuous, and even serviceable to 
Christological thought, by giving it an appropriate mean­
ing in the family life of the Trinity, and Brunner tries 
to achieve the same result by using the term to emphasize 
the true humanity of Jesus. The latter seems to make a 
stronger case for his way of viewing the matter, since 
Forsyth appears to know almost too much about the Trini­
tarian "family."
From Brunner's treatment of the kenosis, by which 
the Son took the "servant" form, it can readily be seen 
that if he had ever become familiar with the Kenotic 
Theory of Forsyth he would have disapproved of it. For 
him, the reduction of the divine attributes from actuality 
to potentiality would not have sufficiently "concealed" 
the Christ of faith behind the Jesus of history. Going
1. Forsyth, God the Holy Father, p. 42.
2. Ibidem.
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hand in hand with.this objection would have been the charge
that Forsyth's theory was far too "explanatory" of what
took place in the Incarnation. It would represent only so
much "grist for the mill" of reason to begin grinding out
a rationalized view of what is, for Brunner, an opaque
paradox and an impenetrable mystery. But his criticism
could well redound to Forsyth's praise.
In contrast to much that Brunner has to say,
Forsyth holds that in the Jesus of Historié together with
the Christ of Geschichte or faith there is the revelation
of God, not in one set over against the other, but in the
one as permeated by and required by the other. This is to
say that Revelation
is not simply the critical residue of the Synoptics, but their totality —  the whole apostolic burthen of the New Testament, pervading the Synoptics them­selves. The only fact ever offered by the Church is the total New Testament fact, where the synoptic figure of the Lord is self-interpreted by the same Lord acting as the Spirit. The New Testament revelation is the person of Christ in its whole and universal action, and not the character of Christ in its biographical aspect.^
Forsyth is not afraid of "history" and the "historical,"
as Brunner seems to be in so much of his Christological
writing. Though he is no more tolerant than Brunner of
the one-sided viewpoint represented by all the contemporary
"Lives of Jesus," he does not propose to err in the
1.• The Principle of Authority, p. I30.
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opposite direction. He believes that there are many in­
stances of true faith coming into being by the grace of 
God from a study of Christ as a figure in history. And he 
has no qualms about advising seeking souls to turn to the 
Synoptics and "pore and wait" (which undoubtedly for 
Forsyth included "thinking" and "reasoning") in the ex­
pectation that the Christ of faith will "surprise you from 
behind with His immortal life."^
The position that Forsyth takes up in the end can 
be set down in one short but pithy sentence: "The great 
fact is the historic phenomenon, Jesus, plus its *meta- 
historic' W o r d . T h i s  is a soundly conceived and well- 
balanced doctrine of the revelation of God in the person 
of Jesus Christ. As H. D. McDonald says ;
Forsyth, therefore, so to speak, puts Historié and Geschichte side by side, and maintains that they belong together in the totality of revelation.With the "Barthians" it is otherwise.3
Brunner, it should be said, has not disregarded the
1. Forsyth, God the Holy Father, p. 88.
2. Forsyth, The,Principle ,of.Authority, p. II5 .
3 . McDonald, Theories of Revelation, p. 8 9. McDonald goes on to castigate Brunner and Barth who "by eliminating the historical Jesus from account . . , can entertain the most radical critical conclusions regarding the records, but they appear to be left with a Christ who remains, only because He has the value of God for man, since He is who He is by the Church's valuation and interpretation of Him"(p. 9 1).
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attacks upon his attitude toward history and the historical 
with respect to the person of Christ and he seeks to* defend 
himself on two grounds. In the first place, he claims that 
those who criticise him have in mind his "old" position in 
The Mediator rather than his "modified" position in the 
Dogmatics ; and, in the second place, he refers to the view 
expressed in an early article, "Das Einmalige und der 
Existenzcharakter" (I9 2 9)» in which he declares forth­
rightly for the "once-for-all-ness" (Einmaligkeit) of the 
Christ-Revelation.^ Brunner seems to feel that his short 
essay established him for all time "on the side of the 
angels" in that here he "nailed" securely, so to speak, 
into the "timber" of history the coming of God in Jesus 
Christ by his insistence on the unique, i.e. unrepeatable, 
character of this revelation. He is sure that he cannot 
be justly charged with any failure to take history seriously 
as in the case of his fellow Barthians, especially of course 
Rudolf Bultmann,^
1. Kegley, ed., The Theology of Emil Brunner, pp. 
340-3 4 5* Brunner makes his double defence in the course of his replies to three critics ; Tetsutaro Ariga, Edward A. Dowey, Jr. and Georges Plorovsky.
2. In his reflections on "The Contemporary Theological Situation" in the third volume of his Dogmatics, Brunner finds Bultmann guilty of an extreme subjectivism which derives from the fact that he "does not relate faith to the historical Jesus Himself, but only to the believing kerygma about Him" (p. 2l6). Bultmann*s own words (found in the Introduction to Jesus and the Word, p. 8) are quoted
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However, the cloud of dubiety that hangs over 
Brunner's position has not been entirely cleared away by 
his rebuttal of his critics. It has already been pointed 
out that the "modification" of the position set forth in 
the Dogmatics, while significant, does not represent an 
about-turn from former views. As for the "Einmaligkeit" 
on which Brunner's thought has a real "fixation," it is 
indeed a vitally important and evangelical concept. P. T. 
Forsyth, as has been shown, has more than a little to say 
about the uniqueness of Christ and His coming to men.^
But —  Brunner has laid upon "once-for-all-ness" a heavy 
burden to serve as a sufficient counteractive to so much 
of his other teaching that gives the divine revelation in
to show that his belief "that we know practically nothing about the life and personality of Jesus" had disintegrated the Jesus of the Gospels and converted the scholarly German theologian to historical skepticism. Brunner considers his own position to be well removed from one in which "even the forgiveness of sins, that content of the Christian message which is retained in Bultmann's theology, is (as it were) left hanging in the air, since it is not rooted in a real historical event" (p. 21?). His own point of view is, he feels, a corrective to that of Karl Barth in whose theol­ogy "the question of the historical Jesus is scarcely raised," and also to that of Bultmann who considered only the Christ kerygma valid, not the historical Jesus. .The viewpoint to which he refers is dialectically set forth, he affirms, in "Das Einmalige und der Existenzcharakter," namely that ; "The historical event of Jesus is unique, first of all in the relative sense of the historian, secondly also in the absolute sense of faith, the eph hapax of apostolic proclamation" (Kegley, ed., The Theology of Emil Brunner, p. 341).
1. See above, pp. l^lff.
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in Jesus Christ a very loose connection with history. The 
basic difficulty encountered in his Christological writing 
has tended to remain there.
There is nothing in the thought of Emil Brunner 
that corresponds to the "Plerosis" of the Kenosis-Pierosis 
Theory, If there had been, it can be conjectured in his 
favour that he would have coined a sesquipedalian German 
word meaning "to become un-kenoticised" and would have 
improved over Forsyth in precision of statement. Be that 
as it may,' he has no idea of any process of "regaining 
what He was" that went on throughout the life of Jesus 
Christ. Such an idea cannot possibly be entertained as 
long as the career of human growth is regarded as the con­
cealment and not the revelation of Deity. This is not to 
say that Brunner does not believe that Jesus "increased in 
wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man," or 
that he rejects the view that Jesus, for all of His true 
humanity, lived a sinless life of perfect obedience to the 
Father. Furthermore, that he developed no Plerosis concept 
does not mean that Brunner proposes to leave the God-man 
in the depths of His humiliation, His Kenosis or exinanitio 
The humiliated servant must be lifted up, and Brunner con­
ceives of this in terms of the traditional view of Christ's 
"Exaltation" —  but with major alterations.
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In his Dogmatics II Brunner declares of the Exalta­
tion of Jesus Christ that it is "the return to the pure 
transcendence of His pre-historical existence..Where, it 
may be asked, does this "return" begin? Brunner will accept 
either the Pauline or the Johannine answer to this question. 
"For Paul the Exaltation of Jesus .is identical with His 
Resurrection, and the same is true in John: only in John 
still more plainly than in Paul, resurrection and cruci­
fixion, and thereby crucifixion and exaltation are regarded 
as a u n i t y . E v e n t u a l l y  there seems to be a slight 
preference for John's viewpoint, and Brunner inquires: "Is 
not this the deepest meaning of the Johannine mystery, 
that the Fourth Gospel always speaks of the exaltation in 
such a way that at the same time it means the exaltation 
of the Cross?"3 Thus, where Forsyth has posited the 
"zenith" of the Plerosis, Brunner finds the ultimate mean­
ing of the Exaltation —  in the Cross.
The discussion of the Resurrection involves, as
might be surmised from Brunner's previous trend of thought, 
a decided lack of interest in the physical and material 
aspects of the Easter event. There was no bodily rising
1. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 374.
2. Ibid., p. 373.
3. Ibid., p. 377.
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from the dead on the part of Jesus Christ. Whereas, 
Forsyth, in his.sermon on "The Living Christ" encourages *1questing souls to "visit His holy sepulchre in Scripture,"*^ 
Brunner is very non-committal about the Empty Tomb. Unlike 
Forsyth, Brunner makes Resurrection and Ascension "all of 
a piece," rejecting the Lucan report of the intervening 
forty days and dissociating a truth known only to faith 
from any connection with physical facts. However, these 
denials do not of themselves constitute a great problem in 
Brunner's Christology, nor do they mark a sharp contrast 
between the two theologians. While he does not reject 
outright a virgin birth and a physical resurrection for 
Jesus, Forsyth certainly "sits loose" to these doctrines.
It is really Brunner's motivation in making his denials 
that becomes suspect and troublesome. Apparently he has 
a basic and persistent fear, quite absent from Forsyth's 
mind, that Christ's involvement with the historical and 
the material will thereby provide evidence of some kind 
which will inhibit the free operation of faith in bringing 
men to acknowledge His Deity. So it comes about that, 
when Brunner’s complicated exposition of the Person of 
Jesus Christ has been examined with care, his explication 
stands under the shadow of an interrogation point, i.e.
!.. God the Holy Father, p. 88,
434
whether the Son of God really entered into the forms of 
earthly existence, whether He became part of history, or if 
He stands behind history so that one sees only the "mask."
The difficulties that crop up in Brunner's Christo­
logical construction provide a real clue to the problem of 
revelation and reason in the Divine-human encounter. On 
the one hand, Brunner sees revelation as merely touching 
the "fringe" of reason, so that there is a contact of 
sorts between them; but at the same time one must never 
concede that the revelation can take on any form of reason. 
However, he realizes that such a position would be 
Docetism. Therefore he tries hard to avoid such Docetism 
by emphasizing again and again the "once-for-all-ness" 
(Einmaligkeit) of Jesus Christ, so the revelation does 
take on reasonable form. Yet Brunner fears to go this far, 
so that at many points he attempts to emphasize the per­
sonal to the disparagement of the form. Thus it is that 
much uncertainty becomes attached to the nature and extent 
of the contact between revelation and reason.
It is against the background of the foregoing dis­
cussion that the "unity" of the "Divine" and the "human" 
in the Person of Jesus Christ, as this is conceived by 
Forsyth and Brunner, will be considered. It must be borne 
in mind that there can be no real unity in the one Person 
unless there is a basic congeniality between "Divine" and 
" human. "
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ill. The Divine-human Person of Jesus Christ
As has been set forth in an earlier chapter,
Forsyth believes that it is high time to discard the 
Chalcedonian definition of the "Two Natures" and replace 
it with a better formulation.^ However, the most important 
points of his position should be restated before the con­
trasting view of Brunner is given.
Forsyth’s objection to Chalcedon begins with the 
conviction that the categories of the formula are "too 
elemental and p h y s i c a l . B e i n g  so regarded they lead to 
the erroneous conclusion that the two natures were united 
into one incarnate Person through a miraculous rather than 
a moral process; hence, the person of Christ becomes the 
result of the miraculous union and not its agent.3 Having 
diagnosed the problem in this way, Forsyth set himself to 
seek out and devise a new and more adequate form of 
theological expression.
The course of Forsyth’s labours was largely deter­
mined by his belonging to a generation whose thought had 
been shaped by personalism in philosophy and an increased 
concern for ethics in religion. If Christianity is to
1. See above, pp. 8$ff.
2. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 223.
3. Ibidem.
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appeal in a persuasive way to modern man, it must be 
articulated in terms of personal ethical experience rather 
than in the abstract speculative terms of ancient dogma.
To this concerned theologian such an undertaking becomes 
absolutely imperative because of the impossibility of com­
prehending Christian Faith apart from its central doctrine 
—  the unique moral experience of the forgiveness of sins 
in Jesus Christ. Speculative philosophical language is 
inherently incapable of dealing with this theme in any 
adequate way.
In Forsyth's estimation, the solution of the 
problem thus posed lies in going back to long neglected 
modes of thought found in the Bible. This means a return 
from the Hellenic to the Hebraic concept of the divine 
immutability —  the divine changelessness demonstrated, 
not violated, by "the stability and utter steadfastness of 
God’s righteous, saving p u r p o s e . G o d  must be thought of 
as capable of doing anything that His holy love demands. 
Grounded in this conviction, Forsyth has no hesitancy in 
declaring that "Infiniturn capax finiti. W h e n  God in His 
divine Self-emptying in Jesus Christ acts in perfect
1. H. P. Lovell Cocks in a review of "The Person and Place of Jesus Christ," The Expository Times (April, 1953) Vol. 64, p. 198.
2. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, 
p. 309.
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freedom to make forgiveness available to sinful men, acts 
to redeem, acts to reconcile, acts to save, the holy loving 
character of the Father is vindicated and the Deity of the 
Son is certified.
It is inevitable that the type of kenotic theory 
which he develops should set Forsyth in opposition to the 
time-honoured concept of the divine immutability. Out of 
this confrontation emerge many of the constructive thoughts 
that are given provocative expression in the latter pages 
of The Person and Place of Jesus Christ. That which is 
most truly affirmed of God is not that He is simply im­
mutable, but that He is "holy immutable morality"^ and 
therefore can do "everything that is prescribed by holy 
Dove ; hence, the Self-retracting act of the Son’s will 
is no negation of the divine nature, "it is the last 
assertion of His nature as Love . . . [and] it is the 
freest energy of His whole will."3 in his conception of
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 312.
2. Ibid., p. 3 1 3.
3 . Ibid., p. 3 1 4. It is really a slight to Forsyththat R. G. Dawe in his Form of a Servant gives Barth such extravagant credit for original boldness and discernment in his approach to the kenotic motif. Dawe asserts that Barth’s fruitful insight in his Commentary on Phillppians and in his Church Dogmatics is that God is utterly free to act in whatever way His holy love demands, and this action is the supreme confirmation of His inviolable immutability ; that the divine self-emptying is the affirmation of the
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the Self-giving of God in Christ as manifesting His 
"changeless change" in a movement that answers to man’s 
great yearning for deliverance from sin, Forsyth effect­
ively lays the ancient ghost of his Christo­
logical thought.
Complementing the kenotic movement, and the neces­
sary counterbalance of the divine kenosiSj is the plerotic 
or Godward movement in the Person of Christ. This is to 
say that the Son of God brought with Him in His Incarna­
tion "such a soul as was bound morally . . .  to grow, 
under His life’s vocation, to the personality that was the 
complete and final revelation of God, the agent of man’s 
redemption, and the locus of man’s communion with God."1 
According to Forsyth, there can be no union of God 
and man in the one person except "in a moral way, by per­
sonal action which is moral in its method as well as in 
its a i m . " I t  is only by the way of moral modulation 
that the divine Logos could become true m a n ,"3 and the
God-ness of God rather than its denial; that God remains absolute and unchangeable in His self-giving in Christ because this act is the highest fulfilment of His will of love for men (pp. 166-175)* Such thoughts of course were a part of P. T. Forsyth’s Christological reflection long before Karl Barth gave them prolific expression. In com­parison with Barth he is "lean to the bone" in his treat­ment of the same theme, but the marrow of his thought strikingly anticipates both Barth and Brunner.
1. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 341.
2. Ibid., p. 223. 3. Ibidem.
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Christian doctrine of incarnation is thereby certified to 
be unique. This idea has "its origin and seat in the Cross, 
which is . . .  the historic focus of moral mediation," 
Furthermore, the contingent of the moral action of Christ 
the incarnate Word was the great and creative moral 
decision of His before He entered the world of time. 
Otherwise the union of Deity and humanity in the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth would have been merely the result of the 
continuous and ascending moral action in His historic life. 
In this case, His moral growth would give but growing 
effect to the indwelling of God in his human person and the 
absolute union would have to take place in His death in 
which His perfect Self-sacrifice would be both completion 
of His personal development and his identification with 
God, This would mean a progressive incarnation of God and 
a progressive deification of the human Jesus in a "rising 
scale of involution," merely another form of adoptionism, 
to which Forsyth strongly objects.
The way has now been prepared for a climactic and 
summary statement with respect to the Person of the God-man*
What we have in Christ, therefore, is more than the co-existence of two natures, or even their interpenetration. We have within this single in- create person the mutual involution of the two personal acts or movements supreme in spiritual
1 . The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 223*
being, the one distinctive of man, the other dis­tinctive of God . . . Cthese3 movements, . . .  redemption and religion, are revealed as being so personal that they can take harmonious, complete, and final effect within one historic person, in- create but corporeal.
Such is the summing up of Forsyth’s substitute for the Two- 
nature Doctrine of Chalcedon. The unity and identity of 
the person of Christ is not to be found in the juxta­
position of two static natures, but in the moral and 
dynamic interplay of two personal activities —  the "mutual 
involution" of the movement of God to man and of man to 
God, But before any critical comment is ventured on what 
Forsyth offers in place of the Chalcedonian formula, Emil 
Brunner’s treatment of the Doctrine of the Two Natures will 
be reviewed.
In an article in The Expository Times on represent­
atives of the Barthian school of theology. Canon J, K, 
Mozley, with a contrasting attitude of P. T, Forsyth in 
mind, once observed of Emil Brunner;
He is not embarrassed, as some eminent British theologians have been, by the "Two Natures" phraseology. He rightly emphasizes the fact that in the language about "substance" and "nature" nothing physical in the modern sense was implied.
1, Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 34-4. Forsyth then states the advantages of this view* "We seem , , , to have something that comes nearer to our ex­perience, something we can verify, and something, moreover, that is of more religious value to us, than if we speak too much about a conjunction of natures,"
2, J, K, Mozley, "Emil Brunner," The Expository Times (September, 1932), p. 537,
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This was written in 1932 and was based on evidence found
in The Mediator, However, a score of years later in his
Dogmatics, Brunner shows more concern over the "phraseology"
of Chalcedon, and now he says :
As soon as the idea of "Nature" emerges in theologywe have occasion to be disturbed, • . . For us , . ,indeed the ancient idea of "Nature" has become al­most hopelessly "naturalized,"^
"Nature" unfortunately took on an altered meaning somewhere 
during the time of the later Renaissance and Brunner is 
willing to admit that this presents a problem, though not 
the greatest one, "Quite apart from this change in language 
and its use , , , we cannot view the application of such an 
abstract philosophical idea to theology without consider­
able m i s g i v i n g , T h i s  "misgiving" is sufficient to 
launch Brunner into a long and passionate argument of the
same type that he uses against the Doctrine of the Virgin
Birth, "Just as all speculation about the way in which 
the Incarnation came to be is fruitless, —  and therefore 
dangerous —  so also is it fruitless to speculate about 
the ’Two Natures,'"3
A very big question arises in connection with the 
affirmation that Jesus Christ was vere Deus and vere homo
1, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemp­tion, p. 358,
2. Ibidem, 3* Ibid., p. 359*
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at one and the same time, a question that never seems to 
have entered the heads of the early Fathers* Brunner 
phrases this question in three forms, two of them 
rhetorical;
Is it possible to throw light on the mystery of the unity of both statements by an effort of thought? Must not every attempt to define the "togetherness" of divinity and humanity in the Person of Jesus break down? Is it not a fact, that all such attempts, of whatever kind, are disastrous, because they inevitably lead man to go further than is allowable in trying to transcend the limitations of human thought?^
The answer that is expected here is quite obvious* There 
was really no choice at Chalcedon but to set "two irrecon­
cilable contradictions side by side.
Does Brunner have anything to offer then in place 
of the Two-nature concept? If so, it is certainly not 
Forsyth's notion of "the mutual involution of two personal 
movements*" This would be a laboured effort of foolishly 
trying to explain the ultimately unexplainable* Brunner 
prefers to say that in "the absolutely unthinkable paradox 
of the divine humanity"3 is represented the self-movement 
of God to man. He does agree with Forsyth that "this Per­
son is not static but dynamic * * * His 'being* coincides
1. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation andRedemption, p , 35Ô”
2. Ibidem.
3* Brunner, The Mediator, p. 493*
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with His • . , action."  ^ Taken as it stands, the Doctrine 
of the Two Natures means simply that "the Eternal Word has 
come." In the component parts of this simple statement 
the profound duality of the Person of Jesus Christ is ex­
pressed. On the one hand, "the humanity of the Son of God 
means that He has really come, it means the contingency, 
the uniqueness of the revelation."^ On the other hand, 
"the divinity of the Son of Man means the eternity of the 
Word, the personal Presence of the Eternal God in Him."3 
Consistent with Barthian theological presuppositions, 
Brunner concludes that the how of the unity of the vere 
Deus and the vere homo in the one Person "is utterly be­
yond the power of human understanding, and it is also be­
yond all that really concerns f a i t h . I t  is in words 
such as these that Brunner might have rebuked Forsyth, 
he had ever become acquainted with the Kenosis-Plerosis 
Theory.
While any resemblance to Forsyth's theory is very 
faint indeed, Brunner does offer a simple and descriptive, 
not explanatory, illustration of the "coming" and the
1, Brunner, The Mediator, p. 493,
2. Ibidem. 3« Ibidem.
4. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. jSTl
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"returning" of God in Christ,^ The basis of his descrip­
tion is the passage in Philippians, so familiar to both . 
theologians. Principal Charles Duthie tells how the para­
bolic movement in Brunner's exposition in The Mediator re­
lates to human understanding of the God-man:
In order to understand this divine-human Jesus who comes to us from the heart of ultimate God, we must consider His life and ministry in its whole­ness, Emil Brunner has provided us with a useful illustration in the parabola. What he calls the "self-movement" of God in Jesus begins in heaven, descends through the Incarnation into the life of Jesus, reaches its nadir in the Cross, and climbs back again into heaven through the Resurrection and the Ascension. This whole movement is a move­ment of God and a movement of God's continuous Self-giving.^
However, aside from being a double movement of God in 
Christ, the divine activity described by Brunner has no 
real similarity to the kenotic-plerotic movement of 
Forsyth's theory and it does nothing to illuminate the re­
lationship of the Divine and human in the one Person.
The same negative results ensue from Brunner's re­
stricted use of the kenosis concept in his Dogmatics. On 
the one hand, kenosis means a divine self-limitation that 
still makes it possible to speak of Jesus as Divine. On 
the other hand, kenosis means a divine self-limitation 
that makes it possible to speak of Jesus as a true man.
1. Brunner, The Mediator, pp. 561-563»
2. Duthie, God In His World, p. 28
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According to Brunner, this self-emptying is the supreme 
paradox of the Christian faith. For the extreme manifesta­
tion of human weakness and frailty in Jesus* death on the 
Cross is also the supreme revelation of His God-ness. How 
this can be true is entirely beyond any rational interpre­
tation or human understanding. Thus it can be seen that 
whereas Forsyth "adjusts" the paradox which comes so 
sharply into focus at Calvary by conceiving this point in 
Christ's career as the climax of the kenotic-plerotic move­
ment, thereby affirming the unity of Divinity and humanity, 
Brunner can only see in the "extremes" of the Cross the 
ultimate paradoxical truth that Christ is both God and man 
in an utterly unexplainable and incomprehensible relation­
ship. In other words, whereas Forsyth holds to kenosis to 
avoid the problem and difficulty of the Two-nature bypath 
laid out at Chalcedon, Brunner holds to kenosis alongside 
that bypath with all of its unrelieved mystery.
In the thought of Emil Brunner it is through the re­
demptive work of Christ that faith in encounter grasps His 
Deity and humanity as modes of God as Agape, the very prin­
ciple which constitutes and determines the human and Divine 
qualities of the one Person, Jesus Christ. In terms of 
this moral principle, the man Jesus is co-eternal with the 
Father. Faith grasps that "it has pleased God to identify 
Himself with a localized finite entity, with the historical
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person, Jesus of Nazareth,"  ^ the One who is vere Deus and 
vere homo. If He were only Divine, He would be a power­
less Impersonal Idea apart from human persons and God as 
being. If He were only human, He would be corrupted by 
sin and could not be free to reveal God (who is not sub­
ject to sin) and reconcile man to God. Therefore faith 
affirms that He is true God and true man. Beyond this 
truth the union of the Divine and human in Christ is 
mystery, and its elements of paradox cannot be reconciled 
within the confines of rational understanding. Thus it 
becomes apparent that while Brunner's Christological 
thought is truly "orthodox" it fails to provide any help 
in resolving the problem presented by the doctrine of the 
Two Natures.
Yet to affirm Brunner's failure at the point of 
the Two-nature difficulty is not to claim unqualified 
success for Forsyth. The latter's notion of the union of 
the Divine and the human as "the mutual involution of two 
personal movements" has not had uncritical acceptance. 
Sixty years ago C. W. Hodge of Princeton Theological 
Seminary, in a review of The Person and Place of Jesus 
Christ, made the comment, "This combination, it seems to 
me, is far more difficult to understand than the union of
1, Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p . 3S2I
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two natures in one person."! And in 1952 W. L. Bradley 
argued that the Kenosis-Plerosis doctrine "has little to 
commend it over the two-nature theory, since it seems as 
abstract and impersonal as the other."2 However, against 
all objections that he does not make it clear how two per­
sonal actions in integrative relationship can constitute 
another person, Forsyth can be defended to some extent at 
least by saying that he knew full well the limitations of 
his proposal and was only hoping to be suggestive where 
it was impossible to explicate. Furthermore, the effort 
of this earnest theologian to cope in some intelligible 
way with the long-standing problem of the Two Natures 
deserves the most careful consideration before any re­
jection is made on the questionable ground that it is as 
"abstract and impersonal" as the ancient formula.
3. The Work of Jesus Christ
The work of Jesus Christ in the thought of Forsyth 
and Brunner has been dealt with in some detail in the 
latter pages of Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this
1. C. W. Hodge, Book Review of The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, by P. T. Forsyth, The Princeton Theological Review, Vol. VIII (October, 1910), p . 692.
2. Bradley, P. T. Forsyth - The Man and His Work,p. 210.
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dissertation. It is the hope of the writer that this has 
been done with sufficient clarity to make it unnecessary to 
re-examine the respective points of view to any great ex­
tent in the course of making a comparison. This hope is 
strengthened by the fact that there are not as many angles 
to be reckoned with or complicated concepts and categories 
to be interpreted in the case of the "Work" as there were 
in the matter of the "Person." Forsyth's and Brunner's 
teaching can thus be reviewed and criticized much more 
briefly in this section. The primary aim will be to pre­
sent comparatively and critically only those views which 
are considered requisite to an understanding of the thesis 
of both theologians that the work of Christ is the clue to 
His person. Furthermore, before dealing with the recon­
ciliation and redemption accomplished by the Saviour of 
men, two aspects of the doctrine of God and the doctrine 
of man which, as has been indicated, are fundamental to 
Forsyth's and Brunner's soteriology will be considered in 
a summary way.
i. The Holiness of God
One of the main emphases in the Barthian, Dialec­
tical or Neo-orthodox Theology of the past half-century 
has been the transcendence of God. Forsyth anticipated 
this emphasis, which was later to appear so prominently in
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the writings of Barth and Brunner, in the stress he placed 
upon God's holiness. He even goes so far as to say, 
"Everything begins and ends in our Christian theology with 
the holiness of G o d . I t  is clear that he and Brunner 
both start their labours with the major premise of the 
majestic and holy God. This holiness is the absolute, 
unconditional and exclusive aspect of the Divine nature.
It is that which sets Him apart from humanity and the whole
realm of the temporal and material, that which makes mani­
fest the qualitative difference between God and man.
Neither Forsyth nor Brunner conceives of this holi­
ness as a static or quiescent attribute of Deity. Accord­
ing to Forsyth, holiness as redemption "speaks in the 
o v e r f l o w , a n d  Brunner posits in holiness "the Will to 
i n c l u d e . " 3  In other words, holiness is active, or, as it 
might be said, "God acting."
In the thought of both theologians Love as Agape is 
vitally identified with the Divine holiness. This is not 
a "sentimental" Love, but a Love that indicates how 
seriously God takes Himself and man. It is never in an- 
thesis to God's wrath and anger. Rather it is a holy Love
1. Forsyth, The Work of Christ, p. ?8.
2. Forsyth, Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 14$.
3. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 163.
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that must judge with a "thoroughgoing judgment" (Forsyth), 
a Love that "breaks through" the wrath of God (Brunner)•
Holy Love is God's will for restored relationship with ma,n 
translated into judging and saving action in Jesus Christ*
At this point notice must be taken of certain 
criticism that has been directed at Forsyth. J. M. Shaw 
writing in Theology Today has claimed to find in his the­
ology a contrast, which is "almost a dualism, drawn between 
the 'holiness * and the 'love* of God, which does less than 
justice to the Scriptural representation,However, to 
this writer it seems difficult to believe that anyone who 
has thoroughly read Forsyth could come to such a conclusion. 
The expression "holy love" occurs over and over again in 
his books and articles, and even when they are found singly 
there is usually a plain indication that "holy" and "love" 
belong together. The ideas embodied in each word are 
shown to have a necessary, close and harmonious relation­
ship. "If holiness do not go out to sanctify . . * all 
things, if it do not give itself in love, it is less than 
holy, Indeed Forsyth seems to take special pains to 
show that there is no tension or separation between God's
1. J. M. Shaw, "The Theology of P. T. Forsyth," Theology Today (October, 1946), p. 3 6 9.
2. Forsyth, This Life and the Next, p. 33*
451
holiness and His love. Shaw's criticism is not based on 
substantial evidence.^
ii. The Sinfulness of Man
It is the joint conviction of Forsyth and Brunner 
that man is a desperately sinful creature, standing in 
guilt before holy God. Guilt is the term preferred by.both 
thinkers to indicate the personal implications of man's 
sinfulness. Sin is utterly divisive in the relationship 
between man and God. Forsyth says that man's sin sets him 
in "sullen severance" from holy God, while Brunner describes 
man as "in revolt" against sovereign and majestic God. In 
the thinking of both men sin and guilt are universal, for 
sin has vitiated "the whole race in its moral aspect and 
r e li a b il i ty . Wh i le  there is much agreement between them 
as to the nature of sin and its consequences, Forsyth's and 
Brunner's views do not coincide all the way. In fact, 
some important differences emerge from their discussion of 
man as a sinner, and these differences should be considered. 
According to Brunner, the question of questions that
1. J. H* Rogers in The Theology of P. T» Forsyth might be thought of as refuting Shaw when he interprets Forsyth's emphasis on the judgment of God as "good news" for the sin­ner rather than bad. "The good news of judgment is that God has chosen to destroy sin and hallow His name in sucha way that man is re-established in communion with Him"(p. 48).
2. Forsyth, The Principle of Authority, p. 4o4.
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arises about man is, "Who is this being?" When the answer 
is given that man is a sinner before holy God who wills to 
restore communion with the creature of His love, the prob­
lem of the great hindering obstacle to such communion must 
be grappled with in a serious way. This problem receives 
close attention in Brunner's Christological writing. In 
the pages of The Mediator he makes a rather shocking state­
ment about man as a sinner: "We are sinners because we are 
human beings ; the idea of a sinless historical human life 
is from the human point of view an impossible idea."^
This assertion has elicited the critical comment from 
D. K. Baillie: "It is highly heretical to teach that man 
is essentially s i n f u l . "3
The idea that the humanity of man is inherently sin­
ful is indeed a reprehensible way of thinking, and it is 
surely no longer in Brunner's mind when he writes "Nature 
and Grace" and seeks to make a distinction between the 
formal and the material Image of God in man. If man is
1. Brunner, Man in Revolt, p. 18.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 320f.
3. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 90. This view has avery direct bearing on Christology and in a footnoteBaillie inquires: "How does Brunner reconcile this with his belief that Jesus lived a sinless life on earth?" The answer can only be that Brunner does not, because he can­not. This is just another example of the inconsistencies that come to light here and there in his writing.
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essentially sinful there cannot be a "formal" Image (that 
which distinguishes man from beast) untouched by sin, and 
all possibility of establishing the fact that man is a re­
sponsive, responsible being before holy God is taken away.
Quite apart from this singular instance of what may 
have been an unintentional "slip" in Brunner's theologizing, 
when the dust has settled from his heated controversy with 
Karl Barth, it is still not clear that there is in man the 
sinner any meaningful "point of contact" for the downcoming 
Agape of God in Christ Jesus. The validity of the sovereign 
principle of "Truth as Encounter" comes into question when 
man is regarded as so affected by sin in the core of his 
being that all mutuality in the encounter is talc en away.
For, as Forsyth has said, the act of redemptive revelation 
whereby sinful man in faith comes to know God as holy 
saving love is "not a simple act but an act of mutuality.
Its sphere is the world of . . . moral and concrete 
experience."^
Forsyth believes that sin, though a great and 
grievous factor in the life of man, does not totally 
corrupt his nature and reduce him to a "blank page" as 
the contact for the redemptive revelation of holy God
1. Forsyth, "Revelation and the Person of Christ,"Faith and Criticism, p. 104.
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in Jesus Christ. As has been shown, man's conscience —  
"more dead than alive" but still alive —  is the locus 
where Christ graciously meets man as the "Conscience of 
the conscience." In this "point of contact" there is 
more of a personal, a moral and a mutual encounter of God
and man in faith than there can possibly be in the
Anknupfungspunkt of Emil Brunner.
In a view that puts him much closer to Brunner than 
to Barth, Forsyth holds that there ^  a general revelation 
in Nature, and that the Christian (but only the Christian) 
can see God "as the indwjelling ground, thought and speech 
of Nature."^ The Jew of the Old Testament truly believed 
that God gave revelation but he never came to the realisa­
tion that God was revelation.
He knew God spoke from time to time, but he did not know that God was ever speaking, and must ever speak —  that the world is his self-utterance, that He is an open-hearted God, that self-revelation is His very nature, and that the whole frame of the world and the soul is tingling with His self- manif estation. . . . The Jew did not realise, asChrist has taught us to realise, the "openness"there is about God.^
And yet Nature is totally deficient as a "saving" revela­
tion of God. There is no moral power in Nature to redeem 
the soul of sinful man from death. This is what Forsyth
1. Forsyth, Religion In Recent Art, p. 143.
2. Ibidem.
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has in mind when he later writes in a manner which might
seem to contradict what he has previously affirmed:
If we will use the words carefully, there is no revelation in Nature. There can be none, because there is no forgiveness. . . . For conscience, stricken or strong, she has no word. Therefore she has no revelation. . . . Christ is the only luminous smile upon the dark face of the world.^
The point has been made. With Forsyth no less than with
Brunner there can be no "Natural Theology" that offers a
way of salvation to man as a sinner before holy God. Man's
salvation can only come through a Christ greatly conceived
as the very power and presence of God Himself in gracious
moral action in an otherwise hopeless human situation.
iii. The Atoning Cross
It can be heartily asserted that the Cross looms 
large upon the horizon of Porsyth-Brunner reflections upon 
the Work of Christ. Forsyth uses the word "Cross" so much 
in his books and articles that he has sometimes been 
charged with obscuring Christ by the "machinery of the 
Atonement."2 As for Brunner, while it is true that he 
does not weave the pattern of the Cross into all of his : 
writings as Forsyth so nearly does, he definitely wants to
1. Forsyth, "Revelation and the Person of Christ," Faith and Criticism, p. 100.
2. Griffith, The Theology of P. T. Forsyth, p. *94.
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be accounted a "theologian of the Cross," along with Luther 
and Calvin,^
The crucifixion of Christ is the central fact of 
human history, yet in the thought of both Forsyth and 
Brunner the real significance of the atoning Cross is 
"superhistoric. The understanding of the Bible and the 
understanding of the teachings and life and person of 
Christ are attendant upon the understanding of the Cross. 
Jesus who was crucified is a historic personality, but in 
the relevance of His Person to our faith He is also "super- 
historic." Paul verbally explicates that which was en­
acted on the Cross of Christ. In the Cross —  and in the 
Cross alone —  is there a clear disclosure of both the
holiness of God and the sinfulness of man. At the same
time the Cross reveals that God in infinite and holy Love, 
and at great cost to Himself, has graciously acted on 
behalf of man the sinner.
Forsyth and Brunner are "neo-orthodox" in their 
interpretation of the Atonement. That is to say they 
follow the main line of Reformation teaching but with 
certain variations, deletions, and changes of emphasis. 
Though Forsyth does some quibbling and qualifying in his
1. The Mediator, pp. 435ff*
1. The Cruciality of the Cross, p. 1?. Cf. B.,The Mediator, p. 504.
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use of the terms "penal" and "substitute," his ultimate 
conclusions in the matter support the opinion that both he 
and Brunner, broadly speaking, hold to a substitutionary 
and Reformed view of the Atonement. This view is entirely 
"objective" in that it is "God Himself who reconciles Him­
self"^ (Forsyth); in that "God Himself provides the 
sacrifice"^ (Brunner).
Forsyth works out his theory within the framework 
of the threefold aspects of the Cross ; the triumphant
aspect has to do with Christ's conquest of the powers of
darkness by His complete obedience in life and death; the 
satisfactionary aspect is the satisfaction, expiation, or 
atonement made by Christ to the Holiness of God; the re­
generative aspect is the sanctifying or new-creative in­
fluence on the soul of man.3
Brunner has a parallel scheme that he presents in 
association with the Reformed doctrine of the threefold 
office of Christ ; Christ as Prophet makes from the Cross, 
as the climax of His teaching and the authentication of 
His Divine-human personality. His highest revelation; 
Christ as Priest, as the culmination of a life of self-
1. Forsyth, The Work of Christ, p. 92.
2. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 482.
3. See above, pp. I83ff.
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giving for sinful humanity, gives Himself on the Cross; 
Christ as King triumphs on the Cross and establishes the 
Kingdom of God wherein "liberated" man may live in 
obedience to the Will of Holy God.^
In these tripartite arrangements Forsyth gives much 
the greater emphasis to the satisfactionary aspect of the 
Cross while Brunner concentrates on the priestly work of 
Christ. In this respect their primary interest and concern 
are seen to coincide. The stress that Forsyth places upon 
the satisfactionary and substitutionary work of Christ as 
"Mediator"2 anticipates Brunner in a striking way in view 
of the fact that some years later the Swiss theologian was 
to gather his Christological thoughts into a massive tome 
under this very title —  The Mediator (Per Mittler). In 
this volume Brunner shows deep appreciation for the 
Anselmic theory of satisfaction.3
1. See above, pp. 3l8ff,
2. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ,p. 12; God the Holy Father, p. 94; Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, pp. l?2ff. See also Forsyth, "Revelation and the Person of Christ," p. 113; "The Reality of Grace," The Hibbert Journal, July I9 0 6 , p. 8 3 2.
3* R. S. Franks in his book, The Atonement, makes the pertinent comment : "It may be observed incidentally that there is the most curious irony in Brunner's praise of Anselm. The rationality that Anselm valued in his theory of satisfaction is what the Barthians most hate. . . . .  Brunner accepts what Anselm meant as a rational doctrine of the Incarnation, not because it is rational (God forbid!), but because St. Paul said something like it, and the
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The Chrlstus Victor element is found in the theories 
of both Forsyth and Brunner —  more pronouncedly in the 
former than in the latter.^ Likewise, the conquest of evil 
is not a hollow victory that results merely in the sup­
pression of Satanic powers and a resultant condition of no- 
sin. The man of faith is freed into a larger life and a 
new obedient heart is created in him. There is absolutely 
no "moral influence" of the Pattern Man involved in this 
change in human life. Forsyth and Brunner are both in­
flexible in their opposition to a "subjective" view of the 
Atonement. The recreating work of Christ takes place with­
in the man of faith who is brought within the Christ of 
God who atoned for man on the Cross. There can be no 
re-creation without atonement.
Forsyth and Brunner alike feel that the Cross was 
the work of that perfect God who on that historic tree., 
sacrificed His Son, revealing to faith His boundless love -• 
a love which judged a sinless Individual for sinful man. 
Such is the supreme love of a supreme God. In contrast to 
this holy sovereign God as seen by faith in the Cross 
stands man in his imperfection, now having a sense of the
inspiration of St.' Paul's epistles settles all controver­sies" (p. 20f).
1, See above, p. 331f.
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chasm between himself and Divinity ; which in turn forces 
man into a crisis, confers dignity upon his life, and 
supplies the dynamic to banish moral confusion.
While building upon the juristic aspects of the 
Atonement in Reformation theology Forsyth and Brunner 
would go beyond the Reformers in expressing their con­
ceptions in more personal terms. Forsyth is anticipating 
Brunner in this matter when he maintains that, "the ulti­
mate, the fundamental judgment is an adjustment between 
persons —  God's and man's. Both theologians ground 
their development of the doctrine of the work of Christ 
upon the principle of the relationship of beings or per­
sons —  God, Christ, and man in relation to one another. 
God, the Creator and Redeemer, is the being who creates 
and redeems human persons through the work of the Divine- 
human person, Jesus Christ. Within the framework of this 
principle there is an objective aspect (the agape activity 
of the holy God in Christ) and a subjective aspect (man's 
reception and appropriation in faith of the agape activity 
of God in Christ) to the work of Christ. Through the work 
of the Divine-human man, a new relationship is established 
between God and man; reconciliation or atonement takes 
place. God performs His redemptive work in Christ.
1. The Justification of God, p. 180
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As has been previously set forth, it is Brunner's 
intent to achieve a "balanced" doctrine of the Atonement.^ 
This means a theory of the atoning work in which the two 
aspects have their proportionate and necessary place. "We 
are not dealing with a purely subjective or a purely ob­
jective process but with an Event which is both objective 
and subjective at the same time, a truth of 'encounter*. 
Brunner sincerely wants to keep away from the "completely 
objectivistic conception of the sola gratia principle"3 
found in the teaching of Karl Barth who "regards interest 
in the believing subject as mere pietistic subjectivism.
As a corrective for this view and in order to construct a 
balanced doctrine Brunner must place a corresponding 
emphasis on the sola fide principle, which he essays to do.
1. See above, pp. 336ff,
2, Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 290.
3* Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the Consummation, p. 213.
4. Ibidem. Brunner is as eager to avoid the extreme objectivism of Barth with respect to the "believing sub­ject" as he is to escape the extreme subjectivism of Bultmann with respect to the historical Jesus. He is con­vinced that in both instances his own view is superior: "Thus we transcend the one-sidedness of objectivism which does indeed confess sola gratia, but does not really con­fess sola fide, and also the one-sidedness of subjectivism, according to which faith is not concerned with the Jesus Christ of history, but only with the kerygma about Jesus Christ" (p. 224).
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However, his own deep commitment to sola gratia and sola 
fide, interpreted in a too inflexible way, makes it im­
possible to show to any degree of intelligibility how the 
two aspects of the saving revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ operate in a balanced relationship. It can only be 
affirmed that this is true. As his solution of the prob­
lem, Brunner is forced to conclude: "The atonement in its 
paradoxical combination of subjective and objective . . . 
is the unfathomable mystery of God.
Forsyth fares better in his effort at this point.^ 
While Anselm thought of the appropriation of the atonement 
by man in terms of an external transfer of merit, and in 
the Reformation the act of faith was seen to be essential 
as the passive personal acceptance of the forensic judg­
ment of God on the sinner, Forsyth is not content with 
these positions. His own view includes but seeks to go 
beyond that of the Reformation. Reconciliation is personal 
and moral or nothing, and it is rooted in the conscience 
of God and man alike. Forsyth places man's faith in closer 
relationship to the atoning Cross. This means bringing 
Christ's regenerative work into the picture. Holiness is 
only satisfied with personal communion, for only man's
1. Brunner, The Mediator, p. 528.
2. See above, p. I88f.
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loving, obedient communion gives God the glory and ap­
preciates the moral right of Lordship which is His. Man, 
however, participates in such communion only by penitent 
faith. Thus, while man's faith is not the ground of the 
atonement, not the substitutionary aspect, it does have a 
real place in the atonement which is indicated by the re­
presentative function of Christ. The Hevelation-Redemption 
act is not solely rational, but it is not magical, and, 
most importantly, it is moral through and through. While 
all is certainly not clear in this view, Forsyth moves 
closer than Brunner to an intelligibly "balanced" theory 
of the atonement.
With Forsyth, in contrast to Brunner, the emphasis 
is more on the Deity of Christ than on His humanity in the 
performance of His mediatorial work. This has been in­
timated previously in the discussion of the Plerosis where 
it was pointed out that Forsyth looked upon the Cross as 
the climax of Christ's regaining of His Godhead. From 
this point it is but a step to the bold declaration that : 
"In the death of Jesus it was God that d i e d . T h i s  would 
seem to be skirting close to the Patripassian heresy which 
Brunner so strongly renounces. However, the startling 
statement must be interpreted figuratively to avoid an
1. Forsyth, "Revelation and the Person of Christ,"Faith and Criticism, p. 132.
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intolerable theological problem —  such a problem, it 
could be said, as has confronted the "Death of God" theo­
logians in the nineteen-sixties. Forsyth is simply trying 
to give the greatest possible emphasis to the amazing 
lengths to which Holy God is willing to go in redeeming 
man from sin, and doing this puts language under a strain, 
Brunner, as has been seen, underscores in his 
Dogmatics the fact that the death on the Cross is the 
final point of the kenosis, the completion of the Incarn­
ation, At the Cross, in the completeness of His enflesh- 
ing, Christ is seen to be most thoroughly human. Apropos 
of this teaching is the comment once made by J# K, Mozley 
on Brunner's viewpoint in The Mediator: "While there is 
much in his work to remind one of Dr. Forsyth, he finds 
more soteriological importance in the Incarnation than 
Forsyth d i d . I t  is even more obvious in his later writ­
ing than it was in the earlier that Brunner attaches more 
saving significance to the Incarnation qua incarnation 
than was true of Forsyth. But it need only be men­
tioned that his doctrine of atonement is never that of 
atonement through incarnation. It is always in Christ's 
objective work of atonement•through His death, when He 
took upon Himself mankind's sinful and guilty condition
1. Mozley, "Emil Brunner," The Expository Times, October 1931, p. 537*
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and in "the form of a servant" passed under the Divine 
decree of punishment, that man receives the blessing of 
forgiveness•
4, The Unity of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ
Forsyth and Brunner are entirely united in their 
belief that the Person of Christ is - to be understood in 
relation to His Work, Because of his theological seniority 
Forsyth may be permitted to speak for the two in saying,
"It is the work of Christ that gives us the key to the 
nature of Christ, The Mediator's work in overcoming the 
opposition between God and man is to act upon man as God 
and upon God as man; as God to deal with man's sin, and as 
man to confess and glorify the holiness of God in judging 
and condemning sin. Without such a conception of Christ 
there can be no real theory of atonement.
In building his Christology Forsyth endeavours to 
keep Person and Work in the closest possible connection 
arid he succeeds well in doing this. With him, the Revela­
tion in Christ is always Redemption and the Redemption is 
the Revelation, Therefore there can really be no "before" 
and "after" in the treatment of Person and Work in 
Christological construction* It makes no material differ­
ence which is discussed first since, in the end, both
1. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ,. p, 346.
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themes must be tightly interwoven,
Forsyth is constantly aware of who Christ when he 
writes of His work, and he is constantly aware of what 
Christ does when he writes of His person. Guiding and 
clarifying, and even determining, his thought is the con­
sciousness of his own relationship to Jesus Christ. It is 
from this consciousness that he can say with steady con­
viction; "The key to the person of Christ is to be found 
, . . in a positive religious experience of Him and to a 
crucial moral decision behind which we cannot go in the 
quest for life's r e a l i t y . T h i s  is to say that "all 
Christology must rest on a moral salvation, spiritually 
and personally r e a l i s e d . I t  is from this perspective 
that Forsyth observes and consistently expresses the unity 
of the Person and Work of Christ.
Brunner has the same factors operating in his favour 
to produce results in his Christological labours similar to 
those achieved by Forsyth. With him it is also true that 
Christ what He does and He does what He is." 3 He 
likewise can give humble and sincere testimony to "en­
counter" with the living and saving Christ. However, he
1. "Revelation and the Person of Christ," op. cit.,
p. 139,
2. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 332,
3. The Mediator, p. 490.
46?
is forced to admit in The Divine-Human Encounter that he 
erred in The Mediator by conforming his thought too closely 
to a mistaken view of the ancient Church which "gave the 
Christian faith a false orientation about the Being Instead 
of the work of C h r i s t , H e  therefore resolves to correct 
this error in the future.
When he came to the writing of his Dogmatics 
Brunner, as has been noted, adopted a different approach 
to his theological task. He now turns to inductive method­
ology and begins with the Work rather than the Person of 
Christ, However, some critics have found fault with this 
procedure, or at least with the way it has been employed 
in The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption.
E. A. Dowey, for instance, points out that Brunner gives
evidence of having been too successful in his new ap-
2proach. When the subject of the "Work" is effectively 
dealt with in accordance with the Truth-as-Sncounter prin­
ciple, as Brunner does in Chapter XI of his Dogmatics II, 
Dowey contends that a subsequent and separate treatment of 
the "Person" is rendered superfluous. "The concept of En­
counter has really robbed the traditional locus on Christ's 
"person" of any raison d'être as a separate theological
1. Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 103.
2, Dowey, "Redeemer and Redeemed as Persons in History," The Theology of Emil Brunner, Kegley, ed., p. 203f.
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t o p i c . T h i s  is demonstrated by the way in which Chapter
XII has been largely devoted to repetition and polemic.
Dowey therefore offers a suggestion and a caveat:
The next development may well be to take more seriously the union of work and person and give a fully integrated analysis. If not, the divine "person" will continue to hover over history as a metaphysical abstraction."^
He goes on to recommend the strategy of two theologians 
who have come to a more unified conception of Work and 
Person by "the use of personal-voluntarist categories."3 
Brunner, however, is not familiar with the term "personal- 
voluntarist" and he is also suspicious of it. It might 
imply that man is more active in laying hold upon the 
truth of God in Jesus Christ through the Divine-human en­
counter than his presuppositions will allow. "If vol­
untarism should mean an ethicism, I must object. It is 
primarily God's and only secondarily man's action which is 
i n v o l v e d . T h i s  statement indicates that Brunner would 
reject the personalistic-voluntarism which serves Forsyth 
so well in developing his thought on the unity of the
1. Dowey, "Redeemer and Redeemed as Persons in History," Kegley, ed., op. cit., p. 204.
2. Ibidem,
3. Ibidem. G. W. Hendry, The Gospel of the Incarnationand W. J. Wolf, No Cross, No Crown.
4. Brunner, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism,"Kegley, ed,, op. cit., p. 343f.
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Person and Work of Jesus Christ.
It should be further noted that Brunner takes excep­
tion to Dowey'8 challenge to "take more seriously the union 
of work and p e r s o n . U n a b l e  to see himself as others see 
him, the theologian says of this exhortation: [It ] cor­
responds precisely to my own o p i n i o n . T h u s ,  a basic 
intention on the part of Brunner to maintain a close bond 
between the traditional loci in Christology cannot be 
denied. But the. fulfilment of this intention leaves some­
thing to be desired. Moreover, while there is a more pos­
itive view of the historic Personality in the Dogmatics 
than there was in The Mediator, this writer is inclined to 
agree with Dowey's warning that unless Work and Person are 
more closely integrated the "Christ of faith" can have 
little real connection with the "Jesus of history."
Criticizing Brunner for the failure to unify the 
Person and Work, but from a theological outlook quite dif­
ferent from Dowey*s, is G. C. Berkouwer in The Person of 
Christ,  ^ This conservative theologian makes a direct 
attack upon the inductive method used in The Christian 
Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, maintaining that there
1. Brunner, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," Kegley, ed., op. cit., p. 343.
2. Ibidem.
3. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ, pp. i04-106.
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is no warrant either in the writings of the Reformers or
in Scripture for such a method in Christology, Berkouwer
further declares that Brunner deludes himself in thinlcing
he can construct his doctrine of Christ in this way and
remain true to his starting point :
He aims to proceed from the work of Christ as a pre­requisite for understanding His person, but in the section on the work of Christ he alrea.dy treats of the "Wurdenajnen Jesu," as, e,g, "Son of God" and "Immanuel." . . . Hence, it is mere illusion tha,t Brunner aims to proceed exclusively from the work of Christ, Now appears too the methodological error of Brunner's intent. In treating Christ's work he already , . . discusses His offices ; so • that then he is no longer able to proceed, phenomen- ologically and inductively from Christ's work in history, , . , The starting point of Christology will have to be the entire witness of Holy Scripture concerning both Christ's person and work,^
Thus, from two different theological perspectives
Brunner is taken to task for failure at the same point in
his Christological construction. However, as was brought
out in the preceding cha.pter of the thesis, ^  in the last
volume of his dogmatic writing Brunner gives fresh evidence
of basic loyalty to the doctrine he is accused of failing
to uphold. In this swing of his thought the emphasis seems
to be less on the priority of the Work of Christ and more
upon the complete congruence of His action and His being.
This trend is certainly in closer harmony with the govern-
1. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ, p. 106.
2. See above, p. 323f.
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ing principle of Truth as Encounter, for the conception of 
Jesus Christ which corresponds most nearly to this Truth is 
not Work plus Person, as Brunner seems to be putting it in 
his Dogmatics II, but Work and Person as Forsyth consis­
tently maintains in all his Christological writing.
5* Forsyth and Brunner and the Structure of Evangelical Christology
In this final section of the chapter an attempt will 
be made to summarize the major viewpoints of Forsyth and 
Brunner as these have come to light in previous discussion. 
The aim will be to "distil" from the extended exposition 
of each theologian’s thought those elements which are be­
lieved to be characteristic of their respective doctrines 
and also required by the construction of Christology on an 
evangelical basis. An attempt will also be made to criti­
cize and evaluate in a brief and incisive way the posi­
tions under comparative study. In conclusion, an estimate 
will be made of the potential viability which seems to be 
indicated by the strength or weakness of each Christologi­
cal system.
In the early pages of this chapter the norms by 
which the Christological thought of P. T. Forsyth and Emil 
Brunner were to be evaluated were declared to be an in­
herent self-consistency and a basic congeniality with the
4? 2
evangelical experience of the Christian Church. The 
attempt has been made to apply the first norm throughout 
the discussion of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ* In 
so doing the thought of Forsyth has been found to be re­
markably free from inconsistencies, but such has not 
appeared to be the case with Brunner. However, it must 
be recognized that the latter has undertaken to construct 
a much more sophisticated theology for a much more sophis­
ticated generation than that of Forsyth's day. Further­
more, the dialectical methodology which Brunner employs 
makes it difficult to determine just where he finally 
stands on important Christological issues and this un­
doubtedly exposes him to misinterpretation and to 
criticism beyond his deserving. In a spirit of wisdom and 
fairness Professor John Knox musingly observes, "I do not 
knovT whether Brunner would deny that any logical contra­
diction is involved in his statements or would simply say 
that the truth about Christ cannot be stated without 
logical contradiction."^
And yet, when all due allowances and excuses have 
been made for Brunner on methodological grounds, there 
still seem to be crucial points in his thought where co­
herency has been unnecessarily sacrificed and where the
1, Knox, The Humanity and Divinity of Christ, p. 89fn.
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theologian's Christological position is disappointingly 
weak, Brunner has firmly eschewed both the radical sub­
jectivism of Bultraann and the radical objectivism of Barth, 
but the attempt to keep to a middle road has not always 
been successful. This becomes evident in his interpreta­
tion of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith where, 
in spite of his insistence of the Einmallgkeit of divine 
Revelation, he tends to detach the."Christ in the flesh" 
from any real connection with the "Christ after the flesh." 
Also, notwithstanding his strong avowal of interest in the 
"believing subject" as a corrective to Barth’s position, 
Brunner never allows to natural man a meaningful "point of 
contact" for the coming of the redemptive revelation in 
Jesus Christ. As Professor N. H. G. Robinson incisively 
puts it ;
Brunner rightly rejects an exclusive interest in the Jesus of history, but in doing so tends to re­ject any interest and to render an incarnation in­conceivable. This is to say that he tends to sub­stitute for the incarnate Christ an X where the in­trusive Word of God may break through ( just as this theology tends to substitute for natural man an X where God may create something new ) and so to make revelation both in Christ and in human life a series of discrete events out of all relation both to the content of incarnate life and of ordinary human lives,^
1. N. H. G. Robinson, Unpublished lectures in "Chris­tology," delivered in St. Mary's College of the University of St. Andrews, Martinmas term, I9 6 6.
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The second tendency to which reference has been 
made poses a real threat to the "Truth as Encounter" 
principle which is so vital in Brunner’s Christological 
construction. This principle loses its authority when all 
initiative and action is allocated to God and man is con­
sidered essentially passive as a recipient of divine 
revelation. On such a basis the meeting between God and 
man is deprived of the character of a genuine encounter.
And without a genuine encounter the truth of God in Jesus 
Christ can only be imparted in a sheerly miraculous way.
The Hevelation-Redemption act becomes the deed of a divine 
thaumaturgiet, as Forsyth would say.
While little has been said about the criterion of 
congeniality with the evangelical experience of the Church, 
the writer believes that this norm has presided implicitly 
over the whole discussion of Forsyth’s and Brunner's 
thought. However, it should now be applied more explicitly 
to the Christologies which have been under consideration.
An incident has been reported by Professor Robinson 
which casts into relief the problem of determining the 
evangelical or non-evangelical character of various types 
of theology:
In a lecture at the most recent conference, of the Society for the Study of Theology, Professor D. M. Mackinnon recalled a conversation he had years be­fore with 0. C. Quick in which he had put the
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question "Where do you draw the line between ortho­doxy and heterodoxy?" and had received the reply "With the clause of the Creeds 'Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven,'
In the creedal clause put forward by Professor Quick there 
is indeed the central and thoroughly Christocentric truth 
of evangelical theology. This clause embraces the vere 
Deus, vere homo concepts which Emil Brunner approvingly 
finds expressed "in lapidary simplicity, for the first 
time, by the Confessio’ Augustana."^ Here also is the im­
plication of the larger answer that P. T, Forsyth gives to 
his own inquiry * What is the Evangelical Faith? "The 
evangelical faith . . , rests on the supremacy of God’s 
holiness, the profundity of man’s guilt, and the finality 
of Christ’s salvation; on the reality of guilty sin, and 
the centrality of holy grace,"3 The Swiss theologian 
would surely concur with all his heart in such a statement. 
Both Forsyth and Brunner believe that the Person and Work 
of One "Who for us men and for our salvation came down 
from heaven" are to be understood in relation to each other 
and to the ultimate category of the holiness of God, It
1, Robinson, a review of On the Love of God by John McIntyre, New College Bulletin (Martinmas,1965), Vol. I, p. 27.
2, Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 357.
3, Forsyth, "What is the Evangelical Faith?", The British Congregationalist (September 17» 1908), p. 239-
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is the obvious intention of both theologians that when the 
day of their discussion is ended their Christologies will 
be found to lie without question on the evangelical side 
of any such dividing line as that proposed by 0. C. Quick.
In Brunner's Christological view, man in faith- 
encounter with the self-movement of the holy God revealed 
in the Person and Work of the incarnate Christ knows that 
He is truly God and different from God and truly Man and 
different from all other men. The Divine-human Christ as 
the self-movement of God is interpreted as the Revealer 
and at the same time the Revealed. Ultimately the how 
of these paradoxical truths is impenetrable mystery, en­
tirely closed to the presumptuous probing of inquisitive 
human minds. Furthermore, Brunner believes that the 
reconciliation of sinful man to God and other men is the 
central work of Christ in whose infinite-finite existence 
God mediates His truth and atonement, and in whose death 
penitence is evoked by which men are forgiven. The 
"Cross-event" reveals to faith the holiness of God as 
Agape and the wickedness of sin and His victory over it.
As man responds in faith and appropriates His work it be­
comes effectual for him. In the redemptive act of divine 
revelation there are both objective and subjective aspects 
in a paradoxical combination invested with unfathomable 
mystery.
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In Forsyth's Christological view, man in the ex­
perience of personal communion with supreme Moral Reality 
—  God —  who is revealed in the Person and Work of Jesus 
Christ as Agape (holy love in action), knows that He is 
truly God (the descending movement of Agape) and different 
from God, and that He is truly man (the ascending movement 
of Agape) and different from all other men. His person is 
a moral and divine act as Love, corresponding to the needs 
of the world, the unity of the Person, and the holiness of 
God. The incarnate Christ is the ultimate form of the re­
lation God maintains to the finite conditions which under­
lie the existence of His creation.
Forsyth holds that the reconciliation of sinful man 
to God and to other men is the central work of Jesus Christ. 
The holy Son of the holy Father comes to man the sinner as 
the "Conscience of the conscience" in personal action 
which is moral from beginning to end. In His satisfaction- 
ary work of holy Love, manifested in His sacrificial life, 
especially in His death, and subsequently in His resur­
rection, He awakens in man a consciousness of the wicked­
ness of sin and of His victory over its power. The in­
carnate Christ kindles in man a responding love by which 
he is morally and spiritually renewed, thereby effecting a 
change in the practical relation of God to man and man to 
God, a change from a wrong relationship to one of Agape
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and harmony. Man must respond in penitence, faith and 
love before Christ's work is effectual for him.
From the summarized statements of the salient 
features of Forsyth's and Brunner's positions it becomes 
apparent that both theologians have structured their Chris­
tologies on an evangelical basis. This means that their 
thought is in essential harmony with that view of the Per­
son and Work of Christ to which the Scripture bears im­
pressive witness and which has been confirmed in the ex­
perience of the Church down through the history of 
Christendom, It must be concluded therefore that the most 
significant difference in their positions cannot be de- . 
termined by this criterion.
It is in the realm of the ethical that the Chris­
tological thought of Forsyth and Brunner shows the clear­
est divergence. With the former the action of Jesus 
Christ, "who for us men and for our salvation came down 
from heaven," is completely moral from its initiation in 
heavenly places to its effectual application in the 
earthly situation of sin and guilt. The unity of Deity 
and humanity in the Son of God -- God whose divinest at­
tribute is the "infinite mobility" of His holy Love —  is 
■therefore to be conceived not in static but in dynamic 
terms of "the mutual involution of two personal movements,"
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The key concept in the moralizing of Christological 
dogma arises, it should be emphasized again, out of Forsyth's 
deep conviction that "God wills to be inquired of" and that 
the Church through her theologians should resume the long 
movement of thought "to pierce and clarify the mystery of 
godliness in Christ," This can only be done, as Forsyth 
believes, on the basic assumption that "morality is the 
nature of things." God, then, is personal Moral Reality, 
and the unity in the one Person of the God-man must be 
conceived as moral, dynamic and mutual. Furthermore, the 
relationship of God to men must be thought of in the same 
terms.
Forsyth's doctrine of the union of the Divine and 
human in Jesus Christ demonstrates, he maintains, that 
"however inadequate earthly personality is to heavenly, 
they are not incompatible, and they are capable of the 
supreme mutual act of love and g r a c e . C h r i s t  can thus 
embody in His one Person the two movements of spiritual 
reality in which God and man meet. It is this line of 
thought that gives the Christology of P. T. Forsyth the 
character of being not only "evangelical" but also "ethical."
1., The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 339* This well-worded statement, to which reference has been made before, indicates a point of view that gives Forsyth flexibility in constructing a more intelligible doctrine of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ than was possible for Brunner.
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As he begins his Christological thinking under the 
governing principle of Truth as encounter Emil Brunner 
faces in the same general direction as that taken by 
Forsyth. The revelation of holy God to sinful man involves 
an act of communication between God and man on a Person to 
person basis. God, who is absolutely unknown except as He 
makes Himself known, acts in accordance with His being as 
holy Love (Agape) and comes to man in the Divine-human 
Person of Jesus Christ, However, this emphasis does not 
deny the fact that one must also speak of an act of man, 
Brunner therefore identifies this act with man's "re­
sponsibility" as the distinguishing characteristic of human 
existence. This in brief is the setting of the stage, so 
to speak, for the encounter of God with man in which Truth 
is revealed in Christ as a saving revelation. The way 
would now seem to be clear for the rounding out of 
Brunner's Christology on an ethical as well as an evangel­
ical basis. Yet it gradually becomes apparent that such 
is not to be the case.
The Christological thought of the Swiss theologian 
loses an earlier ethical colouration on two counts. First, 
in attempting to describe the union of Deity with humanity 
in the one Person, Brunner, after much complicated ex­
position, does not actually break with the old Chalcedonian 
formula which, as Forsyth saw it, united the "natures" on
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a sheerly miraculous rather than a moral basis. In his 
Person/personality analysis, as well as in later dis­
cussion in which he tries to improve upon this idea, 
Brunner tends to make his concepts absolute in such a way 
that all compatibility between Divine and human is taken 
away. In fact, the Deus absconditus truth is given such 
exclusive attention that the complementary truth of the 
homo revelatus seems to be lost by the wayside. The con­
clusion of the matter in Dogmatics II is that Jesus Christ 
is vere Deus and vere homo in a relation that is paradox­
ical to the last degree with no possibility of any "reason­
able" adjustment of an intractable antinomy. Brunner 
draws over this paradox the opaque curtain of unfathomable 
mystery.
So also, in the second place, the idea of the naked 
omnipotence of God comes to override Brunner's promising 
concept of man's responsive actuality in the Divine-human 
encounter. Brunner undoubtedly wants this to be a real 
encounter in the truest sense of the word, with genuine 
mutuality in the meeting of God and man through Jesus 
Christ. However, in making absolute the categories of the 
Formal Image of God and the Material Image of God in man, 
and in ruling that man's responsibility lies wholly in the 
formal category with the Material Image utterly lost in 
sin, Brunner rules out genuine mutuality in encounter.
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The redemptive revelation of God in Jesus Christ becomes 
a marvel, a sheer wonder rather than a moral salvation 
morally construed in which Conscience impinges upon con­
science at the "point of contact" between God and man.
Brunner's failure on the ethical side in the de­
velopment of his Christology can be attributed to his 
inability to advance his thought sufficiently beyond the 
road-block of Barthian presuppositions. The over-all 
Impression that Is gleaned from Brunner's writings is that 
what he purposes to do in the working out of his Chris­
tology never turns out as he intended it should, though he 
is generally reluctant to make such an admission. An ob­
jective critic such as Dr, John Baillie diagnoses the 
difficulty in a very perceptive way when he observes that 
Brunner's position is not far enough removed from Barth's 
not "to be involved in confusion and unreal compromise.,"^ 
Such confusion and compromise "spoils the picture" for 
what might have been a fair structure of Christology 
erected on both an evangelical and an ethical foundation.
However, as was shown earlier, to say that Brunner
1. John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (London: Oxford University Press, reprint 1959)»P* 3Of, The differences and similarities of the views of Barth and Brunner with respect to the "Confrontation with God" are discussed by Baillie throughout most of the first chapter of this book.
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has failed does not mean that Forsyth has perfectly suc­
ceeded. The fire of his critics has been especially di­
rected at the vulnerable point of the development of his 
alternative to the Two-nature Doctrine. And there is no 
evading the fact that such words and phrases as "Kenosis," 
"Pierosis" and "mutual involution of personal movements" 
tend to be repellent to the ordinary mind and conscious­
ness of man. Forsyth's theory stands in need of a more 
attractive mode of expression, if such can be devised. It 
must also be conceded to the critic of "hyper-orthodox" 
persuasion that it is difficult to do any substantial 
proof-texting of Forsyth's Kenosis-Plerosis scheme. The 
tenor of Scripture provides the undergirding, not the text. 
Notwithstanding these and other criticisms, the 
writer of this thesis believes that the view of Forsyth 
represents an impressive and constructive step forward in 
the development of an evangelical Christology. The ban­
ishment of a static ontology from Christological thinking 
would seem to be clear gain. Surely a dynamic conceptual­
ization of the Person of Christ is more congenial with the 
Scriptural witness to a "verbal", as opposed to a "sub­
stantive" , relationship of God to man. On a Scriptural 
basis it makes more sense that the Son of the "active"
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Father should also be conceived in terms of moral movement.
Furthermore, if it is true that "for everything 
there is a season," this would seem to be the season for 
Christological construction that uses the category of the 
dynamic for its truest expression. In a day when the con­
cordant testimony of the physical sciences is that move­
ment —  like morality for Joseph Butler —  is the very 
nature of things, and in a day when men everywhere are 
drawn body and spirit to "where the action is," there is 
peculiar timeliness to the Christ-talk of Forsyth with its 
thoroughgoing emphasis on the dynamic. And while the 
correlative emphasis on the moral is not in current 
fashion, this is a vicissitude which must inevitably pass. 
For, as Forsyth saw it, it is in the realm of the moral 
that religion comes to grips with life, a fact that is 
illustrated in the Bible from cover to cover and confirmed 
again and again in human experience.
P. T. Forsyth has truly made a valiant effort to 
cope with the Christological problem bequeathed to the 
Church by Chalcedon. He has proposed an alternative way 
of regarding the Person of Jesus Christ which, while main­
taining a remarkably firm grasp on His true Deity and His 
true humanity, has managed to avoid to a great extent the 
errors of Docetism on the one hand and Ebionism or 
Adoptionism on the other. This, as has been seen, has
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been accomplished through the device of Kenotic Theory, 
which, in spite of many fault-finders, is still approved 
by thinkers of repute as a means of providing helpful in­
sights not only into the Person of Jesus Christ but also 
into the nature of God and the nature of man.^
Emil Brunner, denying to reason any real capacity 
for throwing light upon the doctrine of the Deity and the 
humanity in the one Person, sees the answer to the problem 
in a paradox of permanent opaqueness and unfathomable 
mystery. This to Brunner is the way the matter stands 
from here to eternity. References to the concepts of para­
dox and mystery are made with almost depressing frequency 
throughout his Christological writing. While it is not to 
be denied that these concepts are Indispensable in any 
attempt of the human mind to lay hold upon the things of 
God, their indiscriminate use neither gives glory to God 
who wills to make Himself known to man nor grants due 
dignity to man created as a rational creature for communion 
with his Maker. Furthermore such use tends to detract from 
the genuine validity of these concepts in interpreting 
divine revelation.^ Forsyth shows much more wisdom
1. Cf. Vincent Taylor, The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching (London; Macmillan, 19^6), ChapV XIX : "Christology and the Kenosis"; Dawe, The Form of a Servant, passim, but especially Chap, IXi "Kenosis in a New Key."
2, Cf. Ronald W, Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox
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and discretion than Brunner in this area of comparison.
He refuses to lean in resignation against the barrier of 
the paradoxical, but instead, he probes that barrier with 
a reverent and relentless mind. This attitude and 
approach have led to, deeper Christological insights than 
would otherwise have been the case.
With respect to these deeper insights of Forsyth, 
it is he rather than Brunner who has shown the possibility 
of thinlcing of the Deity and the humanity of Jesus Christ 
other than in the inadequate and outmoded terms of an age 
long past. Again, it is he rather than Brunner who identi­
fies this Christ as One who enters the world from the 
transcendent realm not as an alien invader in opposition 
to its fundamental order but who, as Christus Creator and 
Christus Redemptor is, in a real sense, "at home" in the 
world —  a world which God the Father manifestly loves and 
which is filled with sacramental, though not saving, inti­
mations of His presence. And yet again, it is Forsyth 
rather than Brunner who sees in the human will and con­
science the necessary prius for the downooming Love 
(Agape) of God in Christ Jesus so that mutuality is estab­
lished for a genuine encounter between Holy God and
(London: Watts, 1958)» Chap. II ; "Coping With Paradox:" :G. C. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ, Chap. XIII : "Christ Incognito?"
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sinful man through the divine act of Revelation-Redemption 
which, to the greater glory of God, is thoroughly moral 
from beginning to end.
Therefore, in conclusion, it is the opinion of the 
writer that sufficient evidence has been adduced in this 
thesis to show that the type of Christology developed by 
Peter Taylor Forsyth deals more fruitfully and con­
vincingly with major Christological problems and there­
fore holds more promise of continuing as a viable doctrine 
of the Person and Work of Christ than does that of Emil 
Brunner.
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